

TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

JAARGANG 2018 Nr. 153

A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

Voor een overzicht van de verdragsgegevens, zie verdragsnummer 006585 in de Verdragenbank.

B. TEKST

Op 7 november 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8088e zitting Resolutie 2383 (2017) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2383 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8088th meeting, on 7 November 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), 2246 (2015), and 2316 (2016) as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/859), as requested by resolution 2316 (2016), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia's sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, and *expressing* concern about the recent piracy incidents that occurred during 2017 and by the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels operating in conformity with international law, *commending* Chinese and Indian naval forces for thwarting an attack on the OS-35, Chinese operations soldiers for capturing three pirates, and Chinese and European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) for preventing an attack on MV Al Heera, and *further commending* countries that have deployed naval forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to dissuade piracy networks from carrying out acts of piracy,

Supporting the outcome of the London Somalia Conference held on 11 May 2017, and the commitment of the Federal Government and Federal Member States of Somalia to developing their maritime security capabilities,

Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *reiterating* its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

Welcoming the successful prosecution of piracy cases in Belgium, India, Mauritius, and the Seychelles during the past year, while *noting* with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of Somalia, which has led to pirates in many cases being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and *reiterating* that, consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention") provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 2 November 2017, from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations *expressing* the appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, asking member states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone, and *requesting* that the provisions of resolution 2316 (2016) be renewed for an additional 12 months,

Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional partners in the 20th plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in Mauritius July 5–7, 2017, co-hosted by the Indian Ocean Commission under the Chairmanship of the Republic of the Seychelles,

Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and the intentions of the Regional Capacity Building Working Group to identify regional priorities and coordination of capacity-building activities and regional responsibilities,

Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in accordance with applicable international human rights law, *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that pirates are held accountable,

Commending the efforts of the EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and the naval activities of the Southern Africa Development Community, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,

Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and to allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law,

Welcoming and encouraging the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union's activities under the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) which assists Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity in order to enable it to enforce maritime law more effectively, and *recognizing* the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

Supporting the development of a coastguard at the federal level and coastguard police at the Federal Member State level, *noting* with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and *recognizing* the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, *noting* the efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high-risk areas, and further welcoming the European Union's EUCAP Somalia, which is working to develop the maritime security capacities of Somalia,

Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the ongoing work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and *noting* the importance of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of piracy,

Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and *welcoming* international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and *commending* the establishment of the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles on 1 July 2017, which will operate alongside its sister centre, and appreciating the establishment of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar, including the establishment of the Piracy Prosecution Readiness Plan which, under the auspices of UNODC and in partnership with EU NAVFOR, will further develop the region's capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions,

Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, strongly *condemning* the continuing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, *expressing* serious concern at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, *recognizing* the adverse impact on their families, *calling* for the immediate release of all remaining hostages, and *noting* the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Seychelles, for their efforts to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international human rights law, and *emphasizing* the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

Welcoming the readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *acknowledging* the return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve their sentences in Somalia,

Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), the central mechanism for developing capability and identifying and channelling support, as highlighted at the London Somalia Conference in May 2017, and *encouraging* the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,

Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and *noting* the complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, *recognizing* that IUU fishing accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,

Noting Somalia's accession to the FAO's Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, *recognizing* the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing the Somalia's capacity to combat such activities, and *stressing* the need for States and international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia's capacity to combat such activities,

Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licences, *commending* in this regard the implementation of a component of the EU-funded Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (CCAP) with FAO aims to promote proper and transparent licensed and regulated fishing with regional states, and *encouraging* further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international community,

Recalling the reports of the Secretary General which illustrate the seriousness of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized anti-piracy courts,

Commending the Hostage Support Partnership (HSP) for the release of 26 seafarers in 2016, but *remaining concerned* that eight Iranian seafarers from the FV Siraj remain as hostages inside Somalia in appalling conditions, and *welcoming* the work of International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) and Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) in the provision of post trauma intervention and financial support to victims of piracy and their families; as well as the CGPCS Piracy Survivors Family Fund (PSFF), which provides funds for the survivors of Somali piracy, and for their families, to provide a range of support during and after captivity and recognizing the need to continue supporting these initiatives and contributions to funds,

Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,

Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,

Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, *noting* the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya, and Tanzania, *recognizing* the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates,

Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further *emphasizing* that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali Coast Guard and Maritime Police Units, Somali National Army, and Somali Police Force,

Welcoming the Padang Communiqué and Maritime Cooperation Declaration adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs,

Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that it condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. *While noting* improvements in Somalia, *recognizes* that piracy exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime, corruption, and terrorism;
3. *Stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community;
4. *Underlines* the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *welcomes* the draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia have submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval by Parliament and *urges* the Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. *Recognizes* the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, *urges* States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. *Calls upon* States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;
10. *Welcomes* the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court for piracy and maritime crime and further *welcomes* the successful prosecution of piracy cases by this body;

11. *Recognizes* the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *calls* upon all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. *Renews* its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;
13. *Highlights* the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued support of these efforts;
14. *Encourages* Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *decides* that, for a further period of 12 months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2316 (2016) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. *Affirms* that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been renewed in response to the 2 November 2017 letter conveying the request of Somali authorities;
16. *Decides* that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above;
17. *Requests* that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;
18. *Calls upon* all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
19. *Calls upon* all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
20. *Welcomes*, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme's continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;
21. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;
22. *Urges* all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;

23. *Urges* States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. *Urges* all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. *Urges* all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. *Commends* the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. *Urges* States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. *Acknowledges* the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;
29. *Encourages* flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
30. *Invites* the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO's role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;
31. *Notes* the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
32. *Requests* States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
33. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
34. *Expresses its intention* to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
35. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 14 november 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8099e zitting Resolutie 2385 (2017) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2385 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8099th meeting, on 14 November 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, in particular resolutions 733 (1992), 1844 (2008), 1907 (2009), 2036 (2012), 2023 (2011), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2124 (2013), 2125 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), 2244 (2015) and 2317 (2016),

Taking note of the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (the SEMG) on Somalia (S/2017/924) and Eritrea (S/2017/925) and their conclusions on the situations in both Somalia and Eritrea,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea respectively, and underscoring the importance of working to prevent destabilizing effects of regional crises and disputes from spilling over into Somalia,

Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, including when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, and to Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region,

Expressing concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of Somalia and the region, and expressing concern at the emergence of, and growing threat of, affiliates of ISIL (also known as Da'esh),

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Welcoming the further improved relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Federal Member States (FMS), and the SEMG, and *underlining* the importance of these relationships improving further and strengthening in the future,

Welcoming the FGS and FMS's political agreement reached on 16 April 2017 on a National Security Architecture to integrate regional and federal forces, the Security Pact, agreed at the London Conference and looking forward to the Security Conference to be held in Mogadishu in December 2017,

Welcoming the efforts of the FGS to improve its notifications to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea ("the Committee"), *urging* further progress in the future, particularly in relation to post-delivery notifications, and *recalling* that improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region,

Taking note of the efforts of the FGS to restore key economic and financial institutions, increase domestic revenue and implement financial governance and structural reforms; *welcoming* the passing of a landmark telecommunications bill together with progress on the anti-corruption bill; and *highlighting* the importance of continual progress in these areas,

Underlining the importance of financial propriety in contributing to stability and prosperity and *stressing* the need for a zero tolerance approach to corruption to promote transparency and increase mutual accountability in Somalia,

Expressing serious concern at reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, *underlining* the importance of refraining from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, *welcoming* further reporting on the matter, and encouraging the FGS, with the support of the international community, to ensure that fishing licenses are issued in a responsible manner and in line with the appropriate Somali legal framework,

Expressing serious concern at the ongoing difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia, and *condemning* in the strongest terms any party obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as the misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies,

Recalling that the FGS has the primary responsibility to protect its population, and *recognizing* the FGS' responsibility, working with the FMS to build the capacity of its own national security forces, as a matter of priority,

Taking note of the three meetings between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, *expressing concern* that the SEMG has not been able to visit Eritrea since 2011 and fully discharge its mandate, and *underlining* that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council fully assess Eritrea's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions,

Expressing concern over reports by the SEMG of ongoing Eritrean support for certain regional armed groups, and *encouraging* the SEMG to provide further detailed reporting and evidence on support for armed groups in the region,

Welcoming the release of four prisoners of war by Eritrea in March 2016, expressing concern at ongoing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes in 2008, *calling on* Eritrea and Djibouti to continue to engage in resolving the issues of combatants, and *urging* Eritrea to share any further available detailed information pertaining to the combatants, including to the SEMG,

Welcoming the restraint shown by both Eritrea and Djibouti with regard to the situation on their shared border following the withdrawal of Qatari forces, recalling the African Union's deployment of a fact finding mission to the Djibouti border following the withdrawal of Qatari forces, *noting* that the fact-finding mission visited Djibouti and is yet to visit Asmara, and welcoming the call by the Assembly of the African Union in July 2017 to encourage the Chairperson of the Commission, with the necessary support of the two countries, to pursue efforts towards normalization of relations and good neighbourhood between Djibouti and Eritrea,

Underlining the importance it attaches to all Member States complying with the terms of the arms embargo imposed on Eritrea by resolution 1907 (2009),

Determining that the situation in Somalia, as well as the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Arms embargo

1. *Reaffirms* the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 14 of resolution 2125 (2013), paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014), and paragraph 2 of resolution 2244 (2015), and paragraph 2 of resolution 2317 (2016) (hereafter referred to as “the arms embargo on Somalia”);
2. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 November 2018, and in that context *reiterates* that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);
3. *Reaffirms* that the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying arms and related materiel for defensive purposes does not amount to a delivery of such items in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;
4. *Reiterates* that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces, and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles;
5. *Welcomes* in this regard the initial improvements by the FGS, of a more rigorous weapons registration, recording and marking procedure, *expresses concern* at reports of continued weapons diversion from within the FGS and FMS, *encourages* further improvements, *notes* that further improved weapons management is vital in order to prevent the diversion of weapons, and *reiterates* that the Security Council is committed to monitoring and assessing improvements in order to review the arms embargo when all conditions as set out in Security Council resolutions are met;
6. *Welcomes* the efforts of the FGS to develop detailed Standard Operating Procedures for weapons and ammunition management including an issue and receipt system to track all weapons post distribution, and *urges* the FGS to finalize and implement these procedures as soon as possible;
7. *Further welcomes* the efforts of the FGS in establishing the Joint Verification Team (JVT) and *urges* Member States to support improved weapons and ammunition management to improve the capacity of the FGS to manage weapons and ammunition;
8. *Welcomes* the improvement in FGS reporting to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), *calls on* the FGS and FMS to implement the National Security Architecture, and the Security Pact, agreed at the London Conference on Somalia which set out to provide Somali-led security and protection to the people of Somalia, and *requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015) on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its Security Forces, including the status of regional and militia forces by 30 March 2018 and then by 30 September 2018;
9. *Recalls* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee, pursuant to paragraphs 3 to 8 of resolution 2142 (2014), *welcomes* the efforts of the FGS in improving its notifications to the Committee;
10. *Calls upon* the FGS to improve the timeliness and content of notifications regarding the completion of deliveries, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2142 (2014) and the destination unit upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, as set out by paragraph 7 of resolution 2142 (2014);
11. *Stresses* Member States’ obligations pursuant to the notification procedures set out in paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013), *underlines* the need for Member States to strictly follow the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions, and *encourages* Member States to consider the Implementation Assistance Notice of 14 March 2016 as a guide;
12. *Recalls* paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) and notes that support for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may include, inter alia, building infrastructure and provision of salaries and stipends solely provided to the Somali National Security Forces;
13. *Urges* increased cooperation by Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014), to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, involving other Somali National Security Forces as appropriate;
14. *Calls upon* the FGS and FMS to enhance civilian oversight of its Security Forces, to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, in particular through investigation and prosecuting individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, and in this context *recalls* the importance of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to the Somali National Army;
15. *Requests* the SEMG to continue its investigations related to the export to Somalia of chemicals that may be used as oxidisers in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, such as the precursors ammo-

- mium nitrate, potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate and sodium chlorate with a view to considering further action, and calls on Members States and the FGS to cooperate with the SEMG in this regard;
16. *Underlines* the importance of timely and predictable payment of salaries to the Somali security forces and *calls on* the FGS to implement systems to improve the timeliness and accountability of payments and supply of provisions to the Somali security forces;
 17. *Recalls* the need to build the capacities of the Somali National Security Forces, in particular the provision of equipment, training and mentoring, in order to develop credible, professional and representative security forces to enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and *encourages* further donor support and coordination as set out in the Security Pact;
 18. *Recalls* OP16 and OP17 of resolution 1907 (2009) and recognizes that during the course of its current and three previous mandates the SEMG has not found conclusive evidence that Eritrea supports Al-Shabaab;
 19. *Further reaffirms* the arms embargo on Eritrea imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009) (hereafter referred to as "the arms embargo on Eritrea");

Threats to peace and security

20. *Expresses concern* at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources which pose a risk to State-building efforts, *expresses serious concern* at reports of financial impropriety involving members of the FGS, FMS and Federal Parliament, which pose a risk to State-building efforts, and in this context *underlines* that individuals engaged in acts which threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia may be listed for targeted measures;
21. *Welcomes* the efforts which the FGS has made in order to improve its financial management procedures including continued engagement between the FGS and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), *encourages* the FGS and FMS to maintain the pace of reform and continue the implementation of IMF-recommended reforms to support the continuation of a Staff Monitored Programme and increased transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness and predictability in revenue collection and budget allocations, and expresses concern at the generation and distribution of counterfeit Somali currency;
22. *Recognizes* that addressing outstanding constitutional issues around power and resource sharing between the FGS and FMS is crucial for Somalia's stability, *emphasizes* the importance of Somali leadership to address these issues in an inclusive manner, with the FGS and the FMS working constructively together, and *encourages* the FGS and FMS to implement the outstanding elements of the National Security Architecture agreement, including decisions around the make-up, distribution and command and control of the security forces and resource-sharing;
23. *Reaffirms* Somalia's sovereignty over its natural resources;
24. *Reiterates its serious concern* that the petroleum sector in Somalia could be a driver for increased conflict, and in that context underlines the vital importance of the FGS putting in place, without undue delay, resource-sharing arrangements and credible legal framework to ensure that the petroleum sector in Somalia does not become a source of increased tension;
25. *Expresses serious concern* at Al-Shabaab's increasing reliance on revenue from natural resources including the taxing of illicit sugar trade, agricultural production, and livestock and further expresses its concern at the group's involvement in the illicit charcoal trade, and *looks forward* to further SEMG reporting on this issue;

Charcoal ban

26. *Reaffirms* the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), *welcomes* efforts of Member States to prevent the import of charcoal of Somali origin, *reiterates* that the FGS and FMS shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, and *urges* Member States to continue their efforts to ensure full implementation of the ban;
27. *Reiterates* its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013), that AMISOM support and assist the FGS and FMS in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the SEMG to charcoal exporting ports;
28. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in their efforts to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *further welcomes* the cooperation between the SEMG and CMF in keeping the Committee informed on the charcoal trade;
29. *Expresses concern* that the charcoal trade provides significant funding for Al-Shabaab, and in that context reiterates paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and *further decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2018;
30. *Condemns* the ongoing export of charcoal from Somalia, in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, *calls on* Members States to share information with the SEMG, *requests* the SEMG to focus on this in their next report, and propose further measures, taking account of human rights concerns, and *expresses* its intention to consider further measures if violations continue;
31. *Encourages* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work, with the FGS, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant Member States and international organizations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal;

Humanitarian access

32. *Expresses serious concern* at the acute humanitarian situation in Somalia and the risk of famine, *welcomes* efforts by the United Nations, the international community and the FGS to avert famine, *condemns* in the strongest terms increased attacks against humanitarian actors and any misuse of donor assistance and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia and *encourages* the FGS to improve the regulatory environment for aid donors;
33. *Decides* that until 15 November 2018 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;
34. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2018 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and *requests* relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and their implementing partners that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia to increase their cooperation and willingness to share information with the United Nations;

Eritrea

35. *Welcomes* the SEMG's ongoing and significant efforts to engage with the Government of Eritrea, in that context recalls the three meetings between the Representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, *reiterates* its expectation that the Government of Eritrea will facilitate the entry of the SEMG to Eritrea, to discharge fully its mandate, in line with its repeated requests, including in paragraph 52 of resolution 2182 (2014);
36. *Welcomes* recent efforts by the Government of Eritrea to engage with the international community, *underlines* that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council be better informed about Eritrea's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and enable a review of measures on Eritrea;
37. *Urges* the Government of Eritrea to facilitate visits by the SEMG to Eritrea, acknowledges the willingness as expressed by the Government of Eritrea to facilitate a visit by the Chair and *urges* the Government to agree a date as soon as possible;
38. *Calls on* Eritrea to cooperate fully with the SEMG, in accordance with the SEMG's mandate contained in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013);
39. *Urges* Eritrea and Djibouti to engage on the issue of the Djiboutian combatants missing in action and *urges* Eritrea to make available any further detailed information including to the SEMG;
40. *Urges* the two parties to continue to maintain an atmosphere of calm and restraint and *calls on* them to seek all available solutions to settle their border dispute peacefully in a manner consistent with international law;
41. *Expresses* its intention to keep under regular review measures on Eritrea, in light of the upcoming mid-term update by the SEMG due by 30 April 2018, taking into account relevant Security Council resolutions, and paragraphs 35 to 40 above;

Somalia

42. *Recalls* resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and *notes* one of the listing criteria under resolution 1844 (2008) is engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
43. *Reiterates* its willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals and entities on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria;
44. *Recalls* paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012) and emphasizes that certain misappropriation of financial resources is a criterion for designation and applies to misappropriation at all levels;
45. *Reiterates its request* for Member States to assist the SEMG in their investigations, *reiterates* that obstructing the investigations or work of the SEMG is a criterion for listing under paragraph 15 (e) of resolution 1907 (2009) and *further requests* the FGS, FMS and AMISOM to share information with the SEMG regarding Al-Shabaab activities;
46. *Decides* to extend until 15 December 2018 the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea SEMG as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 15 November 2018;
47. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the SEMG, in consultation with the Committee, until 15 December 2018, drawing, as

appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the SEMG established pursuant to previous resolutions, and *further requests* that administrative support to the SEMG be adjusted, within existing resources, to facilitate the delivery of their mandate;

48. *Requests* the SEMG to provide monthly updates to the Committee, and a comprehensive midterm update, as well as to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, two final reports; one focusing on Somalia, the other on Eritrea by 15 October 2018, covering all the tasks set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014);
49. *Requests* the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the SEMG and other relevant United Nations entities to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the SEMG and recommend to the Security Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the Somalia and Eritrea arms embargoes, the measures regarding the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as well as implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolutions 1844 (2008) and paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of resolution 1907 (2009) in response to continuing violations;
50. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution;
51. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 22 december 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8151e zitting Resolutie 2397 (2017) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2397 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8151st meeting, on 22 December 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017), resolution 2375 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 28 November 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community including the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare, inherent dignity, and rights of people in the DPRK, and *expressing great concern* that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK at tremendous cost when they have great unmet needs,

Acknowledging that the proceeds of the DPRK's trade in sectoral goods, including but not limited to coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, textiles, seafood, gold, silver, rare earth minerals, and other prohibited metals, as well as the revenue generated from DPRK workers overseas, among others, contribute to the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launch conducted by the DPRK on 28 November 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium

on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8(e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

Sectoral

4. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all crude oil, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil which is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, further *decides* that this prohibition shall not apply with respect to crude oil that, for a period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution, and for twelve months periods thereafter, does not exceed 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons in the aggregate per twelve month period, and *decides* that all Member States providing crude oil shall provide a report to the Committee every 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution of the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK;
5. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such products, *further decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, in the aggregate amount of up to 500,000 barrels during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1, 2018, and for twelve month periods thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and *further directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, *calls upon* all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision beginning on 1 January 2018, *directs* the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard;

6. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, food and agricultural products (HS codes 12, 08, 07), machinery (HS code 84), electrical equipment (HS code 85), earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25), wood (HS code 44), and vessels (HS code 89), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of the above-mentioned commodities and products from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, *clarifies* that the full sectoral ban on seafood in paragraph 9 of resolution 2371 (2017) prohibits the DPRK from selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, fishing rights, and *further decides* that for sales of and transactions involving all commodities and products from the DPRK whose transfer, supply, or sale by the DPRK are prohibited by this paragraph and for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may only allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
7. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals (HS codes 72 through 83) and *further decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300);
8. *Expresses concern* that DPRK nationals continue to work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite the adoption of paragraph 17 of resolution 2375 (2017), *decides* that Member States shall repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad immediately but no later than 24 months from the date of adoption of this resolution unless the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law, including international refugee law and international human rights law, and the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and *further decides* that all Member States shall provide a midterm report by 15 months from the date of adoption of this resolution of all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction that were repatriated over the 12 month period starting from the date of adoption of this resolution, including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated by the end of that 12 month period if applicable, and all Member States shall provide final reports by 27 months from the date of adoption of this resolution;

Maritime Interdiction of Cargo Vessels

9. *Notes with great concern* that the DPRK is illicitly exporting coal and other prohibited items through deceptive maritime practices and obtaining petroleum illegally through ship-to-ship transfers and *decides* that Member States shall seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel in their ports, and may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters, if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded), and *further decides* that, after six months from the date such vessels were frozen (impounded), this provision shall not apply if the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of a flag State, that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of these resolutions;
10. *Decides* that when a Member State has information to suspect that the DPRK is attempting to supply, sell, transfer or procure, directly or indirectly, illicit cargo, that Member State may request additional maritime and shipping information from other relevant Member States, including to determine whether the item, commodity, or product in question originated from the DPRK, *further decides* that all Member States receiving such inquiries shall respond as promptly as possible to such requests in an appropriate manner, *decides* that the Committee, with the support of its Panel of Experts, shall facilitate timely coordination of such information requests through an expedited process, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources to the Committee and the Panel of Experts in this regard;
11. *Reaffirms* paragraph 22 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that each Member State shall prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels it has reasonable grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;

tion, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;

12. *Reaffirms* paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that each Member State shall de-register any vessel it has reasonable grounds to believe was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution and prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from thereafter providing classification services to such a vessel except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and *further decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
13. *Expresses concern* that DPRK-flagged, controlled, chartered, or operated vessels intentionally disregard requirements to operate their automatic identification systems (AIS) to evade UNSCR sanctions monitoring by turning off such systems to mask their full movement history and *calls upon* Member States to exercise enhanced vigilance with regards to such vessels conducting activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;
14. *Recalls* paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and *decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any new or used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
15. *Decides* that, if a Member State has information regarding the number, name, and registry of vessels encountered in its territory or on the high seas that are designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as subject to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), the various measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), the port entry ban imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017), or relevant measures in this resolution, then the Member State shall notify the Committee of this information and what measures were taken to carry out an inspection, an asset freeze and impoundment or other appropriate action as authorized by the relevant provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), or this resolution;
16. *Decides* that the provisions of this resolution shall not apply with respect solely to the trans-shipment of Russia-origin coal to other countries through the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project, as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017) and paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017);

Sanctions Implementation

17. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
18. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;
19. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
20. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;
21. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

22. *Emphasizes* that the measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution shall in no way impede the activities of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;

Political

23. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK, and *demands* that the DPRK stop diverting its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the cost of the people in the DPRK;
24. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and 41% of its total population who are undernourished, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;
25. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, *stresses* the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;
26. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the return of the DPRK to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States parties to the NPT and underlining the need for all States parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
27. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;
28. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch, and *decides* that, if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges or contributing to the development of a ballistic missile system capable of such ranges, then the Security Council will take action to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum;
29. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CH'OE SO'K MIN
- a) Description: Ch'oe So'k-min is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the Foreign Trade Bank branch office in that overseas location. He has been associated with cash transfers from that overseas Foreign Trade Bank office to banks affiliated with North Korean special organizations and Reconnaissance General Bureau operatives located overseas in an effort to evade sanctions.
- b) AKA: n/a
- c) Identifiers: DOB: 25 July 1978; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

2. CHU HYO'K
 - a) Description: Chu Hyo'k is a North Korean national who is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Ju Hyok
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 23 November 1986; Passport No. 836420186 issued 28 October 2016 expires 28 October 2021; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
3. KIM JONG SIK
 - a) *Description*: A leading official guiding the DPRK's WMD development efforts. Serving as Deputy Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Munitions Industry Department.
 - b) A.K.A.: Kim Cho'ng-sik
 - c) *Identifiers*: YOB: between 1967 and 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
4. KIM KYONG IL
 - a) Description: Kim Kyong Il is a Foreign Trade Bank deputy chief representative in Libya.
 - b) AKA: Kim Kyo'ng-il
 - c) Identifiers: Location Libya; DOB: 01 August 1979; Passport No. 836210029; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
5. KIM TONG CHOL
 - a) Description: Kim Tong Chol is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Kim Tong-ch'o'l
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 28 January 1966; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
6. KO CHOL MAN
 - a) Description: Ko Chol Man is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Ko Ch'o'l-man
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 30 September 1967; Passport No. 472420180; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
7. KU JA HYONG
 - a) Description: Ku Ja Hyong is a Foreign Trade Bank chief representative in Libya.
 - b) AKA: Ku Cha-hyo'ng
 - c) Identifiers: Location Libya; DOB: 08 September 1957; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
8. MUN KYONG HWAN
 - a) Description: Mun Kyong Hwan is an overseas Bank of East Land representative.
 - b) AKA: Mun Kyo'ng-hwan
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1967; Passport No. 381120660 expires 25 March 2016; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
9. PAE WON UK
 - a) Description: Pae Won Uk is an overseas Daesong Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Pae Wo'n-uk
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 22 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Passport No. 472120208 expires 22 Feb 2017
10. PAK BONG NAM
 - a) Description: Pak Bong Nam is an overseas Ilsim International Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 06 May 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
 - d) Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
11. PAK MUN IL
 - a) Description: Pak Mun Il is an overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank.
 - b) AKA: Pak Mun-il
 - c) Identifiers: DOB 01 January 1965; Passport No. 563335509 expires 27 August 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
12. RI CHUN HWAN
 - a) Description: Ri Chun Hwan is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Ri Ch'un-hwan
 - c) Identifiers: DOB 21 August 1957; Passport No. 563233049 expires 09 May 2018; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
13. RI CHUN SONG
 - a) Description: Ri Chun Song is an overseas Foreign Trade Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Ri Ch'un-so'ng
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 30 October 1965; Passport No. 654133553 expires 11 March 2019; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
14. RI PYONG CHUL
 - a) *Description*: Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea and First Vice Director of the Munitions Industry Department.
 - b) A.K.A.: Ri Pyo'ng-ch'o'l
 - c) *Identifiers*: YOB: 1948; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
15. RI SONG HYOK
 - a) Description: Ri Song Hyok is an overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank and has reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of North Korea.

- b) AKA: Li Cheng He
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 19 March 1965; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male
16. RI U'N SO'NG
- a) Description: Ri U'n-so'ng is an overseas Korea Unification Development Bank representative.
 - b) AKA: Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song
 - c) Identifiers: DOB: 23 July 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. MINISTRY OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (MPAF)
 - a) *Description:* The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces manages the general administrative and logistical needs of the Korean People's Army.
 - b) *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK

Op 30 januari 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8169e zitting Resolutie 2399 (2018) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2399 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8169th meeting, on 30 January 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the Central African Republic (CAR), in particular resolutions 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2149 (2014), 2181 (2014), 2196 (2015), 2212 (2015), 2217 (2015), 2262 (2016), 2264 (2016), 2281 (2016), 2301 (2016), 2339 (2017), 2387 (2017) as well as resolution 2272 (2016), and the Statements of its President of 18 December 2014 (S/PRST/2014/28), 20 October 2015 (S/PRST/2015/17), 16 November 2016 (S/PRST/2016/17), 4 April 2017 (S/PRST/2017/5), and 13 July 2017 (S/PRST/2017/9),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the CAR, and *recalling* the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the CAR bears the primary responsibility to protect all populations within its territory from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,

Expressing concern at the deterioration of the security situation, in particular in the south-eastern part and the north-western part of the CAR, due to the ongoing clashes between armed groups and other armed spoilers in their attempts to forcefully gain control of territory and resources and destabilize the country, as well as the lack of capacity of the national security forces, the limited authority of the State over all of the CAR territory, and the persistence of the root causes of the conflict,

Emphasizing that any sustainable solution to the crisis in the CAR should be CAR-owned, including the political process, and should prioritize reconciliation of the Central African people, through an inclusive process that involves men and women of all social, economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds, including those displaced by the crisis,

Calling upon the CAR authorities to continue their efforts to implement transparent and inclusive measures that allow for stabilization and reconciliation in the CAR and restore the effective authority of the State over all of the territory of the CAR; to fight impunity by restoring administration of the judiciary and the criminal justice system, including the penitentiary system, throughout the country; to achieve the reform of the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) and internal security forces in order to put in place multi-ethnic, professional, and republican security services through appropriate security sector reform processes; to carry out the inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) of armed groups, including children formerly associated with them and to prevent the re-recruitment of the latter; and to establish a functioning public financial management in order to meet the expenses related to the functioning of the State, implement early recovery plans, and revitalize the economy,

Welcoming the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR that led to the adoption of the roadmap by the ministerial conference held in Libreville on 17 July 2017 by the CAR authorities, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR) with the support of Angola, Chad, Congo and Gabon, and *reaffirming* that this Initiative and this roadmap constitute the main framework for a political solution in the CAR, as agreed by CAR authorities and under their leadership,

Encouraging the CAR authorities, in collaboration with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the European Union Training Mission in the CAR (EUTM-RCA), to provide equal opportunities for members of armed groups, whether anti-Balaka or ex-Séléka, in the process of selecting eligible demobilized members to integrate into the national security and defence forces, *welcoming* in this regard the launch of the DDRR pilot project, and *further encouraging* the CAR authorities to ensure that FACA soldiers of all prefectures enjoy equal access to the registration and simplified verification process,

Underlining the importance of rebuilding a multi-ethnic, republican and professional national army in the CAR, *recognizing* in this regard the work carried out by the EUTM-RCA, *welcoming* the support of other international and regional partners to the training of the national security and defence forces in support of the CAR authorities, and *encouraging* effective coordination with MINUSCA and EUTM-RCA,

Calling upon the CAR authorities to ensure that perpetrators of violations of applicable international law, including those committed against children and women, are excluded from the CAR security and armed forces, and *further calling for* support for the CAR government to develop a comprehensive strategy on sexual and gender-based violence to reduce overall levels of sexual violence,

Welcoming the commitment of the Secretary-General to enforce strictly his zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), noting the various measures taken by MINUSCA and Troop- and Police-contributing countries to combat SEA, which has led to a reduction in reported cases, but still *expressing grave concern* over numerous allegations of SEA reportedly committed by peacekeepers in the CAR, as well as by non-United Nations forces, *stressing* the urgent need for Troop- and Police-contributing countries and, as appropriate, MINUSCA to promptly investigate those cases in a credible and transparent manner and to hold accountable those responsible for such criminal offences or misconduct, and *further stressing* the need to prevent such exploitation and abuse and to improve how these allegations are addressed in line with resolution 2272 (2016),

Welcoming the Secretary-General's Report of 16 October 2017 (S/2017/865) submitted pursuant to resolution 2301 (2016), and *taking note of* his letter dated 10 July 2017 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/597) pursuant to paragraph 29 of resolution 2339 (2017),

Further welcoming also the mid-term update and the final report (S/2017/1023) of the Panel of Experts on the CAR established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), expanded by resolution 2134 (2014) and extended pursuant to resolution 2339 (2017), and *taking note of* the Panel of Experts' recommendations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence and instability in the CAR, and the threats of violence, incitement to ethnic and religious hatred and violence, human rights violations and abuses and international humanitarian law violations, as well as sexual and gender-based violence, in particular against children, committed notably by both ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka elements and other armed groups; the attacks and incitement to violence against United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel; the continuous cycle of provocations and reprisals by armed groups, both inside and outside Bangui and denial of humanitarian access, committed by armed elements, which continue to adversely affect the dire humanitarian situation faced by the civilian population and to impede humanitarian access to vulnerable populations,

Stressing the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in the CAR and to bring to justice perpetrators of these acts, some of which may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to which the CAR is a State party, *noting in this regard* the opening by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on 24 September 2014 of an investigation following the request of the national authorities on alleged crimes committed since 2012, and *welcoming* the ongoing cooperation by the CAR authorities in this regard,

Stressing the importance of putting in place an effective national judicial system, *underlining* the need to bolster national accountability mechanisms, including through further implementation of the 7 August 2014 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Urgent Temporary Measures, *welcoming* in this regard the progressive operationalization of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in the CAR, and *recalling* the importance of continuous support of the international community to this process pursued by the CAR authorities,

Emphasizing that those engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, threaten or impede the political stabilization and reconciliation process, target civilians and attack peacekeepers may meet criteria for designation under sanctions as stated in this resolution,

Expressing concern that illicit trafficking, trade, exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife has a negative impact in the economy and the development of the country, and that it continues to threaten the peace and stability of the CAR,

Recalling the Kimberley Process (KP) Administrative Decision on Resumption of Exports of Rough Diamonds from the CAR, its annexed Operational Framework, and the work of the KP Monitoring Team for CAR, and *recognizing* the need to strengthen the efforts of the CAR Authorities and the KP, to responsibly and progressively, through pre-established "compliant zones", reintegrate the CAR into the global diamond trade,

Noting with concern the findings of the Panel of Experts' final report that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remains active in the south-eastern part of the CAR having carried out the killing and abduction of civilians, including children and women,

Further noting with concern the ongoing transnational criminal activity in the region, *emphasizing* the risk of the situation in the CAR providing a conducive environment for further transnational criminal activities, such as those involving arms trafficking and the use of mercenaries as well as a potential breeding ground for radical networks,

Acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo can make to countering the illicit transfer of arms and related materiel in the CAR and its region, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, DRR and Security sector reform (SSR) processes, *recalling* its resolutions 2117 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2220 (2015), 2262 (2016) and 2339 (2017) and *expressing grave concern* at the threat to peace and security in the CAR arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and the use of such weapons against civilians affected by armed conflict,

Reiterating the importance of all Member States' full implementation of the measures set out in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2196 (2015), 2262 (2016), 2339 (2017) and this resolution, including the obligation to implement targeted sanctions against individuals and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) (the Committee),

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including the key role that neighbouring States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, can play in this regard and encouraging efforts to further enhance cooperation and implementation of the sanctions regime in all its aspects,

Noting with concern the reports that sanctioned individuals are travelling in the region in violation of the travel ban, and *underlining* that individuals or entities who knowingly facilitate the travel of a sanctioned individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria for sanctions,

Further noting with concern the reports that funds, financial assets and economic resources of listed individuals and entities have still not been frozen, and *underlining* the obligation of Member States and CAR authorities to do so without further delays,

Welcoming efforts by the Chair of the Committee and the President of the Security Council to support and strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed pursuant to resolution 2339 (2017) through engagement with Member States, especially regional States,

Determining that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms embargo

1. *Decides* that, until 31 January 2019, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and *decides further* that this measure shall not apply to:
 - a) Supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MINUSCA and the European Union training missions deployed in the CAR, French forces under the conditions provided by paragraph 65 of resolution 2387 (2017), as well as other Member States forces providing training and assistance as notified in advance in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) below;
 - b) Supplies of non-lethal equipment and provision of assistance, including operational and non-operational training to the CAR security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR), in coordination with MINUSCA, and as notified in advance to the Committee, and requests MINUSCA to report on the contribution to SSR of this exemption, as part of its regular reports to the Council;
 - c) Supplies brought into the CAR by Chadian or Sudanese forces solely for their use in international patrols of the tripartite force established on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum by the CAR, Chad and Sudan, to enhance security in the common border areas, in cooperation with MINUSCA, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - d) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - e) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;

- f) Supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international-led patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of the CAR or the CAR's international legal obligations, as notified in advance to the Committee;
 - g) Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee; or
 - h) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;
2. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution, seize, register and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;
 3. *Reiterates* its call upon the CAR authorities, with the assistance of MINUSCA and international partners, to address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the CAR, and to ensure the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition and *further stresses* the importance of incorporating such elements into SSR and DDDR programmes;
 4. *Welcomes* in this regard the creation of the "Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération et la circulation illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre (COMNAT-ALPC)" and *calls on* CAR authorities to fully operationalize it;
 5. *Further welcomes* the establishment of MINUSCA's arms embargo working group (AEWG), which aims to coordinate the mission's efforts on the implementation of the arms embargo and to reinforce its role in countering arms trafficking, and *encourages* the AEWG to serve as a channel for information-sharing on arms trafficking and for recommendations on the control activities to be carried out including, when appropriate, the seizure of weapons, in pursuance of MINUSCA's mandate as defined in paragraph 44 of resolution 2387 (2017);
 6. *Strongly encourages* the CAR authorities to continue to increase their capacity, with the support of MINUSCA, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and other international partners, to store and manage weapons and ammunition in their possession, including those transferred from MINUSCA stocks, according to international best practices and norms, while ensuring that the FACA and internal security forces units receiving such weapons and ammunition are fully trained and vetted;
 7. *Encourages* neighbouring States, in cooperation with the CAR authorities, to take effective action to counter the illicit flow of weapons and ammunition into the CAR and to ensure the traceability of the weapons and ammunition produced on their territories as required by the Kinshasa Convention for the Control of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, parts and components that can be used for their manufacture, repair or assembly;
 8. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular neighbouring States and Member States of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) and of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), to utilize the advance notification and exemption procedures pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution to return arms and related materiel of all types belonging to the FACA, or to implement technical assistance, training or other assistance related to military activities by the Central African national security and defence forces, and in this regard *requests* the Panel of Experts to provide the necessary assistance as per paragraph 32 (b) of this resolution;

Travel ban

9. *Decides* that, until 31 January 2019, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and *calls upon* the CAR Government to enhance cooperation and information sharing with other States in this regard;
10. *Encourages* Member States, as appropriate and in accordance with their domestic law and applicable international legal instruments and framework documents, to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee;
11. *Also encourages* Member States to report any such departures from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations;
12. *Urges* the CAR authorities, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 9 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen, and lost passports and other travel documents, as well as invalidated diplomatic passports, are removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;

13. *Encourages* Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals designated by the Committee for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;
14. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 9 above shall not apply:
 - a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;
 - c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the CAR and stability in the region;
15. *Emphasizes* that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, observes that individuals or entities who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution, and *calls upon* all parties and all Member States to cooperate with the Committee as well as the Panel of Experts on the implementation of the travel ban;

Asset freeze

16. *Decides* that all Member States shall, until 31 January 2019, continue to freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources within their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides further* that all Member States shall continue to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;
17. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 16 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
 - a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
 - b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or
 - c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;
18. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 16 above of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
19. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 16 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 16 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

20. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraphs 9 and 16 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or impede the stabilization and reconciliation process or that fuel violence;
21. *Further decides* in this regard that the measures contained in paragraphs 9 and 16 shall also apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as:
 - a) Acting in violation of the arms embargo established in paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) and extended by paragraph 1 of this resolution, or as having directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to armed groups or criminal networks in the CAR, or as having been the recipient of arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to violent activities of armed groups or criminal networks in the CAR;

- b) Involved in planning, directing, or committing acts in the CAR that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving targeting of civilians, ethnic- or religious-based attacks, attacks on civilian objects, including administrative centers, courthouses, schools and hospitals, and abduction and forced displacement;
 - c) Involved in planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in the CAR;
 - d) Recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the CAR, in violation of applicable international law;
 - e) Providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, wildlife as well as wildlife products in or from the CAR;
 - f) Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the CAR, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in the CAR;
 - g) Involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European Union training missions and French forces deployed under the conditions provided by paragraph 65 of resolution 2387 (2017) and which support them, as well as against humanitarian personnel;
 - h) Being leaders of an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014), paragraphs 11 or 12 of resolution 2196 (2015), paragraphs 12 or 13 of resolution 2262 (2016) or this resolution, or having provided support to, or acted for or on behalf of, or at the direction of, an individual or an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014), paragraphs 11 or 12 of resolution 2196 (2015), paragraphs 12 or 13 of resolution 2262 (2016), paragraphs 16 or 17 of resolution 2339 (2017) or this resolution, or an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity;
22. *Condemns* all acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR and *decides* that individuals and entities who commit such acts and then engage in or provide support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR could meet the designation criteria specified in paragraph 20 above;
23. *Welcomes* measures taken by Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to implement the Regional Initiative against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources as endorsed in the 2010 Lusaka Declaration, including promoting the use by economic actors of Due Diligence Frameworks such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and *encourages* all States, particularly those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines;

Sanctions Committee

24. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) extended by this resolution;
25. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, international and regional and subregional organizations, as may be necessary, in particular neighbouring and regional States, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures renewed by this resolution, and in that regard *encourages* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members;
26. *Requests* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 9 and 16 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and *requests* the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 41 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;
27. *Recalls* the KP's decision that the CAR may resume trade in rough diamonds from "compliant zones" established under conditions set forth by the KP, notes that the KP intends to keep the Security Council, the Committee and its Panel of Experts, and MINUSCA informed of its decisions and, requests the KP Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring to periodically update the Committee on the work of the KP CAR Monitoring Team, including any decisions on areas designated as "compliant zones" and decisions related to the trade of the stockpiles of rough diamonds held in the CAR;
28. *Calls for* enhanced vigilance from international trading centres and States in the region to support the CAR authorities' efforts to re-establish legitimate trade and benefit from its natural resources; and *commends* the CAR for taking special measures to enhance traceability of diamonds from compliant zones so that diamonds are not used for the benefit of armed groups or to destabilize the CAR;
29. *Acknowledges* the KP's progress on the issue of the diamond stockpiles, and *encourages* the KP to facilitate the resolution of the issue, in cooperation with the CAR authorities and in consultation with the Panel of Experts;

Panel of Experts

30. *Expresses* its full support for the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to paragraph 59 of resolution 2127 (2013);

31. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 February 2019, *expresses* its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 January 2019 and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to support its action;
32. *Decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts shall include the following tasks, to:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, including to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building;
 - c) Provide to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 30 July 2018, and a final report by 31 December 2018, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 9 and 16 of this resolution;
 - d) Submit progress updates to the Committee, especially in situations of urgency, or as the Panel deems necessary;
 - e) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities designated by the Committee pursuant to the criteria renewed by paragraphs 20 and 21 above including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
 - f) Assist the Committee by providing information regarding individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, including by reporting such information to the Committee, as it becomes available, and to include in its formal written reports, the names of potential designees, appropriate identifying information, and relevant information regarding why the individual or entity may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 20 and 21 above;
 - g) Collect, in cooperation with MINUSCA, and report to the Committee acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR and identify those perpetrators;
 - h) Cooperate with the KP CAR Monitoring Team to support the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from the CAR and report to the Committee if the resumption of trade is destabilizing the CAR or benefiting armed groups;
33. *Calls upon* the Panel of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of their mandate;
34. *Expresses* particular concern about reports of illicit trafficking networks which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR, and *encourages* the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks;
35. *Requests* the Panel of experts to include the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015), and *encourages* the Panel to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue across its investigations and reporting;
36. *Urges* the CAR, its neighbouring States and other Member States of the ICGLR to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife poaching and trafficking;
37. *Urges* all parties, and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members;
38. *Further urges* all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
39. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

Reporting and review

40. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region and those in which designated individuals and entities designated are based, to actively implement the measures contained in this resolution and to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 9 and 16 of this resolution;
41. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, including alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the CAR on the situation in the CAR as appropriate, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;
42. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in the CAR under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening

through additional measures, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of the country and compliance with this resolution;

43. *Requests* in this regard the Secretariat to provide to the Security Council, within the next 6 months, benchmarks to assess the arms embargo measures according to the progress of the SSR, including FACA and internal security forces and their needs on the basis of option 3 of the letter of the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council on 10 July 2017;
44. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 26 februari 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8190e zitting Resolutie 2402 (2018) inzake het Midden-Oosten aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2402 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8190th meeting, on 26 February 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016), and 2342 (2017) and the statements of its President dated 15 February 2013 (S/PRST/2013/3), 29 August 2014 (S/PRST/2014/18), 22 March 2015 (S/PRST/2015/8) and 25 April 2016 (S/PRST/2016/5), and 15 June 2017 (S/PRST/2017/7) concerning Yemen,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen,

Expressing concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of weapons,

Reiterating its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

Reaffirming the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable,

Expressing its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Secretary-General in support of the Yemeni transition process,

Expressing its grave concern that areas of Yemen are under the control of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Yemen and the region, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations, *expressing* concern at the increasing presence and future potential growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) affiliates in Yemen and *reaffirming its resolve* to address all aspects of the threat posed by AQAP, ISIL (Da'esh), and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,

Recalling the listing of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and associated individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of resolution 2253 (2015) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and resolution 2216 (2015), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard, and encouraging *efforts* to further enhance cooperation,

Recalling the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) imposing a targeted arms embargo,

Gravely distressed by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen, *expressing serious concern* at all instances of hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population of Yemen,

Emphasizing the necessity of discussion by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) ("the Committee"), of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts reports,

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Imple-

mentation Mechanism, and in accordance with resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015) 2216 (2015), and 2266 (2016) and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people;

2. *Decides* to renew until 26 February 2019 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2015), and *further reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);

Designation Criteria

3. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or listed in the annex to resolution 2216 (2015) as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
4. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015);

Reporting

5. *Decides* to extend until 28 March 2019 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 28 February 2019, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 28 March 2019 drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
6. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 28 July 2018, and a final report no later than 28 January 2019 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;
7. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2253 (2015);
8. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
9. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
10. *Calls upon* all Member States which have not already done so to report to the Committee as soon as possible on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) and *recalls* in this regard that Member States undertaking cargo inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2216 (2015) are required to submit written reports to the Committee as set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);
11. *Recalls* the Informal Working Group on General issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
12. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 31 mei 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8273e zitting Resolutie 2418 (2018) inzake Soedan en Zuid-Soedan aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2418 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8273rd meeting, on 31 May 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016), 2280 (2016), 2290 (2016), 2302 (2016), 2304 (2016), 2327 (2016), 2353 (2017), 2392 (2017), and 2406 (2018),

Condemning in the strongest terms the ongoing fighting in violation of the 21 December 2017 “Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians, and Humanitarian Access” (the ACOH), *reiterating* its demand that South Sudan’s leaders implement the permanent ceasefire declared in the 2015 “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan” and ceasefires for which they respectively called on 11 July 2016 and 22 May 2017, as well as the ACOH, and *calling on* South Sudanese parties to demonstrate the political will to peacefully resolve the conflict,

Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 15 July 2018 the measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015), and the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2290 (2016);
2. *Decides* to extend until 14 August 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (f) of paragraph 12 of resolution 2290 (2016), and *decides* that the Panel of Experts should provide to the Committee updates each month, and *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 15 July 2018;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), to report by 30 June 2018 whether any fighting has taken place since adoption of this resolution involving parties to the cessation of hostilities agreement in South Sudan and to report on whether the parties have come to a viable political agreement and *decides* that if the Secretary-General reports such fighting or lack of a viable political agreement, it shall consider applying the measures specified in paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) to the individuals identified in Annex 1 to this resolution and/or an arms embargo within five days of the Secretary-General’s report;
4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. (1) Koang (2) Rambang (3) Chol
 - a) *Description:* Rambang led attacks in Bieh state that expanded or extended the conflict in South Sudan. He ordered his forces to restrict the movement of people working in humanitarian organizations. He was responsible for the detention of two pilots delivering aid, obstructing their humanitarian activities.
 - b) A.K.A.: (a) Koang (b) Rambang (c) Chuol
 - c) *Identifiers:* na
2. (1) Kuol (2) Manyang (3) Juuk
 - a) *Description:* Under Juuk’s command, SPLA forces violated the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians, and Humanitarian Access (ACOH) after it was signed by the Government of South Sudan in 2017 by attacking civilians. Juuk provided military equipment to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), in violation of the ACOH. In 2017, under Juuk’s command the SPLM expanded or extended the conflict through offensives in Pagak.
 - b) A.K.A.: (a) Kuol (b) Manyang (c) Juuk Chaw
 - c) *Identifiers:* DOB: 1945
3. (1) Malek (2) Reuben (3) Riak (4) Rengu
 - a) *Description:* As SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Riak was one of the senior officials of the Government of South Sudan who planned and oversaw an offensive in 2015 that resulted in widespread destruction and large population displacement.
 - b) A.K.A.: (1) Malek (2) Ruben
 - c) *Identifiers:* DOB: 01 Jan 1960
4. (1) Martin (2) Elia (3) Lomuro
 - a) *Description:* In violation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians, and Humanitarian Access (ACOH) signed by the Government of South Sudan in 2017, Lomuro threatened members of the press, obstructed humanitarian missions, and threatened to eliminate the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM). Lomuro also obstructed the activities of UNMISS.
 - b) A.K.A.: (a) Martin (b) Elia (c) Lomoro; (a) Martin (b) Elias (c) Lomoro
 - c) *Identifiers:* DOB: (a) November 20, 1957 or (b) December 1958
5. (1) Michael (2) Makuei (3) Lueth
 - a) *Description:* Makuei expanded or extended the conflict in South Sudan through planning and coordinating a 2014 attack on the UN compound sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bor. He obstructed the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, and worked to obstruct deployment of the Regional Protection Force of UNMISS. As Minister of Information, Broadcasting, Telecommunications, and Postal Services he has overseen attempts

to repress the freedom of expression of civilians through the suppression of publications. He worked to close a UN-operated radio station authorized by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the government and the UN.

- b) A.K.A.: (a) Michael Makwei (b) Michael Makwei Lueth (c) Michael Makuei Lueth Makuei
- c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 1947; POB: (a) Bor, South Sudan (b) Bor, Sudan; Nationality: (a) South Sudan (b) Sudan (c) Kenya

6. (1) Paul (2) Malong (3) Awan

- a) *Description*: As Chief of General Staff of the SPLA, Malong expanded or extended the conflict in South Sudan through breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and breaches of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). He reportedly directed efforts to kill opposition leader Riek Machar. He ordered SPLA units to prevent the transport of humanitarian supplies. Under Malong's leadership, the SPLA attacked civilians, schools and hospitals; forced the displacement of civilians; carried out enforced disappearances; arbitrarily detained civilians; and conducted acts of torture, and rape. He mobilized the Mathiang Anyoor Dinka tribal militia, which uses child soldiers. Under his leadership, the SPLA restricted UNMISS, JMEC, and CTSAMM access to sites to investigate and document abuses.
- b) A.K.A.: (a) Paul Malong Awan Anei (b) Paul Malong (c) Bol Malong
- c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 1962; Alt DOB: (a) 4 December 1960 or (b) 12 April 1960; POB: Malualkon, South Sudan; Nationality: (a) South Sudan (b) Uganda; Passport Nos.: (a) South Sudan S00004370 (b) South Sudan D00001369 (c) Sudan 003606 (d) Sudan 00606 (e) Sudan B002606

Op 11 juni 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8282e zitting Resolutie 2420 (2018) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2420 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8282nd meeting, on 11 June 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling its resolutions 2292 (2016) and 2357 (2017) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2357 for a further 12 months from the date of this resolution;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;
3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 29 juni 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8300e zitting Resolutie 2424 (2018) inzake de Democratische Republiek Congo aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2424 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8300th meeting, on 29 June 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 2360 (2017), and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and *emphasizing* the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Taking note of the final report (S/2018/531) of the Group of Experts on the DRC (“the Group of Experts”) established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and extended pursuant to resolutions 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012), 2136 (2014), 2198 (2015), 2293 (2016) and 2360 (2017),

Reiterating the need for the Government of the DRC to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them and bring those responsible to justice, *welcoming* the Secretary General’s commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice, *further welcoming* the work of the United Nations team deployed to assist the Congolese authorities in their investigations, in agreement with the Congolese authorities, and *calling* for continued cooperation,

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 1 July 2019 the measures as set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 of resolution 2293 (2016), including its reaffirmations therein;
2. *Reaffirms* that measures described in paragraph 5 of resolution 2293 (2016) shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee, as set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2293 (2016) and paragraph 3 of resolution 2360 (2017);
3. *Decides* to extend until 1 August 2019 the mandate of the Group of Experts, as set forth in paragraph 6 of Resolution 2360, *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 1 July 2019, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Group of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group established pursuant to previous resolutions;
4. *Requests* the Group of Experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a mid-term report no later than 30 December 2018, and a final report no later than 15 June 2019, as well as submit monthly updates to the Committee, except in the months where the mid-term and final reports are due;
5. *Reaffirms* the reporting provisions as set out in resolution 2360 (2017);
6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 13 juli 2018 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8310e zitting Resolutie 2428 (2018) inzake Soedan en Zuid-Soedan aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2428 (2018)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8310th meeting, on 13 July 2018

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016), 2280 (2016), 2290 (2016), 2302 (2016), 2304 (2016), 2327 (2016), 2353 (2017), 2392 (2017), 2406 (2018), and 2418 (2018),

Expressing grave alarm and concern regarding the conflict between the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) and opposition forces which emanated from internal political disputes among the country’s political and military leaders that has resulted in great human suffering, including significant loss of life, conflict-induced food insecurity and threat of famine, displacement of more than four million people, and the loss of property, further impoverishing and disadvantaging the people of South Sudan,

Commending the continued efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led High Level Revitalization Forum to facilitate the peace process in South Sudan, *takes note* of the Khartoum Declaration and the intention of the parties to continue negotiations, and *urges* all parties to engage to reach agreement on outstanding issues,

Strongly condemning past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, *further condemning* harassment and targeting of civil society, humanitarian personnel and journalists, *emphasizing* that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights must be held accountable, and that the TGNU bears the primary responsi-

bility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and in this regard, *urging* the Government of South Sudan to expeditiously sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union for the creation of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan,

Expressing deep concern at reports of misappropriation of funds that undermine the stability and security of South Sudan, and that these activities can have a devastating impact on society and individuals, weaken democratic institutions, undermine the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, facilitate illegal activities, divert humanitarian assistance or complicate its delivery, and undermine economic markets,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Expresses deep concern* at the failures of South Sudan's leaders to bring an end to the hostilities and *condemns* the continued and flagrant violations of the 17 August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the 21 December 2017 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (ACOH), and the 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration;
2. *Demands* that South Sudan's leaders fully and immediately adhere to the ARCSS, ACOH, and 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration and allow, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and the UN guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to help ensure timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need;
3. *Reiterates* that there is no military solution to the conflict;

Arms Embargo

4. *Decides* that, until 31 May 2019, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the territory of South Sudan from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned; and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;
5. *Decides* that the measure imposed in paragraph 4 of this resolution shall not apply to the supply, sale or transfer of:
 - a) Arms and related materiel, as well as training and assistance, intended solely for support of or use by UN personnel, including the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA);
 - b) Non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as notified in advance to the Committee;
 - c) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to South Sudan by UN personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;
 - d) Arms and related materiel temporarily exported to South Sudan by the forces of a State which is taking action, in accordance with international law, solely and directly to facilitate the protection or evacuation of its nationals and those for whom it has consular responsibility in South Sudan, as notified to the Committee;
 - e) Arms and related materiel, as well as technical training and assistance, to or in support of the African Union Regional Task Force intended solely for regional operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army, as notified in advance to the Committee;
 - f) Arms and related materiel, as well as technical training and assistance, solely in support of the implementation of the terms of the peace agreement, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - g) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;
6. *Stresses* the importance that notifications or requests for exemptions pursuant to paragraph 5 above contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use, the end user, the technical specifications and quantity of the equipment to be shipped and, when applicable, the supplier, the proposed date of delivery, mode of transportation and itinerary of shipments;

Inspections

7. *Underscores* that arms shipments in violation of this resolution risk fuelling conflict and contributing to further instability, and *strongly urges* all Member States to take urgent action to identify and prevent such shipments within their territory;
8. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular States neighbouring South Sudan, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to South Sudan, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 4 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of these provisions;

9. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 4 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items, and *decides* further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;
10. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for supply, sale, or transfer are found, further *requires* such Member States to submit to the Committee within 30 days a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

Targeted Sanctions

11. *Underscores* its willingness to impose targeted sanctions in order to support the search for an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan;
12. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2019 the travel and financial measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015);
13. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals, and that the provisions of paragraph 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals and entities, as designated for such measures by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2206 (2015) ("the Committee"), as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan;
14. *Underscores* that such actions or policies as described in paragraph 13 above may include, but are not limited to:
 - a) Actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan ("the Agreement");
 - b) Actions or policies that threaten transitional agreements or undermine the political process in South Sudan, including Chapter 4 of the Agreement;
 - c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in South Sudan;
 - d) The targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the planning, directing, or commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, or torture), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law;
 - e) Planning, directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan;
 - f) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan;
 - g) The obstruction of the activities of international peacekeeping, diplomatic, or humanitarian missions in South Sudan, including the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism or of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance;
 - h) Attacks against United Nations missions, international security presences, or other peacekeeping operations, or humanitarian personnel;
 - i) Acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an individual or entity designated by the Committee; or
 - j) Engagement by armed groups or criminal networks in activities that destabilize South Sudan through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources;
15. *Expresses* concerns at reports of misappropriation and diversion of public resources which pose a risk to the peace, security, and stability of South Sudan, *expresses* serious concern at the reports of financial impropriety involving the TGNU, which pose a risk to the peace, stability, and security of South Sudan, and in this context, *underscores* that individuals engaged in actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan may be listed for travel and financial measures;
16. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) apply to individuals, as designated for such measures by the Committee, who are leaders of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition, militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 13 and 14 above;
17. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015) shall apply to the individuals identified in Annex 1 to this resolution;

Sanctions Committee/Panel of Experts

18. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, international and regional and subregional organizations, as well as UNMISS, as may be necessary, in particular neighbouring and regional States, in order to ensure the full implementation of the measures in this resolution, and in that regard encourages the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members;
19. *Decides* to extend until 1 July 2019 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 2206 (2015) and this paragraph, *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 31 May 2019, and *decides* that the Panel should carry out the following tasks:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 above;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, with particular focus on the benchmarks outlined in paragraph 26 below;
 - c) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, including the financing modalities of such activities as well as procurement of these items through illicit trafficking networks, to individuals and entities undermining implementation of the Agreement or participating in acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable;
 - d) Gather, examine and analyse information on armed groups or criminal networks engaging in the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources in South Sudan;
 - e) Provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 1 December 2018, a final report by 1 May 2019, and except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month;
 - f) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by this resolution, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
20. *Requests* the Panel of experts to include the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015), and *encourages* the Panel to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue across its investigations and reporting;
21. *Calls upon* all parties and all Member States, especially those neighboring South Sudan, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, including by providing any information on illicit transfers of wealth from South Sudan into financial, property and business networks and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
22. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and *invites* the High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;

Role of UNMISS

23. *Recalls* the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) as outlined in resolution 2406 (2018), in particular paragraph 7 (c) regarding monitoring, investigating, verifying and reporting on abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law;
24. *Encourages* timely information exchange between UNMISS and the Panel of Experts, and *requests* UNMISS to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts, within its mandate and capabilities;

Review

25. *Expresses* its intent to monitor and review the situation at 90-day intervals from the adoption of this resolution or more frequently, as needed, and *invites* the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to share relevant information with the Council, as appropriate, on its assessment of the parties' implementation of the Agreement, adherence to the ARCSS, ACOH and 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration, and the facilitation of unhindered and secure humanitarian access, also *expresses* its intent to continue to impose any sanctions that may be appropriate to respond to the situation, which may include the designation of senior individuals responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan;
26. *Affirms* also that it shall be prepared to adjust the measures contained in this resolution, including by strengthening through additional measures, as well as modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the peace, accountability, and

reconciliation process, and in light of the implementation of the parties' commitments, including the ceasefire, and compliance with this and other applicable resolutions;

27. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. **Name:** 1: MALEK 2: REUBEN 3: RIAK 4: RENGU

Title: Lieutenant General **Designation:** **a)** Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics **b)** Deputy Chief of Defence Staff and Inspector General of the Army **DOB:** 1 Jan. 1960 **POB:** Yei, South Sudan **Good quality a.k.a.:** Malek Ruben **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** South Sudan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Other information:** As SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Riak was one of the senior officials of the Government of South Sudan who planned and oversaw an offensive in Unity state in 2015 that resulted in widespread destruction and large population displacement.

Reason for listing:

Malek Ruben Riak is being listed pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 (a), and 8 of resolution 2206 (2015), as reaffirmed in resolution 2418 (2018), for "actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan"; "Actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan ...," and as a leader "of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition, militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 6 and 7," and pursuant to paragraph 14 (e) of this resolution for "planning, directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan".

Additional information:

According to the report by the Panel of Experts on South Sudan in January 2016 (S/2016/70), Riak was one of a group of senior security officials who planned a Unity state offensive against the SPLM-IO beginning in January 2015, and subsequently oversaw its execution from late April 2015 onwards. The Government of South Sudan began arming Bul Nuer youth in early 2015 to facilitate their participation in the offensive. Most Bul Nuer youth already had access to AK-pattern automatic rifles, but ammunition was critical to sustaining their operations. The Panel of Experts reported evidence, including testimony from military sources, that ammunition was supplied to youth groups by SPLA headquarters specifically for the offensive. Riak was the SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at the time. The offensive resulted in systematic destruction of villages and infrastructure, the forced displacement of the local population, the indiscriminate killing and torturing of civilians, the widespread use of sexual violence, including against the elderly and children, the abduction and recruitment of children as soldiers, and large population displacement. Following the destruction of much of the southern and central parts of the state, numerous media and humanitarian organizations, as well as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) published reports about the scale of the abuses that were perpetrated."

2. **Name:** 1: PAUL 2: MALONG 3: AWAN 4: na

Title: General **Designation:** **a)** Former Chief of Staff of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) **b)** Former Governor, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State **DOB:** **a)** 1962 **b)** 4 Dec. 1960 **c)** 12 Apr. 1960 **POB:** Malualkon, South Sudan **Good quality a.k.a.:** **a)** Paul Malong Awan Anei **b)** Paul Malong **c)** Bol Malong **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** **a)** South Sudan **b)** Uganda **Passport no:** **a)** South Sudan number S00004370 **b)** South Sudan number D00001369 **c)** Sudan number 003606 **d)** Sudan number 00606 **e)** Sudan number B002606 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Other information:** As Chief of General Staff of the SPLA, Malong expanded or extended the conflict in South Sudan through breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and breaches of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). He reportedly directed efforts to kill opposition leader Riek Machar. He ordered SPLA units to prevent the transport of humanitarian supplies. Under Malong's leadership, the SPLA attacked civilians, schools and hospitals; forced the displacement of civilians; carried out enforced disappearances; arbitrarily detained civilians; and conducted acts of torture, and rape. He mobilized the Mathiang Anyoor Dinka tribal militia, which uses child soldiers. Under his leadership, the SPLA restricted UNMISS, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), and CTSAMM access to sites to investigate and document abuses.

Reason for listing:

Paul Malong Awan is being listed pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 (a), 7 (b), 7 (c), 7 (d), 7 (f), and 8 of resolution 2206 (2015), as reaffirmed in resolution 2418 (2018), for "actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement"; "actions or policies that threaten transitional agreements or undermine the political process in South Sudan"; "the targeting of civilians, including women

and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law"; "planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in South Sudan"; "The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan; "the obstruction of the activities of international peacekeeping, diplomatic, or humanitarian missions in South Sudan, including IGAD's Monitoring and Verification Mechanism or of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance; and as a leader "of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition, militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 6 and 7".

Additional information:

Malong served as Chief of General Staff of the SPLA from April 23, 2014, to May 2017. In his former position as the Chief of General Staff, he expanded or extended the conflict in South Sudan through breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and breaches of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). As of early August 2016, Malong reportedly directed efforts to kill South Sudanese opposition leader Riek Machar. Malong, knowingly countermanding President Salva Kiir's orders, ordered the 10 July 2016 tank, helicopter gunship, and infantry assaults on Machar's residence and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)'s "Jebel" base. Malong personally oversaw efforts from SPLA headquarters to intercept Machar. As of early August 2016, Malong wanted the SPLA to attack Machar's suspected position immediately and informed SPLA commanders that Machar was not to be taken alive. In addition, in early 2016 information indicates that Malong ordered SPLA units to prevent the transport of humanitarian supplies across the Nile River, where tens of thousands of civilians were facing hunger, claiming that food aid would be diverted from civilians to militia groups. As a result of Malong's orders, food supplies were blocked from crossing the Nile for at least two weeks.

Throughout his tenure as Chief of General Staff of the SPLA, Malong has been responsible for the SPLA and its allied forces' perpetration of serious abuses including attacks on civilians, forced displacement, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, and rape. Under Malong's leadership, the SPLA launched attacks directed against the civilian population and intentionally killed unarmed and fleeing civilians. In the Yei area alone, the UN documented 114 killings of civilians by the SPLA and its allied forces between July 2016 and January 2017. The SPLA intentionally attacked schools and hospitals. In April 2017, Malong allegedly ordered the SPLA to clear all people, including civilians from the area around Wau. Malong reportedly did not discourage the killing of civilians by the SPLA troops, and persons suspected of hiding rebels were considered legitimate targets.

According to a 15 October 2014 African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan report, Malong was responsible for the mass mobilization of Mathiang Anyoor Dinka tribal militia, which Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) documented use child soldiers.

Under Malong's leadership of the SPLA, the government forces regularly restricted United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), and CTSAMM's access when they tried to investigate and document abuses. For example, on April 5, 2017, a joint UN and CTSAMM patrol tried to access Pajok but was turned back by SPLA soldiers.

In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de *negenentwintigste* augustus 2018.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,

S.A. BLOK