

# TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

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JAARGANG 2020 Nr. 37

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## A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;  
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

Voor een overzicht van de verdragsgegevens, zie verdragsnummer 006585 in de Verdragenbank.

## B. TEKST

Op 23 januari 1992 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 3039e zitting Resolutie 733 (1992) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 733 (1992)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 3039th meeting, on 23 January 1992**

*The Security Council,*

*Considering* the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

*Having heard* the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia and commending the initiative taken by him in the humanitarian field,

*Gravely alarmed* at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on the stability and peace in the region,

*Concerned* that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international peace and security,

*Recalling* its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Recalling also* the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter,

*Expressing its appreciation* to the international and regional organizations that have provided assistance to the populations affected by the conflict and deploring that personnel of these organizations have lost their lives in the exercise of their humanitarian tasks,

*Taking note* of the appeals addressed to the parties by the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 16 December 1991, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 1991, and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992 (S/23448),

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, and expresses its concern with the situation prevailing in that country;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations and to this end to appoint a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of this assistance;
3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, immediately to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities to

- permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict in Somalia;
4. *Strongly urges* all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia;
  5. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise;
  6. *Calls on* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia, which would permit all Somalis to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;
  7. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it under the supervision of the coordinator;
  8. *Urges* all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;
  9. *Calls upon* all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia;
  10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on this matter;
  11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

*Adopted unanimously at the 3039<sup>th</sup> meeting.*

Op 22 juli 2002 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 4580e zitting Resolutie 1425 (2002) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

#### **Resolution 1425 (2002)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4580th meeting, on 22 July 2002**

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular on the weapon and military equipment embargo established by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "arms embargo"), resolution 1407 (2002) of 3 May 2002, and the statement of its President of 28 March 2002 (S/PRST/2002/8),

*Noting* with serious concern the continued flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia from sources outside the country, in contravention of the arms embargo, which is severely undermining peace and security and the political efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia,

*Reiterating* its call on all States and other actors to comply scrupulously with the arms embargo, and its insistence that all States, in particular those of the region, should not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia. Such interference only further destabilizes Somalia, contributes to a climate of fear and impacts adversely on human rights, and could jeopardize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

*Underlining* the role of the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD), in particular the frontline States (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya), in bringing lasting peace to Somalia, and expressing its support and expectation that the planned National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia to be held in Nairobi will move forward as a matter of urgency and with the pragmatic and result-oriented involvement of the frontline States,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 27 June 2002 (S/2002/709) and the report of the expert team appointed by the Secretary-General (S/2002/722), detailing the resources and expertise required for a Panel of Experts to generate independent information on the violations and for improving the enforcement of the arms embargo, in accordance with resolution 1407 (2002),

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Stresses* that the arms embargo on Somalia prohibits financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment;
2. *Decides* that the arms embargo prohibits the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, within one month from the date of adoption of this resolution, in consultation with the committee established by resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 (hereinafter

ter referred to as “the Committee”), a Panel of Experts consisting of three members to be based in Nairobi for a period of six months, in order to generate independent information on violations of the arms embargo and as a step towards giving effect to and strengthening the embargo, with the following mandate:

- investigating the violations of the embargo covering access to Somalia by land, air and sea, in particular by pursuing any sources that might reveal information related to violations, including relevant States, intergovernmental organizations and international law enforcement cooperation bodies, non-governmental organizations, financial institutions and intermediaries, other brokering agencies, civil aviation companies and authorities, members of the Transitional National Government, local authorities, political and traditional leaders, civil society and the business community;
  - detailing information in relevant areas of expertise related to violations and measures to give effect to and strengthen the arms embargo in its various aspects;
  - carrying out field based research, where possible, in Somalia, States neighbouring Somalia and other States, as appropriate;
  - assessing the capacity of States in the region to implement fully the arms embargo, including through a review of national customs and border control regimes;
  - providing recommendations on possible practical steps and measures for giving effect to and strengthening the arms embargo;
4. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that the Panel of Experts comprises, and have access to, sufficient expertise in the areas of armament and financing thereof, civil aviation, maritime transport, and regional affairs, including specialized knowledge of Somalia, in accordance with the resource requirements, administrative and financial arrangements outlined in the report of the expert team pursuant to resolution 1407 (2002);
  5. *Requests* the Panel of Experts in its work in accordance with its mandate to take fully into account the recommendations provided in the report of the experts team pursuant to resolution 1407 (2002), including regarding cooperative arrangements, methodology and issues related to the strengthening of the arms embargo;
  6. *Requests* all States and the Transitional National Government and local authorities in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts in its quest for information in accordance with this resolution, including by facilitating visits to sites and actors and by providing full access to government officials and records, as required by the Panel of Experts;
  7. *Calls* again upon all States, in particular those in the region, to provide the Committee with all available information on violations of the arms embargo;
  8. *Urges* all other individuals and entities contacted by the Panel of Experts to cooperate fully by providing relevant information and facilitating its investigations, including political and traditional leaders, members of the civil society and the business community, financial institutions and intermediaries, other brokering agencies, civil aviation companies and authorities, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and international law enforcement cooperation bodies;
  9. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to notify the Security Council immediately, through the Committee, of any lack of cooperation by the States, authorities, individuals and entities referred to in paragraphs 6 and 8 above;
  10. *Further requests* the Panel of Experts to brief the Chairman of the Committee to inform his mission to the region, scheduled for October 2002, and to provide an oral briefing to the Council, through the Committee, in November 2002;
  11. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to submit a final report at the end of its mandated period to the Security Council, through the Committee, for its consideration;
  12. *Requests* the Chairman of the Committee to forward the report of the Panel of Experts, within two weeks of its reception, to the Security Council for its consideration;
  13. *Expresses* its determination to consider the report of the Panel of Experts and any relevant proposals for follow-up action and recommendations on possible practical steps for strengthening the arms embargo;
  14. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in his next report due on 31 October 2002, to include updates on:
    - the activities undertaken to coordinate ongoing peace-building initiatives and to provide for their incremental expansion, and on the preparatory activities undertaken on the ground in preparation for a comprehensive peace-building mission once security conditions permit, in accordance with the statement of its President of 28 March 2002;
    - the technical assistance and cooperation provided to enhance the administrative and judicial capacities throughout Somalia to contribute to the monitoring of and giving full effect to the arms embargo, in accordance with the statement of its President of 28 March 2002 and resolution 1407 (2002);
    - the reporting by States to the Committee on measures they have in place to ensure the full and effective implementation of the arms embargo, in accordance with resolution 1407 (2002);
  15. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to invite Member States to make contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia, acknowledging any pledges already made, and to ensure proper coordination among the involved United Nations agencies in implementing the tasks to be carried out in accordance with the statement of its President of 28 March 2002;
  16. *Calls* on Member States to come forward with contributions to the United Nations activities in support of Somalia, including the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Op 29 augustus 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8607e zitting Resolutie 2484 (2019) inzake Mali aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

**Resolution 2484 (2019)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8607th meeting, on 29 August 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions, statements of its President and press statements on the situation in Mali,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and *underscoring* the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives,

*Recalling* the provisions of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement") calling upon the Security Council to give its full support to the Agreement, to closely monitor its implementation and, if necessary, to take measures against anyone hindering the implementation of the commitments contained therein or the realisation of its objectives,

*Recognizing* that more progress was made during the past year than during the first years after the signing of the Agreement, which were characterized by a slow pace of implementation, *noting* that a combination of some level of political will and international pressure, including through the prospect of sanctions, constituted an important factor in securing these positive results, *expressing* a significant sense of impatience with parties over the persistent delays in the full implementation of key provisions of the Agreement, *further noting* that continued delays in implementation contribute to a political and security vacuum jeopardizing the stability and development of Mali as well as the viability of the Agreement, *stressing* the need for increased ownership and prioritization in the implementation of the Agreement, and *further stressing* the importance of the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in the mechanisms established by the Agreement to support and monitor its implementation,

*Recalling* the provisions of resolution 2480 (2019) urging Malian parties to take immediate and concrete action to fulfil the priority measures listed in paragraph 4 of resolution 2480 (2019) before the end of MINUSMA's current mandate, encouraging the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) ("the Panel of Experts") to identify parties responsible for potential lack of implementation of these priority measures through its regular reporting and interim updates, and expressing its intent, should these priority measures not be implemented by the end of MINUSMA's current mandate, to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on individuals and entities who are thus obstructing or threatening the implementation of the Agreement,

*Stressing* that all parties to the Agreement share the primary responsibility to make steadfast progress in its implementation,

*Taking note* of the decisions of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali ("the Committee") of 20 December 2018 and 10 July 2019 that several individuals be placed on the list of individuals and entities subject to measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) ("the 2374 Sanctions List") and *further taking note* of the intention of the Committee to consider the removal of these individuals from the 2374 Sanctions List if the priority measures listed in paragraph 4 of resolution 2480 (2019) are fully implemented and the individuals designated cease all illicit activities, including those listed in the statement of case, while *stressing* that the Security Council has not yet seen sufficient progress to merit such consideration,

*Reiterating* that individuals or entities placed on the 2374 Sanctions List shall not benefit from any financial, operational or logistical support from United Nations entities deployed in Mali, until their removal from the 2374 Sanctions List and without prejudice to the exemptions set by paragraphs 2, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2374 (2017),

*Taking note* of the final report (S/2019/636) of the Panel of Experts,

*Noting* the importance of continued cooperation and information exchange between the Panel of Experts and all other United Nations entities operating in Mali, within their mandates and capabilities,

*Determining* that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 August 2020 the measures as set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of resolution 2374 (2017);
2. *Reaffirms* that these measures shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee, as set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2374 (2017);
3. *Decides* to extend until 30 September 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 of resolution 2374 (2017), as well as the request to MINUSMA, as set out in paragraph 16 of resolution 2374 (2017), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2020, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the current members of the Panel of Experts;
4. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 29 February 2020, a final report no later than 15 August 2020, and periodic updates in between, as appropriate;
5. *Reaffirms* the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2374 (2017);
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 12 september 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8617e zitting Resolutie 2488 (2019) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2488 (2019)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8617th meeting, on 12 September 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all of its previous resolutions, statements of its President and press statements on the situation in the Central African Republic,

*Welcoming* the increased efforts made by the CAR authorities, in coordination with their international partners, to advance the reform of the security sector, including the ongoing deployment of CAR defence and security forces as well as the adoption of a National Defence Plan, a Force Employment Concept, and a National Security Policy and *acknowledging* the urgent need for the CAR authorities to train and equip their defence and security forces to be able to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens in the CAR,

*Welcoming* the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the CAR authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019 ("the Agreement"), after the peace talks that took place in Khartoum, Sudan, from 24 January to 5 February 2019 within the framework of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR and under the auspices of the African Union, further *welcoming* the consensus reached by the signatory parties to the Agreement regarding the formation of an inclusive government in line with article 21 of the Agreement, as well as the engagement of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and the United Nations, *urging* the CAR authorities and the signatory armed groups to implement the Agreement in good faith and without delay in order to meet the aspirations expressed by the people of the CAR to peace, security, justice, reconciliation, inclusivity and development, and *calling on* neighbouring States, regional organizations, and all international partners to support the implementation of the Agreement and to coordinate their actions in order to bring lasting peace and stability to the CAR,

*Recalling* its intention to review, by 30 September 2019, the arms embargo measures on the CAR authorities in the light of progress achieved towards the key benchmarks established in its Presidential Statement of 9 April 2019 (S/PRST/2019/3),

*Taking note* in this regard of the CAR authorities' report of 30 June 2019 addressed to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR ("the Committee") consistent with paragraph 11 of resolution 2454 (2019) and of the Secretary-General's letter of 26 July 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/609) consistent with paragraph 10 of resolution 2454 (2019),

*Welcoming* the commitment demonstrated by the CAR authorities, along with their international partners, to achieve the necessary progress towards the key benchmarks established in its Presidential Statement of 9 April 2019 (S/PRST/2019/3) and *encouraging* them to continue their efforts to address the challenges that remain,

*Taking note of* the midterm report (S/2019/608) of the Panel of Experts on the CAR established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and extended pursuant to resolution 2454 (2019), and *taking note of* the Panel of Experts' recommendations,



*Determining* that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Recalls* that, pursuant to the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended to 31 January 2020 by paragraph 1 of resolution 2454 (2019), all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;
2. *Decides*, pursuant to its intention as expressed in paragraph 10 of resolution 2454 (2019) to review the arms embargo measures on the CAR authorities, to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by paragraph 1 of resolution 2454 (2019), such that, until 31 January 2020, they shall not apply to:
  - a) Supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MINUSCA and the European Union training missions deployed in the CAR, French forces under the conditions provided by paragraph 69 of resolution 2448 (2018), and other Member States' forces providing training and assistance as notified in advance in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) below;
  - b) Supplies of non-lethal equipment and provision of assistance, including operational and non-operational training to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of security sector reform (SSR), in coordination with MINUSCA, and as notified in advance to the Committee, and *requests* that MINUSCA report on the contribution to SSR of this exemption, as part of its regular reports to the Council;
  - c) Supplies brought into the CAR by Chadian or Sudanese forces solely for their use in international patrols of the tripartite force established on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum by the CAR, Chad and Sudan, to enhance security in the common border areas, in cooperation with MINUSCA, as approved in advance by the Committee;
  - d) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as notified in advance to the Committee;
  - e) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;
  - f) Supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international-led patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area and by armed wildlife rangers of the Chinko Project and the Bamingui-Bangoran National Park to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of the CAR or the CAR's international legal obligations, as notified in advance to the Committee;
  - g) Supplies of weapons with a calibre of 14.5 mm or less, and ammunition and components specially designed for such weapons, to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, and intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as notified in advance to the Committee;
  - h) Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment that are not listed in paragraph 2 (g) of this resolution to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, and intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee; or
  - i) Other sales or supply of arms and other related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;
3. *Decides* that the supplying Member State is primarily responsible for notifying the Committee and that such notification must be at least 20 days in advance of the delivery of any supplies as permitted in paragraph 2 (d), paragraph 2 (f) and paragraph 2 (g) of this resolution and *affirms* that the supplying international, regional or subregional organization is primarily responsible for notifying the Committee and that such notification must be at least 20 days in advance of the delivery of any supplies as permitted in paragraph 2 (d), paragraph 2 (f) and paragraph 2 (g) of this resolution;
4. *Decides* that all notifications and exemption requests to the Committee shall include: the details of the manufacturer and supplier of the equipment; a description of equipment including the type, calibre, quantity as well as serial numbers and/or lot numbers or the proposed date(s) when the serial numbers and/or lot numbers will be provided in the case of an exemption request; the proposed date(s) and place(s) of delivery; the mode(s) of transport and itinerary of shipments; and the purpose of use and end user, including the intended destination unit in the CAR security forces as well as the intended place of storage; *further stresses* the importance of a specific focus on detailed explanations for how the requested equipment will support SSR;
5. *Decides* that arms and other related lethal equipment sold or supplied to the CAR security forces solely for their development may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of either the CAR security forces or the selling or supplying Member State;

6. *Decides* that the CAR authorities shall update the Committee by 31 December 2019 on the progress achieved in the SSR process, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) process and in the management of weapons and ammunition;
7. *Requests* that the Secretary-General update the Security Council, no later than 31 December 2019, on the progress achieved by the CAR authorities on the key benchmarks established in its Presidential Statement of 9 April 2019 (S/PRST/2019/3);
8. *Calls on* the CAR authorities to allow the Panel of Experts and MINUSCA access to the notified and exempted arms and related lethal equipment at the time of import and before the transfer to the end user takes place, *stresses* that the CAR authorities should mark the arms and related lethal equipment when received in the territory of CAR, and *calls on* the CAR authorities to maintain a registry of all arms and materiel owned by CAR security forces, in particular small arms and light weapons, with a view to improving tracking and monitoring of their circulation;
9. *Calls on* the CAR authorities and the authorities of neighbouring States to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat transnational criminal networks and armed groups involved in arms trafficking and *calls for* the reactivation of joint bilateral commissions between the CAR and neighbouring States to address cross-border issues, especially issues related to arms trafficking; *further welcomes* in this regard the reactivation of the joint bilateral commissions between the CAR and Cameroon and the CAR and the Republic of Congo as well as the intention expressed by the CAR authorities and Chadian authorities to reactivate the joint bilateral commission between their two countries;
10. *Affirms* that it intends to keep the situation in the CAR under continuous review and be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution at any time as may be necessary, including by 31 January 2020, in light of the evolution of the security situation in the country and of the progress achieved in relation the SSR process, the DDRR process and the management of weapons and ammunition, including in relation to the updates requested in paragraph 6 and in paragraph 7 of this resolution;
11. *Further reaffirms* all the measures imposed by and provisions set out in paragraphs 2 to 8 of resolution 2454 (2019);
12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Op 3 oktober 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8631e zitting Resolutie 2491 (2019) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2491 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8631st meeting, on 3 October 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2016), 2380 (2017) and 2437 (2018) and its Presidential Statement of 16 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/25),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

*Welcoming* the Secretary-General's report of 5 September 2019 (S/2019/711),

*Mindful* of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

*Welcoming* the measures that have been taken to implement resolution 2240 (2015) and encouraging their continuation,

*Reaffirming* the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of stabilisation of Libya and endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people;
2. *Decides* to renew the authorisations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015), for a further period of twelve months from the date of adoption of this resolution, reaffirms paragraph 11 thereof and otherwise reiterates its resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2106), 2380 (2017) and 2437 (2018) and its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2015/25;
3. *Renews* the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of its resolution 2240 (2015) from the date of adoption of this resolution, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council six months and eleven months after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation, in particular with regards to the implementation of paragraphs of 7 to 10 of its resolution 2240 (2015);

4. *Expresses* its intention to continue to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authority provided in this resolution for additional periods;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Op 15 november 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8665e zitting Resolutie 2498 (2019) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2498 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8665th meeting, on 15 November 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and *underscoring* the importance of working to prevent destabilising effects of regional disputes from spilling over into Somalia,

*Expressing* its support for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in their efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism and tackle the flow of illegal arms and armed groups, *further expressing* its intention to ensure the arms embargo in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, and *noting* its intention to set out all of the provisions of the arms embargo in this text,

*Condemning* Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing* grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through their increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and *further expressing* grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also known as Da'esh),

*Reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

*Condemning* any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, including when they result in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and *further condemning* continued illegal flows of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia,

*Expressing* serious concern at reports of increased exploitation of Somalia, by Al-Shabaab and transnational organized crime networks, as a transit and transshipment point for the trade in sub-standard, illicit and dual-use goods and the revenues this trade generates for Al-Shabaab, and *further expressing* concern at continued reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, and *encourages* the FGS, with support from the international community, to ensure fishing licenses are issued in accordance with the appropriate Somali legislation,

*Reiterating* the importance of co-operation and coordination between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) and implementation of the National Security Architecture and *noting* that a successful transition to Somali-led security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as set out under the Transition Plan is fundamental to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region,

*Expressing* concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, *welcoming* efforts made by the FGS to reduce corruption including the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law on 21 September 2019, progress made by the FGS in strengthening public financial management and the positive work of the Financial Reporting Centre, and *calling* for the FGS to continue its efforts to address corruption and to continue to accelerate the pace of reform,

*Expressing* serious concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, and *condemning* in the strongest terms any party obstructing the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, any misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies, and acts of violence against and harassment of humanitarian workers,

*Further expressing* serious concern over the widespread nature and persistence of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia, and *encouraging* the Somali authorities to further strengthen efforts to address it, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019),

*Taking note with appreciation* of the final report of the Panel of Experts (the Panel) on Somalia (S/2019/858) and the technical assessment mission report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/616), *expressing* serious concern that the FGS has not been cooperating with the Panel during the majority of their mandate, *welcoming*



the FGS's collaboration and active participation with the technical assessment team on their visit, *urging* the FGS to engage on a way forward which will enable the Security Council to better assess and monitor compliance with the sanctions regime, and *recalling* that panels of experts operate pursuant to mandates from the Security Council,

*Welcoming* regional efforts with a view to supporting the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti including disputes regarding their shared border, and *expressing* concern at continuing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action,

*Determining* that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* Al-Shabaab's extraction of revenue from natural resources in addition to the charcoal trade, including the taxing of the illicit sugar trade, agricultural production and livestock, *notes with concern* their ability to store and transfer resources, and *requests* the Panel, with input from FGS and UNODC, to conduct an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, their methods of storage and transfer, and mapping of illegal taxation systems, and to provide recommendations to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia (the Committee);
2. *Requests* the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States, particularly other Member States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law, and *requests* the FGS to submit, in their regular reporting to the Committee, an update on concrete actions taken by the FGS to counter the financing of terrorism;
3. *Calls upon* the FGS, in coordination with the FMS, to accelerate the implementation of the National Security Architecture, including decisions around the composition, distribution and command and control of the security forces, and to take further steps to deliver the Somali-led Transition Plan, and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows tracking of all such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;
4. *Reiterates* the importance of the FGS and FMS enhancing civilian oversight of all their security institutions and implementing appropriate vetting of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, *calls upon* the FGS to continue to investigate promptly and as appropriate prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *recalls* the importance of the Secretary-General's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to the Somali security forces and AMISOM;
5. *Calls upon* the international community to support implementation of the Somali-led Transition Plan to help develop credible, professional and representative Somali security forces, including providing additional and coordinated support to develop the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the FGS and FMS, with a particular focus on training, storage, support for infrastructure and distribution, technical assistance and capacity building with regard to countering financing of terrorism, and support in tackling the threat of IEDs;

#### *Arms Embargo*

6. *Reaffirms* that all States shall for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, until the Council decides otherwise (as initially imposed by paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002));
7. *Decides* that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS in accordance with paragraph 9 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institution to which it was originally sold or supplied or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;
8. *Reaffirms* that the FGS, in cooperation with the FMS, and AMISOM shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction;

*(i) Exemptions, advance approvals and notifications*

9. *Decides* that until 15 November 2020 the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons and military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annex A and B to this resolution and the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, which are subject to the relevant advance approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraphs 10-17;
10. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, to provide security for the Somali people, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case by-case basis, submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;
11. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution and the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces to provide security for the Somali people are subject to notifications to the Committee for information submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;
12. *Decides* that deliveries of weapons and military equipment listed in Annex B to this resolution or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the purposes of helping develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from the supplying State or international, regional and sub-regional organisation and *requests* States or international, regional and sub-regional organisations to inform the FGS in parallel of any such deliveries at least five working days in advance;
13. *Decides* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to seek approval from or notify the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, as applicable of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to the Somali National Security Forces, at least five days in advance, and that all requests for approvals and notifications should include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and ammunition, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of storage;
14. *Decides* that the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering weapons and military equipment or technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to the Somali National Security Forces pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, may alternatively, make an advance request for approval or notification, as applicable, in consultation with the FGS, *decides* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation choosing to do so should inform the appropriate national coordinating body within the FGS of the advance request for approval or notification and provide the FGS with technical support with notification procedures where appropriate, and *requests* the Committee to transmit advance requests for approval and notifications from States or international, regional or subregional organisations to the appropriate national coordinating body in the FGS;
15. *Decides* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering any weapon and military equipment, technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, pursuant to paragraph 10 or 12, has responsibility for seeking approval from or notifying the Committee, as applicable, for any deliveries of those items, advice, assistance or training, and informing the FGS in parallel at least five working days in advance;
16. *Decides* that where paragraphs 10 or 11 apply, that the FGS shall no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery to the Somali National Security Forces, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage, and recognises the value of the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation doing the same, in cooperation with the FGS;
17. *Reaffirms* that the delivery of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use shall be notified to the Committee five days in advance for its information only, by the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;
18. *Notes with concern* reports that States were not adequately following the notification procedures set out in prior resolutions, *reminds* States of their obligations pursuant to the notification procedures, set out in paragraph 10-17, and *further urges* States to follow strictly the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS;

*(ii) Exceptions*

19. *Reaffirms* that the embargo shall not apply to:

- a) Supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM's strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM; and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, all as per paragraph 10 (a)-(d) of resolution 2111 (2013);
- b) Supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of States or international, regional and subregional organisations undertaking measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, upon the request of the FGS for which it has notified the Secretary-General, and provided that any measures undertaken shall be consistent with applicable international humanitarian and international human rights law;
- c) Supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;
- d) Entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution 2244 (2015));

#### *Targeted sanctions in Somalia*

- 20. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions 2002 (2011), and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018), and *further recalls* that the listing criteria includes, but is not limited to, planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender based violence;
- 21. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;
- 22. *Decides* that until 15 November 2020 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

#### *Somalia Charcoal ban*

- 23. *Condemns* any exports of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, *reaffirms* its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and *decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2020;
- 24. *Reiterates* its requests that AMISOM support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia, and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports;
- 25. *Reaffirms* the importance of the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *encourages* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work with the FGS and FMS, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant States and international organisations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal, and the trafficking of other licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities in Somalia;

#### *IED components ban*

- 26. *Noting* the increase in IED attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, *decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;
- 27. *Further decides* that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 27, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place,

and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;

28. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including inter alia items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with the FGS, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that the FGS and FMS are provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

#### *Panel of Experts on Somalia*

29. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2020, the Panel on Somalia and that the mandate of the Panel shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018) and paragraph 1 of this resolution, *requests* the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019), and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension to the mandate no later than 15 November 2020;
30. *Urges* the FGS to cooperate with the Panel to facilitate interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and ISIL held in custody, *reiterates the importance* of cooperation between the Panel and the FGS, *urges* the FGS to resume full cooperation with the Panel, including setting a date for a visit by the incoming Panel to Somalia without further delay, *notes* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and *requests* the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;
31. *Reiterates its request* for States, the FGS, the FMS and AMISOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, *urges* the FGS and the FMS to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in FGS and FMS custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in FGS and FMS custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;

#### *Reporting*

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with an update, no later than the 31 July 2020 on any further developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti;
33. *Requests* the Panel to provide monthly updates to the Committee, including a comprehensive mid-term update as well as to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report by 15 October 2020 to include a focused analysis on the financial revenues of Al-Shabaab pursuant to paragraph 1;
34. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2020 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia;
35. *Requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 15 February 2020 and then by 15 August 2020, on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, and the status of regional and militia forces, including as annexes the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014), and incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, and *requests* future reports of the JVT to cross-reference serial numbers of weapons documented by the JVT with available records detailing the distribution of arms to the security forces;
36. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

### **Annex A**

#### **Items subject to the Committee's advance approval**

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;  
Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);



3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability;
7. Aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;  
Note: "Aircraft" means fixed wing, swivel wing, rotary wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing vehicle, or helicopter.
8. "Vessels" and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;  
Note: "Vessel" includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel.
9. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

## **Annex B**

### **Equipment requiring a notification with regard to deliveries to the Somali National Security Forces and Committee approval for Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS**

- All types of weapons with a calibre up to 12.7mm: and associated ammunition;
- RPG-7 and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
- Helmets manufactured according to military standards or specification, or comparable national standards;
- Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
  - Soft body armour or protective garments, manufactured to military standards or specifications, or their equivalents;  
*Note: military standards or specifications include, as a minimum, specifications for fragmentation protection.*
  - Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;
- Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) positioning equipment, specifically designed or modified for military use.

## **Annex C**

### **Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components**

*Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology*

#### *Part I*

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
  - a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
  - b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
2. Explosive-related goods:
  - a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating cord).
3. "Technology" required for the "production" or "use" of the items listed at paras. 1, 2 & 3.

#### *Part II*

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
  - a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
  - b. Nitroglycol;
  - c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
  - d. Picryl chloride;
  - e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT).
2. Explosives precursors:
  - a. Ammonium nitrate;
  - b. Potassium nitrate;
  - c. Sodium chlorate;
  - d. Nitric acid;
  - e. Sulphuric acid.

Op 4 december 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8678e zitting Resolutie 2500 (2019) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2500 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8678th meeting, on 4 December 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), 2316 (2016), 2383 (2017) and 2442 (2018) as well as the Statements of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/867), as requested by resolution 2442 (2018), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia's sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

*Noting* that joint counter-piracy efforts have resulted in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as in hijackings since 2011, with no successful ship hijackings for ransom reported off the coast of Somalia since March 2017 however, *recognizing* the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses, *noting* the letter of 22 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations requesting international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, and *recalling* reports of the Secretary General and communiqués of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which continue to illustrate that piracy off the coast of Somalia has been repressed but not eradicated, and *commending* countries and organizations that have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region to suppress piracy and protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia and the region,

*Reaffirming* that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

*Recognizing* the need and *commending* the efforts of States, including in particular States in the region, to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy including those who plan, organize, facilitate or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *reiterating* its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, or released prematurely, *reaffirming* that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

*Welcoming* the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force (LETF) to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates and facilitators, and international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the LETF and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, *further commending* the Padang Communiqué and Maritime Cooperation Declaration adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the operationalization of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC) in Madagascar and *emphasizing* the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

*Welcoming* efforts by the CGPCS, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), the financing mechanism provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund), and donors to strengthen regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates as well as those associated with facilitating piracy and to incarcerate those convicted consistent with applicable international human rights law, *noting* with appreciation the assistance and capacity-building provided by UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia), and *recognizing* the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

*Commending* the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA and EUCAP Somalia, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151 (CMF), the counter piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali

authorities to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE), and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,

*Commending* the 31 States and some 26 Non-State organizations that met at the 22nd Plenary Session of the CGPCS in June 2019 and agreed to a revised orientation and strategic review of the CGPCS, praised the increasing involvement of the States of the region with the establishment of an architecture that includes agreements to establish dedicated regional centres in Madagascar and Seychelles, called upon deployers to maintain their presence off the coast of Somalia, commended a reinforced role of the Virtual Legal Forum, of the LETF and the MSCC, called for increased participation of the shipping industry, and endorsed the offer of the Republic of Kenya to take over the Chair of the CGPCS in 2020,

*Underlining* the importance of cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States in the development of a coast guard in Somalia, *noting* with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, *and welcoming* the approval of the fifth version of the Best Management Practices to deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (BMP5) by the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee,

*Reaffirming* international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, and *expressing serious concern* at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, *calling* for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and *noting* the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

*Welcoming* the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, to serve the full terms of their sentences, but *expresses serious concern* regarding the premature release by "Somaliland" of 19 convicted prisoners returned from Seychelles to Somalia and reiterates that sentences served must be those passed by the courts of the prosecuting states and that any proposal to vary the sentences must be in conformity with the 2011 Transfer Agreement with the Seychelles, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law,

*Expressing* serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), *recognizing* that IUU fishing can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities, and *noting* the complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, *welcoming* Somalia's accession to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)'s Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, and the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution and enforcement of fishing licences

*Remaining concerned* that three Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and *welcoming* the work of International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN), the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP), and the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF) in providing support to victims of piracy and their families, and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives and contributions to funds,

*Emphasizing* that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further *emphasizing* that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National Army, and Somali Police Force,

*Determining* that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. *While noting* improvements in Somalia, *recognizes* that piracy exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. *Stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community in collaboration with Somali authorities and other relevant actors, and *encourages* Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight

against piracy and armed robbery at sea, without impeding the exercise of high seas freedoms or other navigational rights and freedoms by ships of any State, consistent with international law, as reflected in UNCLOS;

4. *Underlines* the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *welcomes* the recent launch of the Department of Somali Maritime Administration, and *encourages* the FGS to hold a National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC) meeting;
5. *Recognizes* the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, and to develop the capacity of Somali authorities to investigate and prosecute such persons, and the capacity of Somalia's Financial Intelligence Unit to identify illicit financial activity and support the prosecution of pirate financiers, and *urges* States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and develop a corresponding legal architecture as part of its efforts to target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;
9. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and *further calls upon* the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;
10. *Calls upon* States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
11. *Recognizes* the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective arrest, prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted pirates and key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *calls upon* all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. *Renews* its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;
13. *Highlights* the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, encourages the full participation of Somalia in all coordination efforts and urges continued support of these efforts;
14. *Decides* that, for a further period of 12 months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2442 (2018) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. *Affirms* that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been renewed in response to the 22 November 2019 letter conveying the request of Somali authorities;
16. *Decides* that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of



assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and sub-regional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above, as most recently reaffirmed by OP 19(b) of resolution 2498 (2019);

17. *Calls upon* all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law, or develop legislative processes, to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;
18. *Calls upon* all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction, to criminalize piracy under their domestic law, and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, decides to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
19. *Further calls upon* all States to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for or associated with acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including international criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law; to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
20. *Urges* all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
21. *Urges* all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
22. *Welcomes* the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme's continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *welcomes* the work of international and regional organizations to strengthen the capacity of financial intelligence units in Somalia and neighbouring states;
23. *Recognizes* the successful prosecution of piracy cases by Seychelles and *implores* regional authorities to honour transfer agreements;
24. *Urges* States parties to The Convention and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and its protocols to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
25. *Acknowledges* the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and *urges* States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further *urges* States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;
26. *Welcomes and encourages* efforts by flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
27. *Invites* the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO's role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;
28. *Notes* the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional organizations;
30. *Expresses its intention* to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
31. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 16 december 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8686e zitting Resolutie 2501 (2019) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2501 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8686th meeting, on 16 December 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on international terrorism and the threat it poses to Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), 2160 (2014) and 2255 (2015) and the relevant statements of its President,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

*Reaffirming* its support for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan,

*Emphasizing* its serious concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, including the ongoing violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban and associated groups, including the Haqqani Network, and by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and their affiliates,

*Reiterating* its support for the fight against illicit production and trafficking of drugs from, and chemical precursors to, Afghanistan, acknowledging that illicit proceeds of the drug trafficking significantly contribute to the financial resources of the Taliban and its associates, and recognizing the threats that the Taliban, illegal armed groups and criminals involved in narcotics trade, and illicit exploitation of natural resources, continue to pose to the security and stability of Afghanistan,

*Urging* an immediate reduction in violence leading to a ceasefire to create an environment conducive to peace negotiations,

*Reiterating* the need to ensure that the present sanctions regime contributes effectively to ongoing efforts to advance reconciliation to bring about peace, stability, and security in Afghanistan,

*Welcoming* efforts to initiate inclusive intra-Afghan negotiations aimed at securing a durable peace settlement that ends the conflict in Afghanistan and ensures that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for international terrorism,

*Recognizing* that, notwithstanding accelerated efforts to make progress toward reconciliation, the situation in Afghanistan remains a threat to international peace and security, and *reaffirming* the need to combat this threat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in this effort,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

#### *Measures*

1. *Decides* that all States shall continue to take the measures required by paragraph 1 of resolution 2255 with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution 1988 (2011) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established in paragraph 35 of resolution 1988 ("the Committee") in the 1988 Sanction List ("the List");
2. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, that the 1267/1988 Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (Monitoring Team), established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), shall continue to support the Committee for a period of twelve months from the date of expiration of the current mandate in December 2019, with the mandate set forth in the annex to this resolution, and further *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect, and *highlights* the importance of ensuring that the Monitoring Team receives the necessary administrative and substantive support to effectively, safely and in a timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council;
3. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to gather information on instances of non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolution 2255 (2015) and to keep the Committee informed of such instances, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, *encourages* Committee members to address issues of non-compliance and bring them to the attention of the Monitoring Team or the Committee, and *further directs* the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;

4. *Decides* to actively review the implementation of the measures outlined in this resolution and to consider adjustments, as necessary, to support peace and stability in Afghanistan;
5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

### Annex

In accordance with paragraph 3 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following responsibilities:

- a) To submit, in writing, an annual comprehensive, independent report to the Committee, on implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures;
- b) To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee's record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;
- c) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
- d) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel on behalf of the Committee;
- e) To gather information on behalf of the Committee on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including by, but not limited to, collating information from Member States and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee's request, and to provide recommendations to the Committee on such cases of non-compliance for its review;
- f) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the List;
- g) To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 26 of resolution 2255 (2015);
- h) To bring to the Committee's attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;
- i) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;
- j) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the List, as instructed by the Committee;
- k) To consult with the Committee, the Government of Afghanistan, or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying individuals or entities that could be added to, or removed from, the List;
- l) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the List as updated and accurate as possible;
- m) To collate, assess, monitor and report on and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including by key Afghan government institutions and any capacity assistance requirements; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;
- n) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations and bodies, including United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other United Nations agencies, and engage in regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex;
- o) To cooperate closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and engage in a regular dialogue with Member States and other relevant organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Forces, on the nexus between narcotics trafficking and those individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of resolution 2255 (2015), and report as requested by the Committee;
- p) To provide an update to the special report of the Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 2160 (2014) Annex (p), as part of its regular comprehensive report;
- q) To consult with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen enforcement of the measures;
- r) To consult with relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions, to learn about the practical implementation of the assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of that measure;
- s) To cooperate closely with the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and other relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom and on relevant trends and developments in this area;
- t) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, and with

relevant international organizations, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies, to raise awareness of the sanctions and to assist in the implementation of the measures in accordance with FATF Recommendation 6 on asset freezing and its related guidance;

- u) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector and other international organizations, including International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and INTERPOL to raise awareness of and learn about the practical implementation of the travel ban, including the use of advanced passenger information provided by civil aircraft operators to Member States, and assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of these measures;
- v) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, international and regional organizations and relevant representatives of the private sector on the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to peace, security and stability in Afghanistan, to raise awareness of the threat and to develop, in line with their responsibilities under paragraph (a) of this annex, recommendations for appropriate measures, to counter this threat;
- w) To work with relevant international and regional organizations in order to promote awareness of, and compliance with, the measures;
- x) To cooperate with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs, physical descriptions and, in accordance with their national legislation, other biometric and biographic data of listed individuals when available for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices and to exchange information on emerging threats;
- y) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006);
- z) To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance in capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;
- aa) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;
- bb) To study and report to the Committee on the current nature of the threat of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban, in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan and the best measures to confront it, including by developing a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts according to the priorities identified by the Committee;
- cc) To gather information, including from the Government of Afghanistan and relevant Member States, on travel that takes place under a granted exemption, pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2255 (2015), and to report to the Committee, as appropriate; and
- dd) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

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Op 31 januari 2020 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8712e zitting Resolutie 2507 (2020) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

#### **Resolution 2507 (2020)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8712th meeting, on 31 January 2020**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all of its previous resolutions, statements of its President, and press statements on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR),

*Welcoming* the efforts made by the CAR authorities, in coordination with their international partners, to advance the reform of the security sector (SSR), including the ongoing deployment of CAR defence and security forces, *encouraging* them to implement their National Defence Plan, Force Employment Concept, and National Security Policy, and *acknowledging* the urgent need for the CAR authorities to train and equip their defence and security forces to be able to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens in the CAR,

*Welcoming also* the commitment demonstrated and the progress made by the CAR authorities, along with their international partners, to achieve the key benchmarks established in the statement of its President of 9 April 2019 (S/PRST/2019/3), *taking note of* the letter of the CAR authorities addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/57), and *encouraging* them to continue their progress to address challenges that remain,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General of 15 October 2019 (S/2019/822) submitted pursuant to resolution 2448 (2018),



*Taking note of the Secretary-General's letter dated 31 December 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/1008) consistent with paragraph 7 of resolution 2488 (2019) and of the CAR authorities' report addressed to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR ("the Committee") consistent with paragraph 6 of resolution 2488 (2019),*

*Further taking note of the midterm report (S/2019/608) and the final report (S/2019/930) of the Panel of Experts on the CAR established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), expanded by resolution 2134 (2014) and extended pursuant to resolution 2454 (2019) ("the Panel of Experts"), and taking note also of the Panel of Experts' recommendations,*

*Determining that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,*

*Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,*

1. *Decides that, until 31 July 2020, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and further decides that these measures shall not apply to:*
  - a) *Supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MINUSCA and the European Union training missions deployed in the CAR, French forces under the conditions provided by paragraph 52 of resolution 2499 (2019), and other Member States' forces providing training and assistance as notified in advance in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) below;*
  - b) *Supplies of non-lethal equipment and provision of assistance, including operational and non-operational training to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of security sector reform (SSR), in coordination with MINUSCA, and as notified in advance to the Committee, and requests that MINUSCA report on the contribution to SSR of this exemption, as part of its regular reports to the Council;*
  - c) *Supplies brought into the CAR by Chadian or Sudanese forces solely for their use in international patrols of the tripartite force established on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum by the CAR, Chad and Sudan, to enhance security in the common border areas, in cooperation with MINUSCA, as approved in advance by the Committee;*
  - d) *Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as notified in advance to the Committee;*
  - e) *Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;*
  - f) *Supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international-led patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area and by armed wildlife rangers of the Chinko Project and the Bamingui-Bangoran National Park to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of the CAR or the CAR's international legal obligations, as notified in advance to the Committee;*
  - g) *Supplies of weapons with a calibre of 14.5 mm or less, and ammunition and components specially designed for such weapons, and of unarmed ground military vehicles and ground military vehicles mounted with weapons with a calibre of 14.5 mm or less, to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, and intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as notified in advance to the Committee;*
  - h) *Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment that are not listed in paragraph 1 (g) of this resolution to the CAR security forces, including state civilian law enforcement institutions, and intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee; or*
  - i) *Other sales or supply of arms and other related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;*
2. *Decides that the supplying Member State is primarily responsible for notifying the Committee and that such notification must be at least 20 days in advance of the delivery of any supplies as permitted in paragraph 1 (d), paragraph 1 (f) and paragraph 1 (g) of this resolution and affirms that the supplying international, regional or subregional organisation is primarily responsible for notifying the Committee and that such notification must be at least 20 days in advance of the delivery of any supplies as permitted in paragraph 1 (d), paragraph 1 (f) and paragraph 1 (g) of this resolution;*
3. *Decides to renew until 31 July 2020 the measures and provisions as set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2488 (2019) and recalls paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2488 (2019);*
4. *Decides to renew until 31 July 2020 the measures and provisions as set out in paragraphs 9, 14, and 16 to 19 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by paragraph 1 of resolution 2454 (2019) and recalls paragraphs 10 to 13 and 15 of resolution 2399 (2018);*

5. *Reaffirms* that the measures described in paragraphs 9 and 16 of resolution 2399 (2018) shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee, as set forth in paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by paragraph 2 of resolution 2454 (2019);
6. *Decides* to extend until 31 August 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraphs 30 to 39 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by paragraph 3 of resolution 2454 (2019), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 July 2020, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the current members of the Panel of Experts;
7. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a final report no later than 15 July 2020, and progress updates, as appropriate;
8. *Expresses particular concern* about reports of illicit transnational trafficking networks which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR, and *requests* the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks, in cooperation with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council as appropriate;
9. *Urges* all parties, and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organisations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members;
10. *Further urges* all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate and *recalls* the value of information-sharing between MINUSCA and the Panel of Experts;
11. *Reaffirms* the Committee provisions and the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by resolution 2454 (2019);
12. *Requests* the CAR authorities to report, by 30 June 2020, to the Committee on the progress achieved regarding the SSR, the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) process and the management of weapons and ammunition;
13. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in close consultation with MINUSCA, including UNMAS, and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 30 June 2020, an assessment on the progress achieved by the CAR authorities on the key benchmarks on the arms embargo established in the statement of its President of 9 April 2019 (S/PRST/2019/3);
14. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in the CAR under continuous review and be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, at any time as may be necessary, in light of the evolution of the security situation in the country, of the progress achieved in relation to the SSR process, the DDRR process and the management of weapons and ammunition, including in relation to the report and assessment requested in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this resolution, and of compliance with this resolution;
15. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 11 februari 2020 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8719e zitting Resolutie 2509 (2020) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

#### **Resolution 2509 (2020)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8719th meeting, on 11 February 2020**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze and measures concerning illicit oil exports which were imposed and modified by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2146 (2014), and modified by subsequent resolutions including, 2441 (2018) and 2473 (2019), and that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by subsequent resolutions was extended until 15 February 2020 by resolution 2441 (2018),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

*Reiterating* its request that all Member States support fully the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and its call on Member States to use their influence with the parties to bring about a ceasefire and a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive political process,

*Underscoring* the importance of ensuring that existing measures are fully implemented and that violations are reported to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, and *recalling* in that regard that individuals or entities engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya may be designated for targeted sanctions,

*Reaffirming* that all parties must comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and *emphasising* the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians,

*Expressing* its concern that the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya undermines the Government of National Accord (GNA) and National Oil Corporation and poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya, and *noting* with concern the reports of the illicit import of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products to Libya,

*Recalling* that providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya may constitute acts that threaten the peace, stability and security of Libya,

*Further reiterating* its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and stressing the need for the Government of National Accord to exercise sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority as a matter of urgency, without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement,

*Recalling* resolution 2259 (2015) which called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions outside of the Libyan Political Agreement, as stipulated therein,

*Recalling* that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the oceans and seas,

*Further recalling* resolutions 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017), 2420 (2018) and 2473 (2019) which in relation to the implementation of the arms embargo authorise, for the period of time specified by those resolutions, the inspection on the high seas off the coast of Libya of vessels bound to or from Libya believed to be carrying arms or related materiel in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and the seizure and disposal of such items provided that Member States make good faith efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel's flag State prior to any inspections while acting in accordance with those resolutions,

*Determining* that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

#### *Prevention of Illicit Exports of Petroleum, including Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products*

1. *Condemns* attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya, including by parallel institutions which are not acting under the authority of the Government of National Accord;
2. *Decides* to extend until 30 April 2021 the authorisations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolution 2441 (2018) and to modify the designation period in paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014) to be one year, which may be renewed by the Committee;
3. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Government of National Accord and notification to the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (the Committee) of a focal point responsible for communication with the Committee with respect to the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), *reiterates* its request that the focal point inform the Committee of any vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya, and urges the Government of National Accord to work closely with the National Oil Company in that regard, and to provide regular updates to inform the Committee on ports, oil fields, and installations that are under its control, and to inform the Committee about the mechanism used to certify legal exports of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, and *requests* that the Panel of Experts closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products;
4. *Calls* on the Government of National Accord, on the basis of any information regarding such exports or attempted exports, to expeditiously contact the concerned vessel's flag State, in the first instance, to resolve the issue and directs the Committee to immediately inform all relevant Member States about notifications to the Committee from the Government of National Accord's focal point regarding vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya;

#### *Effective Oversight of the Financial Institutions*

5. *Requests* that the Government of National Accord confirm to the Committee as soon as it exercises sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority;

## *Arms Embargo*

6. *Calls* for full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo, and further calls on all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict and reiterates that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation;
7. *Calls* upon the Government of National Accord to improve the implementation of the arms embargo, including at all entry points, as soon as it exercises oversight, and calls upon all Member States to cooperate in such efforts;

## *Travel Ban and Asset Freeze*

8. *Calls* on Member States, particularly those in which designated individuals and entities are based as well as those in which their assets frozen under the measures are suspected to be present, to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement effectively the travel ban and asset freeze measures in relation to all individuals on the sanctions list;
9. *Reiterates* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons as designated by the Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of 1970, as modified by paragraphs 11 of resolution 2213 (2015), 11 of resolution 2362 (2017) and 11 of resolution 2441 (2018) and this resolution and *calls upon* the Government of National Accord to enhance cooperation and information sharing with other States in this regard;
10. *Reaffirms* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and taking note of the letter circulated as document S/2016/275, *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider changes, when appropriate, to the asset freeze at the request of the Government of National Accord;

## *Panel of Experts*

11. *Decides* to extend until 15 May 2021 the mandate of the Panel of Experts (the Panel), established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), and 2213 (2015), and 2441 (2018), decides that the Panel's mandated tasks shall remain as defined in resolution 2213 (2015) and shall also apply with respect to the Measures updated in this resolution, *expresses* its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 15 April 2021;
12. *Decides* that the Panel shall provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 15 September 2020, and a final report to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, no later than 15 March 2021 with its findings and recommendations;
13. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including UNSMIL, and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the Measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017), 2362 (2017), 2420 (2018), 2441 (2018), 2473 (2019) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and calls on UNSMIL and the Government of National Accord to support Panel investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities, as appropriate;
14. *Calls* upon all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members, and further calls upon all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Panel deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
15. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the Measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the Measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya;
16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Op 25 februari 2020 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8732e zitting Resolutie 2511 (2020) inzake het Midden-Oosten aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2511 (2020)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8732nd meeting, on 25 February 2020**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous relevant resolutions and statements of its President concerning Yemen,



*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, *Expressing* concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence and enforced disappearances, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of weapons,

*Emphasising* the environmental risks and the need, without delay, for access of UN officials to inspect and maintain the Safer oil tanker, which is located in the Houthi-controlled North of Yemen,

*Reiterating* its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

*Reaffirming* the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable,

*Expressing* its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Secretary-General in support of the Yemeni transition process,

*Expressing* its alarm that areas of Yemen remain under the control of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Yemen and the region, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations, expressing concern at the increasing presence and future potential growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) affiliates in Yemen, and *reaffirming* its resolve to address all aspects of the threat posed by AQAP, ISIL (Da'esh), and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,

*Recalling* the listing of AQAP and associated individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of resolution 2253 (2015) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

*Noting* the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and resolution 2216 (2015), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard, and *encouraging* efforts to further enhance cooperation,

*Welcoming* the work of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014),

*Recalling* the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) imposing a targeted arms embargo, and *calling on* all Member States and other actors to comply with the targeted arms embargo,

*Condemning* in the strongest terms violations of International Humanitarian Law and violations and abuses of International Human Rights Law, including those involving conflict-related sexual violence in Houthi-controlled areas and recruitment and use of children in armed conflict across Yemen, as recorded in the Panel of Experts' final report (S/2020/70),

*Expressing alarm* over the obstacles that have been imposed on the work and access of the Panel of Experts during the course of its last mandate,

*Expressing serious concern* at the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen and all instances of undue hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the recent interference in aid operations in Houthi-controlled areas as well as obstacles and the undue limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population occurring throughout Yemen, which is preventing vulnerable people from receiving the assistance they need to survive,

*Emphasising* the necessity of discussion by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) ("the Committee") of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts reports,

*Determining* that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, and in accordance with its previous relevant resolutions, and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people;
2. *Decides* to renew until 26 February 2021 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2015), and *further reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);
3. *Emphasising* the importance of facilitating humanitarian assistance, *decides* that the Committee established in paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (hereafter, the "Committee") may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015) if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of the United Nations and other humanitarian organisations in Yemen or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;

### *Designation Criteria*

4. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or listed in the annex to resolution 2216 (2015) as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
5. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015);
6. *Affirms* that sexual violence in armed conflict, or the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, could constitute an act, as specified in paragraph 18 (c) of resolution 2140 (2014), and therefore a sanctionable act of engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, as described in paragraph 17 of that resolution;

### *Reporting*

7. *Decides* to extend until 28 March 2021 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 28 February 2021, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 28 March 2021 drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
8. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a mid-term update to the Committee no later than 28 July 2020, and a final report no later than 28 January 2021 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee, and also that they include information, as appropriate, about the commercially available components which have been used by individuals or entities designated by the Committee to assemble unmanned aerial vehicles, water-borne improvised explosive devices, and other weapon systems, and bearing in mind that this request should not have an adverse impact on humanitarian assistance or legitimate commercial activities;
9. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2368 (2017);
10. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
11. *Emphasises* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
12. *Recalls* the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
13. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;
14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de zesde april 2020.

*De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,*

S.A. BLOK