

# TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

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JAARGANG 2019 Nr. 137

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## A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;  
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

Voor een overzicht van de verdragsgegevens, zie verdragsnummer 006585 in de Verdragenbank.

## B. TEKST

Op 30 augustus 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8336e zitting Resolutie 2432 (2018) inzake Mali aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2432 (2018)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8336th meeting, on 30 August 2018**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2423 (2018), 2391 (2017) and 2374 (2017),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and *underscoring* the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives,

*Taking note* of the renewed commitment of the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* coalition of armed groups and the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* coalition of armed groups ("the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups") to the expeditious implementation of all of their remaining obligations under the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement"), through the adoption of a "*Chronogramme d'actions prioritaires*" during the meeting of the *Comité de Suivi de l'Accord* (CSA) held in Bamako on the 15 and 16 January 2018, followed by the adoption of a Roadmap for its implementation on 22 March 2018 ("the Roadmap"),

*Welcoming* the recent positive steps achieved in the implementation of the Agreement, while *expressing* its deep frustration that parties have too long stalled the implementation of the Agreement, in spite of significant international support and assistance, *further expressing* a significant sense of impatience with parties over the persistent delays in the full implementation of key provisions of the Agreement and *stressing* the absolute urgency for the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to take unprecedented steps to fully and expeditiously deliver on remaining obligations under the Agreement,

*Stressing* that all parties to the Agreement share the primary responsibility to make steadfast progress in its implementation,

*Recalling* the provisions of the Agreement calling upon the Security Council to give its full support to the Agreement, to closely monitor its implementation and, if necessary, to take measures against anyone hindering the implementation of the commitments contained therein or the realisation of its objectives,

*Recalling* the provisions of resolution 2423 (2018) expressing the intention of the Security Council to follow closely the timely implementation of the Roadmap referred to above and to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) should the parties not implement the agreed-upon commitments within the announced timeframe,

*Taking note* of the final report (S/2018/581) of the Panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) (“the Panel of experts”),

*Determining* that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 August 2019 the measures as set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of resolution 2374 (2017);
2. *Reaffirms* that these measures shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (“the Committee”), as set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2374 (2017);
3. *Decides* to extend until 30 September 2019 the mandate of the Panel of experts, as set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 of resolution 2374 (2017), as well as the request to MINUSMA, as set out in paragraph 16 of resolution 2374 (2017), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2019, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the current members of the Panel of experts;
4. *Requests* the Panel of experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 28 February 2019, a final report no later than 15 August 2019, and periodic updates in between, as appropriate;
5. *Reaffirms* the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2374 (2017);
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Op 3 oktober 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8365e zitting Resolutie 2437 (2018) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

#### **Resolution 2437 (2018)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8365th meeting, on 3 October 2018**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2016) and 2380 (2017) and its Presidential Statement of 16 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/25),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

*Welcoming* the Secretary-General’s report of 31 August 2018 (S/2018/807),

*Mindful* of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of stabilization of Libya and endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people;
2. *Decides*, for a further period of twelve months from the date of adoption of this resolution, to renew the authorisations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015), reaffirms paragraph 11 thereof and otherwise reiterates its resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2106) and 2380 (2017) and its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2015/25;
3. *Renews* the reporting requests set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2240 (2015) from the date of adoption of this resolution;
4. *Expresses* its intention to continue to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authority provided in this resolution for additional periods;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 5 november 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8389e zitting Resolutie 2441 (2018) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2441 (2018)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8389th meeting, on 5 November 2018**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze and measures concerning illicit oil exports which were imposed and modified by resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017), 2362 (2018), 2420 (2018) (the Measures), and that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015) and 2278 (2016) was extended until 15 November 2018 by resolution 2362 (2017),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

*Recalling* resolution 2259 (2015) which welcomed the signing of the 17 December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement of Skhirat, Morocco and endorsed the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) as the sole legitimate government of Libya, that should be based in Tripoli, and *further expressing* its determination in this regard to support the Government of National Accord,

*Welcoming* endorsement in principle of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) by the House of Representatives on 25 January 2016 and the subsequent meetings of the Libyan Political dialogue which reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the LPA, and *reaffirming* that the LPA remains the only viable framework to end the Libyan political crisis, and its implementation remains key to holding elections and finalising the political transition,

*Underlining* the primary responsibility of the GNA in taking appropriate action to prevent the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya and *reaffirming* the importance of international support for Libyan sovereignty over its territory and resources,

*Expressing* its concern that the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya undermines the Government of National Accord and poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya,

*Expressing* support for Libyan efforts to resolve peacefully the disruptions of Libya's energy exports and *reiterating* that control of all facilities should be transferred back to the proper authorities,

*Further reiterating* its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil Corporation (NOC), *recalling* events in the Oil Crescent and the Security Council's Press Statement of 19 July 2018 welcoming the announcement that Libya's NOC had resumed its work on behalf, and for the benefit, of all Libyans, and *stressing* the need for the Government of National Accord to exercise sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority as a matter of urgency, without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement,

*Further recalling* resolution 2259 (2015) which called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside the Libyan Political Agreement, as specified by it,

*Recalling* that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the oceans and seas,

*Further recalling* resolutions 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017) and 2420 (2018) which in relation to the implementation of the arms embargo authorise, for the period of time specified by those resolutions, the inspection on the high seas off the coast of Libya of vessels bound to or from Libya believed to be carrying arms or related materiel in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and the seizure and disposal of such items provided that Member States make good faith efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel's flag State prior to any inspections while acting in accordance with those resolutions,

*Reaffirming* the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians and stressing the need to transfer detainees to State authority,

*Reiterating* its expression of support for the Government of National Accord, as stated in paragraph 3 of resolution 2259 (2015), and *noting* in this regard the specific requests made to the Government of National Accord in this resolution,

*Reiterating* its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and work with the Libyan authorities and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UN-SMIL) to develop a coordinated package of support to build the capacity of the Government of National Accord, in line with Libyan priorities and in response to requests for assistance,

*Determining* that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,  
*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

#### *Prevention of Illicit Exports of Petroleum, including Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products*

1. *Condemns* attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya, including by parallel institutions which are not acting under the authority of the Government of National Accord;
2. *Decides* to extend until 15 February 2020 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014), and *decides further* that the authorisations provided by and the measures imposed by that resolution shall apply with respect to vessels loading, transporting, or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya;
3. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Government of National Accord and notification to the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (the Committee) of a focal point responsible for communication with the Committee with respect to the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), *requests* the focal point to continue to inform the Committee of any vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya, and *urges* the Government of National Accord to work closely with the National Oil Company in that regard, and to provide regular updates to inform the Committee on ports, oil fields, and installations that are under its control, and to inform the Committee about the mechanism used to certify legal exports of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products;
4. *Calls* on the Government of National Accord, on the basis of any information regarding such exports or attempted exports, to expeditiously contact the concerned vessel's flag State, in the first instance, to resolve the issue and *directs* the Committee to immediately inform all relevant Member States about notifications to the Committee from the Government of National Accord's focal point regarding vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya;

#### *Effective Oversight of the Financial Institutions*

5. *Requests* that the Government of National Accord confirm to the Committee as soon as it exercises sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority;

#### *Arms Embargo*

6. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Government of National Accord of a focal point pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2278, *takes note* of the briefing provided by the focal point to the Committee on the structure of the security forces under its control, the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Government security forces, and training needs, *continues* to emphasise the importance of the Government of National Accord exercising control over and safely storing arms, with the support of the international community, and *stresses* that ensuring security and defending Libya from terrorism must be the task of unified and strengthened national security forces under the sole authority of the Government of National Accord within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement;
7. *Affirms* that the Government of National Accord may submit requests under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014) for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, for the use by security forces under its control to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Al-Qaida, Ansar Al Sharia, and other associated groups operating in Libya, *calls* upon the Committee to consider expeditiously such requests, and *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider reviewing the arms embargo, when appropriate;
8. *Urges* Member States to assist the Government of National Accord, upon its request, by providing it with the necessary security and capacity-building assistance, in response to threats to Libyan security and in defeating ISIL, groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Al-Qaida, Ansar Al Sharia, and other associated groups operating in Libya;
9. *Urges* the Government of National Accord to improve further the monitoring and control of arms or related materiel that are supplied, sold or transferred to Libya in accordance with paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), including through the use of end user certificates issued by the Government of National Accord, *requests* the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) to consult with the Government of National Accord about the safeguards needed to safely procure and secure arms and related materiel, and *urges* Member States and regional organizations to provide assistance to the Government of National Accord upon its request to strengthen the infrastructure and mechanisms currently in place to do so;

10. *Calls upon* the Government of National Accord to improve the implementation of the arms embargo, including at all entry points, as soon as it exercises oversight, and *calls upon* all Member States to cooperate in such efforts;

#### *Travel Ban and Asset Freeze*

11. *Reaffirms* that the travel ban and asset freeze measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011) paragraph 11 of resolution 2213 (2015) and paragraph 11 of resolution 2362 (2017), apply to individuals and entities designated under that resolution and under resolution 1973 (2011) and by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *reaffirms* that these measures also apply to individuals and entities determined by the Committee to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition, and *reaffirms* that, in addition to the acts listed in paragraph 11 (a)-(f) of resolution 2213 (2015), such acts may also include but are not limited to planning, directing, sponsoring, or participating in attacks against United Nations personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015) and this resolution (the Panel) and *decides* that such acts may also include but are not limited to planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence;
12. *Calls on* Member States, particularly those in which designated individuals and entities are based as well as those in which their assets frozen under the measures are suspected to be present, to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement effectively the travel ban and asset freeze measures in relation to all individuals on the sanctions list, including those designated by the Committee on 7 June 2018 and 11 September 2018;
13. *Reaffirms* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and taking note of the letter circulated as document S/2016/275, *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider changes, when appropriate, to the asset freeze at the request of the Government of National Accord;

#### *Panel of Experts*

14. *Decides* to extend until 15 February 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts (the Panel), established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), and 2213 (2015), *decides* that the Panel's mandated tasks shall remain as defined in resolution 2213 (2015) and shall also apply with respect to the Measures updated in this resolution and requests the Panel of experts to include the necessary sexual and gender-based violence expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015);
15. *Decides* that the Panel shall provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 15 June 2019, and a final report to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, no later than 15 December 2019 with its findings and recommendations;
16. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including UNSMIL, and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the Measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017), 2362 (2017), 2420 (2018) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and *calls on* UNSMIL and the Government of National Accord to support Panel investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities, as appropriate;
17. *Calls upon* all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members, and further *calls upon* all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Panel deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
18. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the Measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the Measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya;
19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 6 november 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8391e zitting Resolutie 2442 (2018) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2442 (2018)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8391st meeting, on 6 November 2018**

*The Security Council,*

*Recognizing* that 2018 marks the 10th anniversary of resolution 1816 on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015) and 2316 (2016) and 2383 (2017) as well as the Statements of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/903), as requested by resolution 2383 (2017), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia's sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

*Noting* that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, with no successful ship hijackings reported off the coast of Somalia since March 2017 however, *recognizing* the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels operating in conformity with international law, *commending* countries that have deployed naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to dissuade piracy networks from carrying out acts of piracy,

*Welcoming* the reinstatement of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC) meeting held from 9 to 10 July 2018 between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and international partners which called for enhanced cooperation in strengthening Somalia's maritime security as a key priority for both the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States and urged the National Security Council to agree on a delineation of roles of the Somali maritime forces, as required by the Transition Plan and recognizing the importance of engaging in transition planning,

*Further reaffirming* that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

*Recognizing* the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *reiterating* its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

*Noting* with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of Somalia, which has led to pirates in many cases being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and reiterating that, consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention") provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation,

*Underlining* the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 25 October 2018, from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations *expressing* the appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, asking member states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone, and *requesting* that the provisions of resolution 2383 (2017) be renewed for an additional 12 months,

*Welcoming* the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional partners in the 21st plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in Nairobi, Kenya, 11-13 July 2018, co-hosted by the Indian Ocean Commission under the Chairmanship of Mauritius,

*Recognizing* the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and the intentions of the Regional Capacity Building Working Group to identify regional priorities and coordination of capacity-building activities and regional responsibilities,

*Noting* the progress made to enhance Somali capacity building through the National Maritime Coordination Committee (NMCC) to assess maritime priorities between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States,

*Welcoming* the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in accordance with applicable international human rights law, *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that pirates are held accountable,

*Commending* the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA and EUCAP Somalia, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,

*Noting* the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and to allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law,

*Welcoming and encouraging* the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union's activities under the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) which assists Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity in order to enable it to enforce maritime law more effectively, and *recognizing* the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

*Supporting* the development of a coastguard at the federal level and coastguard police at the Federal Member State level, *noting* with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and *recognizing* the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, *noting* the efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high-risk areas, and further welcoming the European Union's EUCAP Somalia, which is working to develop the maritime security capacities of Somalia,

*Underlining* the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the ongoing work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and *noting* the importance of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of piracy,

*Further recognizing* that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and *welcoming* international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and *commending* the establishment of the Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar, the sister centre of the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles following the signing of the Regional Agreement for the Setting up of a Regional Maritime Information Exchange and Sharing Mechanism in the Western Indian Ocean by Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Union of Comoros and Seychelles, including the establishment of the Piracy Prosecution Readiness Plan which, under the auspices of UNODC and in partnership with EU NAVFOR, will further develop the region's capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions,

*Reaffirming* international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, strongly *condemning* the continuing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, *expressing* serious concern at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, *recognizing* the adverse impact on their families, *calling* for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and *noting* the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

*Commending* Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania, for their efforts to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international human rights law, and *emphasizing* the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

*Welcoming* the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *acknowledging* the return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve their sentences in Somalia, and *noting* that the sentences served must be those passed by the courts of the prosecuting states and that any proposal to vary the sentences must be in conformity with the 2011 Transfer Agreement with the Seychelles,

*Welcoming* the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), the central mechanism for developing capability and identifying and channelling support, as highlighted at the London Somalia Conference in May 2017, and *encouraging* the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,

*Expressing* serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and *noting* the complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, *recognizing* that IUU fishing accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,

*Noting* Somalia's accession to the FAO's Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, *recognizing* the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing Somalia's capacity to combat such activities, and *stressing* the need for States and international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia's capacity to combat such activities,

*Recognizing* the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licences, *commending* in this regard the implementation of a component of the EU-funded Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (CCAP) with FAO aims to promote proper and transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional states, and *encouraging* further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international community,

*Recalling* the reports of the Secretary General which illustrate the seriousness of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized anti-piracy courts,

*Remaining concerned* that four-Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and *welcoming* the work of International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) and Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) in the provision of post trauma intervention and financial support to victims of piracy and their families; as well as the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), which provides funds for the survivors of Somali piracy, and for their families, to provide a range of support during and after captivity and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives and contributions to funds,

*Recognizing* the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,

*Noting* efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,

*Bearing in mind* the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, *noting* the operations of information-sharing centres in, Kenya, and Tanzania, *recognizing* the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates,

*Emphasizing* that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further *emphasizing* that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National Army, and Somali Police Force,

*Welcoming* the Padang Communiqué and Maritime Cooperation Declaration adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs,

*Welcoming* the publication in June 2018 by BIMCO, International Chamber of Shipping, International Group of Protection & Indemnity Clubs, Intertanko, The Oil Companies International Marine Forum and others, of version 5 of Best Management Practices to deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (BMP5), acknowledging that the information and guidance contained within helps to reduce the risks to mariners and seafarers engaged in their lawful occupations,

*Recognizing* that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,

*Determining* that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that it condemns and deplors all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. *While noting* improvements in Somalia, *recognizes* that piracy exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. *Stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community in collaboration with Somali authorities and other relevant actors;
4. *Underlines* the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *encourages* the approval by the Parliament of the draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia have submitted to the Council of Ministers and *urges* the Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. *Recognizes* the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, *urges* States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. *Calls upon* States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;
10. *Welcomes* the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court for piracy and maritime crime and further *welcomes* the successful prosecution of piracy cases by this body;
11. *Recognizes* the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *calls upon* all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. *Renews* its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;

13. *Highlights* the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued support of these efforts;
14. *Encourages* Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *decides* that, for a further period of 13 months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2383 (2017) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. *Affirms* that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been renewed in response to the 25 October 2018 letter conveying the request of Somali authorities;
16. *Decides* that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above;
17. *Requests* that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;
18. *Calls upon* all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
19. *Calls upon* all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
20. *Welcomes*, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme's continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;
21. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;
22. *Urges* all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;
23. *Urges* States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. *Urges* all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. *Urges* all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. *Commends* the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. *Urges* States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. *Acknowledges* the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance

industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;

29. *Encourages* flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
30. *Invites* the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO's role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;
31. *Notes* the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
32. *Requests* States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
33. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within twelve months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
34. *Expresses its intention* to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
35. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Op 14 november 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8398e zitting Resolutie 2444 (2018) inzake Somalië en Eritrea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2444 (2018)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8398th meeting, on 14 November 2018**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, in particular resolutions 733 (1992), 1844 (2008), 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2036 (2012), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2124 (2013), 2125 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), 2244 (2015), 2317 (2016) and 2385 (2017),

*Taking note* of the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (the SEMG) on Somalia (S/2018/1002) and Eritrea (S/2018/1003) and their conclusions on the situations in Somalia and Eritrea,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea, and underscoring the importance of working to prevent destabilising effects of regional crises and disputes from spilling over into Somalia,

*Condemning* Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing concern* that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing concern* at the presence of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia,

*Reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

*Underlining* its support for the efforts of the Somali authorities to deliver stability and security in Somalia and to reduce the threats to peace and security posed by Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL (also known as Da'esh),

*Condemning* any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, including when they result in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL (also known as Da'esh) and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and *expressing concern* at reports of increased illegal flows of weapons and ammunition supplies from Yemen to Somalia,

*Welcoming* the cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Federal Member States (FMSs), and the SEMG, and *underlining* the importance of these relationships improving further and strengthening in the future,

*Welcoming* the development of a conditions-based transition plan with clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the Somali security institutions and forces, *calling for* its swift and coordinated implementation with full participation from all stakeholders, and *recalling* the critical importance of accelerating the implementation of the National Security Architecture agreement between the FGS and the FMSs, including decisions to define the composition and roles of Somalia's security forces and to integrate and provide federal support to regional forces, in order to provide the foundation for a successful transition to Somali-led security,

*Taking note of* the efforts of the FGS to improve its notifications to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea ("the Committee"), *urging* further progress in this regard, and *recalling* that improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region,

*Commending* the efforts of the FGS to restore key economic and financial institutions, increase domestic revenue and implement financial governance and structural reforms, *welcoming* the continued progress on building a track record of reforms under the International Monetary Fund Staff-Monitored Programme, together with progress on the anti-corruption bill, and *highlighting* the importance of continual progress in these areas,

*Welcoming* the FGS's efforts to implement the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2015) and the National Communications Act (2017), *underlining* the importance of compliance with the counter-terrorism and national security provisions in this legislation, and *further welcoming* the establishment of a Financial Reporting Centre to serve as Somalia's financial intelligence unit,

*Underlining* the importance of financial propriety in contributing to stability and prosperity, *welcoming* the efforts of the FGS to address corruption, and *stressing* the need for a zero tolerance approach to corruption to promote transparency and increase mutual accountability in Somalia,

*Expressing* serious concern at reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, *underlining* the importance of refraining from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, *welcoming* further reporting on the matter, and *encouraging* the FGS, with the support of the international community, to ensure that fishing licenses are issued in a responsible manner and in line with the appropriate Somali legal framework,

*Expressing serious concern* at the ongoing difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia, and *condemning* in the strongest terms any party obstructing the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, any misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies, and acts of violence against and harassment of humanitarian workers,

*Recalling* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to protect its population, and *recognising* the FGS's responsibility, working with the FMSs, to build the capacity of its own national security forces, as a matter of priority,

*Welcoming* the FGS's efforts to address sexual- and gender-based violence, *encouraging* strengthened reporting mechanisms to facilitate prosecutions, and *further encouraging* the FGS to continue to implement its National Action Plan on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict through training, accountability, victim support and oversight of the security sector,

*Commending* efforts towards peace, stability and reconciliation in the region, including the signing of the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July 2018, the signing of the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea on 5 September 2018, and the signing of the Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 16 September 2018,

*Taking note of* the decision of the Secretary-General to appoint a new Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa who will, inter alia, work with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other relevant subregional and regional organisations in consolidating recent gains in peace and security in the region, and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General,

*Regretting* that the SEMG has not been able to visit Eritrea since 2011 and fully discharge its mandate, and *welcoming* the meeting on 5 October 2018 between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Coordinator of the SEMG,

*Welcoming* that in recent months several armed groups in the region have declared that they will cease hostilities and engage peacefully in efforts to pursue reconciliation in the region,

*Expressing concern* at ongoing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes in 2008, *calling on* Eritrea and Djibouti to continue to engage in resolving the issues of combatants, and *urging* Eritrea to share any further available detailed information pertaining to the combatants,

*Taking note of increased engagement between Eritrea and Djibouti, strongly encouraging further efforts towards normalisation of relations and good neighbourhood between Djibouti and Eritrea, including cooperation in accordance with international law to resolve any disputes regarding their shared border, and reaffirming its readiness to continue to assist the parties in the peaceful settlement of any prolonged disputes,*

*Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,*

*Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,*

*Lifting of arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and targeted sanctions on Eritrea*

1. *Recalls* paragraphs 16 and 17 of resolution 1907 (2009) and *recognises* that during the course of its current and four previous mandates the SEMG has not found conclusive evidence that Eritrea supports Al-Shabaab;
2. *Welcomes* the meeting on 25 September 2018 between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Chair of the Committee, and *further welcomes* the meeting on 5 October 2018 between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Coordinator of the SEMG, with the participation of the Chair of the Committee;
3. *Welcomes* the meeting between the President of Djibouti and the President of Eritrea in Jeddah on 17 September 2018, *underlines* the importance of continuing efforts towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti for regional peace, stability and reconciliation, and *encourages* Member States, international, regional and subregional organisations and other parties to continue to support these efforts including through their good offices;
4. *Decides* to lift from the date of adoption of this resolution the arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and targeted sanctions imposed on Eritrea by the Security Council in its resolutions 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013);
5. *Expresses its satisfaction* that funds derived from the mining sector of Eritrea are not contributing to violations of resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009), 1907 (2009) or 2023 (2011), and *decides* that from the date of adoption of this resolution, States are no longer required to undertake the measures set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2023 (2011);
6. *Urges* Eritrea and Djibouti to engage on the issue of the Djiboutian combatants missing in action including through the mediation of any relevant party of their own choosing, and *further urges* Eritrea to make available any further detailed information;
7. *Urges* the two parties to continue efforts to settle their border dispute peacefully in a manner consistent with international law by conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or by any other means of pacific dispute settlement identified in Article 33 of the Charter upon which they agree;
8. *Affirms* that it will continue to follow developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and will support the two countries in the resolution of these matters in good faith;

*Committee*

9. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, hereafter to be known as the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia ("the Committee"), shall include the tasks as set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 751 (1992), paragraph 11 of resolution 1844 (2008), and paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012), and *requests* that the Committee amends its guidelines, its implementation assistance notices and its website accordingly;

*Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group*

10. *Decides* to terminate the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), with effect from 16 December 2018;

*Panel of Experts on Somalia*

11. *Decides* to establish, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2019, the Panel of Experts on Somalia, *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts shall include the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of this resolution as they relate to Somalia, and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extensions of the mandate of the Panel of Experts no later than 15 November 2019;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to establish the Panel of Experts, consisting of six members and to be based in Nairobi, in consultation with the Committee, until 15 December 2019, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the SEMG established pursuant to previous resolutions, and *further requests* the Panel of Experts to include the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015);

## Somalia Arms embargo

13. *Reaffirms* the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 14 of resolution 2125 (2013), paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014), paragraph 2 of resolution 2244 (2015), paragraph 2 of resolution 2317 (2016) and paragraph 2 of resolution 2385 (2017) (hereafter referred to as “the arms embargo on Somalia”);
14. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 November 2019, and in that context *reiterates* that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);
15. *Reaffirms* its decision that the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying arms and related materiel for defensive purposes does not amount to a delivery of such items in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;
16. *Reiterates* its decision that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces, and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS and the FMSs to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles;
17. *Welcomes* in this regard the improvements made by the FGS in weapons registration, recording and marking procedures and *encourages* further improvements, *expresses concern* at reports of continued weapons diversion from within the FGS and FMSs, *notes* that further improved weapons and ammunition management is vital in order to prevent the diversion of weapons and ammunition, and *reiterates* that the Security Council is committed to monitoring and assessing improvements in order to review the arms embargo when all conditions as set out in Security Council resolutions are met;
18. *Calls upon* the FGS to facilitate access for the Panel of Experts, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel of Experts submitted at least ten days in advance, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in FGS custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in FGS custody and access to all FGS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess progress in this area;
19. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts of the FGS to develop detailed Standard Operating Procedures for weapons and ammunition management including an issue and receipt system to track all weapons post distribution, *further welcomes* the development of a mechanism to distribute weapons and ammunition to regional forces, consistent with the requirements of this resolution including paragraph 16, *encourages* that such a mechanism be expanded to include other military equipment and supplies, consistent with the requirements of this resolution including paragraph 16, and *urges* the FGS to finalise and implement these procedures as soon as possible;
20. *Welcomes* the establishment of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) and *urges* Member States to support improved weapons and ammunition management to improve the capacity of the FGS to manage weapons and ammunition;
21. *Takes notes of* FGS reporting to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), *calls on* the FGS and FMSs to accelerate the implementation of the National Security Architecture agreement, the Security Pact, and the transition plan in order to provide Somali-led security and protection to the people of Somalia, and *requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 15 March 2019 and then by 15 September 2019, on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its Security Forces, including the status of regional and militia forces, and to include as annexes the reports of the JVT requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014);
22. *Recalls* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its Security Forces, pursuant to paragraphs 3 to 8 of resolution 2142 (2014), and *calls upon* the FGS to improve its notifications to the Committee;
23. *Calls upon* the FGS to continue to improve the timeliness and content of notifications regarding the completion of deliveries, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2142 (2014);
24. *Requests* the FGS to incorporate the notifications regarding the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, detailed in paragraph 7 of resolution 2142 (2014), into the regular FGS reporting to the Security Council requested in paragraph 20;
25. *Stresses* Member States’ obligations pursuant to the notification procedures set out in paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013), *urges* Member States to strictly follow the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions, and *encourages* Member States to consider Implementation Assistance Notice No.2 of the Committee as a guide;

26. *Recalls* paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) and *notes* that support for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may include, inter alia, building infrastructure and provision of salaries and stipends solely provided to the Somali National Security Forces;
27. *Urges* increased cooperation by the FGS, FMSs and AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014), to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates;
28. *Calls upon* the FGS and FMSs to enhance civilian oversight of their security forces, to continue to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, and to investigate and as appropriate prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in this context *recalls* the importance of the Secretary-General's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to Somali security forces;
29. *Decides* that the Panel of Experts will continue the investigations started by the SEMG related to the export to Somalia of chemicals that may be used as oxidisers in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, such as the precursors ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate and sodium chlorate with a view to considering further action, and *calls on* Member States and the FGS to cooperate with the Panel of Experts in this regard;
30. *Underlines* the importance of timely and predictable payment of salaries to the Somali security forces and *calls on* the FGS to continue to implement systems to improve the timeliness and accountability of payments and supply of provisions to the Somali security forces, and *welcomes* the progress made to date on biometric registration;
31. *Recalls* the need to build the capacities of the Somali National Security Forces, in particular the provision of equipment, training and mentoring, in order to develop credible, professional and representative security forces to enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces in line with the transition plan, and *encourages* further donor support and coordination as set out in the Security Pact;
32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to conduct a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo, with options and recommendations for improving implementation, by 15 May 2019;

#### *Threats to peace and security in Somalia*

33. *Condemns* Al-Shabaab's increased revenue from natural resources including the taxing of the illicit sugar trade, agricultural production and livestock, *further expresses concern* at the group's involvement in the illicit charcoal trade, and *welcomes* the Panel of Experts' reporting on these issues;
34. *Requests* the FGS to cooperate with the Panel of Experts to facilitate interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and ISIL (also known as D'aesh) held in FGS custody, in order to assist the Panel of Experts with its investigations;
35. *Welcomes* the efforts that the FGS has made to improve its financial management procedures including the successful completion of two International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff-Monitoring programmes and the commitments to further reform made under the third Staff-Monitored programme, *encourages* the FGS and FMSs to maintain the pace of reform to increase transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness and predictability in revenue collection and budget allocations, and *expresses concern* at the generation and distribution of counterfeit Somali currency;
36. *Expresses concern* at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources, including reports of alleged financial impropriety involving members of the FGS, FMSs, Federal Parliament and Somali opposition groups which pose a risk to state-building efforts, and in this context *strongly welcomes* the steps taken by the FGS to address cases of corruption and to develop anti-corruption legislation;
37. *Underlines* that individuals engaged in acts that threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia may be listed for targeted measures;
38. *Recognises* that addressing outstanding constitutional issues around power and resource sharing between the FGS and FMSs is crucial for Somalia's stability, *calls upon* the FGS and the FMSs to work constructively together to address these issues in an inclusive manner, and *encourages* the FGS and FMSs to implement the outstanding elements of the National Security Architecture agreement, including decisions around the make-up, distribution and command and control of the security forces and resource-sharing;
39. *Reaffirms* Somalia's sovereignty over its natural resources;
40. *Reiterates its serious concern* that the petroleum sector in Somalia could be a driver for increased conflict, *welcomes* the political agreement on petroleum and mineral resource-sharing reached by the FGS and the FMSs in June 2018, and *underlines* the vital importance of the FGS and FMSs putting in place, without undue delay, resource-sharing arrangements and credible legal frameworks to ensure that the petroleum sector in Somalia does not become a source of increased tension;

#### *Somalia Charcoal ban*

41. *Reaffirms* its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), *welcomes* efforts of Member States to prevent

the import of charcoal of Somali origin, *reiterates* that the FGS and FMSs shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, *urges* Member States to continue their efforts to ensure full implementation of the ban, and *further reiterates* that individuals and entities engaged in acts which violate the charcoal ban may be listed for targeted measures;

42. *Reiterates* its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013) and paragraph 16 of resolution 2431 (2018) that AMISOM support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia, and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel of Experts to charcoal exporting ports;
43. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *further welcomes* the cooperation between the Panel of Experts and CMF in keeping the Committee informed on the charcoal trade;
44. *Expresses concern* that the charcoal trade provides significant funding for Al-Shabaab, and in that context *reiterates* paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and *further decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2019;
45. *Condemns* the ongoing export of charcoal from Somalia, in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, *calls* on Member States to share information with the Panel of Experts, *requests* the Panel of Experts to continue to focus on this in their next report and propose further measures, taking account of human rights concerns, and *expresses* its intention to consider further measures if violations continue;
46. *Encourages* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work with the FGS, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant Member States and international organisations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal;

#### *Humanitarian access in Somalia*

47. *Expresses grave concern* at the ongoing humanitarian situation in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* in the strongest terms attacks against humanitarian actors and any misuse of donor assistance and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia, and *encourages* the FGS to improve the regulatory environment for aid donors;
48. *Decides* that until 15 November 2019 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;
49. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2019 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and *requests* relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and their implementing partners that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia to increase their cooperation and willingness to share information with the United Nations;

#### *Targeted sanctions in Somalia*

50. *Recalls* its decisions in resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, *notes* one of the listing criteria under resolution 1844 (2008) is engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, and *decides* that such acts may also include but are not limited to planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence;
51. *Reiterates* its willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals and entities on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria;
52. *Recalls* paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012) and emphasises that certain misappropriation of financial resources is a criterion for designation and applies to misappropriation at all levels;
53. *Reiterates* its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations, and *further requests* the FGS, FMSs and AMISOM to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding Al-Shabaab activities;

#### *Reporting*

54. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide monthly updates to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), and a comprehensive midterm update, as well as to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report by 15 October 2019;

55. *Requests* the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the Panel of Experts and other relevant United Nations entities, to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the Panel of Experts and recommend to the Security Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the Somalia arms embargo, the measures regarding the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as well as implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolutions 1844 (2008) in response to continuing violations;
56. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution;
57. *Requests* the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed of developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and to report to the Security Council no later than 15 February 2019 and every six months thereafter, and *expresses its intention* to keep this request under review in light of developments;
58. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 31 januari 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8455e zitting Resolutie 2454 (2019) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2454 (2019)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 8455th meeting, on 31 January 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions and statements on the Central African Republic (CAR), in particular resolutions 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2149 (2014), 2181 (2014), 2196 (2015), 2212 (2015), 2217 (2015), 2262 (2016), 2264 (2016), 2281 (2016), 2301 (2016), 2339 (2017), 2387 (2017), 2399 (2018), 2448 (2018) as well as resolution 2272 (2016), and the Statements of its President of 18 December 2014 (S/PRST/2014/28), 20 October 2015 (S/PRST/2015/17), 16 November 2016 (S/PRST/2016/17), 4 April 2017 (S/PRST/2017/5), 13 July 2017 (S/PRST/2017/9), and 13 July 2018 (S/PRST/2018/14),

*Welcoming* the significant efforts made by the CAR authorities, in coordination with their international partners, to advance the reform of the security sector, including the ongoing deployment of CAR defence and security forces as well as the adoption of a National Defence Plan, a Force Employment Concept, and a National Security Policy and *acknowledging* the urgent need for the CAR authorities to train and equip their defence and security forces to be able to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens in the CAR,

*Welcoming* the Secretary-General's Report of 15 October 2018 (S/2018/922) submitted pursuant to resolution 2387 (2017), and *taking note of* his letter dated 31 July 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/752) pursuant to paragraph 43 of resolution 2399 (2018),

*Taking note of* the midterm report and the final report (S/2018/1119) of the Panel of Experts on the CAR established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), expanded by resolution 2134 (2014) and extended pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018), and *taking note of* the Panel of Experts' recommendations,

*Determining* that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 January 2020 the measures and provisions as set out in paragraphs 1 to 19 of resolution 2399 (2018);
2. *Reaffirms* that the measures described in paragraphs 9 and 16 of resolution 2399 (2018) shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) ("the Committee"), as set forth in paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution 2399 (2018);
3. *Decides* to extend until 29 February 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraphs 30 to 39 of resolution 2399 (2018), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 January 2020, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the current members of the Panel of Experts;
4. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 30 July 2019, a final report no later than 31 December 2019, and progress updates, as appropriate;
5. *Expresses particular concern* about reports of illicit transnational trafficking networks which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR, and *requests* the Panel, in the course of carrying out its man-

- date, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks, in cooperation with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council as appropriate;
6. *Urges* all parties, and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members;
  7. *Further urges* all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate and *recalls* the value of information-sharing between MINUSCA and the Panel of Experts;
  8. *Reaffirms* the Committee provisions and the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2399 (2018);
  9. *Expresses* its intention to establish, no later than 30 April 2019, clear and well identified key benchmarks regarding the reform of the security sector, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process, and the management of weapons and ammunition, that could serve in guiding the Security Council to review the arms embargo measures on the Government of the CAR;
  10. *Requests* in this regard the Secretary-General, in close consultation with MINUSCA, UNMAS and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 31 July 2019, an assessment on the progress achieved on the key benchmarks that will be established pursuant to paragraph 9 above and *further expresses* its intention to review, by 30 September 2019, the arms embargo measures on the Government of the CAR in light of this assessment;
  11. *Requests* the CAR authorities to report, by 30 June 2019, to the Committee on the progress achieved regarding the reform of the security sector, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process, and the management of weapons and ammunition;
  12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 26 februari 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8469e zitting Resolutie 2456 (2019) inzake het Midden-Oosten aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

#### **Resolution 2456 (2019)**

##### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8469th meeting, on 26 February 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016), 2342 (2017), 2402 (2018), 2451 (2018) and 2452 (2019) and the statements of its President dated 15 February 2013 (S/PRST/2013/3), 29 August 2014 (S/PRST/2014/18), 22 March 2015 (S/PRST/2015/8), and 25 April 2016 (S/PRST/2016/5), 15 June 2017 (S/PRST/2017/7) and 15 March 2018 (S/PRST/2018/5) concerning Yemen,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen,

*Expressing* concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of weapons,

*Reiterating* its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

*Reaffirming* the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable,

*Expressing* its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Secretary-General in support of the Yemeni transition process,

*Expressing its grave concern* that areas of Yemen are under the control of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Yemen and the region, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations, *expressing* concern at the increasing presence and future potential growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) affiliates in Yemen, and *reaffirming its resolve* to address all aspects of the threat posed by AQAP, ISIL (Da'esh), and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,

*Recalling* the listing of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and associated individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of resolution 2253 (2015) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

*Noting* the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and resolution 2216 (2015), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard, and encouraging *efforts* to further enhance cooperation,

*Recalling* the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) imposing a targeted arms embargo,

*Gravely distressed* by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen, *expressing serious concern* at all instances of hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population of Yemen,

*Emphasizing* the necessity of discussion by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (“the Committee”) of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts reports,

*Determining* that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, and in accordance with resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016), 2451 (2018) and 2452 (2019) and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people;
2. *Decides* to renew until 26 February 2020 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2015), and *further reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);

#### *Designation Criteria*

3. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or listed in the annex to resolution 2216 (2015) as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
4. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015);

#### *Reporting*

5. *Decides* to extend until 28 March 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 28 February 2020, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 28 March 2020 drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
6. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a mid-term update to the Committee no later than 28 July 2019, and a final report no later than 28 January 2020 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;
7. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2368 (2017);
8. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
9. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
10. *Calls upon* all Member States which have not already done so to report to the Committee as soon as possible on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015), and *recalls* in this regard that Member States undertaking cargo inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2216 (2015) are required to submit written reports to the Committee as set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);
11. *Recalls* the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
12. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 30 mei 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8536e zitting Resolutie 2471 (2019) inzake Zuid-Sudan aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2471 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8536th meeting, on 30 May 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016), 2280 (2016), 2290 (2016), 2302 (2016), 2304 (2016), 2327 (2016), 2353 (2017), 2392 (2017), 2406 (2018), 2418 (2018), and 2428 (2018),

*Determining* that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2020 the measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), as renewed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2428 (2018), and reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015), and paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of resolution 2428 (2018);
2. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2020 the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018), and reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 2428 (2018);
3. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2020 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as established by paragraph 18 of resolution 2206 (2015) and most recently renewed by paragraph 19 of resolution 2428 (2018), and *decides* that the Panel of Experts should provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 1 December 2019, a final report by 1 May 2020, and, except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month, and *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 31 May 2020;
4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Op 10 juni 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8540e zitting Resolutie 2473 (2019) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

### **Resolution 2473 (2019)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 8540th meeting, on 10 June 2019**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

*Recalling* its resolutions 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017) and 2420 (2018) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

*Mindful* of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2420 for a further 12 months from the date of this resolution;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;
3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter

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Op 26 juni 2019 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8563e zitting Resolutie 2478 (2019) inzake de Democratische Republiek Congo aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

## Resolution 2478 (2019)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8563rd meeting, on 26 June 2019

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 2360 (2017), and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and *emphasizing* the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

*Taking note* of the final report (S/2019/469) of the Group of Experts on the DRC (“the Group of Experts”) established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and extended pursuant to resolutions 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012), 2136 (2014), 2198 (2015), 2293 (2016), 2360 (2017) and 2424 (2018),

*Reiterating* the need for the Government of the DRC to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them and bring those responsible to justice, *welcoming* the Secretary General’s commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice, *further welcoming* the work of the United Nations team deployed to assist the Congolese authorities in their investigations, in agreement with the Congolese authorities, and *welcoming* their continued cooperation,

*Determining* that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 1 July 2020 the measures as set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 of resolution 2293 (2016), including its reaffirmations therein;
2. *Reaffirms* that measures described in paragraph 5 of resolution 2293 (2016) shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee, as set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2293 (2016) and paragraph 3 of resolution 2360 (2017);
3. *Decides* to extend until 1 August 2020 the mandate of the Group of Experts, as set forth in paragraph 6 of Resolution 2360, *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 1 July 2020, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Group of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group established pursuant to previous resolutions;
4. *Requests* the Group of Experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a mid-term report no later than 30 December 2019, and a final report no later than 15 June 2020, as well as submit monthly updates to the Committee, except in the months where the mid-term and final reports are due;
5. *Reaffirms* the reporting provisions as set out in resolution 2360 (2017);
6. *Recalls* the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work as adopted by the Committee on 6 August 2010, and *calls on* Member states to use, as appropriate, the procedures and criteria therein, including on the issues of listing and delisting and *recalls* resolution 1730 (2006) in that regard;
7. *Requests* the Group of Experts to circulate to the Committee every twelve months proposed updates to the existing information on the DRC Sanctions List compiled in line with the Guidelines and in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence or nationality, where known, regarding:
  - a) identifiers of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated by the Committee;
  - b) individuals on the DRC Sanctions List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information such as the certification of death, and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any legal beneficiaries or any joint owners on the DRC Sanctions List who would be in position to obtain any unfrozen assets;
  - c) groups, undertakings and entities on the Sanctions List that are reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, along with an assessment of any relevant information;
  - d) other relevant additions or modifications to the statement of cases;
8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen

heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de *vierde* september 2019.

*De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,*

S.A. BLOK