

TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

JAARGANG 2026 Nr. 5

A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

Voor een overzicht van de verdragsgegevens, zie verdragsnummer 006585 in de Verdragenbank.

B. TEKST

Op 17 oktober 2025 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 10018^e zitting Resolutie 2794 (2025) inzake Haïti aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2794 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10018th meeting, on 17 October 2025

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Haiti, in particular its resolutions 2653 (2022), 2743 (2024), 2699 (2023), 2700 (2023), 2751 (2024), 2752 (2024), and 2793 (2025),

Expressing grave concern about the extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities, including kidnappings, trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, homicides, and sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, and indiscriminate armed gang violence against children, in particular the killings and maiming, abduction and the perpetration of sexual violence against children, as well as ongoing impunity for perpetrators, enablers, and financiers, corruption and recruitment of children by gangs and the implications of Haiti's situation for the region,

Expressing deep concern that illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and ammunition to armed gangs in Haiti that engage in persistent and destabilizing criminal activities contributes to undermining the rule of law and respect for human rights, can impede the provision of humanitarian assistance, and can have wide-ranging negative humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences,

Urging Member States to strengthen implementation of the arms embargo, including through enhanced collaboration as appropriate with the Haitian national authorities, relevant countries in the region, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, *inter alia*,

Recognizing the need to safeguard due process, and to ensure fair and clear procedures for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) and subsequent resolutions, and noting the adoption of resolution 2744 (2024) enhancing the mandate and procedure of the Focal Point for Delisting, while further recognizing the role of UN sanctions in conflict resolution and maintaining international peace and security,

Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Travel Ban and Asset Freeze

1. *Decides* to renew until one year from the date of adoption of this resolution the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of resolution 2653 (2022) and previously extended in resolution 2752 (2024), *reaffirms* resolution 2664 (2022), and *affirms* that paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 2653 (2022) shall continue to apply and decides that actions as described in paragraph 15 of resolution 2653 (2022) include engaging in activities that destabilize Haiti through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources;

Arms Embargo

2. *Decides* that, for a period of one year from the date of adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to Haiti, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition of all types including small arms, light weapons and their ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned; and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, and further decides that this measure shall not apply to:
 - a) The supply, sale, or transfer of arms and related materiel, or provision of related assistance, training, or personnel to or by the UN or a UN-authorized mission and to or by a security unit that operates under the command of the Government of Haiti, intended to be used by or in coordination with those entities and intended solely to further the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti;
 - b) Other supplies, sales, or transfers of arms and related materiel, or provision of related assistance, training, or personnel to Haiti as approved in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) to further the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti;
 - c) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, when intended to further the objectives of peace and stability in Haiti;
3. *Decides* that Member States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel in Haiti, including through the strengthening of their border control mechanisms;
4. *Calls upon* Member States, including those planning to transfer firearms, ammunition and related materiel to relevant Haitian authorities, either by sale or donation, to support those authorities in strengthening their weapons and ammunition management capacities, in order to mitigate potential diversions, including through enhancing physical security and stockpile management, as well as by conducting post-delivery controls;
5. *Reaffirms* that Member States shall implement paragraph 2, and encourages timely coordination with the Committee to facilitate approval of legitimate transfers in support of relevant Haitian authorities pursuant to paragraph 2(b);
6. *Encourages* greater coordination among the Committee and its Panel of Experts, BINUH, UNODC, GSF, UNSOH, and other regional frameworks, on the implementation of the sanctions, including arms embargo provisions, to raise awareness of regional countries, relevant Haitian authorities, and the general public in Haiti on the provisions, sources and routes of illicit arms and ammunition flows, and to encourage support for Haiti to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H), and Haitian border and customs authorities, and in this regard, welcomes and encourages the Committee to convene regular joint briefing sessions with relevant agencies to the wider UN membership to raise awareness of the sanctions;
7. *Encourages* the Government of Haiti to reinforce the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the HNP and FAd'H through enhancing the safe and effective management, proper marking, recordkeeping, monitoring, storage, and disposal of their national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as seized weapons and ammunition, and to strengthen border and customs control to curb illicit trafficking and diversion, *and further recalls* paragraph 1(e) of resolution 2793 (2025) for efforts in this regard;
8. *Confirms* that, in line with paragraph 1(e) of resolution 2793 (2025), the GSF, should support the HNP and the Haitian armed forces to record and dispose of illicit arms, ammunition, and other materiel, seized as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out its mandate, as appropriate;
9. *Affirms* that the exemption contained in paragraph 2(a) of this resolution applies to, inter alia, the UN, BINUH, and the GSF (inclusive of the transitioning MSS mission) and UNSOH as authorized by resolution 2793 (2025), the HNP, and the FAd'H;

Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts

10. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 19 of resolution 2653 (2022), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
11. *Decides* to extend for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of this resolution the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution 2653 (2022), and *further decides* that this mandate shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

12. *Directs* the Committee to consider expeditiously the update of the list of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), taking into account the reports submitted by the Panel of Experts, including adding to the list individuals and entities that act in violation of the arms embargo imposed in this resolution;
13. *Requests* that the Panel of Experts provide to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 28 March 2026, a final report no later than 1 September 2026, and periodic updates in between;
14. *Requests* all Member States to regularly inform the Panel of Experts and the Committee the concrete actions they have taken to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, in order to facilitate the reporting work of the Panel of Experts and the sharing of best practices among member States, and *requests* the Panel of Experts to report on the implementation of this resolution in its regular reporting to the Security Council;
15. *Requests* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, BINUH, UNSOH and GSF to ensure cooperation and appropriate information sharing with the Panel of Experts, and further requests all Member States involved to work to ensure the security of the members of the Panel of Experts and facilitate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel to execute its mandate;

Review

16. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in Haiti under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of progress achieved on the following key benchmarks:
 - a) When the Government of Haiti has developed adequate judicial and rule of law capacity to address armed groups and criminal-related activities;
 - b) Progressive reduction in the amount of violence committed by armed groups and criminal networks, including the number of intentional homicides, kidnappings and incidents of sexual violence, as measured on an annual basis, beginning over the initial period of twelve months from adoption of this resolution;
 - c) Progressive decrease in the number of incidents of illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, as well as illicit financial flows therefrom, including by increasing the number and volume of arms seizures;
17. *Requests* in this regard the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 1 September 2026, an assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in the paragraph above;
18. *Requests* the Haitian authorities to report, no later than twelve months from the date of adoption of this resolution and annually thereafter, to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on the progress achieved on the key benchmarks in paragraph 24 of resolution 2700 (2023), and *urges* Haitian authorities to report on steps it has taken to implement the sanctions measures, including legislative, regulatory, and enforcement actions;
19. *Decides* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above shall also apply to the individuals listed in the annex to this resolution;
20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Designation Annex

1. Dimitri Herard has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti and has supported criminal activities that undermine the country's institutions and exacerbate its humanitarian crisis. Herard is the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit (USGPN) under President Jovenel Moïse. He has played a key role in enabling the activities of criminal networks and gangs in Haiti, including supporting the Ti Bwa gang in creating a special combat unit named "Back up 100 plak," which has increased its fighting capacity. Herard has been implicated in facilitating the trafficking of arms and ammunition, which have fueled gang violence and destabilized the country. His actions have contributed to the expansion of gang control over key areas, further undermining Haiti's security and governance.
2. Kempes Sanon has engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Haiti through his leadership of the Les Argentins gang, also known as the Bel Air gang, which operates from its stronghold in the Haut Bel-Air area of Port-au-Prince. With approximately 150 members, the gang has been involved in systematic human rights violations, including extortion, kidnappings, and illicit taxation. Sanon has played a significant role in consolidating gang power in Port-au-Prince, particularly through his involvement in the Viv Ansanm alliance, which has launched coordinated attacks to expand gang-controlled territories. Under his leadership, Les Argentins has conducted repeated assaults on neighborhoods like Solino, resulting in numerous casualties and the displacement of thousands of residents. Sanon also maintains a network of individuals within governmental institutions, including security agen-

cies, which enables him to evade arrest and facilitate his criminal activities. He escaped from prison in 2021, where he was incarcerated for kidnapping, theft, and assassination, and has since continued to destabilize Haiti through his actions.

Op 6 november 2025 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 10036^e zitting Resolutie 2799 (2025) inzake Syrië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2799 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10036th meeting, on 6 November 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the Syrian Arab Republic and those relating to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime, including 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2178 (2014), 2253 (2015), 2368 (2017), 2396 (2017), 2462 (2019), 2664 (2022), 2734 (2024), and 2761 (2024), as well as the main principles and objectives embodied in its resolution 2254 (2015),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the full respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as its continued support for the people of the Syrian Arab Republic,

Noting its intention to promote the long-term reconstruction, stability, and economic development of the Syrian Arab Republic, while stressing that such efforts should be consistent with the integrity and effectiveness of the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime,

Welcoming the Syrian Arab Republic's commitments to ensuring full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access consistent with international humanitarian law; countering terrorism including foreign terrorist fighters, ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and their affiliated groups, individuals, undertakings, and entities; *further recalling* the expectations that the Syrian Arab Republic will take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters; protect human rights and safety and security of all Syrians regardless of ethnicity or religion; counter-narcotics; advance transitional justice; non-proliferation and the elimination of any remnants of chemical weapons; regional security and stability; as well as an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, and *expressing* the expectation that the Syrian Arab Republic will adhere to these and all other commitments made to all Syrian people,

Reaffirming the need for all Member States, including Syria, to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL (Da'esh) and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL (Da'esh), foreign terrorist fighters, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council, including those individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities designated under the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that Ahmed al-Sharaa, included on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List as Ahmad Hus-sain Al-Sharaa (QDi.317), and Anas Hasan Khattab (QDi.336) are delisted from the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
 2. *Decides* to remain actively seized of this matter.
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Op 14 november 2025 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 10044^e zitting Resolutie 2801 (2025) inzake Jemen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2801 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10044th meeting, on 14 November 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and statements of its President concerning Yemen, including resolutions 2140 (2014), 2216 (2015), 2624 (2022), 2664 (2022), 2675 (2023), 2707 (2023), and 2758 (2024),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen,

Expressing grave concern at the continued activities of the Houthis, and condemning in the strongest terms attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, and cross-border attacks on States in the region, which threaten civilian populations, international shipping, and regional peace and security,

Expressing alarm that such actions taken by the Houthis undermine the political transition process in Yemen, and jeopardize the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen,

Calling for immediate de-escalation across Yemen by all parties to the conflict without preconditions as well as a nationwide ceasefire,

Calling on all the stakeholders and all the varied and multiple parties, including inter alia and not limited to the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, to meet with the Special Envoy and participate constructively in ongoing framework consultations, as well as broader peace efforts, without preconditions,

Expressing concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and threats arising from the illicit transfer, diversion, destabilising accumulation, and misuse of weapons,

Expressing grave concern that the Houthis continue to generate revenue from international sources to finance their acquisition of arms and related materiel, including unmanned aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles, and emphasizing that cutting off such funding streams is critical to stemming their attacks inside Yemen, on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, as well as cross-border attacks on States in the region, which threaten regional peace, security, and freedom of navigation,

Reiterating its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation, and calling for an immediate end to incitement to violence by the Houthis against any group or nationality, as documented in annex 87–88 of the Panel of Experts report (S/2025/650),

Reaffirming the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable, and underlining the need to ensure accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in Yemen,

Expressing deep concern about the serious humanitarian threat posed to civilians by explosive remnants of war including landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Yemen and calling on the Houthis to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of weapons that have indiscriminate effects (such as landmines), to record their placement, and to remove existing landmines from areas under their control,

Expressing its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen in support of the Yemeni transition process, and an inclusive Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned political process, under UN auspices,

Demanding the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women in the peace process, and the need for full implementation of Yemen's Women, Peace, and Security National Action Plan in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), and recalling with satisfaction the 30 per cent minimum quota for women in the National Dialogue Conference,

Condemning sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual violence in conflict and torture, and particularly in detention facilities, and stressing the need for sufficient and appropriate protections for women and girls in refugee camps and elsewhere, including adequate provision of sex-separated facilities for women such as latrines, as well as for remedy and assistance for survivors of sexual violence in conflict as detailed in resolution 2467 (2019),

Calling once again for the full implementation of the Riyadh Agreement and underlining the need for the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen to refrain from taking actions that undermine the Riyadh Agreement,

Expressing its alarm that areas of Yemen remain under the control of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Yemen, the Middle East region, and the Horn of Africa, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations, expressing concern at the increasing presence and future potential growth of the

Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) affiliates in Yemen, and reaffirming its resolve to address all aspects of the threat posed by AQAP, ISIL (Da'esh), and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,

Recalling the listing of AQAP and associated individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2368 (2017) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and resolution 2216 (2015), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard,

Expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in Yemen arising from the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Recalling the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) and subsequent resolutions imposing a targeted arms embargo, and calling on all Member States and other actors to comply with their obligations,

Condemning in the strongest terms the increasing number of incidents off the coast of Yemen, including attacks on civilian and commercial ships as well as arbitrary or unlawful seizure and detention of commercial vessels, which poses a significant risk to the maritime security of vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea along the coast of Yemen, and expressing concern over maritime smuggling of arms and related materials into and out of Yemen in violation of the targeted arms embargo,

Condemning in the strongest terms the detentions of UN, NGO, civil society and diplomatic mission personnel, as well as the unlawful forced entry into, and seizure of United Nations premises and assets, and demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees and expressing deep concern at the negative impact of these detentions on the humanitarian situation in Yemen,

Condemning in the strongest terms violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable, as well as human rights abuses, including those involving conflict-related sexual violence in Houthi-controlled areas, and the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, including in schools, summer camps and mosques, as recorded in the Panel of Experts' final report (S/2025/650),

Expressing serious concern at the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen, including the growing risk of large-scale famine, and all instances of undue hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as obstacles and the undue limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population occurring throughout Yemen, which is preventing vulnerable people from receiving the assistance they need to survive,

Emphasising the Security Council's commitment to facilitating commercial imports through Yemen's ports and noting Yemen's very strong dependence on commercial imports of food, fuel and other essential commodities to meet civilians' basic survival needs, as well as the essential role of private remittances from Yemenis working abroad that support civilian families with no other source of income,

Calling on the parties to the conflict to take measures to prevent the further fragmentation of Yemen's economy, including banking and financial institutions,

Emphasising the necessity of discussion by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) ("Committee") of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts reports,

Stressing the importance of Member States providing timely and up to date information to the Committee on possible arms embargo violations in order to identify and combat illicit trafficking sources and supply chains,

Recognising the need to safeguard due process, and to ensure fair and clear procedures for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and subsequent resolutions, and noting the adoption of resolution 2744 (2024) enhancing the mandate and procedure of the Focal Point for Delisting, while further recognizing the role of UN sanctions in conflict resolution and maintaining international peace and security,

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Strongly condemns* the cross-border and maritime attacks by the Houthis, and demands the immediate cessation of such attacks, including those against infrastructure and civilian targets;

2. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, and in accordance with its previous relevant resolutions, and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people, and which will require all parties to end the conflict and choose Yemen's future via a political process that includes and meets the legitimate aspirations of all Yemen's multiple and varied parties;
3. *Emphasises* that there is no military solution to the current conflict and that the only viable path forward is dialogue and reconciliation among the multiple and varied parties including but not limited to the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, Yemen's major political and regional parties, and women, youth and civil society;
4. *Decides* to renew until 14 November 2026 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2014), and further reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);
5. *Emphasises* the importance of facilitating humanitarian assistance and facilitating commercial imports, noting that the measures imposed by resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of Yemen, nor civilian access to humanitarian assistance, commercial imports or remittances; affirms that the present resolution is without prejudice to the ongoing application and implementation of resolution 2664 (2022); and reaffirms its decision (set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 2511 (2020)) that the Committee established in paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (hereafter, the "Committee") may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015) if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of the United Nations and other humanitarian organisations in Yemen or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;
6. *Encourages* Member States to support capacity building efforts of the Yemeni Coast Guard to effectively implement the measures imposed by paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015), with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yemen;
7. *Calls on* Member States to increase efforts to combat the smuggling of weapons and components via land and sea routes, to ensure implementation of the targeted arms embargo;
8. *Emphasises* that States should ensure that all measures taken by them to implement this resolution comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law, as applicable;

Designation Criteria

9. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or listed in the annexes to resolutions 2216 (2015), 2564 (2021) and 2624 (2022), as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
10. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015);
11. *Reaffirms* that sexual violence in armed conflict, or violations against children in armed conflict such as the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, could constitute an act, as specified in paragraph 18 (c) of resolution 2140 (2014), and therefore a sanctionable act of engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, as described in paragraph 17 of that resolution;
12. *Affirms* that the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) may include cross-border launches from Yemen using ballistic and cruise missile technology;
13. *Affirms* that the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) may include attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden by parties to the conflict;
14. *Reaffirms* paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014);
15. *Requests* the Panel of Experts, and as appropriate the Committee Chair, to present to the Council by 15 April 2026 a report and advice on dual-use components and precursor chemicals including a formal assessment of the impact and scope of their direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer to Yemen when there are reasonable grounds to believe that such items would be used by individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) or listed in the annexes to resolutions 2216 (2015), 2564 (2021) and 2624 (2022), threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen as described in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014);
16. *Requests* the Panel of Experts, and as appropriate the Committee Chair, to present to the Council by 15 April 2026 a report and advice for improving information sharing and flag State capacity to prevent vessels suspected of carrying arms or related materiel in violation of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) from entering Yemen, and a formal assessment of the impact and scope of such activities on the implementation of the targeted arms embargo and restrictions under resolutions 2140 (2014), 2216 (2015), 2564 (2021) and 2624 (2022);

Reporting

17. *Decides* to extend until 15 December 2026 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 14 November 2026, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 15 December 2026, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
18. *Reiterates* the Panel of Experts should carry out its mandate under the direction of the Committee and take all necessary measures to verify the accuracy, credibility, and relevance of all information gathered;
19. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 15 April 2026, and a final report no later than 15 October 2026 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;
20. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2610 (2021);
21. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organisations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, and further urges all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
22. *Emphasises* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
23. *Condemns* the continued supply of weapons and components to Yemen in violation of the targeted arms embargo established by paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015), as a serious threat to peace and stability in Yemen and the region;
24. *Urges* all Member States to respect and implement their obligations to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for, the benefit of designated individuals and entities and those acting on their behalf or at their direction in Yemen, of arms and related materiel of all types, as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015);
25. *Recalls* the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
26. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;
27. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 25 november 2025 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 10053^e zitting Resolutie 2804 (2025) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2804 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10053rd meeting, on 25 November 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling its resolutions 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017), 2420 (2018), 2473 (2019), 2526 (2020), 2578 (2021), 2635 (2022), 2684 (2023), 2733 (2024) and 2780 (2025) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

Reaffirming its resolution 2796 (2025),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2780 (2025) for a further 6 months from the date of this resolution;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within five months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 12 december 2025 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 10064^e zitting Resolutie 2806 (2025) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2806 (2025)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 10064th meeting, on 12 December 2025

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Commending the progress made in Somalia over the past ten years, and especially over the past three years in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

Emphasising that the purpose of this resolution is to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the Arms Embargo targeting Al-Shabaab

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing* concern about the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks, *expressing* deep concern at the loss of life from these attacks, *further condemning* Al-Shabaab's radicalisation to violent ends and exploitation, including financially of communities, and *reiterating* its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Strongly condemning the reported targeting of civilians by Al-Shabaab as well as its indiscriminate use of explosive weapons, in particular in densely populated areas, and the consequences for the civilian population, as recorded by the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) (Panel), including in its final report (S/2025/777),

Calling for compliance with international law, and *expressing* continued concern about all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the targeting of civilians, violations of obligations related to the respect and protection of humanitarian personnel, and any unlawful attacks against civilian objects, and all violations and abuses of human rights, including those involving sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, especially as related to trafficking in persons, forced marriage and sexual slavery in areas where Al-Shabaab is present,

Expressing concern about the flow of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, and *emphasising* the importance of preventing Al-Shabaab from developing and exploiting a relationship with listed groups in the region,

Recalling the 2025 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2025/247), *noting* with concern the high levels of abduction and recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, with almost all instances of recruitment and use and abduction of children attributed to Al-Shabaab, *welcoming* the progress made by the Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali National Police Force (SNPF) towards ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children and *urging* the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (GFRS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS) to further strengthen efforts to end and prevent the "six grave violations" against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolutions 1379 (2001), 1998 (2011), 2225 (2015) and 2467 (2019),

Underscoring the importance of a holistic, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation and support for leadership roles of women in Somalia, to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth unemployment and poverty, and *emphasising* the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, detect and prevent terrorist travel, and stop arms trafficking,

Reiterating that terrorism cannot, and should not, be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, *condemning* terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, *expressing* concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes, *supporting* the GFRS's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives, and *strongly encouraging* Member States to work with the GFRS to prevent Al-Shabaab from using social media platforms for criminal purposes and to counter terrorist propaganda,

Expressing serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *encouraging* States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and *calling for* all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, particularly applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access to all persons in need across Somalia,

Recognising the contribution of Somali, African Union, and other forces operating legally in Somalia towards combatting Al-Shabaab, often at great sacrifice, and liberating areas of central Somalia from Al-Shabaab, and *welcoming* Somali and international efforts to bring stabilisation support and services to newly liberated communities,

Noting with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition in contravention of the measures imposed by the Security Council in this and previous resolutions, and *urging* the GFRS, FMS and Member States to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

Stressing the primary role of the Central Monitoring Department (CMD), established by the GFRS to provide coordination, oversight, assurance and monitoring of the delivery, marking, circulation and audit of weapons and ammunition across Somalia, with support and advice from Member States, *welcoming* the progress made by the CMD in this area, *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to strengthen coordination with and capacity-building to the CMD as the primary focal point for weapons and ammunition management assistance to Somalia, and *calling on* the GFRS to continue coordinating all activities related to weapons and ammunition management through the CMD,

Welcoming the progress made by the GFRS in developing the firearms bill and the counter-improvised explosive device strategy, *calling on* the GFRS to finalise the establishment of a centralised licensing authority for weapons, in accordance with international best practices, to strengthen oversight and ensure accountability, and *encouraging* Somalia's international partners to continue to support the GFRS's efforts to strengthen weapons and ammunition management, including through technical support and capacity building, as requested by the GFRS,

Underscoring the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through targeted sanctions, preventing access to weapons and ammunition, disrupting its finances, reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, improving maritime domain awareness and international collaboration,

Recognising the need to continuously strengthen due process and to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended, and *recalling* the adoption of resolution 2744 (2024) enhancing the mandate and procedure of the Focal Point for Delisting,

Determining that Al-Shabaab's attempts to undermine peace and security in Somalia and the region, including through acts of terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A. Targeted sanctions

1. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008), which imposed targeted sanctions, and its resolutions 2002 (2011), 2093 (2013) and 2662 (2022), which expanded the listing criteria, and *recalls* its decisions in resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018);
2. *Recalls* resolution 2664 (2022), which established a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freeze measures, including those imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008);

B. Arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab

3. *Recalls* that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical

assistance or training, financial and other assistance including investment, brokering or other financial services, related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of weapons and military equipment, to Al-Shabaab, as an entity designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution by the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab (Committee);

4. *Welcomes* the launch of the updated Weapons and Ammunition Management Strategy of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2025-2030, and *further notes* the GFRS's commitment to enact laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, re-transfer and brokering in conventional weapons and explosives in order to prevent illicit trafficking and diversion, including the establishment of criminal offences to deter and prosecute violations;
5. *Notes* paragraphs 36 to 45 and 48 of this resolution, which currently impose additional controls to prevent Al-Shabaab from gaining access to weapons, ammunition and military equipment as well as measures pertaining to the FMS, *expresses* its intention to review these measures, informed by the reporting requested in paragraphs 50 and 51 of this resolution, and, upon its assessment that the laws, regulations and administrative procedures referred to in paragraph 4 of this resolution have been established, to, as appropriate, lift the measures in paragraphs 36 to 45 and 48 of this resolution, and *stresses* the importance of ensuring any such decision supports the objective of preventing all terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons, ammunition and military equipment;
6. *Stresses* that deliveries of all weapons, ammunition and military equipment to FMS may only be provided in coordination with and with prior notification to the GFRS, through the CMD to allow for appropriate review and consideration, in line with the relevant procedures set out in paragraphs 41 to 44 of this resolution, and *notes* the CMD's role as the focal point for the GFRS on weapons and ammunition management;
7. *Welcomes* the technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab (S/2025/673), *commends* Somalia for the progress made on the management, registration and documentation of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment, the transfer of arms and regulations related to arms control, and efforts to reduce the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices, *endorses* the technical assessment's recommendations, within existing resources and AUSSOM's existing mandate, and *further encourages* Somalia's international partners, in coordination with relevant international agencies, as appropriate, to support the GFRS in its efforts to:
 - a. implement the National Weapons and Ammunition Management strategy and the National Counter-IED strategy;
 - b. develop overarching legislation regulating international transfers of conventional arms;
 - c. enable the delivery of the Arms Disruption Cell's objectives, including on emerging threats in arms trafficking;
 - d. develop procedures to better facilitate the recording of ammunition stocks in the National WAM Database;
 - e. develop national capacity related to maritime interdiction; and,
 - f. enhance national forensic investigations capacity;
8. *Affirms* that the GFRS, in cooperation with the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM), shall register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured or seized from Al-Shabaab in the National Captured Weapons Database and, with the assistance of the Panel as necessary, investigate their origin;
9. *Calls on* Member States to take reasonable steps to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Somalia and *further calls on* Member States to share data with the GFRS, through the CMD, the Committee, the Panel, AUSSOM and UNTMIS, as appropriate, regarding weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured from Al-Shabaab and the smuggling of weapons and ammunition in violation of the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab;

C. Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

10. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and *requests* the GFRS, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop and implement a comprehensive and coordinated plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's financial operations;
11. *Calls upon* the GFRS to continue working with the FMS, Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:
 - a. identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks by improving anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards, guidance, and compliance with legal frameworks, including those pertaining to designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP);
 - b. strengthen supervision of, and compliance with, AML and CFT regulations and standards across financial institutions and DNFBPs, including as related to Know Your Customer and customer due diligence procedures and suspicious transaction reporting in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019), Targeted Financial Sanctions Act (2023) and relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations, and encourage collaboration with the telecoms sector to reduce the risk of exploitation of the mobile money sector by Al-Shabaab;

- c. continue constructive engagement with the ongoing Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation (MENAFATF) process, including scheduling an onsite evaluation to maintain progress on priority areas relating to terrorist financing and money laundering risks;
 - d. prioritise the continued development of a secure and inclusive national identification system that improves financial access while countering the financing of terrorism;
 - e. improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing, including continuing to build financial crime investigative capacity across law enforcement agencies and enhancing inter-agency coordination and collaboration; and,
 - f. develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in AML and CFT roles within national competent authorities and the private sector, and a plan to protect those who share information relating to Al-Shabaab's extortion tactics;
12. *Requests* the GFRS, the Panel and relevant UN entities to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and, with support from the international community, implement a comprehensive and coordinated action plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system, strengthen implementation of the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects and develop a plan to disrupt all illicit trade from which Al-Shabaab profits;
13. *Encourages* continued cooperation at the regional and international level to address the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the region including continued support to Somalia's efforts to address money laundering and terrorist financing risks, and *further encourages* international cooperation with relevant UN agencies supporting regional countries in their efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;

D. Charcoal Ban

14. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014);
15. *Welcomes* measures taken by the GFRS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, *reaffirms* the importance of the efforts to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *encourages* Somalia to continue to ensure the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

E. Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

16. *Welcomes* the GFRS's adoption of the National Counter-IED Strategy 2025-2030 and *encourages* its full implementation;
17. *Recalls* that, in line with the National Counter-IED Strategy, all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in Part I of Annex B to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk exists that they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;
18. *Reaffirms* that:
- a. prior to transferring any items in Part I of Annex B to Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items shall notify the GFRS for its awareness;
 - b. where an item in Part I of Annex B is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 18, the supplying State shall notify the GFRS for its awareness of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and that the GFRS shall subsequently notify the Committee within 15 working days, and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including:
 - i. purpose of the use of the item(s);
 - ii. end user;
 - iii. specifications;
 - iv. quantity of the item(s); and,
 - v. intended storage location;
19. *Calls upon* Member States to support the GFRS in implementing appropriate legislation to regulate and monitor the import and transit of items listed in Parts I and II of Annex B;
20. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including, among other things, items in Part II of Annex B, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

21. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives and tracing the origin and chain of custody of IEDs and their components;

F. Maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness

22. *Decides* to renew, until 30 November 2026, the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 2182 (2014), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution 2607 (2021) to cover IED components, as most recently renewed by paragraph 23 of resolution 2776 (2025);
23. *Affirms* that the maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness measures renewed by paragraph 22 of this resolution do not otherwise hinder the sovereign right of Somalia to enter into bilateral agreements with Member States on maritime security cooperation;
24. *Encourages* Member States and regional and international organisations that have the capacity to do so to support the GFRS, at its request, to:
 - a. strengthen its maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade and maritime movements of licit and illicit goods that lend support to Al-Shabaab; and,
 - b. improve law enforcement and counter-smuggling at ports, through the extension of capacity-building;
25. *Expresses* its intention to review and revise the provisions in this resolution on maritime interdictions and maritime domain awareness and take appropriate action regarding extension or modification of these provisions, no later than 30 November 2026;

G. Panel of Experts and Security Council Committee

26. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution until 31 December 2026, the Panel, to consist of up to 5 members, appropriately located with due consideration for mandate implementation and administrative requirements, with the following mandate:
 - a. to conduct the tasks referred to in paragraphs 8 and 12 of this resolution;
 - b. to assist the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the measures detailed in paragraphs 1, 3, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22 and 36 of this resolution, including by reporting any information on violations;
 - c. to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the GFRS in reducing the smuggling of weapons and ammunition,
 - d. to give recommendations to the Committee on how to address sexual violence in conflict and the "six grave violations" against children as identified by the Secretary-General, in line with S/2024/751;
 - e. to investigate Al-Shabaab's acquisition of components used in the manufacture of IEDs;
 - f. to investigate Al-Shabaab's access to and use of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including IEDs, and emerging threats in arms smuggling, and work closely with the Committee on recommendations for measures to improve overall compliance with this resolution;
 - g. to investigate, in coordination with relevant UN entities, all activities used by Al-Shabaab to generate revenues, including the use of charcoal as a revenue source;
 - h. to investigate the organisational structure of Al-Shabaab, including its senior leadership structures, as well as its methods of recruitment and training;
 - i. to include in its reports to the Committee any information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution for possible future measures by the Council; and,
 - j. to assist the Committee in compiling narrative summaries of reasons for listing, to be made accessible on the Committee's website, after individuals and entities designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution are added to the list;
27. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include relevant dedicated expertise on the Panel in line with paragraph 11 of resolution 2467 (2019) and *further requests* the Panel to apply this expertise across all aspects of its investigations and reporting;
28. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Member States and the Panel, *requests* the GFRS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, and *stresses* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997;
29. *Reiterates* its request for Member States and AUSSOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations; and,
 - a. *requests* the GFRS to facilitate, on the basis of written requests to the GFRS by the Panel, access for the Panel to armouries, military storage facilities in SNA sectors and captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to facilitate photographs of weapons and ammunition held in Somali custody and access to logbooks and distribution records;
 - b. *encourages* the Panel to coordinate and work closely with the CMD on paragraph 29.a;
 - c. *urges* the GFRS, AUSSOM and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities, in particular on illicit flows of finances, charcoal, weapons, ammunition and military equipment by Al-Shabaab, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions;

- d. *encourages* the Panel, with due regard for its impartiality and confidentiality obligations, to engage regularly with the GFRS, in line with document S/2006/997 and the mandate in paragraph 26 of this resolution;
 - e. *urges* the GFRS to facilitate, in support of the implementation of the Panel's mandate, engagement between the Panel and relevant authorities, including as relates to paragraph 29.c; and,
 - f. *encourages* Member States to engage and share information with the Panel on individuals supporting Al-Shabaab through propaganda, financing, recruitment, materiel support and other means;
30. *Encourages* Somalia, Member States, and regional and subregional organisations to provide regular inputs to the Committee regarding the implementation and monitoring of the sanctions regime, and *stresses* that requests regarding frameworks for cooperation and engagement with the Panel should be directed to the Committee;
 31. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2467 (2019), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to communicate to the Committee pertinent information, in writing, with regard to paragraph 43 (e) of resolution 2093 (2013), as appropriate;
 32. *Requests* the Panel to provide:
 - a. regular updates to the Committee, in collaboration with independent experts appointed to help the work of other sanctions committees and relevant UN entities, as and when appropriate, including detailed investigations where relevant and one thematic report by 30 June 2026;
 - b. a comprehensive mid-term update; and
 - c. for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee, a final report by 31 October 2026; and *urges* the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;
 33. *Requests* the Panel to include in its reporting a specific update on Al-Shabaab's use of charcoal as a revenue source;
 34. *Decides* that briefings from the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) to the Security Council shall take place on an annual basis and before 30 November 2026;
 35. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, no later than 30 November 2026;

H. Preventing Al-Shabaab from accessing weapons, ammunition and military equipment

36. *Reaffirms* paragraph 4 of resolution 2776 (2025);
37. *Encourages* the GFRS to share with the Committee a list of licenced private security companies operating in Somalia that shall be allowed to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment required for static and mobile protection;
38. *Emphasises* Somalia's sovereign right to govern the entry into its territory of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, consistent with this resolution, and encourages the GFRS to ensure that private security companies operating in Somalia obtain requisite approval from the GFRS before importing weapons, ammunition and military equipment;
39. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 do not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:
 - a. GFRS;
 - b. SNA;
 - c. NISA;
 - d. SNPF; and,
 - e. the Somali Custodial Corps;
40. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 shall not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:
 - a. United Nations personnel, including UNTMIS and UNSOS;
 - b. AUSSOM, and the Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to AUSSOM; and,
 - c. European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as any other Member State forces, with a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the GFRS, provided that they inform the Committee, for information purposes only, about the existence of such agreements;
41. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 37 of this resolution, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed private security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 43 of this resolution;
42. *Decides* that deliveries of all weapons, ammunition and military equipment not covered by Annex A to this resolution to FMS, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia as defined in the list requested in paragraph 37 of this resolution, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed pri-

vate security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may only be provided in coordination with the GFRS and are subject to notification to the Committee, for information only, at least five working days in advance in accordance with the process set out in paragraph 43 of this resolution;

43. *Reaffirms* that all notifications should include:
 - a. details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including type, lot/batch and serial numbers;
 - b. a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
 - c. proposed date and place of delivery; and
 - d. all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;
44. *Decides* that, prior to delivering any weapons, ammunition and military equipment to FMS, or to licensed private security companies operating in Somalia, for the purpose of supporting the FMS and licensed private security companies in countering Al-Shabaab or to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items shall notify the GFRS to allow for appropriate review and consideration, *notes* the CMD's role as the focal point for the GFRS on weapons and ammunition management, *emphasises* Somalia's sovereign right to govern the entry into its territory of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, consistent with this resolution, and *affirms* that the GFRS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 41 and 42, of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia, within five working days of receiving notification from the supplying Member State;
45. *Reaffirms* that to further avoid Al-Shabaab obtaining weapons and ammunition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation and *requests* the Committee to share all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 41 and 42 submitted to the Committee with the CMD and the Office of National Security, for their information;
46. *Requests* the Committee, in cooperation with the GFRS, to develop, produce and disseminate templates for notifications to the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 18.b, 41, 42 and 44;
47. *Requests* the Secretariat to support the GFRS' dissemination efforts in relation to the control of arms, ammunition and related materiel in the local language, if necessary, within its existing resources;
48. *Reaffirms* that the measures referenced in paragraph 36 shall not apply to:
 - a. supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, private security contractors and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;
 - b. the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or subregional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and
 - c. entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;

I. Reporting

49. *Requests* the GFRS, following consultation through the structures of the National Security Architecture and Somali Security Development Plan, to provide to the Security Council, by 31 May 2026 and then by 31 October 2026, reports which include:
 - a. a description of the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;
 - b. a description of the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;
 - c. the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);
 - d. an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information; and,
 - e. an update on specific actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism in Somalia;
50. *Requests* the GFRS, in the second report requested in paragraph 49 of this resolution, to further include an update on implementation of the National Weapons and Ammunition Management strategy, including progress towards the establishment and implementation of the laws, regulations and administrative procedures referred to in paragraph 4 of this resolution;
51. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, by 31 October 2026, a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo targeting Al-Shabaab, in consultation with the GFRS, relevant UN entities as appropriate and other relevant stakeholders, including further updates on the key areas included in document S/2025/673, with specific recommendations as appropriate;
52. *Requests* the organisations and states listed in paragraph 40.c of this resolution, or subsequently added, to provide to the Security Council, and to the CMD and the Office of National Security, by 31 October

2026, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and detail of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period;

53. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process¹⁾

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
 - a. Note: This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers;
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel; and fuses;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability, including thermal and infrared, and accessories;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. "Vessels" and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
 - a. Note: "Vessel" includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

Annex B – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components

Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology

Part I²⁾

1. Explosive materials and precursors, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - c. Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
 - d. Nitric acid;
 - e. Sulphuric acid;
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
 - b. "Technology" required for the "production" or "use" of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2 (a);

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - b. Nitroglycol;
 - c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - d. Picryl chloride;
 - e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
2. Explosives precursors:
 - a. Ammonium nitrate;
 - b. Potassium nitrate;
 - c. Sodium chlorate;
3. Dual use items identified by the Panel:
 - a. Alarm systems with disturbance sensors, including motorcycle alarms;
4. Learning code receivers.

In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen

¹⁾ (Not applicable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali National Army, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps).

²⁾ To be notified to Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in advance of intended shipment.

heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de *drieëntwintigste* januari 2026.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,

D.M. VAN WEEL