

TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

JAARGANG 2017 Nr. 185

A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

Voor een overzicht van de verdragsgegevens, zie verdragsnummer 006585 in de Verdragenbank.

B. TEKST

Op 6 oktober 2016 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7783e zitting Resolutie 2312 (2016) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2312 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7783rd meeting, on 6 October 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling resolution 2240 (2015) and Presidential Statement 2015/25,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report S/2016/766,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Reaffirming also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC Convention) and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, as the primary international legal instruments to combat the smuggling of migrants and related conduct, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC Convention, as the primary international legal instruments to combat trafficking in persons,

Underlining that, although the crime of smuggling of migrants may share, in some cases, some common features with the crime of trafficking in persons, Member States need to recognize that they are distinct crimes, as defined by the UNTOC Convention and its Protocols, requiring differing legal, operational, and policy responses,

Deploring the continuing maritime tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea that have resulted in thousands of casualties, and *noting with concern* that such casualties were, in some cases, the result of exploitation and misinformation by transnational criminal organizations which facilitated the illegal smuggling of migrants via dangerous methods for personal gain and with callous disregard for human life,

Expressing grave concern at the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular off the coast of Libya and *reiterating* that among these migrants may be persons who meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

Emphasizing in this respect that migrants, including asylum seekers and regardless of their migration status, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and *urging* all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human

rights law and international refugee law, as applicable, *stressing also* the obligation of States, where applicable, to protect the human rights of migrants regardless of their migration status, including when implementing their specific migration and border security policies,

Reaffirming in this respect the need to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, especially those of women and children, and to address international migration through international, regional or bilateral cooperation and dialogue and through a comprehensive and balanced approach, recognizing the roles and responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination in promoting and protecting the human rights of all migrants, and avoiding approaches that might aggravate their vulnerability,

Further recalling the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,

Expressing further concern that the situation in Libya is exacerbated by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory, which could provide support to other organized crime and terrorist networks in Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Government of National Accord to take appropriate action to prevent the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through the territory of Libya and its territorial sea,

Mindful of the need to support further efforts to strengthen Libyan border management, *considering* the difficulties of the Government of National Accord to manage effectively the migratory flows in transit through Libyan territory, and *noting* its concern for the repercussions of this phenomenon on the stability of Libya and of the Mediterranean region,

Welcoming ongoing support by the most concerned Member States, including Member States of the European Union (EU), taking into account inter alia the role of FRONTEX and the specific mandate of EUBAM Libya in support of the Government of National Accord, and by neighbouring States,

Acknowledging the European Council Conclusions of 20 June 2016 and the press statement of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 16 February 2016 which underlined the need for effective international action to address both the immediate and long-term aspects of illegal migration and human trafficking towards Europe,

Taking note of the Decision of the Council of the European Union of 20 June 2016 to extend the mandate of "EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia and to expand it, including capacity-building assistance and training to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy in law enforcement at sea, in particular to prevent human smuggling and trafficking,

Taking further note of the ongoing discussions between the EU and the Government of National Accord on migration-related issues,

Expressing also strong support to the States in the region affected by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking and *emphasizing* the need to step up coordination of efforts in order to strengthen an effective multidimensional response to these common challenges in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to tackle their root causes and to prevent people from being exploited by migrant smugglers and human traffickers,

Acknowledging the need to assist States in the region, upon request, in the development of comprehensive and integrated regional and national strategies, legal frameworks, and institutions to counter terrorism, transnational organized crime, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking, including mechanisms to implement them within the framework of States' obligations under applicable international law,

Stressing that addressing both migrant smuggling and human trafficking, including dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks in the region and prosecuting migrant smugglers, and human traffickers requires a coordinated, multidimensional approach with States of origin, of transit, and of destination, and further *acknowledging* the need to develop effective strategies to deter migrant smuggling and human trafficking in States of origin and transit,

Emphasizing that migrants should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and *urging* all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable,

Bearing in mind the obligations of States under applicable international law to exercise due diligence to prevent and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to investigate and punish perpetrators, to identify and provide effective assistance to victims of trafficking and migrants and to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress migrant smuggling and human trafficking,

Reaffirming the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of stabilization of Libya and endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people;
2. *Reiterates its calls* on Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the EU, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord and with each other, including by sharing information to assist Libya, upon request, in building needed capacity including to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in its territorial sea; in order to prevent the further proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the territory of Libya and off its coast;
3. *Urges* Member States and regional organizations, in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord, and with each other, including by sharing information about acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya's territorial sea and on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and rendering assistance to migrants and victims of human trafficking recovered at sea, in accordance with international law;
4. *Urges* States and regional organizations whose naval vessels and aircraft operate on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Libya, to be vigilant for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and in this context, *encourages* States and regional organizations to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, in cooperation with Libya;
5. *Calls upon* Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations that are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking to inspect, as permitted under international law, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, any unflagged vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organized criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, including inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies;
6. *Further calls upon* such Member States to inspect, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organized criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya;
7. *Decides* that, for a further period of twelve months from the date of adoption of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015) and otherwise reiterates the content of those paragraphs;
8. *Reaffirms* that the authorizations provided in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 2240 (2015) apply only with respect to the situation of migrant smuggling and human trafficking on the high seas off the coast of Libya and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a flag State over its vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation, and that the authorization provided in paragraph 10 in resolution 2240 (2015) applies only in confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the high seas off the coast of Libya;
9. *Underscores* that this resolution is intended to disrupt the organized criminal enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking and prevent loss of life and is not intended to undermine the human rights of individuals or prevent them from seeking protection under international human rights law and international refugee law;
10. *Emphasizes* that all migrants, including asylum seekers, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urges all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
11. *Urges* Member States and regional organizations acting under the authorizations referred to in paragraph 7 of this resolution to have due regard for the livelihoods of those engaged in fishing or other legitimate activities;
12. *Calls upon* all States, with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking at sea, consistent with States' obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
13. *Calls* for Member States to consider ratifying or acceding to, and for States Parties to effectively implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
14. *Requests* States utilizing the authority of this resolution to inform the Security Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every three months thereafter on the progress of actions undertaken in exercise of the authority provided in paragraph 7 above;
15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council eleven months after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation, in particular with regards to the implementation of paragraph 7 above;

16. *Expresses* its intention to continue to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authority provided in this resolution for additional periods;
17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 9 november 2016 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7805e zitting Resolutie 2316 (2016) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2316 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7805th meeting, on 9 November 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013), 2184 (2014), and 2246 (2015) as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/843), as requested by resolution 2246 (2015), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia's sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

Noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a steady decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, and *continuing* to be gravely concerned by the ongoing threat that resurgent piracy and armed robbery at sea poses to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing vessels operating in conformity with international law,

Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *reiterating* its concern over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against pirates off the coast of Somalia, which has led to pirates being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and *reiterating* that, consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention") provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of seizing, or exercising control over, a ship by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, noting the several requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 24 October 2016, from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations *expressing* the appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, asking member states and international organizations to support the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its Exclusive Economic Zone, and *requesting* that the provisions of resolution 2246 (2015) be renewed for an additional twelve months,

Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional partners in the 19th plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), hosted by the Seychelles in Victoria, Seychelles, May 31-June 3, 2016,

Recognizing the work of the CGPCS and the Law Enforcement Task Force to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates, and of the Working Group on Capacity Building of the CGPCS to coordinate judicial, penal, and maritime capacity-building efforts to enable regional states to better tackle piracy,

Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in accordance with applicable international human rights law, *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, and being determined to continue efforts to ensure that pirates are held accountable,

Commending the efforts of the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and the naval activities of the Southern Africa Development Community, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region,

Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and to allow charters that favour arrangements that make use of such measures, while urging States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law,

Noting that HRA boundaries are set and defined by the insurance and maritime industry, and have been redefined in December 2015,

Welcoming the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union's activities under the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), which is working with the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its criminal justice system, and *recognizing* the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

Supporting the development of a coastal police force, *noting* with appreciation the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and in relevant parts of the Indian Ocean that are still within the High Risk Area and *recognizing* the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, *noting* the efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high-risk areas, and further welcoming the European Union's EUCAP Nestor, which is working to develop the maritime security capacities of Somalia,

Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the ongoing work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and *noting* the importance of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of piracy,

Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and *welcoming* international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and *taking note* of the ongoing efforts of the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea, hosted by Seychelles to combat piracy and transnational organized crime,

Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, strongly *condemning* the continuing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, *expressing* serious concern at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, *recognizing* the adverse impact on their families, *calling* for the immediate release of all hostages, and *noting* the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Seychelles, for their efforts to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international human rights law, and *emphasizing* the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

Welcoming the readiness of the national and regional administrations of Somalia to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *acknowledging* the return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve their sentences in Somalia,

Welcoming the work of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC), as an important mechanism of information sharing, and *encouraging* the Somali national and regional administrations to take increasing responsibility for counter-piracy initiatives,

Expressing serious concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) in Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and *noting* the complex relationship between IUU fishing and piracy, *recognizing* that IUU fishing accounts for millions of dollars in lost revenue for Somalia each year, and can contribute to destabilization among coastal communities,

Noting Somalia's accession to the FAO's Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, *recognizing* the projects supported by FAO and UNODC aimed at enhancing the Somalia's capacity to combat such activities, and *stressing* the need for States and international organizations to further intensify their support to the Federal Government of Somalia, at its request, in enhancing Somalia's capacity to combat such activities,

Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia towards the development of a legal regime for the distribution of fishing licenses, and encouraging further efforts in this regard, with the support of the international community,

Recalling the reports of the Secretary-General which illustrate the seriousness of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized anti-piracy courts,

Stressing the need for States to consider possible methods to assist the seafarers who are victims of pirates, and welcoming in this regard the efforts of the "Hostage Support Programme" and the Piracy Survivor Family Fund launched at the 2014 CGPCS to provide support to hostages during their release and return home, as well as to their families throughout the hostage situation,

Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,

Noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,

Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, *noting* the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya, and Tanzania, *recognizing* the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates,

Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and further *emphasizing* that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali National Army and Somali Police Force,

Welcoming the Padang Communiqué and Maritime Cooperation Declaration adopted by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at its 15th Council of Ministers meeting, which call upon members to support and strengthen cooperation to address maritime challenges including piracy and illegal trafficking of drugs, and welcoming Somalia's October 2016 signing of the IORA charter to formally become a member State, thereby strengthening Somalia's cooperation with its neighbours on maritime safety and security,

Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that it condemns and deplors all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;

2. *While noting* improvements in Somalia, *recognizes* that piracy exacerbates instability in Somalia by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime and corruption;
3. *Stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to prevent and suppress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community;
4. *Underlines* the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *welcomes* the draft coast guard law which the Somali authorities, with the support of the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor have submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval by Parliament and *urges* the Somali authorities, to continue their work to pass a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks;
5. *Recognizes* the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, *urges* States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and calls upon Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, stresses that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. *Calls upon* States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;
10. *Welcomes* the initiative of the Seychelles authorities to establish a court for piracy and maritime crime and further *welcomes* the successful prosecution of piracy cases by this body;
11. *Recognizes* the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *calls upon* all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
12. *Renews* its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;
13. *Highlights* the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, commends the work of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and urges continued support of these efforts;
14. *Encourages* Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *decides* that, for a further period of twelve months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2246 (2015) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
15. *Affirms* that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under The Convention, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been renewed based on the receipt of the 24 October 2016 letter conveying the consent of Somali authorities;

16. *Decides* that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 14 above;
17. *Requests* that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 14 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;
18. *Calls upon* all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
19. *Calls upon* all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and decides to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
20. *Welcomes*, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme's continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;
21. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to accede to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as part of its efforts to target money laundering and financial support structures on which piracy networks survive;
22. *Urges* all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;
23. *Urges* States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
24. *Urges* all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and children from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
25. *Urges* all States to share information with INTERPOL for use in the global piracy database, through appropriate channels;
26. *Commends* the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct and urges both state and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
27. *Urges* States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
28. *Acknowledges* the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and urges States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further urges States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;
29. *Encourages* flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
30. *Invites* the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and recognizes the IMO's role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;
31. *Notes* the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and welcomes the ongoing work by the WFP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;

32. *Requests* States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
33. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
34. *Expresses its intention* to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 14 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
35. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 10 november 2016 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7807e zitting Resolutie 2317 (2016) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2317 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7807th meeting, on 10 November 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, in particular resolutions 733 (1992), 1844 (2008), 1907 (2009), 2036 (2012), 2023 (2011), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2124 (2013), 2125 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), and 2244 (2015),

Taking note of the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (the SEMG) on Somalia (S/2016/919) and Eritrea (S/2016/920) and their conclusions on the situations in both Somalia and Eritrea,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea respectively,

Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia and to Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region,

Expressing concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of Somalia and the region,

Welcoming the further improved relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), regional administrations, and the SEMG, and *underlining* the importance of these relationships improving further and strengthening in the future,

Welcoming the efforts of the FGS to improve its notifications to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea ("the Committee"), *looking forward* to further progress in the future, particularly in relation to post-delivery notifications, and *recalling* that improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region,

Taking note of the preliminary efforts of the FGS to restore key economic and financial institutions and progress achieved on financial governance and structural reforms; and *welcoming* the passing of anti-money-laundering legislation and the establishment of a Financial Reporting Centre,

Underlining the importance of financial propriety in the run up to, and conduct of, elections in Somalia in 2016, and *stressing* the need for further efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency and increase mutual accountability in Somalia,

Expressing serious concern at reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, *underlining* the importance of refraining from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, *welcoming* further reporting on the matter, and encouraging the FGS, with the support of the international community, to ensure that fishing licenses are issued in a responsible manner and in line with the appropriate Somali legal framework,

Expressing serious concern at the ongoing difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia, and *condemning* in the strongest terms any party obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as the misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies,

Recalling that the FGS has the primary responsibility to protect its population, and *recognizing* the FGS' responsibility, working with the regional administrations to build the capacity of its own national security forces, as a matter of priority,

Taking note of the two meetings and six letters between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, *expressing concern* that the SEMG has not been able to visit Eritrea since 2011 and fully discharge its mandate, and *underlining* that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council be better informed about Eritrea's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions,

Taking note that during the course of its current and two previous mandates the SEMG has not found any evidence that the Government of Eritrea is supporting Al-Shabaab,

Expressing concern over reports by the SEMG of ongoing Eritrean support for certain regional armed groups, and *encouraging* the SEMG to provide further detailed reporting and evidence on this issue,

Expressing serious concern at ongoing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes in 2008, *urging* Eritrea to share any available detailed information pertaining to the combatants, including to the SEMG,

Welcoming the release of four prisoners of war by Eritrea in March 2016, *expressing* support for mediation efforts by the State of Qatar and *encouraging* further mediation efforts by the State of Qatar in order to reach a final and binding solution to resolve this issue as well as the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea,

Underlining the importance it attaches to all Member States complying with the terms of the arms embargo imposed on Eritrea by resolution 1907 (2009),

Determining that the situation in Somalia, as well as the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms embargo

1. *Reaffirms* the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 14 of resolution 2125 (2013), paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014), and paragraphs 2 to 10 of resolution 2244 (2015) (hereafter referred to as "the arms embargo on Somalia");
2. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 November 2017, and in that context *reiterates* that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);
3. *Reaffirms* that the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying arms and related materiel for defensive purposes does not amount to a delivery of such items in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;
4. *Reiterates* that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces, and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles;
5. *Welcomes* in this regard the commencement, by the FGS, of a more rigorous weapons registration, recording and marking procedure, *expresses concern* at reports of continued weapons diversion from within the FGS, *notes* that further improved weapons management is vital in order to prevent the diversion of weapons, *welcomes* the efforts of the FGS to develop detailed Standard Operating Procedures for weapons and ammunition management, and *urges* the FGS to finalize and implement these procedures as soon as possible;
6. *Further welcomes* the efforts of the FGS in establishing the Joint Verification Team (JVT) and *urges* Member States to support improved weapons and ammunition management to improve the capacity of the FGS to manage weapons and ammunition;
7. *Welcomes* the improvement in FGS reporting to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), *calls on* the FGS and regional administrations to prioritize a sustainable and comprehensive agreement on the composition of the Somali Security Forces based on the National Security Policy and *requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015) on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its Security Forces, including the status of regional and militia forces by 30 March 2017 and then by 30 September 2017;
8. *Recalls* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee, pursuant to paragraphs 3 to 8 of resolution 2142 (2014), *welcomes* the efforts of the FGS in improving its notifications to the Committee;
9. *Calls upon* the FGS to improve the timeliness and content of notifications regarding the completion of deliveries, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2142 (2014) and the destination unit upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, as set out by paragraph 7 of resolution 2142 (2014);
10. *Stresses* Member States' obligations pursuant to the notification procedures set out in paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013), *underlines* the need for Member States to strictly follow the notification pro-

cedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions, and *encourages* Member States to consider the Implementation Assistance Notice of 14 March 2016 as a guide;

11. *Recalls* paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) and notes that support for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may include, inter alia, building infrastructure and provision of salaries and stipends solely provided to the Somali National Security Forces;
12. *Urges* increased cooperation by Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014), to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, involving other Somali National Security Forces as appropriate;
13. *Calls upon* the FGS and regional administrations to enhance civilian oversight of its Security Forces, to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, in particular through investigation and prosecuting individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, and in this context *recalls* the importance of the Secretary-General's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to the Somali National Army;
14. *Underlines* the importance of timely and predictable payment of salaries to the Somali security forces and *calls on* the FGS to implement systems to improve the timeliness and accountability of payments and supply of provisions to the Somali security forces;
15. *Recalls* the need to build the capacities of the Somali National Security Forces, in particular the provision of equipment, training and mentoring, in order to build credible, professional security forces to enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and *encourages* further donor support in this regard;
16. *Further reaffirms* the arms embargo on Eritrea imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009) (hereafter referred to as "the arms embargo on Eritrea");

Threats to peace and security

17. *Expresses concern* at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources which pose a risk to State-building efforts, *expresses serious concern* at reports of financial impropriety involving members of the FGS, regional administrations, Federal Member States and Federal Parliament, which pose a risk to State-building efforts, and in this context *underlines* that individuals engaged in acts which threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia may be listed for targeted measures;
18. *Welcomes* the efforts which the FGS has made in order to improve its financial management procedures including continued engagement between the FGS and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), *encourages* the Somali authorities to maintain the pace of reform and continue the implementation of IMF-recommended reforms to support the continuation of a Staff Monitored Programme and increased transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness and predictability in revenue collection and budget allocations, and expresses concern at the generation and distribution of counterfeit Somali currency;
19. *Reaffirms* Somalia's sovereignty over its natural resources;
20. *Reiterates its serious concern* that the petroleum sector in Somalia could be a driver for increased conflict, and in that context underlines the vital importance of the FGS putting in place, without undue delay, resource-sharing arrangements and credible legal framework to ensure that the petroleum sector in Somalia does not become a source of increased tension;
21. *Expresses serious concern* at Al-Shabaab's increasing reliance on revenue from natural resources including the taxing of illicit sugar trade, agricultural production, and livestock and *looks forward* to further SEMG reporting on this issue;

Charcoal ban

22. *Reaffirms* the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), *welcomes* the decrease in exports of charcoal from Somalia and increased efforts of Member States to prevent the import of charcoal of Somali origin, *reiterates* that the Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, and *urges* Member States to continue their efforts to ensure full implementation of the ban;
23. *Reiterates* its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013), that AMISOM support and assist the Somali authorities in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the SEMG to charcoal exporting ports;
24. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in their efforts to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *further welcomes* the cooperation between the SEMG and CMF in keeping the Committee informed on the charcoal trade;
25. *Expresses concern* that the charcoal trade provides funding for Al-Shabaab, and in that context reiterates paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and *further decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2017;
26. *Encourages* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant Member States and international organizations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal;

Humanitarian access

27. *Expresses serious concern* at the acute humanitarian situation in Somalia, *condemns* in the strongest terms increased attacks against humanitarian actors and any misuse of donor assistance and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia and *encourages* the FGS to improve the regulatory environment for aid donors;
28. *Decides* that until 15 November 2017 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;
29. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2017 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and *requests* relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and their implementing partners that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia to increase their cooperation and willingness to share information with the United Nations;

Eritrea

30. *Welcomes* the SEMG's ongoing and significant efforts to engage with the Government of Eritrea, in that context recalls the two meetings between the Representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, *reiterates* its expectation that the Government of Eritrea will facilitate the entry of the SEMG to Eritrea, to discharge fully its mandate, in line with its repeated requests, including in paragraph 52 of resolution 2182 (2014); and *underlines* that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council be better informed about Eritrea's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions;
31. *Urges* the Government of Eritrea to facilitate a visit of the SEMG to Eritrea, and thereafter to support regular visits to Eritrea by the SEMG;
32. *Calls on* Eritrea to cooperate fully with the SEMG, in accordance with the SEMG's mandate contained in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013);
33. *Stresses* its demand that the Government of Eritrea allow access and make available any detailed information, including to the SEMG, pertaining to the Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of 2008 so that those concerned may ascertain the presence and conditions of any remaining Djiboutian prisoners of war;
34. *Expresses* its intention to review measures on Eritrea in light of the upcoming midterm update by the SEMG due by 30 April 2017, and taking into account relevant Security Council resolutions;

Somalia

35. *Recalls* resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and *notes* one of the listing criteria under resolution 1844 (2008) is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;
36. *Reiterates* its willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals and entities on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria;
37. *Reiterates its request* for Member States to assist the SEMG in their investigations, *reiterates* that obstructing the investigations or work of the SEMG is a criterion for listing under paragraph 15 (e) of resolution 1907 (2009) and *further requests* the FGS, regional authorities and AMISOM to share information with the SEMG regarding Al-Shabaab activities;
38. *Decides* to extend until 15 December 2017 the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea SEMG as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 15 November 2017;
39. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the SEMG, in consultation with the Committee, until 15 December 2017, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the SEMG established pursuant to previous resolutions, and *further requests* that administrative support to the SEMG be adjusted, within existing resources, to facilitate the delivery of their mandate;
40. *Requests* the SEMG to provide monthly updates to the Committee, and a comprehensive midterm update, as well as to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, two final reports; one focusing on Somalia, the other on Eritrea by 15 October 2017, covering all the tasks set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014);

41. *Requests* the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the SEMG and other relevant United Nations entities to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the SEMG and recommend to the Security Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the Somalia and Eritrea arms embargoes, the measures regarding the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as well as implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolutions 1844 (2008) and paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of resolution 1907 (2009) in response to continuing violations;
42. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution;
43. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 30 november 2016 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7821e zitting Resolutie 2321 (2016) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2321 (2016)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7821st meeting, on 30 November 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), and resolution 2270 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on September 9, 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 9 September 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
4. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;
5. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods, and *clarifies* that the term "luxury goods" includes also, but is not limited to, the items specified in annex IV of this resolution;
6. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 14 through 16 of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and *decides* that these paragraphs shall apply also with respect to any items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution;
7. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in a new conventional arms dual-use list to be adopted by the Committee, *directs* the Committee to adopt this list within 15 days and to report to the Security Council to this effect, and further *decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adopt the list within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;
8. *Decides* that paragraph 19 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply with respect to all leasing, chartering or provision of crew services to the DPRK without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;
9. *Decides* that paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall apply to registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;
10. *Clarifies* that, for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;
11. *Decides* that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:
 - a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or
 - b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination;
12. *Decides* that the Committee, if it has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessels are or have been related to nuclear- or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, may require any or all of the following measures with respect to vessels it designates pursuant to this paragraph: (a) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall de-flag the vessel; (b) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall direct the vessel to a port identified by the Committee, in coordination with the port State; (c) all Member States shall prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless in case of emergency, in case of return to the vessel's port of origination, or in case of direction by the Committee; (d) a vessel designated by the Committee shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006);
13. *Expresses concern* that the personal luggage and checked baggage of individuals entering into or departing from the DPRK may be used to transport items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *clarifies* that such luggage and baggage constitute "cargo" for the purposes of implementing paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016);
14. *Calls upon* all Member States to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts;
15. *Decides* that all Member States shall take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces, if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;

16. *Decides* that all States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer, at banks in their territory;
17. *Recalls* that, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity, and *emphasizes* accordingly that DPRK diplomatic agents are prohibited in the receiving State from such practice of professional or commercial activity;
18. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities;
19. *Recalls* that a Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and that the exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council;
20. *Recalls* that paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including their airports, that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK-flagged aircraft, emphasizes that this measure requires States to inspect DPRK-flagged aircraft when they land in or take off from their territory, recalls also that paragraph 31 of resolution 2270 (2016) requires all States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, to the territory of the DPRK, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance to ensure that no more fuel is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight;
21. *Expresses* concern that prohibited items may be transported to and from the DPRK by rail and by road, and *underscores* that the obligation in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) to inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory includes the cargo being transported by rail and by road;
22. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes;
23. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the DPRK;
24. *Decides* that all Member States shall de-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and further *decides* that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph;
25. *Notes* that, for the purpose of implementing resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, the term "transit" includes but is not limited to the travel of individuals through a State's international airport terminals en route to a destination in another State, regardless of whether such individuals pass through customs or passport control at that airport;
26. *Decides* that paragraph 29 of resolution 2270 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:

"*Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to:

 - a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;
 - b) Total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 53,495,894 US dollars or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever is lower, between the date of adoption of this resolution and 31 December 2016, and total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 400,870,018 US dollars or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower, beginning 1 January 2017, provided that the procurements (i) involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (ii) are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals *and* unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, and *decides* that each Member State that procures coal from the DPRK shall notify the Committee of the aggregate amount of the volume of such procure-

ment for each month no later than 30 days after the conclusion of that month on the form in annex V to this resolution, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the volume of procurement of coal from the DPRK reported by Member States and value calculated by the Committee Secretary, as well as the amount reported for each month and with the number of States that reported for each month, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications, *calls upon* all States that import coal from the DPRK to periodically review this website to ensure that they do not exceed the mandatory aggregate annual limit, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached, further *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate value or volume of coal procurements from the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amount has been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease procuring coal from the DPRK for the year, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard; and

c) Transactions in iron and iron ore that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution."

27. *Directs* the Panel of Experts, following the end of each month, to determine and transmit to the Committee, in no more than 30 days, an estimate of the average (mean) price in US dollars of coal exported from the DPRK that month based on credible and factually accurate trade data, and *directs* the Committee Secretary to use this average price as the basis to calculate the value of the procurement of coal from the DPRK each month based on the volume reported by States for the purposes of notifying all member states and making publicly available DRPK export levels on the Committee website on a real-time basis as required in paragraph 26 of this resolution;
28. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, copper, nickel, silver and zinc, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;
29. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, statues, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance;
30. *Decides* that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters and vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
31. *Decides* that Member States shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within 90 days, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;
32. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade), except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis;
33. *Decides* that, if a Member State determines that an individual is working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution, then Member States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the individual's state of nationality, consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), or this resolution;
34. *Expresses* concern that DPRK nationals are sent to work in other States for the purpose of earning hard currency that the DPRK uses for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and *calls upon* States to exercise vigilance over this practice;
35. *Reiterates* its concern that bulk cash may be used to evade measures imposed by the Security Council, and *calls upon* Member States to be alert to this risk;
36. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

37. *Reaffirms* that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and *notes* that these obligations are complementary to the obligations in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
38. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;
39. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2276 (2016), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
40. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;
41. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
42. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase the capacity of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and strengthen its ability to analyse the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities, to include additional funding allocated to the procurement of aerial imagery and analysis services, access to relevant trade and international security databases and other information sources, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat;
43. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to include findings and recommendations in its midterm reports, beginning with the midterm report due to be submitted to the Committee by no later than 5 August 2017;
44. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Panel of Experts, to hold special meetings on important thematic and regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, to identify, prioritize, and mobilize resources to areas that would benefit from technical and capacity-building assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;
45. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;
46. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;
47. *Reaffirms* its support to the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
48. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situa-

tion and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

49. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;
50. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. PAK CHUN IL
 - a) *Description*: Pak Chun Il has served as the DPRK Ambassador to Egypt and provides support to KOMID.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 28 July 1954; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 563410091
2. KIM SONG CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Kim Song Chol is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.
 - b) *AKA*: Kim Hak Song
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 26 March 1968, alt. DOB: 15 October 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport: 381420565, alt. Passport: 654120219
3. SON JONG HYOK
 - a) *Description*: Son Jong Hyok is a KOMID official that has conducted business in Sudan on behalf of KOMID's interests.
 - b) *AKA*: Son Min
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 20 May 1980; Nationality: DPRK
4. KIM SE GON
 - a) *Description*: Kim Se Gon works on behalf of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 13 November 1969; Passport: PD472310104; Nationality: DPRK
5. RI WON HO
 - a) *Description*: Ri Won Ho is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 17 July 1964; Passport: 381310014, Nationality: DPRK
6. JO YONG CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Jo Yong Chol is a DPRK Ministry of State Security Official stationed in Syria supporting KOMID.
 - b) *AKA*: Cho Yong Chol
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 30 September 1973, Nationality: DPRK
7. KIM CHOL SAM
 - a) *Description*: Kim Chol Sam is a representative for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) who has been involved in managing transactions on behalf of DCB Finance Limited. As an overseas-based representative of DCB, it is suspected that Kim Chol Sam has facilitated transactions worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and likely managed millions of dollars in DPRK related accounts with potential links to nuclear/missile programmes.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 11 March 1971; Nationality: DPRK
8. KIM SOK CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Kim Sok Chol acted as the DPRK Ambassador to Myanmar and he operates as a KOMID facilitator. He was paid by KOMID for his assistance and arranges meetings on behalf of KOMID, including a meeting between KOMID and Myanmar's defense related persons to discuss financial matters.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 8 May 1955; Passport 472310082; Nationality: DPRK
9. CHANG CHANG HA
 - a) *Description*: Chang Chang Ha is the President of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS).
 - b) *AKA*: Jang Chang Ha
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 10 January 1964; Nationality: DPRK
10. CHO CHUN RYONG
 - a) *Description*: Cho Chun Ryong is the Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (SEC).
 - b) *AKA*: Jo Chun Ryong
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 4 April 1960; Nationality: DPRK
11. SON MUN SAN

- a) *Description:* Son Mun San is the Director-General of the External Affairs Bureau of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE).
- b) *AKA:* n/a
- c) *Identifiers:* DOB: 23 January 1951; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. KOREA UNITED DEVELOPMENT BANK
 - a) *Description:* Korea United Development Bank operates in the financial services industry of the DPRK economy.
 - b) *Location:* Pyongyang, North Korea; SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY
2. ILSIM INTERNATIONAL BANK
 - a) *Description:* Ilsim International Bank is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC). Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: ILSIKPPY
3. KOREA DAESONG BANK
 - a.) *Description:* Daesong Bank is owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers' Party.
 - b) *AKA:* Choson Taesong Unhaeng; AKA: Taesong Bank
 - c) *Location:* Segori-dong, Gyongheung St. Potonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT/BIC: KDBKKPPY
4. SINGWANG ECONOMICS AND TRADING GENERAL CORPORATION
 - a) *Description:* Singwang Economics and Trading General Corporation is a DPRK firm for trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the money for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Location:* DPRK
5. KOREA FOREIGN TECHNICAL TRADE CENTER
 - a) *Description:* Korea Foreign Technical Trade Center is a DPRK firm trading in coal. DPRK generates a significant share of the funds needed to finance its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by mining natural resources and selling those resources abroad.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Location:* DPRK
6. KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION
 - a) *Description:* Korea Pugang Trading Corporation is owned by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Location:* Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK
7. KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE COMPANY
 - a) *Description:* Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company is a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation – DPRK's defense conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military related sales – and has engaged in proliferation-related transactions.
 - b) *AKA:* Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; AKA: International Chemical Joint Venture Company
 - c) *Location:* Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK; Location: Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Location: Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK
8. DCB FINANCE LIMITED
 - a) *Description:* DCB Finance Limited is a front company for Daedong Credit Bank (DCB), a listed entity.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Locations:* Akara Building, 24 de Castro Street, Wickhams Cay I, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands; Dalian, China
9. KOREA TAESONG TRADING COMPANY
 - a) *Description:* Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria.
 - b) *AKA:* n/a
 - c) *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK
10. KOREA DAESONG GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION
 - a) *Description:* Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation is affiliated with Office 39 through minerals (gold) exports, metals, machinery, agricultural products, ginseng, jewelry, and light industry products.
 - b) *AKA:* Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation
 - c) *Location:* Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang City, DPRK

Annex III

Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology

Nuclear- and/or Missile-usable Items

1. Isocyanates (TDI (Toluene di-isocyanate), MDI (Methylene bis (phenyl isocyanate)), IPDI (Isophorone diisocyanate), HNMDI or HDI (Hexamethylene diisocyanate), and DDI (dimethyl diisocyanate) and production equipment.
2. Ammonium nitrate, chemically pure or in phase stabilized version (PSAN).
3. Non-destructive test chambers with a 1m or more critical internal dimension.
4. Turbo-pumps for liquid or hybrid rocket engines.
5. Polymeric Substances (Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Ether (HTPE), Hydroxyl Terminated Caprolactone Ether (HTCE), Polypropylene glycol (PPG), Polydiethyleneglycol adipate (PGA) and Polyethylene Glycol (PEG)).
6. Inertial equipment for any application, particularly for civilian aircraft, satellite, geophysical survey applications and their associated test equipment.
7. Countermeasure Subsystems and Penetration Aids (e.g. jammers, chaff, decoys) designed to saturate, confuse, or evade missile defences.
8. Manganese metal Brazing Foils.
9. Hydroforming machines.
10. Thermal treatment furnaces – Temperature >850 degrees C and one dimension >1m.
11. Electrical Discharge Machines (EDMs).
12. Friction stir welding machines.
13. Modelling and design software related to the modelling of aerodynamic and thermodynamic analysis of rocket or unmanned aerial vehicle systems.
14. High-speed imaging cameras except those used in medical imaging systems.
15. Truck chassis with 6 or more axles.

Chemical/Biological Weapons-usable Items

1. Floor-mounted fume hoods (walk-in style) with a minimum nominal width of 2.5 meters.
2. Batch centrifuges with a rotor capacity of 4 L or greater, usable with biological materials.
3. Fermenters with an internal volume of 10-20 L (.01-.02 cubic meters), usable with biological materials.

Annex IV

Luxury Goods

1. Rugs and tapestries (valued greater than \$500)
2. Tableware of porcelain or bone china (valued greater than \$100)

Annex V

Standard Form for Notification of Import of Coal From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

pursuant to paragraph 26 (b) of resolution 2321 (2016)

This form notifies the UN Security Council 1718 Committee of the procurement of coal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in keeping with the relevant provisions of resolution 2321 (2016).

Procuring State:

Month:

Year:

Coal imported from DPRK, in metric tons:

Coal imported from DPRK, in US dollars (optional):

Additional information (optional):

Signature/seal:

Date:

Op 27 januari 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7872e zitting Resolutie 2339 (2017) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2339 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7872nd meeting, on 27 January 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the Central African Republic (CAR), in particular resolutions 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2149 (2014), 2181 (2014), 2196 (2015), 2212 (2015), 2217 (2015), 2262 (2016), 2264 (2016), 2281 (2016), 2301 (2016) as well as resolution 2272 (2016), and the Statements of its President of 18 December 2014 (S/PRST/2014/28), 20 October 2015 (S/PRST/2015/17), and 16 November 2016 (S/PRST/2016/17),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the CAR, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the CAR bears the primary responsibility to protect all populations within its territory from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,

Noting with concern that while improving, the security situation in the CAR remains fragile, due to the continued presence of armed groups and other armed spoilers, as well as the ongoing violence, the lack of capacity of the national security forces, the limited authority of the State over all of the CAR territory, and the persistence of the root causes of the conflict,

Emphasizing that any sustainable solution to the crisis in the CAR should be CAR-owned, including the political process, and should prioritize reconciliation of the Central African people, through an inclusive process that involves men and women of all social, economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds, including those displaced by the crisis,

Calling upon the CAR authorities to urgently implement transparent and inclusive measures that allow for stabilization and reconciliation in the CAR, including to take concrete steps to restore the effective authority of the State over all of the territory of the CAR; to fight impunity by restoring administration of the judiciary and the criminal justice system, including the penitentiary system, throughout the country; to speed up the reform of the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) and internal security forces in order to put in place multi-ethnic, professional, and republican security services through appropriate security sector reform processes; to carry out the inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) of armed groups, including children formerly associated with them; and to establish a functioning public financial management in order to meet the expenses related to the functioning of the State, implement early recovery plans, and revitalize the economy,

Encouraging the CAR authorities, in collaboration with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) and the European Union Training Mission in the CAR (EUTM-RCA), to provide equal opportunities for members of armed groups, whether anti-Balaka or ex-Séléka, in the process of selecting eligible demobilized members to integrate into the national security and defence forces, and to ensure that FACA soldiers of all prefectures enjoy equal access to the registration and simplified verification process,

Underlining the importance of rebuilding a multi-ethnic, republican and professional national army in the CAR, recognizing in this regard the work carried out by the EUTM-RCA and welcoming the intention of Member States of the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) to contribute to the training of the national security and defence forces in support of the CAR authorities and in coordination with EUTM,

Calling upon the CAR authorities to ensure that perpetrators of violations of applicable international law, including those committed against children and women, are excluded from the CAR security and armed forces,

Welcoming the commitment of the Secretary-General to enforce strictly his zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, expressing grave concern over numerous allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse reportedly committed by peacekeepers in the CAR, stressing the urgent need for troop- and police-contributing countries and MINUSCA to promptly investigate those cases in a credible and transparent manner and to hold accountable those responsible for such criminal offenses or misconduct, and further stressing the need to prevent such exploitation and abuse and to improve how these allegations are addressed,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's Report of 29 September 2016 (S/2016/824) submitted pursuant to resolution 2301 (2016),

Further welcoming also the midterm update and the final report (S/2016/1032) of the Panel of Experts on the CAR established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), expanded by resolution 2134 (2014) and extended pursuant to resolution 2262 (2016), and taking note of the Panel of Experts' recommendations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence and instability in the CAR, and the threats of violence, human rights violations and abuses and international humanitarian law violations, including against women and children; the attacks against United Nations peacekeepers, international forces and humanitarian personnel; the continuous cycle of provocations and reprisals by armed groups, both inside and outside Bangui and denial of humanitarian access, committed by armed elements, which continue to adversely affect the dire humanitarian situation faced by the civilian population and to impede humanitarian access to vulnerable populations,

Stressing the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in the CAR and to bring to justice perpetrators of these acts, some of which may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to which the CAR is a State party, noting in this regard the opening by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on 24 September 2014 of an investigation following the request of the national authorities on alleged crimes committed since 2012 and welcoming the ongoing cooperation by the CAR authorities in this regard,

Stressing the importance of putting in place an effective national judicial system, underlining the need to bolster national accountability mechanisms, including through further implementation of the 7 August 2014 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Urgent Temporary Measures, and the law promulgated in June 2015 to establish a national Special Criminal Court to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in the CAR, and recalling the importance of continuous support of the international community to this process pursued by the CAR authorities,

Emphasizing that those engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, threaten or impede the political stabilization and reconciliation process, target civilians and attack peacekeepers may meet criteria for designation under sanctions as stated in this resolution,

Expressing concern that illicit trafficking, trade, exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife has a negative impact in the economy and the development of the country, and that it continues to threaten the peace and stability of the CAR,

Taking note of the Kimberley Process (KP) Administrative Decision on Resumption of Exports of Rough Diamonds from the CAR, its annexed Operational Framework, and the work of the KP Monitoring Team for CAR and recognizing the extraordinary efforts of the CAR Authorities and the KP, to responsibly and progressively, through pre-established "compliant zones", reintegrate the CAR into the global diamond trade,

Noting with concern the findings of the Panel of Experts' final report that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remains active in the CAR, has established links to other armed groups and is generating revenues from the exploitation and trade of natural resources, including gold, diamonds and wildlife poaching,

Further noting with concern the ongoing transnational criminal activity in the region, emphasizing the risk of the situation in the CAR providing a conducive environment for further transnational criminal activities, such as those involving arms trafficking and the use of mercenaries as well as a potential breeding ground for radical networks,

Acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo can make to countering the illicit transfer of arms and related materiel in the CAR and its region, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, DDRR and SSR processes, recalling its resolutions 2117 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2220 (2015) and 2262 (2016) and expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in the CAR arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and the use of such weapons against civilians affected by armed conflict,

Reiterating the importance of all Member States' full implementation of the measures set out in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2196 (2015), 2262 (2016) and this resolution, including the obligation to implement targeted sanctions against individuals and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) (the Committee),

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including the key role that neighbouring States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, can play in this regard and encouraging efforts to further enhance cooperation and implementation of the sanctions regime in all its aspects,

Noting with concern the reports that sanctioned individuals are travelling in the region in violation of the travel ban, and underlining that individuals or entities who knowingly facilitate the travel of a sanctioned individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria for sanctions,

Welcoming efforts by the Chair of the Committee and the President of the Security Council to support and strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed pursuant to resolution 2262 (2016) through engagement with Member States, especially regional States, and welcoming in this regard the travel by the Chair and Committee members to the CAR in May 2016,

Welcoming the outcome of the international support conference held in Brussels in November 2016 and the pledges announced during this conference, encouraging Member States to swiftly disburse these pledges, and encourages further mobilization at the African Union Solidarity Conference for the CAR to be held in Addis Ababa in February 2017,

Determining that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms embargo

1. *Decides* that, until 31 January 2018, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:
 - a) Supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MINUSCA, the African Union-Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), and the European Union Missions and French Forces deployed in the CAR;
 - b) Supplies of non-lethal equipment and provision of assistance, including operational and non-operational training to the CAR security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR), in coordination with MINUSCA, and as notified in advance to the Committee, and requests MINUSCA to report on the contribution to SSR of this exemption, as part of its regular reports to the Council;
 - c) Supplies brought into the CAR by Chadian or Sudanese forces solely for their use in international patrols of the tripartite force established on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum by the CAR, Chad and Sudan, to enhance security in the common border areas, in cooperation with MINUSCA, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - d) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - e) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;
 - f) Supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of the CAR or the CAR's international legal obligations, as notified in advance to the Committee;
 - g) Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee; or
 - h) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;
2. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution, seize, register and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;
3. *Reiterates* its call upon the CAR authorities, with the assistance of MINUSCA and international partners, to address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the CAR, and to ensure the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition and further stresses the importance of incorporating such elements into SSR and DDDR programmes;
4. *Strongly encourages* the CAR authorities to increase their capacity, with the support of MINUSCA, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and other international partners, to store and manage weapons and ammunition in their possession, including those transferred from MINUSCA stocks, according to international best practices and norms, while ensuring that the FACA and interior forces units receiving such weapons and ammunition are fully trained and vetted;

Travel ban

5. *Decides* that, until 31 January 2018, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee,

provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and calls upon the CAR Government to enhance cooperation and information sharing with other States in this regard;

6. *Encourages* Member States, as appropriate and in accordance with their domestic law and applicable international legal instruments and framework documents, to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee;
7. *Also encourages* Member States to report any such departures from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations;
8. *Urges* the CAR authorities, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 5 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen, and lost passports and other travel documents, as well as invalidated diplomatic passports are removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;
9. *Encourages* Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals designated by the Committee for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;
10. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply:
 - a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;
 - c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the CAR and stability in the region;
11. *Emphasizes* that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, observes that individuals or entities who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution and calls upon all parties and all Member States to cooperate with the Committee as well as the Panel of Experts on the implementation of the travel ban;

Asset freeze

12. *Decides* that all Member States shall, until 31 January 2018, continue to freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources within their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall continue to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;
13. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
 - a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
 - b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or
 - c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;
14. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above, and after notification by the relevant States to

the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

16. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraphs 5 and 12 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or impede the stabilization and reconciliation process or that fuel violence;
17. *Further decides* in this regard that the measures contained in paragraphs 5 and 12 shall also apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as:
 - a) Acting in violation of the arms embargo established in paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) and extended by paragraph 1 of this resolution, or as having directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to armed groups or criminal networks in the CAR, or as having been the recipient of arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to violent activities of armed groups or criminal networks in the CAR;
 - b) Involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, in the CAR, including, targeting of civilians, ethnic- or religious-based attacks, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abduction and forced displacement;
 - c) Involved in planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in the CAR;
 - d) Recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the CAR, in violation of applicable international law;
 - e) Providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, wildlife as well as wildlife products in or from the CAR;
 - f) Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the CAR, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in the CAR;
 - g) Involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European Union Missions and French operations which support them;
 - h) Being leaders of an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014), paragraphs 11 or 12 of resolution 2196 (2015), paragraphs 12 or 13 of resolution 2262 (2016) or this resolution, or having provided support to, or acted for or on behalf of, or at the direction of, an individual or an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014), paragraphs 11 or 12 of resolution 2196 (2015), paragraphs 12 or 13 of resolution 2262 (2016) or this resolution, or an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity;
18. *Welcomes* measures taken by Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to implement the Regional Initiative against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources as endorsed in the 2010 Lusaka Declaration, including promoting the use by economic actors of Due Diligence Frameworks such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and encourages all States, particularly those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines;

Sanctions Committee

19. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) extended by this resolution;
20. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, international and regional and subregional organizations, as may be necessary, in particular neighbouring and regional States, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures renewed by this resolution, and in that regard encourages the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members;
21. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular neighbouring States and Member States of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) and of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) to utilize the advance notification and exemption procedures pursuant to paragraph 1 of this resolution to return arms and related materiel of all types belonging to the FACA, or to implement technical assistance, training or other assistance related to military activities by the Central African national security and defence forces, and in this regard requests the Panel of Experts to provide the necessary assistance as per paragraph 28 (b) of this resolution;
22. *Requests* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 12 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and requests the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 37 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;

23. *Recognizes* the KP's decision that the CAR may resume trade in rough diamonds from "compliant zones" established under conditions set forth by the KP, notes that the KP intends to keep the Security Council, the Committee and its Panel of Experts, and MINUSCA informed of its decisions and, requests the KP Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring to periodically update the Committee on the work of the KP CAR Monitoring Team, including any decisions on areas designated as "compliant zones" and decisions related to the trade of the stockpiles of rough diamonds held in the CAR;
24. *Calls for* enhanced vigilance from trading centres and States in the region to support the CAR authorities' efforts to re-establish legitimate trade and benefit from its natural resources; and commends the CAR for taking special measures to enhance traceability of diamonds from compliant zones so that diamonds are not used for the benefit of armed groups or to destabilize the CAR;
25. *Encourages* the KP to resolve the issue of the diamond stockpiles in cooperation with the CAR authorities and in consultation with the Panel of Experts;

Panel of Experts

26. *Expresses* its full support for the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to paragraph 59 of resolution 2127 (2013);
27. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 February 2018, expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 January 2018 and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to support its action;
28. *Decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts shall include the following tasks, to:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, including to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building;
 - c) Provide to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 30 July 2017, and a final report by 31 December 2017, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 12 of this resolution;
 - d) Submit progress updates to the Committee, especially in situations of urgency, or as the Panel deems necessary;
 - e) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities designated by the Committee pursuant to the criteria renewed by paragraphs 16 and 17 above including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
 - f) Assist the Committee by providing information regarding individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, including by reporting such information to the Committee, as it becomes available, and to include in its formal written reports, the names of potential designees, appropriate identifying information, and relevant information regarding why the individual or entity may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 16 and 17 above;
 - g) Cooperate with the KP CAR Monitoring Team to support the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from the CAR and report to the Committee if the resumption of trade is destabilizing the CAR or benefiting armed groups;
29. *Requests* the Secretariat to provide to the Security Council, by 30 May 2017, options for the elaboration of benchmarks, in coordination with EUTM and other active partners in the field of SSR and in consultation with the CAR Authorities, to assess the arms embargo measures according to the progress of the SSR, including FACA and Internal Security Forces and their needs, as well as additional information on the Panel of Experts' recommended arms embargo working group to be potentially established within MINUSCA by the Security Council, including on the composition, tasks, functioning, resource requirements and implication with regards the implementation of MINUSCA's mandate, of such a working group, with reference to previous similar experiences in other UN Peacekeeping Missions;
30. *Calls upon* the Panel of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of their mandate;
31. *Expresses particular concern* about reports of illicit trafficking networks which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR, and encourages the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks;
32. *Urges* the CAR, its neighbouring States and other Member States of the ICGLR to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife poaching and trafficking;
33. *Urges* all parties, and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members;
34. *Further urges* all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;

35. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

Reporting and review

36. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region and those in which designated individuals and entities designated are based, to actively implement the measures contained in this resolution and to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 12 of this resolution;
37. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, including alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the CAR on the situation in the CAR as appropriate, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;
38. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in the CAR under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening through additional measures, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of the country and compliance with this resolution;
39. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 23 februari 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7889e zitting Resolutie 2342 (2017) inzake Jemen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2342 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7889th meeting, on 23 February 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2016) and the statements of its President dated 15 February 2013 (S/PRST/2013/3), 29 August 2014 (S/PRST/2014/18), 22 March 2015 (S/PRST/2015/8) and 25 April 2016 (S/PRST/2016/5) concerning Yemen,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen,

Expressing concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of weapons,

Reiterating its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

Reaffirming the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable,

Expressing its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Envoy for Yemen to the Secretary-General, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, in support of the Yemeni transition process,

Expressing its grave concern that areas of Yemen are under the control of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Yemen and the region, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations, *expressing* concern at the increasing presence and future potential growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) affiliates in Yemen and *reaffirming its resolve* to address all aspects of the threat posed by AQAP, ISIL (Da'esh), and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,

Recalling the listing of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and associated individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of resolution 2253 (2015) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and resolution 2216 (2015), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard, and encouraging *efforts* to further enhance cooperation,

Recalling the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) imposing a targeted arms embargo,

Gravely distressed by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen, *expressing serious concern* at all instances of hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population of Yemen,

Emphasizing the necessity of discussion by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (“the Committee”), of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts reports,

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, and in accordance with resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2216 (2015), and 2266 (2016) and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people;
2. *Decides* to renew until 26 February 2018 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2015), and *further reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);

Designation Criteria

3. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or listed in the annex to resolution 2216 (2015) as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;
4. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015);

Reporting

5. *Decides* to extend until 28 March 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 28 February 2018, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 28 March 2018 drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
6. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 28 July 2017, and a final report no later than 28 January 2018 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;
7. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2253 (2015);
8. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
9. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
10. *Calls upon* all Member States which have not already done so to report to the Committee as soon as possible on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) and *recalls* in this regard that Member States undertaking cargo inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2216 (2015) are required to submit written reports to the Committee as set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);
11. *Recalls* the Informal Working Group on General issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
12. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 23 maart 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7904e zitting Resolutie 2345 (2017) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2345 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7904th meeting, on 23 March 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolutions 825 (1993), 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1887 (2009), 1928 (2010), 1985 (2011), 2050 (2012), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2141 (2014), 2207 (2015), 2270 (2016), 2276 (2016), 2321 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Recalling the creation, pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), of a Panel of Experts, under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the tasks provided for by that paragraph,

Recalling the interim report by the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and the 27 February 2017 final report (S/2017/150) by the Panel,

Recalling the methodological standards for reports of sanctions monitoring mechanisms contained in the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997),

Welcoming the efforts made by the Secretariat to expand and improve the roster of experts for the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Note of the President (S/2006/997),

Emphasizing, in that regard, the importance of credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analysis, and recommendations, in accordance with the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009),

Determining that proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend until 24 April 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 29 of resolution 2094 (2013), *decides* that this mandate shall apply also with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 2321 (2016), *expresses* its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 24 March 2018, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect;
2. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee no later than 5 August 2017 a midterm report on its work, as requested in paragraph 43 of resolution 2321 (2016), and *further requests* that, after a discussion with the Committee, the Panel of Experts submit to the Council its midterm report by 6 September 2017, and *requests* also a final report to the Committee no later than 1 February 2018 with its findings and recommendations, and *further requests* that, after a discussion with the Committee, the Panel of Experts submit to the Council its final report no later than 14 March 2018;
3. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee a planned program of work no later than thirty days after the Panel's reappointment, *encourages* the Committee to engage in regular discussions about this program of work and to engage regularly with the Panel about its work, and *further requests* the Panel of Experts to provide to the Committee any updates to this program of work;
4. *Expresses* its intent to continue to follow the work of the Panel;
5. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), and resolution 2321 (2016);
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 24 mei 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7948e zitting Resolutie 2353 (2017) inzake Zuid-Soedan aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2353 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7948th meeting, on 24 May 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014), 2206 (2015), 2241 (2015), 2252 (2015), 2271 (2016), 2280 (2016), 2290 (2016), 2302 (2016), 2304 (2016), and 2327 (2016),

Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 May 2018 the measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of resolution 2206 (2015), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2206 (2015), and the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2290 (2016);
2. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of paragraph 12 of resolution 2290 (2016), and *decides* that the Panel of Experts should provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by 1 December 2017, a final report by 1 May 2018, and, except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month, and *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 31 May 2018;
3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 2 juni 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7958e zitting Resolutie 2356 (2017) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2356 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7958th meeting, on 2 June 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), and resolution 2321 (2016), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development activities including a series of ballistic missile launches and other activities conducted by the DPRK since 9 September 2016 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
3. *Recalls* the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by subsequent resolutions, and *decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, includ-

ing through illicit means, and that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

4. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation, and *welcomes* efforts by Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and *stresses* the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;
5. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CHO IL U
 - a) *Description*: Director of the Fifth Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Cho is believed to be in charge of overseas espionage operations and foreign intelligence collection for the DPRK.
 - b) *AKA*: Cho Il Woo
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: May 10, 1945; POB: Musan, North Hamgyo'ng Province, DPRK; nationality: DPRK; Passport Number 736410010
2. CHO YON CHUN
 - a) *Description*: Vice Director of the Organization and Guidance Department, which directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK's military.
 - b) *AKA*: Jo Yon Jun
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: September 28, 1937; Nationality: DPRK
3. CHOE HWI
 - a) *Description*: First Vice Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Propaganda and Agitation Department, which controls all DPRK media and is used by the government to control the public.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: YOB: 1954 or 1955, Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
4. JO YONG-WON
 - a) *Description*: Vice Director of the Worker's Party of Korea's Organization and Guidance Department, which directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK's military.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Cho Yongwon
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: October 24, 1957; Nationality: DPRK; Gender, male; Address: DPRK
5. KIM CHOL NAM
 - a) *Description*: President of Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation, a company that procures supplies for General Bureau of Atomic Energy and serves as a cash route to the DPRK.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: February 19, 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120238; Address: DPRK
6. KIM KYONG OK
 - a) *Description*: Vice Director of the Organization and Guidance Department, which directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK's military.
 - b) *AKA*: Kim Kyong Ok
 - c) *Identifiers*: YOB: 1937 or 1938; Nationality: DPRK; Address: Pyongyang, DPRK
7. KIM TONG-HO
 - a) *Description*: Vietnam Representative for Tanchon Commercial Bank, which is the main DPRK financial entity for weapons and missile-related sales.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: August 18, 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 745310111; Gender: male; Address: Vietnam
8. MIN BYONG CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Member of the Worker's Party of Korea's Organization and Guidance Department, which directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK's military.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Min Pyo'ng-ch'o'l, Min Byong-chol, Min Byong Chun
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: August 10, 1948; Nationality: DPRK; Gender: male; Address: DPRK
9. PAEK SE BONG
 - a) *Description*: Paek Se Bong is a former Chairman of the Second Economic Committee, a former member of the National Defense Commission, and a former Vice Director of Munitions Industry Department (MID).
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 21 March 1938; Nationality: DPRK
10. PAK HAN SE
 - a) *Description*: Vice Chairman of the Second Economic Committee, which oversees the production of the DPRK's ballistic missiles and directs the activities of Korea Mining Development Corporation, the DPRK's premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

- b) A.K.A.: Kang Myong Chol
 - c) *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 290410121; Address: DPRK
11. PAK TO CHUN
- a) *Description*: Pak To Chun is a former Secretary of Munitions Industry Department (MID) and currently advises on affairs relating to nuclear and missile programmes. He is a former State Affairs Commission member and is a member Workers' Party of Korea Political Bureau.
 - b) AKA: Pak Do Chun
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 9 March 1944; Nationality: DPRK
12. RI JAE IL
- a) *Description*: Vice Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Propaganda and Agitation Department, which controls all DPRK's media and is used by the government to control the public.
 - b) AKA: RI, Chae-II
 - c) *Identifiers*: YOB 1934; Nationality: DPRK
13. RI SU YONG
- a) *Description*: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, specializes in acquisition for DPRK's defence industries and support to Pyongyang's military-related sales. Its procurements also probably support the DPRK's chemical weapons programme.
 - b) A.K.A.: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: June 25, 1968; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654310175; Gender: male; Address: Cuba
14. RI YONG MU
- a) *Description*: Ri Yong Mu is a Vice Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, which directs and guides all DPRK's military, defence, and security-related affairs, including acquisition and procurement.
 - b) AKA: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 25 January 1925; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. KANGBONG TRADING CORPORATION
 - a) *Description*: The Kangbong Trading Corporation sold, supplied, transferred, or purchased, directly or indirectly, to or from the DPRK, metal, graphite, coal, or software, where revenue or goods received may benefit the Government of the DPRK or the Workers' Party of Korea. The Kangbong Trading Corporation's parent is the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.
 - b) AKA: N/A
 - c) *Location*: DPRK
2. KOREA KUMSAN TRADING CORPORATION
 - a) *Description*: Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, which oversees the DPRK's nuclear programme.
 - b) AKA: N/A
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK
3. KORYO BANK
 - a) *Description*: Koryo Bank operates in the financial services industry in the DPRK's economy and is associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP.
 - b) AKA: N/A
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK
4. STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY
 - a) *Description*: The Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People's Army is in charge of all DPRK ballistic missile programmes and is responsible for SCUD and NODONG launches.
 - b) AKA: Strategic Rocket Force; Strategic Rocket Force Command of KPA; Strategic Force; Strategic Forces
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

Op 12 juni 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7964e zitting Resolutie 2357 (2017) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2357 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7964th meeting, on 12 June 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Recalling its resolution 2292 (2016) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2292 for a further 12 months from the date of this resolution;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;
3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 21 juni 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7981e zitting Resolutie 2360 (2017) inzake de Democratische Republiek Congo aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2360 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7981st meeting, on 21 June 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and *emphasizing* the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of the DRC for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its populations with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law, including protection from crimes against humanity and war crimes,

Taking note of the interim report (S/2016/1102) of the Group of Experts on the DRC ("the Group of Experts") established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and extended pursuant to resolutions 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012), 2136 (2014), 2198 (2015) and 2293 (2016),

Condemning in the strongest terms the killing of two members of the Group of Experts who were monitoring the sanctions regime in the Kasai Central region, expressing its deepest sympathy to the families of the victims, the Governments of the United States, Chile and Sweden, as well as to the Group of Experts on the DRC and the UN Secretariat, and *further expressing concern* over the unknown status of the four Congolese nationals accompanying them,

Reiterating the need for the Government of the DRC to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and bring the perpetrators to justice, *calling upon* the Government of the DRC to cooperate with the United Nations enquiries, as well as with law enforcement investigations that may be conducted by Sweden or the United States, in accordance with DRC national legislation, and in this context, *welcoming* the Secretary General's establishment of a UN Board of Inquiry to investigate the deaths of the two experts and his commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice,

Recalling the strategic importance of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the region, and *reiterating* its call to all signatories to fulfil promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under this agreement in order to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence,

Recalling the commitments under the PSC Framework by all States of the region not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, and to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, and *reiterating* its strong condemnation of any and all internal or external support to armed groups active in the region, including through financial, logistical or military support,

Remaining greatly concerned by the security and humanitarian situation that continues to severely affect the civilian population, *expressing deep concern* regarding the recent surge in the number of internally displaced persons in the DRC, *further reiterating* its deep concern regarding the ongoing military activities of foreign and domestic armed groups and the smuggling of Congolese natural resources, in particular gold and ivory, *stressing* the importance of neutralizing all armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and all other armed groups in the DRC, in line with resolution 2348 (2017),

Condemning the violence witnessed in the Kasai region over recent months and expressing serious concerns at alleged violations and abuses of human rights committed in the region, *reiterating its serious concern* at serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by local militia in that region, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of applicable international law, as well as attacks on the Democratic Republic of the Congo security forces and symbols of State authority, *further reiterating its serious concerns* at the recent reports of 42 mass graves and of killings of civilians by members of the security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all of which might constitute war crimes under international law,

Reiterating the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the Kasais region, *further reiterating* its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations, including the disproportionate use of force, which will be conducted jointly by the Government of the DRC, MONUSCO and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC, and in collaboration with the AU, as announced by the Government of the DRC, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and *looking forward* to their results,

Condemning the brutal killings of more than 600 civilians in the Beni area since October 2014, *expressing deep concern* regarding the continued threat posed by armed groups, in particular the ADF, and the persistence of violence in this region, *further expressing concern* at reports of collaboration between elements of the FARDC and armed groups at a local level, in particular recent reports of individual officers of the FARDC playing a role in the insecurity in the region of Beni, *calling* for investigations in order to ensure that those responsible are held to account, *noting* the commitment expressed by the Government of the DRC in its letter of 15 June 2016 (S/2016/542),

Expressing further concern at increased impediments to humanitarian access in eastern DRC resulting from insecurity and violence, as well as continued attacks against humanitarian actors and assets, *underlining* that such acts could be the basis for designation pursuant to paragraph 2 of this resolution, and *calling upon* all parties in the conflict to respect the impartiality, independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors,

Reaffirming the importance of completing the permanent demobilization of the former 23 March Movement (M23) combatants, *stressing* the importance of ensuring that its ex-combatants do not regroup or join other armed groups, and *calling for* the acceleration of the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations and of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) of M23 ex-combatants, including by overcoming obstacles to repatriation, in coordination with the regional States concerned,

Condemning the illicit flow of weapons within and into the DRC, including their recirculation to and between armed groups, in violation of resolutions 1533 (2004), 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012), 2136 (2014), 2198 (2015) and 2293 (2016), and *declaring* its determination to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures set out by its resolutions concerning the DRC,

Acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo makes to countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons in the DRC, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform,

Underlining that the transparent and effective management of its natural resources and ending illegal smuggling and trafficking of such resources are critical for the DRC's sustainable peace and security, *expressing concern* at the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources by armed groups, and the negative impact of armed conflict on protected natural areas, *commending* the efforts of the DRC park rangers and others who seek to protect such areas, *encouraging* the Government of the DRC to continue efforts to safeguard these areas, and *stressing* its full respect for the sovereignty of the Government of the DRC over its natural resources and its responsibility to effectively manage these resources in this regard,

Recalling the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including poaching and illegal trafficking of wildlife, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and encouraging the continuation of the regional efforts of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the governments involved against the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *stressing*, in this regard, the importance of regional cooperation and deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources,

Noting the Group of Experts' findings that there have been positive efforts related to the minerals trade and traceability schemes but that gold remains a serious challenge, *recalling* the ICGLR's Lusaka Declaration of the Special Session to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region and its call for

industry due diligence, *commending* the ICGLR's commitment and progress on this issue and *underscoring* that it is critical for regional governments and trading centres, particularly those involved in gold refining and the gold trade to intensify efforts to increase vigilance against smuggling and reduce practices that could undermine the DRC and ICGLR's regional efforts,

Noting with concern reports indicating the continued involvement of armed groups, as well as some elements of the FARDC, in the illegal minerals trade, the illegal production and trade of charcoal and wood, and wildlife poaching and trafficking,

Noting with great concern the persistence of serious human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations against civilians in the eastern part of the DRC, including summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children committed by armed groups,

Recalling that full and timely implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement is critical in supporting the legitimacy of the transitional institutions, *stressing* the crucial importance of a peaceful and credible electoral cycle, in accordance with the Constitution and respecting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, for lasting stabilisation and consolidation of constitutional democracy in the DRC, and *calling for* the immediate implementation of confidence-building measures, as per the agreement, including by putting an end to restrictions of the political space in the DRC, in particular arbitrary arrests and detention of members of the political opposition and of civil society, as well as restrictions of fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of opinion and expression, including freedom of the press, *further stressing* the importance of the Government of the DRC and its national partners taking all necessary steps to accelerate preparations for the elections without further delays, including participation of women at all levels and to ensure an environment conducive to the peaceful and inclusive conduct of political activities, and the holding of elections, as per the 31 December agreement,

Remaining deeply concerned by reports of an increase in serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed by some members of the FARDC, the National Intelligence Agency, the Republican Guard and Congolese National Police (PNC), *urging* all parties to refrain from violence and provocation as well as to respect human rights, and *emphasizing* that the Government of the DRC must comply with the principle of proportionality in the use of force,

Recalling the importance of fighting against impunity within all ranks of its security forces, and *stressing the need* for the Government of the DRC to continue its efforts in this regard and to ensure the professionalism of its security forces,

Calling for all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights including those involving violence or abuses against children and acts of sexual and gender-based violence, to be swiftly apprehended, brought to justice and held accountable,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions on women and peace and security, on children and armed conflict, and on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, also *recalling* the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to the parties in armed conflict of the DRC (S/AC.51/2014/3) adopted on 18 September 2014,

Welcoming the efforts of the Government of the DRC, including the Presidential Adviser on Sexual Violence and the Recruitment of Children, to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence, and MONUSCO, to implement the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the FARDC, and to combat impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, including sexual violence committed by the FARDC,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including the key role that neighbouring States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, can play in this regard and *encouraging* efforts to further enhance cooperation,

Underlining the fundamental importance of timely and detailed notifications to the Committee concerning arms, ammunition and training as set out in section 11 of the Guidelines of the Committee,

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Sanctions regime

1. *Decides* to renew until 1 July 2018 the measures as set out in paragraph 1 to 6 of resolution 2293 (2016), including its reaffirmations therein, and *decides* to review the provisions of the present resolution by 31 October 2017 following submission of the final report referred to in paragraph 5 of this resolution;
2. *Reaffirms* that measures described in paragraph 5 of resolution 2293 shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee for engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the DRC, as set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2293 (2016);

3. *Decides* that such acts include planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers or United Nations personnel, including members of the Group of Experts;

Group of experts

4. *Decides* to extend until 1 August 2018 the mandate of the Group of Experts, *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 1 July 2018, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Group of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group established pursuant to previous resolutions;
5. *Extends* to 15 August 2017 the deadline for the submission of the final report of the Group of Experts requested in paragraph 9 of resolution 2293 (2016), given the extraordinary circumstances under which the Group of Experts is currently operating and taking into account the letter dated 15 June 2017 from the Chair of the Committee to the President of the Security Council;
6. *Requests* the Group of Experts to fulfil its mandate as consolidated below, and to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a mid-term report no later than 30 December 2017, and a final report no later than 15 June 2018, as well as submit monthly updates to the Committee, except in the months where the mid-term and final reports are due;
 - a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 2 of this resolution;
 - b) gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation, with a focus on incidents of non-compliance, of the measures decided in this resolution;
 - c) consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of Member States, in particular those in the region, to ensure the measures imposed by this resolution are effectively implemented;
 - d) gather, examine and analyse information regarding the regional and international support networks to armed groups and criminal networks in the DRC;
 - e) gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms, related materiel and related military assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks and the transfer of arms and related materiel to armed groups from the DRC security forces;
 - f) gather, examine and analyse information regarding perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses, including those within the security forces, in the DRC,
 - g) evaluate the impact of minerals traceability referred to in paragraph 21 of this resolution and continue collaboration with other forums;
 - h) assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by this resolution, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
7. *Expresses* its full support to the Group of Experts and calls for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, MONUSCO, relevant UN bodies and the Group of Experts, *encourages* further that all parties and all States ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control and *reiterates* its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members and its support staff, and that all parties and all States, including the DRC and countries of the region, provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
8. *Calls upon* the Group of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;

Armed groups

9. *Strongly condemns* all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international humanitarian law as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights including attacks on the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children, and *reiterates* that those responsible will be held accountable;
10. *Demands* that the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA and all other armed groups operating in the DRC cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities, including the exploitation of natural resources, and that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms, and liberate and demobilize all children from their ranks;

National and Regional Commitments

11. *Welcomes* the progress made to date by the Government of the DRC on ending the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, *urges* the Government of the DRC to continue the full implementation and dissemination throughout the military chain of command, including in remote areas, of its commitments made in the action plan signed with the United Nations, and for the protection of girls and boys from

sexual violence, and further *calls upon* the Government of the DRC to ensure that children are not detained on charges related to association with armed groups;

12. *Welcomes* efforts made by the Government of the DRC to combat and prevent sexual violence in conflict, including progress made in the fight against impunity, and *calls on* the Government of DRC to further pursue its action plan commitments to end sexual violence and violations committed by its armed forces and continue efforts in that regard, noting that failure to do so may result in the FARDC being named again in future Secretary-General's reports on sexual violence;
13. *Stresses* the importance of the Government of the DRC actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country and of regional cooperation to this end, including through its ongoing cooperation with the International Criminal Court, *encourages* MONUSCO to use its existing authority to assist the government of the DRC in this regard, and *calls on* all signatories of the PSC Framework to continue to implement their commitments and cooperate fully with one another and the Government of the DRC, as well as MONUSCO to this end;
14. *Recalls* that there should be no impunity for any of those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the DRC and the region, and, in this regard, *urges* the DRC, all countries in the region and other concerned UN Member States to bring perpetrators to justice and hold them accountable, including those within the security sector;
15. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC to continue to enhance stockpile security, accountability and management of arms and ammunition, with the assistance of international partners, to address ongoing reports of diversion to armed groups, as necessary and requested, and to urgently implement a national weapons marking program, in particular for state-owned firearms, in line with the standards established by the Nairobi Protocol and the Regional Centre on Small Arms;
16. *Emphasizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of the DRC to reinforce State authority and governance in eastern DRC, including through effective security sector reform to allow army, police and justice sector reform, and to end impunity for violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, and *urges* the Government of the DRC to increase efforts in this regard, in accordance with its national commitments under the PSC Framework;
17. *Urges* the Government of the DRC as well as all relevant parties to swiftly implement the 31 December 2016 "Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement" and to ensure an environment conducive to a free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral process, in accordance with the Congolese Constitution, and *recalls* all relevant paragraphs of resolution 2348 (2017);
18. *Calls upon* all States, especially those in the region, to take effective steps to ensure that there is no support, in or from their territories, for armed groups in, or travelling through, the DRC, stressing the need to address the networks of support, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, financing and recruitment of armed groups active in the DRC, as well as the need to address the ongoing collaboration between FARDC elements and armed groups at a local level, and *calls upon* all States to take steps to hold accountable, where appropriate, leaders and members of the FDLR and other armed groups residing in their countries;

Natural Resources

19. *Further encourages* the continuation of efforts by the Government of the DRC to address issues of illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources, including holding accountable those elements of the FARDC which participate in the illicit trade of natural resources, particularly gold and wildlife products;
20. *Stresses* the need to undertake further efforts to cut off financing for armed groups involved in destabilizing activities through the illicit trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife products;
21. *Welcomes* in this regard the measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement the due diligence guidelines on the supply chain of minerals, as defined by the Group of Experts and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *recognizes* the Congolese Government's efforts to implement minerals traceability schemes, and *calls on* all States to assist the DRC, the ICGLR and the countries in the Great Lakes region to develop a responsible minerals trade;
22. *Welcomes* measures taken by the Governments in the region to implement the Group of Experts due diligence guidelines, including adopting the Regional Certification Mechanism of the ICGLR into their national legislation, in accordance with OECD Guidance and international practice, *requests* the extension of the certification process to other Member States in the region, and *calls on* all States, particularly those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines, including by urging importers, processing industries, including gold refiners, and consumers of Congolese mineral products to exercise due diligence in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 1952 (2010);
23. *Encourages* the ICGLR and ICGLR Member States to work closely with the industry schemes currently operating in the DRC to ensure sustainability, transparency, and accountability of operations, and further *recognizes* and *encourages* the DRC government's continued support for the establishment of traceability and diligence systems to allow for the export of artisanal gold;
24. *Continues to encourage* the ICGLR to put in place the necessary technical capacity required to support Member States in their fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources, *notes* that some ICGLR

Member States have made significant progress, and *recommends* all Member States to fully implement the regional certification scheme and report mineral trade statistics in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 1952 (2010);

25. *Encourages* all States to continue efforts to end the illicit trade in natural resources, in particular in the gold sector, and to hold those complicit in the illicit trade accountable, as part of broader efforts to ensure that the illicit trade in natural resources is not benefiting sanctioned entities, armed groups or criminal networks, including those with members in the FARDC;
26. *Reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 7 to 9 of resolution 2021 (2011) and *calls upon* the DRC and States in the Great Lakes region to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat regional criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including wildlife poaching and trafficking, and require their customs authorities to strengthen their control on exports and imports of mineral from the DRC;

Role of MONUSCO

27. *Recalls* the mandate of MONUSCO as outlined in resolution 2348 (2017), in particular in paragraph 30 underlining the importance of enhanced political and conflict-related analysis, including by collecting and analysing information on the criminal networks which support the armed groups, paragraph 35 (iii) regarding the monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo, and paragraph 35 (iv) on mining activities;
28. *Encourages* timely information exchange between MONUSCO and the Group of Experts in line with paragraph 43 of resolution 2348 (2017), and *requests* MONUSCO to assist the Committee and the Group of Experts, within its capabilities;

Sanctions Committee, Reporting and Review

29. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region and those in which individuals and entities designated pursuant to paragraph 2 of this resolution are based, to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 and recommended in paragraph 8 of resolution 1952 (2010);
30. *Emphasizes* the importance for the Committee of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
31. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, including alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the DRC on the situation in the DRC as appropriate, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;
32. *Requests* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of resolution 2293 (2016) and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and *requests* the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 31 of this resolution, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;
33. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);
34. *Decides* that, when appropriate and no later than 1 July 2018, it shall review the measures set forth in this resolution, with a view to adjusting them, as appropriate, in light of the security situation in the DRC, in particular progress in security sector reform and in disarming, demobilizing, repatriating, resettling and reintegrating, as appropriate, Congolese and foreign armed groups, with a particular focus on children among them, and compliance with this resolution;
35. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 29 juni 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7988e zitting Resolutie 2362 (2017) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2362 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7988th meeting, on 29 June 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling the arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze and measures concerning illicit oil exports which were imposed and modified by resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2292 (2016), and 2357 (2017) (the Measures), and that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), and 2213 (2015) was extended until 31 July 2017 by resolution 2278 (2016),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which welcomed the signing of the 17 December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement of Skhirat, Morocco and endorsed the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015 to support the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya, that should be based in Tripoli, and *further expressing* its determination in this regard to support the Government of National Accord,

Welcoming the meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue on 10 March 2016, which reaffirmed its commitment to uphold the Libyan Political Agreement *further welcoming* recent efforts to strengthen dialogue between Libyans, supported by Libya's neighbours and regional organizations, *noting* the importance of the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led process to advance inclusive political dialogue,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Government of National Accord in taking appropriate action to prevent the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya and *reaffirming* the importance of international support for Libyan sovereignty over its territory and resources,

Expressing its concern that the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya undermines the Government of National Accord and poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of Libya,

Expressing support for Libyan efforts to resolve peacefully the disruptions of Libya's energy exports and *reiterating* that control of all facilities should be transferred back to the proper authorities,

Further reiterating its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil Corporation, *highlighting* the importance of these institutions continuing to function for the benefit of all Libyans, and *stressing* the need for the Government of National Accord to exercise sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority as a matter of urgency, without prejudice to future constitutional arrangements pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement,

Further recalling resolution 2259 (2015) which called on Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside the Libyan Political Agreement, as specified by it,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the oceans and seas,

Further recalling resolution 2292 (2016) and resolution 2357 (2017) which in relation to the implementation of the arms embargo authorise, for the period of time specified by those resolutions, the inspection on the high seas off the coast of Libya of vessels bound to or from Libya believed to be carrying arms or related materiel in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and the seizure and disposal of such items provided that Member States make good faith efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel's flag State prior to any inspections while acting in accordance with those resolutions,

Reaffirming the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians and *stressing* the need to transfer detainees to State authority,

Reiterating its expression of support for the Government of National Accord, as stated in paragraph 3 of resolution 2259 (2015), and *noting* in this regard the specific requests made to the Government of National Accord in this resolution,

Reiterating its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and work with the Libyan authorities and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to develop a coordinated package of support to build the capacity of the Government of National Accord, in line with Libyan priorities and in response to requests for assistance,

Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Prevention of Illicit Exports of Petroleum, including Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products

1. *Condemns* attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya, including by parallel institutions which are not acting under the authority of the Government of National Accord;

2. *Decides* to extend until 15 November 2018 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014), and *decides further* that the authorisations provided by and the measures imposed by that resolution shall apply with respect to vessels loading, transporting, or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya;
3. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Government of National Accord and notification to the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (the Committee) of a focal point responsible for communication with the Committee with respect to the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), *requests* the focal point to continue to inform the Committee of any vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya, and *urges* the Government of National Accord to provide regular updates to inform the Committee on ports, oil fields, and installations that are under its control, and to inform the Committee about the mechanism used to certify legal exports of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products;
4. *Calls* on the Government of National Accord, on the basis of any information regarding such exports or attempted exports, to expeditiously contact the concerned vessel's flag State, in the first instance, to resolve the issue and *directs* the Committee to immediately inform all relevant Member States about notifications to the Committee from the Government of National Accord's focal point regarding vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya;

Effective Oversight of the Financial Institutions

5. *Requests* that the Government of National Accord confirm to the Committee as soon as it exercises sole and effective oversight over the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Investment Authority;

Arms Embargo

6. *Welcomes* the appointment by the Government of National Accord of a focal point pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2278, *takes note* of the briefing provided by the focal point to the Committee on the structure of the security forces under its control, the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Government security forces, and training needs, *continues* to emphasise the importance of the Government of National Accord exercising control over and safely storing arms, with the support of the international community, and *stresses* that ensuring security and defending Libya from terrorism must be the task of unified and strengthened national security forces under the sole authority of the Government of National Accord within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement;
7. *Affirms* that the Government of National Accord may submit requests under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014) for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, for the use by security forces under its control to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar Al Sharia, and other groups associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya, *calls* upon the Committee to consider expeditiously such requests, and *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider reviewing the arms embargo, when appropriate;
8. *Urges* Member States to assist the Government of National Accord, upon its request, by providing it with the necessary security and capacity-building assistance, in response to threats to Libyan security and in defeating ISIL, groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar Al Sharia, and other groups associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya;
9. *Urges* the Government of National Accord to improve further the monitoring and control of arms or related materiel that are supplied, sold or transferred to Libya in accordance with paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), including through the use of end user certificates issued by the Government of National Accord, *requests* the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) to consult with the Government of National Accord about the safeguards needed to safely procure and secure arms and related materiel, and *urges* Member States and regional organizations to provide assistance to the Government of National Accord upon its request to strengthen the infrastructure and mechanisms currently in place to do so;
10. *Calls upon* the Government of National Accord to improve the implementation of the arms embargo, including at all entry points, as soon as it exercises oversight, and *calls* upon all Member States to cooperate in such efforts;

Travel Ban and Asset Freeze

11. *Reaffirms* that the travel ban and asset freeze measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011) and paragraph 11 of resolution 2213 (2015), apply to individuals and entities designated under that resolution and under resolution 1973 (2011) and by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *reaffirms* that these measures also apply to individuals and entities determined by the Committee to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or

security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition, and *decides* that, in addition to the acts listed in paragraph 11 (a)-(f) of resolution 2213 (2015), such acts may also include but are not limited to planning, directing, sponsoring, or participating in attacks against United Nations personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015) and this resolution (the Panel);

12. *Reaffirms* its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and taking note of the letter circulated as document S/2016/275, *affirms* the Security Council's readiness to consider changes, when appropriate, to the asset freeze at the request of the Government of National Accord;

Panel of Experts

13. *Decides* to extend until 15 November 2018 the mandate of the Panel of Experts (the Panel), established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012), 2146 (2014), 2174 (2014), and 2213 (2015) and *decides* that the Panel's mandated tasks shall remain as defined in resolution 2213 (2015) and shall also apply with respect to the Measures updated in this resolution;
14. *Decides* that the Panel shall provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 28 February 2018, and a final report to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, no later than 15 September 2018 with its findings and recommendations;
15. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including UNSMIL, and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the Measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and *calls* on UNSMIL and the Government of National Accord to support Panel investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities, as appropriate;
16. *Calls* upon all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members, and further *calls* upon all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Panel deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
17. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the Measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the Measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya;
18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 20 juli 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8007e zitting Resolutie 2368 (2017) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2368 (2017)¹⁾

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8007th meeting, on 20 July 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), 2161 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2214 (2015), 2249 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2309 (2016), 2322 (2016), 2331 (2016), 2341 (2017), 2347 (2017), 2354 (2017),

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed, and *reiterating* its unequivocal condemnation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property, and greatly undermining stability,

Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations,

¹⁾ Reissued for technical reasons on 27 July 2017.

Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization, *Expressing* its gravest concern about the presence, violent extremist ideology and actions of ISIL, and Al-Qaida, and the growing presence of their affiliates around the world,

Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the importance of Member States fulfilling all of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations,

Underscoring the important role of the United Nations, in particular the United Nations Security Council, in facilitating international cooperation in countering terrorism,

Stressing that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism,

Recalling the Presidential Statements of the Security Council on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts of 15 January 2013 (S/PRST/2013/1), 28 July 2014 (S/PRST/2014/14), 19 November 2014 (S/PRST/2014/23), 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), 28 July 2015 (S/PRST/2015/14), 11 May 2016 (S/PRST/2016/6) and 13 May 2016 (S/PRST/2016/7),

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, *stressing* in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Recognizing that development, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, and *underlining* that a particular goal of counter-terrorism strategies should be to ensure sustainable peace and security,

Reaffirming its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists,

Urging all States, including States where ISIL is present, to prevent any trade, economic, and financial ties with ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including through enhancing their border security efforts,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, including in support of countering terrorism, and *stressing* in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

Stressing the important role the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee plays in identifying possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 1, including its role in determining the appropriate course of action on each case,

Recalling that ISIL is a splinter group of Al-Qaida, and *recalling* further that any individual, group, undertaking, or entity supporting ISIL or Al-Qaida is eligible for listing,

Condemning the frequent, recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL around the world resulting in numerous casualties, as well as the continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by ISIL, and *recognizing* the need for sanctions to reflect current threats and, in this regard, *recalling* paragraph 7 of resolution 2249 (2015),

Recalling that all States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, and *urges* States to act in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find and bring to justice, extradite or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the direct or indirect financing of activities conducted by terrorists or terrorist groups,

Reminding all States that they have an obligation to take the measures described in paragraph 1 with respect to all individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities included on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2161 (2014) and 2253 (2015), regardless of the nationality or residence of such individuals, groups, undertakings, or entities,

Urging all Member States to participate actively in maintaining and updating the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List by contributing additional information pertinent to current listings, submitting delisting requests when appropriate, and by identifying and nominating for listing additional individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities which should be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

Reminding the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to remove expeditiously and on a case-by-case basis individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing outlined in this resolution, *welcoming* improvements to the Committee's procedures and the format of the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, *expressing* its intent to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair and clear, and *recognizing* the challenges, both legal and otherwise, to the measures implemented by Member States under paragraph 1 of this resolution,

Recognizing the importance of building capacities of Member States to counter terrorism and terrorist financing,

Welcoming again the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) and the enhancement of the Ombudsperson's mandate in resolutions 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2161 (2015) and 2253 (2015) *noting* the Office of the Ombudsperson's significant contribution in providing additional fairness and transparency, and *recalling* the Security Council's firm commitment to ensuring that the Office of the Ombudsperson is able to continue to carry out its role effectively and independently, in accordance with its mandate,

Welcoming the Ombudsperson's biannual reports to the Security Council, including the reports submitted on 21 January 2011, 22 July 2011, 20 January 2012, 30 July 2012, 31 January 2013, 31 July 2013, 31 January 2014, 31 July 2014, and 2 February 2015,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation between the Committee and INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, and all other United Nations bodies, and *strongly encouraging* further engagement with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, and *welcoming* the initiative of the Secretary-General to transfer the current CTITF and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre into the office of Counter-terrorism,

Recalling its resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2133 (2014) strongly condemning kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, expressing its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, *reiterating its call upon* all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, welcoming the endorsement by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in September 2015 of the "Addendum to the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists" and *urging* all States to remain vigilant about kidnapping and hostage-taking by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and their affiliates,

Gravely concerned that in some cases ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities continue to profit from involvement in transnational organized crime, and *expressing concern* that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, and artefacts, and from the illicit trade in natural resources including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal, petroleum, and petroleum products, as well as from kidnapping for ransom and other crimes including extortion and bank robbery,

Recognizing the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act, including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors, and recalling paragraph 5 of resolution 1452 (2002),

Recognizing the need for Member States to prevent the abuse of non-governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, *noting* that the ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has identified individual cases in which terrorists and terrorist organizations exploit some non-profit organizations in the sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations, and *calling upon* non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, attempts by terrorists to abuse their status through risk mitigation measures, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or belief, and *welcoming* the 2016 revised international standard and guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in Recommendation 8, including its recommendation for a more appropriate, risk-based approach and government engagement with the non-profit sector to appropriately and effectively mitigate terrorist abuse, and to take appropriate actions when necessary, noting that any such measures implemented by states be consistent with their international obligations, and *reiterating* that States should identify and take effective and proportionate actions against non-profit organizations that either are exploited by or knowingly support terrorists or terrorist organizations taking into account the specifics of the case,

Recalling its decision that Member States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls on States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional, and international levels,

Strongly condemning the continued flow of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, military equipment, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and their components, and improvised explosive device (IED) components to and between ISIL, Al-Qaida, their affiliates, and associated groups, illegal armed groups and criminals, and *encouraging* Member States to prevent and disrupt procurement networks for such weapons, systems and components between ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including through proposing relevant listing requests,

Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, as well as their use to incite, recruit, fund, or plan terrorist acts,

Stressing the need to effectively counter the ways that ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to incite and recruit others to commit terrorist acts, and *further recalling* in this regard resolution 2354 (2017) and the “Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives” (S/2017/375) with recommended guidelines and good practices,

Expressing concern at the flow of international recruits to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated groups and the scale of this phenomenon, and *recalling* its resolution 2178 (2014) deciding that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping of foreign terrorist fighters and the financing of their travel and of their activities,

Reiterating the obligation of Member States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the foreign terrorist fighter-related activities described in paragraph 6 of resolution 2178 (2014), and *reiterating* further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists,

Expressing concern at the increasing number of foreign terrorist fighters leaving zones of armed conflict, returning to their countries of origin, transiting through, traveling to or relocating to or from other Member States, and *encouraging* Member States to share relevant information, as appropriate, within and between governments about funding flows and movement of foreign terrorist fighters to mitigate the risk they pose,

Calling upon Member States to continue information sharing, through appropriate channels and arrangements, and consistent with international and domestic law, on individuals, groups, undertakings and entities implicated in terrorist activities, in particular their supply of weapons and sources of material support, and on the ongoing international counter-terrorism coordination including among special services, security agencies and law enforcement organizations and criminal justice authorities,

Condemning any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular of petroleum and petroleum products, modular refineries, and related materiel including chemicals and lubricants, with ISIL, Al-Nusrah Front (ANF), and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities designated by the Committee, and *reiterating* that such engagement would constitute support for such individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and may lead to further listings by the Committee,

Condemning the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria particularly by ISIL and ANF, including targeted destruction of religious sites and objects; and *recalling its decision* that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in such items, thereby allowing for their eventual safe return to the Iraqi and Syrian people,

Recalling its resolution 2178 (2014) expressing concern with the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and *reaffirming* its resolve to address all aspects of that threat, including terrorist acts perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters,

Condemning in the strongest terms abductions of women and children by ISIL, ANF, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and recalling resolution 2242 (2015), *expressing* outrage at their exploitation and abuse, including rape, sexual violence, forced marriage, and enslavement by these entities, *encouraging* all State and non-state actors with evidence to bring it to the attention of the Council, along with any information that such human trafficking and related forms of exploitation and abuse may support the perpetrators financially, *emphasizing* that this resolution requires States to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make available any funds, financial assets or economic resources for ISIL's benefit, and *noting* that any person or entity who transfers funds to ISIL directly or indirectly in connection with such exploitation and abuse would be eligible for listing by the Committee,

Recalling its resolution 2331 (2016), condemning all acts of trafficking, *further expressing* its intention to invite the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and on Children and Armed Conflict to brief the Committee, in accordance with the Committee's rules of procedure, and to provide relevant information including, if applicable, the names of individuals involved in the trafficking in persons who may meet the Committee's designation criteria,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists to facilitate implementation by national authorities, *further welcoming* the Secretariat's efforts to translate all list entries and narrative summaries of reasons for listing available in all official languages of the United Nations, and *encouraging* the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, to continue its work to implement the data model approved by the Committee,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the following measures as previously imposed by paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), and paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 1989 (2011), with respect to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities:

Asset Freeze

- a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons' benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;

Travel Ban

- b) Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

Arms Embargo

- c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities;

Listing Criteria

2. *Decides* that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and therefore eligible for inclusion in the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List include:
 - a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;
 - b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;
 - c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;
3. *Notes* that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from crime, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors;
4. *Confirms* that any individual, group, undertaking or entity either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, any individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida, including on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, shall be eligible for listing;
5. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting and related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida, ISIL, and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
6. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to funds, financial assets or economic resources that may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of listed individuals in connection with their travel, including costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging, and that

such travel-related funds, other financial assets or economic resources may only be provided in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and in paragraphs 10, 80 and 81 below;

7. *Notes* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to financial transactions involving any funds, economic resources or income-generating activities that benefit individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including, but not limited to, trade in petroleum products, natural resources, chemical or agricultural products, weapons, or antiquities by listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, kidnapping for ransom, and the proceeds of other crimes including, trafficking in persons, extortion and bank robbery;
8. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above shall also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;
9. *Reaffirms* that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 1 above and are frozen;
10. *Encourages* Member States to make use of the provisions regarding available exemptions to the measures in paragraph 1 (a) above, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), *confirms* that exemptions to the travel ban must be submitted by Member States, individuals or the Ombudsperson, as appropriate, including when listed individuals travel for the purpose of fulfilling religious obligations, and *notes* that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may receive exemption requests submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity, for Committee consideration, as described in paragraph 81 below;

Measures implementation

11. *Reiterates* the importance of all States identifying, and if necessary introducing, adequate procedures to implement fully all aspects of the measures described in paragraph 1 above;
12. *Reaffirms* that those responsible for committing, organizing, or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable, *recalls* its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, *underlines* the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and *urges* Member States to provide full coordination in such investigations or proceedings, especially with those States where, or against whose citizens, terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find and bring to justice, extradite, or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the direct or indirect financing of activities conducted by ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;
13. *Reiterates* Member States' obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available economic resources to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, *recalls also* that this obligation applies to the direct and indirect trade in petroleum and refined petroleum products, modular refineries, and related material including chemicals and lubricants, and other natural resources, and *recalls further* the importance of all Member States complying with their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make donations to individuals and entities designated by the Committee or those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated individuals or entities;
14. *Encourages* all Member States to more actively submit to the Committee listing requests of individuals and entities supporting ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and directs the Committee to immediately consider, in accordance with its resolution 2199 (2015), designations of individuals and entities engaged in financing, supporting, facilitating acts or activities, including in petroleum and antiquities trade-related activities with ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;
15. *Recalls* its resolution 2331 (2016), reaffirms its intention to consider targeted sanctions for individuals and entities associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida involved in trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict and in sexual violence in conflict, and encourages all Member States to consider submitting to the Committee listing requests in this regard;
16. *Expresses* increasing concern about the lack of implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) including the insufficient level of reporting by Member States to the Committee on the measures they have taken to comply with its provisions and *calls upon* Member States to take the necessary measures to fulfil their obligation under paragraph 12 of resolution 2199 to report to the Committee interdictions in their territory of any petroleum, petroleum products, modular refineries,

and related material being transferred to or from ISIL or ANF, and *calls upon* Member States to report also such interdictions of antiquities, as well as the outcome of proceedings brought against individuals and entities as a result of any such activity;

17. *Strongly urges* all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) revised Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, particularly Recommendation 6 on targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing; to apply the elements in FATF's Interpretive Note to Recommendation 6, with the final objective of effectively preventing terrorists from raising, moving and using funds, in line with the objectives of Immediate Outcome 10 of the FATF methodology; to take note of, inter alia, related best practices for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing and the need to have appropriate legal authorities and procedures to apply and enforce targeted financial sanctions that are not conditional upon the existence of criminal proceedings; and to apply an evidentiary standard of proof of "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable basis", as well as the ability to collect or solicit as much information as possible from all relevant sources;
18. *Welcomes* the recent FATF reports on the Financing of the Terrorist Organization ISIL (published February 2015) and Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks (published October 2015), and ongoing FATF work related to terrorist financing, including the development of risk indicators related to terrorist financing, *welcomes* further the recent FATF guidance on criminalizing terrorist financing (October 2016), including Interpretive Note to Recommendation 5, clarifying that Recommendation 5 applies to "funds or other assets" and that this term covers the broadest range of financial assets and economic resources, including petroleum and petroleum products and other natural resources, and other assets which could be used to obtain funds, the relevant elements of resolution 2178 (2014), specifically clarifying that terrorist financing includes the financing of the travel of individuals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and *highlights* that FATF Recommendation 5 applies to the financing of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;
19. *Encourages* FATF to continue its efforts to prioritize countering terrorist financing, in particular identifying and working with Member States with strategic anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing deficiencies that have hindered Member States from effectively countering the financing of terrorism, including by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, group, entities and undertakings, and in this regard, *reiterates* that the provision of economic resources to such groups is a clear violation of this and other relevant resolutions and is not acceptable;
20. *Clarifies* that the obligation in paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1373 (2001) applies to making funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;
21. *Calls upon* States to ensure that they have established as a serious criminal offense in their domestic laws and regulations the willful violation of the prohibition described in paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1373 (2001);
22. *Calls upon* Member States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as required by paragraph 1 (a), and *taking into account* relevant FATF Recommendations and international standards designed to enhance financial transparency including effectively supervising the money value transfer systems and detecting and preventing the physical cross-border movement of currency to support terrorism, as well as to protect non-profit organizations, from terrorist abuse, using a risk-based approach, while working to mitigate the impact on legitimate activities through all of these mediums;
23. *Urges* Member States to remain vigilant about the use of information and communication technology for terrorist purposes and act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from recruiting and raising funds for terrorist purposes, and to counter their violent extremist propaganda and incitement to violence on the Internet and social media, including by developing effective counter narratives, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with obligations under international law, and *stresses* the importance of cooperation with civil society and the private sector in this endeavor;
24. *Urges* Member States to promote awareness of the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List as widely as possible, including to relevant domestic agencies, the private sector and the general public to ensure effective implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 above and *encourages* Member States to urge that their respective company, property and other relevant public and private registries regularly screen their available databases, including but not limited to those with legal and/or beneficial ownership information, against the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
25. *Highlights* the importance of strong relationships with the private sector in countering the financing of terrorism, *welcomes* the work by FATF to develop risk indicators related to terrorist financing and *calls upon* Member States to engage with financial institutions and share information on terrorist financing (TF) risks to provide greater context for their work in identifying potential TF activity related to ISIL,

Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to promote stronger relationships between governments and the private sector as well as between private sector entities in countering terrorist financing;

26. Underscores that ransom payments to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities continue to be one of the sources of income which supports their recruitment efforts, strengthens their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks, and incentivizes future incidents of kidnapping for ransom, and *reaffirms* the call upon Member States in resolution 2133 (2014) to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments, or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages;
27. *Urges* Member States to remain vigilant about the growing presence of ISIL and its affiliates around the world, and *further urges* Member States to identify and propose for listing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that meet the criteria in paragraph 2 of this resolution;
28. *Recognizes* the importance of information sharing within and between governments to effectively counter the financing of terrorism, *calls upon* Member States to continue exercising vigilance over relevant financial transactions and improve information-sharing capabilities and practices within and between governments through multiple authorities and channels, including law enforcement, intelligence, security services, and financial intelligence units, and also *calls upon* Member States to improve integration and utilization of financial intelligence with other types of information available to national governments to more effectively counter the terrorist financing threats posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;
29. *Decides* that Member States, in order to prevent ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonators, detonating cord, or poisons, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices, and *further encourages* Member States to share information, establish partnerships, and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices;
30. *Encourages* Member States, including through their permanent missions, and relevant international organizations to meet the Committee for in-depth discussion on any relevant issues;
31. *Urges* all Member States, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated and removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;
32. *Encourages* Member States to share, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, with the private sector information in their national databases related to fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost identity or travel documents pertaining to their own jurisdictions, and, if a listed party is found to be using a false identity including to secure credit or fraudulent travel documents, to provide the Committee with information in this regard;
33. *Encourages* Member States that issue travel documents to listed individuals to note, as appropriate, that the bearer is subject to the travel ban and corresponding exemption procedures;
34. *Encourages* Member States to consult the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List when considering whether to grant travel visa applications, for the purpose of effectively implementing the travel ban;
35. *Reaffirms* its call upon Member States in resolution 2178 (2014) to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee and further reaffirms its call upon Member States to report any such departure from their territories, or such attempted entry into or transit through their territories, of such individuals to the Committee, as well as sharing this information with the State of residence or nationality, as appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and international obligations;
36. *Calls upon* Member States to develop the capability to process Passenger Name Records (PNR) data and to ensure PNR data is used by the relevant national competent authorities, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offenses, and *encourages* Member States to require that, where appropriate, airlines under their jurisdiction provide PNR to their relevant national authorities;
37. *Reaffirms* its decision in resolution 2178 (2014) that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of such foreign terrorist fighter-related activities described in paragraph 6 of that resolution;
38. *Encourages* Member States to exchange information expeditiously with other Member States, in particular States of origin, destination and transit, when they detect the travel of individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

39. *Calls upon* Member States to improve international, regional, and subregional cooperation to address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin, transiting through, traveling to or relocating to or from other Member States, including through increased sharing of information, in accordance with domestic and international law, for the purpose of identifying such movement of foreign terrorist fighters, the sharing and adoption of best practices, and improved understanding of the patterns of travel and financing used by foreign terrorist fighters;
40. *Urges* Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and international law, concerning the identity of foreign terrorist fighters, including, as appropriate, foreign terrorist fighters of more than one nationality with Member States whose nationality the foreign terrorist fighter holds, as well as to ensure consular access by those Member States to their own detained nationals, in accordance with applicable international and domestic law;
41. *Encourages* designating States to inform the Monitoring Team whether a national court or other legal authority has reviewed a listed party's case and whether any judicial proceedings have begun, and to include any other relevant information when submitting the standard form for listing;
42. *Encourages* all Member States to designate national focal points in charge of liaising with the Committee and the Monitoring Team on issues related to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 1 above and the assessment of the threat from ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;
43. *Encourages* all Member States to report to the Committee on obstacles to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 1 above, with a view to facilitating technical assistance;
44. *Calls upon* all States to submit an updated report to the Committee no later than 120 days from the date of adoption of this resolution on their implementation, including relevant enforcement actions as appropriate, of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;

The Committee

45. *Directs* the Committee to continue to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List and for removing them as well as for granting exemptions per resolution 1452 (2002), and *directs* the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in support of these objectives;
46. *Requests* the Committee to report, through its Chair, at least once per year, to the Council on its findings regarding Member States' implementation efforts, and identify and recommend steps necessary to improve implementation and on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team in conjunction with other Committee Chairs, as appropriate, and *expresses* its intention to hold informal consultations at least once per year on the work of the Committee and *further requests* the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;
47. *Directs* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 1 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and *directs* the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 46, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;
48. *Confirms* that no matter should be left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that extraordinary circumstances require additional time for consideration, in accordance with the Committee's guidelines;
49. *Requests* the Committee to facilitate, through the Monitoring Team or specialized United Nations agencies, assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

Listing

50. *Encourages* all Member States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;
51. *Reaffirms* that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Member States shall use the standard form for listing, available on the Committee's website, and provide a statement of case that should include as detailed and specific reasons as possible describing the proposed basis for the listing, and as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and to the extent possible, the information required by INTERPOL to issue a Special Notice, and *reaffirms* that the statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to the Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 55;
52. *Reaffirms* that Member States proposing a new listing, as well as Member States that have proposed names for inclusion on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List before the adoption of this resolution, shall specify if the Committee or the Ombudsperson may not make known the Member State's status as a designating State;

53. *Encourages* Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;
54. *Directs* the Committee to continue to update, as necessary, the standard form for listing in accordance with the provisions of this resolution; further *directs* the Monitoring Team to report to the Committee on further steps that could be taken to improve the quality of the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List and Consolidated Sanctions List, including by improving identifying information, as well as steps to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and further *directs* the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, to implement, disseminate and maintain the data model approved by the Committee in all official languages and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional resources in this regard;
55. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee's website, at the same time a name is added to the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, a narrative summary of reasons for listing that are as detailed and specific as possible, as well as additional relevant information;
56. *Encourages* Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to inform the Committee of any relevant court decisions and proceedings so that the Committee can consider them when it reviews a corresponding listing or updates a narrative summary of reasons for listing;
57. *Calls upon* all members of the Committee and the Monitoring Team to share with the Committee any information they may have available regarding a listing request from a Member State so that this information may help inform the Committee's decision on listing and provide additional material for the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 54;
58. *Reaffirms* that the Secretariat shall, after publication but within three working days after a name is added to the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State or States where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the State of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known), and *requests* the Secretariat to publish on the Committee's website all relevant publicly releasable information, including the narrative summary of reasons for listing, immediately after a name is added to the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
59. *Reaffirms* the requirement that Member States take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the listing and to include with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects of listing, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee's procedures for considering delisting requests, including the possibility of submitting such a request to the Ombudsperson in accordance with paragraph 43 of resolution 2083 (2012) and annex II of this resolution, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002) and paragraphs 82 and 1 (b) of this resolution regarding available exemptions, including the possibility of submitting such requests through the Focal Point mechanism in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 82 of this resolution;

Review of Delisting Requests – Ombudsperson/Member States

60. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson, established by resolution 1904 (2009), as reflected in the procedures outlined in annex II of this resolution, for a period of 24 months from the date of expiration of the Office of the Ombudsperson's current mandate in December 2019, *affirms* that the Ombudsperson shall continue to receive requests from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government, and *further affirms* that the Ombudsperson shall continue to present to the Committee observations and a recommendation on the delisting of those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities that have requested removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List through the Office of the Ombudsperson, either a recommendation to retain the listing or a recommendation that the Committee consider delisting;
61. *Recalls* its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing in the Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson on a delisting request pursuant to annex II;
62. *Recalls* its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with annex II of this resolution, where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;

63. *Recalls* its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 62 on a case-by-case basis;
64. *Reiterates* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;
65. *Underscores* the importance of the Office of the Ombudsperson, and *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the Ombudsperson by providing necessary resources, including for translation services, as appropriate, and to make the necessary arrangements to ensure its continued ability to carry out its mandate in an independent, effective and timely manner, and to keep the Committee updated on actions in this regard;
66. *Strongly urges* Member States to provide all relevant information to the Ombudsperson, including any relevant confidential information, where appropriate, *encourages* Member States to provide relevant information, including any detailed and specific information, when available and in a timely manner, *welcomes* those national arrangements entered into by Member States with the Office of the Ombudsperson to facilitate the sharing of confidential information, *strongly encourages* Member States' further progress in this regard, including by concluding arrangements with the Office of the Ombudsperson for the sharing of such information, and *confirms* that the Ombudsperson must comply with any confidentiality restrictions that are placed on such information by Member States providing it;
67. *Strongly urges* Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are already in the process of challenging their listing through national and regional courts to first seek removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson;
68. *Notes* the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards and, inter alia, best practices relating to targeted financial sanctions, as referenced in paragraph 22 of this resolution;
69. *Recalls* its decision that when the designating State submits a delisting request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity after 60 days unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the measures shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;
70. *Also recalls* its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 69 on a case-by-case basis;
71. *Further recalls* its decision that, for purposes of submitting a delisting request in paragraph 69, consensus must exist between or among all designating States in cases where there are multiple designating States; and further *recalls* its decision that co-sponsors of listing requests shall not be considered designating States for purposes of paragraph 62;
72. *Strongly urges* designating States to allow the Ombudsperson to reveal their identities as designating States to those listed individuals and entities that have submitted delisting petitions to the Ombudsperson;
73. *Directs* the Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider delisting requests of Member States for the removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that are alleged to no longer meet the criteria established in the relevant resolutions, and set out in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and *strongly urges* Member States to provide reasons for submitting their delisting requests;
74. *Encourages* States to submit delisting requests for individuals who are officially confirmed to be dead, and for entities reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, while at the same time taking all reasonable measures to ensure that assets that had belonged to these individuals or entities will not be transferred or distributed to other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List or any other Security Council sanctions list;
75. *Encourages* Member States, when unfreezing the assets of a deceased individual or an entity that is reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist as a result of a delisting, to recall the obligations set forth in resolution 1373 (2001) and, particularly, to prevent unfrozen assets from being used for terrorist purposes;
76. *Reaffirms* that, prior to the unfreezing of any assets that have been frozen as a result of the listing of Osama bin Laden, Member States shall submit to the Committee a request to unfreeze such assets and shall provide assurances to the Committee that the assets will not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to a listed individual, group, undertaking or entity, or otherwise used for terrorist purposes in line with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), and *decides* further that such assets may only be unfrozen in the absence of an objection by a Committee member within 30 days of receiving the request, and stresses the exceptional nature of this provision, which shall not be considered as establishing a precedent;
77. *Calls upon* the Committee when considering delisting requests to give due consideration to the opinions of designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, and other relevant States as determined by the Committee, *directs* Committee members to provide their reasons for object-

ing to delisting requests at the time the request is objected to, and *requests* the Committee to provide reasons to relevant Member States and national and regional courts and bodies, upon request and where appropriate;

78. *Encourages* all Member States, including designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation to provide all information to the Committee relevant to the Committee's review of delisting petitions, and to meet with the Committee, if requested, to convey their views on delisting requests, and further *encourages* the Committee, where appropriate, to meet with representatives of national or regional organizations and bodies that have relevant information on delisting petitions;
79. *Confirms* that the Secretariat shall, within three days after a name is removed from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation (to the extent this information is known), and *recalls* its decision that States receiving such notification shall take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual, group, undertaking or entity of the delisting in a timely manner;
80. *Reaffirms* that, in cases in which the Ombudsperson is unable to interview a petitioner in his or her state of residence, the Ombudsperson may request, with the agreement of the petitioner, that the Committee consider granting exemptions to the restrictions on assets and travel in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this resolution for the sole purpose of allowing the petitioner to meet travel expenses and travel to another State to be interviewed by the Ombudsperson for a period no longer than necessary to participate in this interview, provided that all States of transit and destination do not object to such travel, and further directs the Committee to notify the Ombudsperson of the Committee's decision;

Exemptions/Focal Point

81. *Recalls* that the assets freeze measures outlined in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to funds and other financial assets or economic resources that the Committee determines to be:
 - a) necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial assets or economic resources, following notification of intention to authorize access to such funds and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 3 working days of the notification;
 - b) necessary for extraordinary expenses, being expenses other than basic expenses, following notification of the intention to authorize release of such funds and approval of the Committee of the request within 5 working days of the notification, and where appropriate, there should be specific periods of time requested by the notifying Member States for such expenses;
82. *Reaffirms* that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may:
 - a) Receive requests from listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 (a) of this resolution, as defined in resolution 1452 (2002) provided that the request has first been submitted for the consideration of the State of residence, and *reaffirms* further that the Focal Point shall transmit such requests to the Committee for a decision, directs the Committee to consider such requests, including in consultation with the State of residence and any other relevant States, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals, groups, undertaking or entities of the Committee's decision;
 - b) Receive requests from listed individuals for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 (b) of this resolution and transmit these to the Committee to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether entry or transit is justified, directs the Committee to consider such requests in consultation with States of transit and destination and any other relevant States, and *reaffirms* further that the Committee shall only agree to exemptions to the measures in paragraph 1 (b) of this resolution with the agreement of the States of transit and destination, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals of the Committee's decision;
83. *Reaffirms* that the Focal Point may receive, and transmit to the Committee for its consideration, communications from:
 - a) individuals who have been removed from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
 - b) individuals claiming to have been subjected to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 above as a result of false or mistaken identification or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
84. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in consultation with relevant States, to carefully consider such communications and to respond, through the Focal Point, to such communications referred to in paragraph 83 (b), as may be appropriate, within 60 days, and *further directs* the Committee, in consultation with INTERPOL as may be appropriate, to communicate with Member States as may be appropriate to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identity or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

Review and maintenance of the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List

85. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, including where possible and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;
86. *Requests* the Monitoring Team to circulate to the Committee every twelve months a list compiled in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, where known, of:
 - a) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List whose entries lack identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them;
 - b) individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information such as the certification of death, and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any individuals or entities who would be in a position to receive any unfrozen assets;
 - c) individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List that are reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, along with an assessment of any relevant information;
 - d) any other names on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List that have not been reviewed in three or more years ("the triennial review");
87. *Directs* the Committee to review whether these listings remain appropriate, and *further directs* the Committee to remove listings if it decides they are no longer appropriate;
88. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to refer to the Chair for review listings for which, after three years, no relevant State has responded in writing to the Committee's requests for information, and in this regard, *reminds* the Committee that its Chair, acting in his or her capacity as Chair, may submit names for removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as appropriate and subject to the Committee's normal decision-making procedures;

Coordination and outreach

89. *Directs* the Committee to continue to cooperate with other relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees, in particular those established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1970 (2011) and 2140 (2014);
90. *Reiterates* the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee and United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to these bodies;
91. *Encourages* the Monitoring Team and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to continue their joint activities, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and 1540 Committee experts to assist Member States in their efforts to comply with their obligations under the relevant resolutions, including through organizing regional and subregional workshops;
92. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), and 2133 (2014), 2161 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), and 2214 (2015) and 2253 (2015);
93. *Directs* the Committee to consider requests for information from States and international organizations with ongoing judicial proceedings concerning implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 1 above, and to respond as appropriate with additional information available to the Committee and the Monitoring Team;

Monitoring Team

94. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, as well as to support the Ombudsperson, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team and its members, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a further period of twenty four months from the expiration of its current mandate in December 2019, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in annex I, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect, and *welcomes* the restructuring under way in the Secretariat which will allow the Monitoring Team to receive and fully enjoy the benefits of the additional substantive and administrative staff and resources requested in paragraph 90 of resolution 2253 (2015) to effectively, safely, and in a

timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high-risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, and *requests* further updates from the Secretariat by December 17 2017 on the restructuring;

95. *Directs* the Monitoring Team, in its comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee referred to in paragraph (a) of annex 1, to report on relevant thematic and regional topics and developing trends as may be requested by the Security Council or the Committee following the adoption of this resolution;
96. *Encourages* relevant United Nations Missions, within their existing mandates, resources, and capabilities, to assist the Committee and the Monitoring Team, such as through logistical support, security assistance, and exchange of information in their work relevant to the threat by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in their respective areas of deployment;
97. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to identify, gather information on, and keep the Committee informed of instances and common patterns of non-compliance with the measures imposed in this resolution, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, requests the Monitoring Team to work closely with State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, designating States, other relevant States, and relevant United Nations Missions, and further directs the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;
98. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Monitoring Team, to hold special meetings on important thematic or regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Counter Terrorism Committee and CTED, CTITF, and with the FAFT to identify and prioritize areas for the provision of technical assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;
99. *Requests* the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to provide the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) on a quarterly basis oral briefings on its analysis of global implementation of resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2178 (2014) including gathered information and analysis relevant to potential sanctions designations by Member States or Committee actions that could be taken;
100. *Recalls* its request in paragraph 14 of resolution 2331 (2016) to the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, when consulting with Member States, to include in their discussions the issue of trafficking in persons in the areas of armed conflict and the use of sexual violence in armed conflict as it relates to ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and to report to the Committee on these discussions as appropriate;

ISIL Reporting

101. *Emphasizing* the threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide strategic-level reports that demonstrate and reflect the gravity of the aforementioned threat, including from foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL and associated groups and entities, foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin, transiting through, traveling to or relocating to or from other Member States, and the sources of financing of these groups and entities including through illicit trade in petroleum, antiquities, and other natural resources, as well as their planning and facilitation of attacks, any support to ISIL, Al-Qaida or any individual included on the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, and reflects the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering this threat, the next report to be provided by 31 January 2018 and then every six months thereafter, with the input of CTED, in close collaboration with the Monitoring Team, as well as other relevant United Nations actors;

Additions to the Sanctions List

102. *Decides* that the individuals and entities specified in Annex III of this resolution shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 1 of this resolution and added to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
103. *Directs* the Committee to make accessible on the Committee's website the narrative summaries of reasons and list entries for listing the individuals and entities specified in Annex III of this resolution as agreed by the Council and *confirms* that the provisions of this resolution and subsequent relevant resolutions shall apply to the names specified in Annex III for so long as they remain on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

Reviews

104. *Decides* to review the measures described in paragraph 1 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in eighteen months or sooner if necessary;
105. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

In accordance with paragraph 94 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following mandates and responsibilities:

- a) To submit, in writing, comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, every six months, the first by 31 December 2017, on the following issues:
 - (i) implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
 - (ii) the global threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, al-Nusra Front and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including (but not limited to) the threat posed by the presence of ISIL and its affiliates in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya, and Afghanistan and beyond, and the threats presented by Boko Haram;
 - (iii) the impact of the measures in resolution 2199 (2015) and resolution 2253 (2015) including progress on implementation of these measures, unintended consequences and unexpected challenges, as mandated in that resolutions in the form of updates on each of the following subjects: petroleum and petroleum products trade; trade in cultural property; kidnapping for ransom and external donations; natural resources; the proceeds of crimes including trafficking in persons, extortion and bank robbery direct or indirect supply; sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types; as part of the impact assessment, pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2199 (2015);
 - (iv) the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining Al-Qaida, ISIL, and all other associated groups, undertakings;
 - (v) any other issues that the Security Council or the Committee requests the Monitoring Team to include in its comprehensive reports as set forth in paragraph 95 of this resolution; and
 - (vi) specific recommendations related to improved implementation of relevant sanctions measures, including those referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, resolution 2178 (2014) and resolution 2199 (2015), and possible new measures;
- b) To assist the Ombudsperson in carrying out his or her mandate as specified in annex II of this resolution, including by providing updated information on those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking their removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- c) To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee's record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;
- d) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
- e) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with CTED and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;
- f) To work closely and share information with CTED and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to identify areas of convergence and overlap and to help facilitate concrete coordination, including in the area of reporting, among the three Committees;
- g) To participate actively in and support all relevant activities under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy including within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, established to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, in particular through its relevant working groups;
- h) To gather information, on behalf of the Committee, on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including by collating information from all relevant sources, including Member States, and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee's request, and to provide cases of non-compliance and recommendations to the Committee on actions to respond to such cases of non-compliance for its review;
- i) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- j) To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 55 of this resolution;
- k) To consult with the Committee or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying that certain individuals or entities should be added to, or removed from, the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- l) To bring to the Committee's attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;
- m) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;
- n) To coordinate and cooperate with the national counter-terrorism focal point or similar coordinating body in the state of visit where appropriate;
- o) To cooperate closely with relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and on relevant trends and developments in this area;
- p) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as instructed by the Committee;

- q) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List as updated and accurate as possible;
- r) To encourage Member States to provide information to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the fulfilment of its mandate, as appropriate;
- s) To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and ISIL, and the best measures to confront them, including by developing, within existing resources, a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts through an annual workshop and/or other appropriate means, in consultation with the Committee;
- t) To collate, assess, monitor, report on, and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including implementation of the measure in paragraph 1 of this resolution as it pertains to preventing the criminal misuse of the Internet by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, which shall be included in the Monitoring Team's regular report as outlined in section (a) of this annex; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;
- u) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies as well as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex, such as gaps and challenges in States' implementation of the measures in this resolution;
- v) To consult, in confidence, with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen implementation of the measures;
- w) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, and international and regional organizations, including FATF and its regional bodies, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the asset freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;
- x) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector and international and regional organizations, including ICAO, IATA, WCO and INTERPOL, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the travel ban, including the use of advanced passenger information provided by civil aircraft operators to Member States, and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;
- y) To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of international and regional organizations and the private sector, in coordination with national authorities, as appropriate, to promote awareness of, enhance compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the arms embargo, with a particular emphasis on measures to counter the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the procurement of related components used to construct IEDs, in particular (but not limited to) trigger mechanisms, explosive precursors, commercial grade explosives, detonators, detonating cords, or poisons;
- z) To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;
- aa) To work with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs and, in accordance with their national legislation, biometric information of listed individuals for possible inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, to work with INTERPOL to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and to further work with INTERPOL, as appropriate, to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identity, with a view to reporting to the Committee on such instances and proposing any recommendations;
- bb) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006), and to work, in consultation with the Secretariat, to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and the Consolidated Sanctions List so as to facilitate implementation by national authorities;
- cc) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;
- dd) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Annex II

In accordance with paragraph 60 of this resolution, the Office of the Ombudsperson shall be authorized to carry out the following tasks upon receipt of a delisting request submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity ("the petitioner").

The Council recalls that Member States are not permitted to submit delisting petitions on behalf of an individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Information gathering (four months)

1. Upon receipt of a delisting request, the Ombudsperson shall:
 - a) Acknowledge to the petitioner the receipt of the delisting request;
 - b) Inform the petitioner of the general procedure for processing delisting requests;
 - c) Answer specific questions from the petitioner about Committee procedures;
 - d) Inform the petitioner in case the petition fails to properly address the original listing criteria, as set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and return it to the petitioner for his or her consideration; and
 - e) Verify if the request is a new request or a repeated request and, if it is a repeated request to the Ombudsperson and it does not contain relevant additional information, return it to the petitioner, with an appropriate explanation, for his or her consideration.
2. For delisting petitions not returned to the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall immediately forward the delisting request to the members of the Committee, designating State(s), State(s) of residence and nationality or incorporation, relevant United Nations bodies, and any other States deemed relevant by the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson shall ask these States or relevant United Nations bodies to provide, within four months, any appropriate additional information relevant to the delisting request. The Ombudsperson may engage in dialogue with these States to determine:
 - a) These States' opinions on whether the delisting request should be granted; and
 - b) Information, questions or requests for clarifications that these States would like to be communicated to the petitioner regarding the delisting request, including any information or steps that might be taken by a petitioner to clarify the delisting request.
3. Where all designating States consulted by the Ombudsperson do not object to the petitioner's delisting, the Ombudsperson may shorten the information gathering period, as appropriate.
4. The Ombudsperson shall also immediately forward the delisting request to the Monitoring Team, which shall provide to the Ombudsperson, within four months:
 - a) All information available to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the delisting request, including court decisions and proceedings, news reports, and information that States or relevant international organizations have previously shared with the Committee or the Monitoring Team;
 - b) Fact-based assessments of the information provided by the petitioner that is relevant to the delisting request; and
 - c) Questions or requests for clarifications that the Monitoring Team would like asked of the petitioner regarding the delisting request.
5. At the end of this four-month period of information gathering, the Ombudsperson shall present a written update to the Committee on progress to date, including details regarding which States have supplied information, and any significant challenges encountered therein. The Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for information gathering, giving due consideration to requests by Member States for additional time to provide information.

Dialogue (two months)

6. Upon completion of the information gathering period, the Ombudsperson shall facilitate a two-month period of engagement, which may include dialogue with the petitioner. Giving due consideration to requests for additional time, the Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for engagement and the drafting of the Comprehensive Report described in paragraph 8 below. The Ombudsperson may shorten this time period if he or she assesses less time is required.
7. During this period of engagement, the Ombudsperson:
 - a) May submit questions, either orally or in writing, to the petitioner, or request additional information or clarifications that may help the Committee's consideration of the request, including any questions or information requests received from relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team;
 - b) Should request from the petitioner a signed statement in which the petitioner declares that they have no ongoing association with Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative thereof, and undertakes not to associate with Al-Qaida or ISIL in the future;
 - c) Should meet with the petitioner, to the extent possible;
 - d) Shall forward replies from the petitioner back to relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team and follow up with the petitioner in connection with incomplete responses by the petitioner;
 - e) Shall coordinate with States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team regarding any further inquiries of, or response to, the petitioner;
 - f) During the information gathering or dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson may share with relevant States information provided by a State, including that State's position on the delisting request, if the State which provided the information consents;
 - g) In the course of the information gathering and dialogue phases and in the preparation of the report, the Ombudsperson shall not disclose any information shared by a state on a confidential basis, without the express written consent of that state; and

- h) During the dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson shall give serious consideration to the opinions of designating States, as well as other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States most affected by acts or associations that led to the original listing.
- 8. Upon completion of the period of engagement described above, the Ombudsperson, shall draft and circulate to the Committee a Comprehensive Report that will exclusively:
 - a) Summarize and, as appropriate, specify the sources of, all information available to the Ombudsperson that is relevant to the delisting request. The report shall respect confidential elements of Member States' communications with the Ombudsperson;
 - b) Describe the Ombudsperson's activities with respect to this delisting request, including dialogue with the petitioner; and
 - c) Based on an analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson's recommendation, lay out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the delisting request. The recommendation should state the Ombudsperson's views with respect to the listing as of the time of the examination of the delisting request.

Committee discussion

- 9. After the Committee has had fifteen days to review the Comprehensive Report in all official languages of the United Nations, the Chair of the Committee shall place the delisting request on the Committee's agenda for consideration.
- 10. When the Committee considers the delisting request, the Ombudsperson, shall present the Comprehensive Report in person and answer Committee members' questions regarding the request.
- 11. Committee consideration of the Comprehensive Report shall be completed no later than thirty days from the date the Comprehensive Report is submitted to the Committee for its review.
- 12. After the Committee has completed its consideration of the Comprehensive Report, the Ombudsperson may notify all relevant States of the recommendation.
- 13. Upon the request of a designating State, State of nationality, residence, or incorporation, and with the approval of the Committee, the Ombudsperson may provide a copy of the Comprehensive Report, with any redactions deemed necessary by the Committee, to such States, along with a notification to such States confirming that:
 - a) All decisions to release information from the Ombudsperson's Comprehensive Reports, including the scope of information, are made by the Committee at its discretion and on a case-by-case basis;
 - b) The Comprehensive Report reflects the basis for the Ombudsperson's recommendation and is not attributable to any individual Committee member; and
 - c) The Comprehensive Report, and any information contained therein, should be treated as strictly confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member State without the approval of the Committee.
- 14. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing, the requirement for States to take the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, unless a Committee member submits a delisting request, which the Committee shall consider under its normal consensus procedures.
- 15. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with this annex II, including paragraph 7 (h), unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council.
- 16. Following the conclusion of the process described in paragraphs 61 and 62 of this resolution, the Committee shall convey, within 60 days, to the Ombudsperson, whether the measures described in paragraph 1 are to be retained or terminated, and approve an updated narrative summary of reasons for listing, where appropriate. In cases where the Committee informs the Ombudsperson that it has followed his or her recommendation, the Ombudsperson immediately informs the Petitioner of the Committee's decision and submits to the Committee, for its review, a summary of the analysis contained in the Comprehensive Report. The Committee reviews the summary within 30 days of the decision to retain or terminate the listing, and communicates its views on the summary to the Ombudsperson. The purpose of the Committee's review is to address any security concerns, including to review if any information confidential to the Committee is inadvertently included in the summary. Following the Committee's review, the Ombudsperson transmits the summary to the Petitioner. The summary shall accurately describe the principal reasons for the recommendation of the Ombudsperson, as reflected in the analysis of the Ombudsperson. In his or her communication with the Petitioner, the Ombudsperson will specify that the summary of the analysis does not reflect the views of the Committee or of any of its members. In cases

where the listing is retained, the summary of the analysis shall cover all the arguments for delisting by the Petitioner to which the Ombudsperson responded. In cases of delisting, the summary shall include the key points of the analysis of the Ombudsperson. In cases where the Committee informs the Ombudsperson that it has not followed his or her recommendation or that the Chair has submitted the question to the Security Council under paragraph 15 of this Annex, the Committee communicates to the Ombudsperson, within 30 days of its decision or the Council's decision, the reasons for this decision for transmission to the Petitioner. These reasons shall respond to the principal arguments of the Petitioner.

17. After the Ombudsperson receives the communication from the committee under paragraph 16 of Annex II, if the measures in paragraph 1 are to be retained, the Ombudsperson shall send to the petitioner, with an advance copy sent to the Committee, a letter that:
 - a) Communicates the outcome of the petition;
 - b) Describes, to the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson's Comprehensive Report, the process and publicly releasable factual information gathered by the Ombudsperson; and
 - c) Forwards from the Committee all information about the decision provided to the Ombudsperson pursuant to paragraph 16 of Annex II above.
18. In all communications with the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations and confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member States.
19. The Ombudsperson may notify the petitioner, as well as those States relevant to a case but which are not members of the Committee, of the stage at which the process has reached.

Other Office of the Ombudsperson Tasks

20. In addition to the tasks specified above, the Ombudsperson shall:
 - a) Distribute publicly releasable information about Committee procedures, including Committee Guidelines, fact sheets and other Committee-prepared documents;
 - b) Where address is known, notify individuals or entities about the status of their listing, after the Secretariat has officially notified the Permanent Mission of the State or States, pursuant to paragraph 79 of this resolution; and
 - c) Submit biannual reports summarizing the activities of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council.

Annex III

1. Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo

Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "recruiting for," and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

2. Hanifa Money Exchange Office (branch located in Albu Kamal, Syrian Arab Republic)

Hanifa Money Exchange Office (branch located in Albu Kamal, Syrian Arab Republic) is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to," "otherwise supporting acts or activities of," and being "either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by, or otherwise supporting" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

3. Selselat al-Thabab

Selselat al-Thabab is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

4. Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed

Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to," "otherwise supporting acts or activities of," and being "either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by, or otherwise supporting" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

5. Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev

Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on

behalf of, or in support of," "recruiting for," and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

6. Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili

Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "recruiting for," and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137).

7. Oman Rochman

Oman Rochman is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "recruiting for," and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

8. Jund al Aqsa

Jund al Aqsa is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of," "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to," "otherwise supporting acts or activities of," and being "either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by, or otherwise supporting" Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

Op 5 augustus 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8019e zitting Resolutie 2371 (2017) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2371 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8019th meeting, on 5 August 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), and resolution 2356 (2017), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the July 3 and July 28 of 2017 ballistic missile tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK"), which the DPRK has stated were tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and at the challenge such tests constitute to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger they pose to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated launches and attempted launches of ballistic missiles, and *noting* that all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,

Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,

Expressing great concern that the DPRK's prohibited arms sales have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the ballistic missile launches conducted by the DPRK on 3 July and 28 July of 2017, which the DPRK has stated were launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and which used ballistic missile technology in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches; shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
4. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the designation of additional goods, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;
5. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016) through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to update this list every 12 months;

Transportation

6. *Decides* that the Committee may designate vessels for which it has information indicating they are, or have been, related to activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution and all Member States shall prohibit the entry into their ports of such designated vessels, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;
7. *Clarifies* that the measures set forth in paragraph 20 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 9 of resolution 2321 (2016), requiring States to prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from owning, leasing, operating any vessel flagged by the DPRK, without exception, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, apply to chartering vessels flagged by the DPRK;

Sectoral

8. *Decides* that paragraph 26 of resolution 2321 (2016) shall be replaced by the following:
"*Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, *decides* that for sales and transactions of iron and iron ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, and *decides* further that this provision shall not apply with respect to coal that the exporting State confirms on the basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the exporting State notifies the Committee in advance and such

transactions involving coal originating outside of the DPRK are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;"

9. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further *decides* that for sales and transactions of seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
10. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, lead and lead ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and further *decides* that for sales and transactions of lead and lead ore for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
11. *Expresses concern* that DPRK nationals frequently work in other States for the purpose of generating foreign export earnings that the DPRK uses to support its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile programs, *decides* that all Member States shall not exceed on any date after the date of adoption of this resolution the total number of work authorizations for DPRK nationals provided in their jurisdictions at the time of the adoption of this resolution unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of additional DPRK nationals beyond the number of work authorizations provided in a member state's jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of this resolution is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution;

Financial

12. *Decides* that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK entities or individuals, or the expansion of existing joint ventures through additional investments, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis;
13. *Clarifies* that the prohibitions contained in paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) apply to clearing of funds through all Member States' territories;
14. *Clarifies* that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered financial institutions for the purposes of implementing paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 33 and 34 of resolution 2270 (2016), and paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016);

Chemical Weapons

15. *Recalls* paragraph 24 of resolution 2270 (2016), *decides* that the DPRK shall not deploy or use chemical weapons, and *urgently calls upon* the DPRK to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions;

Vienna Convention

16. *Demands* that the DPRK fully comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

Impact on the People of the DPRK

17. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;

Sanctions Implementation

18. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other United Nations sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
19. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), and 2356 (2017), and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;
20. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
21. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;
22. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
23. *Requests* that Interpol issue Special Notices with respect to designated individuals, and *directs* the Committee to work with Interpol to develop the appropriate arrangements to do so;
24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide additional analytical resources needed to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to strengthen its ability to analyze the DPRK's sanctions violation and evasion activities;

Political

25. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;
26. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions, and *further decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall not apply with respect to financial transactions with the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank or the Korea National Insurance Corporation if such transactions are solely for the operation of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK or humanitarian assistance activities that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations;
27. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
28. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situa-

tion and welcomes efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;

29. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;
30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. CHOE CHUN YONG
 - a) *Description*: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Ch'oe Ch'un-yo'ng
 - c) *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654410078; Gender: male
2. HAN JANG SU
 - a) *Description*: Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Chang-Su Han
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: November 08, 1969; POB: Pyongyang, DPRK; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 745420176, expires on October 19, 2020; Gender: male
3. JANG SONG CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Jang Song Chol is a Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) representative overseas.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: 12 March 1967; Nationality: DPRK
4. JANG SUNG NAM
 - a) *Description*: Chief of an overseas Tangun Trading Corporation branch, which is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support the DPRK's defense research and development programs.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: July 14, 1970; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120368, issued on March 22, 2013; Passport expiration date: March 22, 2018; Gender: male
5. JO CHOL SONG
 - a) *Description*: Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation, which provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading, a subordinate entity of Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Cho Ch'o'l-so'ng
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: September 25, 1984; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654320502, expires on September 16, 2019; Gender: male
6. KANG CHOL SU
 - a) *Description*: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for the DPRK's defense industries and support for the DPRK's military-related overseas sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK's chemical weapons program.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: February 13, 1969; Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 472234895
7. KIM MUN CHOL
 - a) *Description*: Representative for Korea United Development Bank.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Kim Mun-ch'o'l
 - c) *Identifiers*: DOB: March 25, 1957; Nationality: DPRK
8. KIM NAM UNG
 - a) *Description*: Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: n/a
 - c) *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 654110043
9. PAK IL KYU
 - a) *Description*: Official for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which specializes in acquisition for DPRK's defense industries and support to Pyongyang's military-related sales. Its procurements also likely support the DPRK's chemical weapons program.
 - b) *A.K.A.*: Pak Il-Gyu
 - c) *Identifiers*: Nationality: DPRK; Passport no.: 563120235; Gender: male

List Update for Aliases:

- JANG BOM SU (KPi.016) – *New AKA*: Jang Hyon U with date of birth 22 February 1958 and diplomatic passport number 836110034, which expires on 1 January 2020.
- JON MYONG GUK (KPi.018) – *New AKA*: Jon Yong Sang with date of birth 25 August 1976 and diplomatic passport number 836110035, which expires on 1 January 2020.

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. FOREIGN TRADE BANK (FTB)
 - a) *Description*: Foreign Trade Bank is a state-owned bank and acts as the DPRK's primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Location*: FTB Building, Jungsong-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
2. KOREAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (KNIC)
 - a) *Description*: The Korean National Insurance Company is a DPRK financial and insurance company and is affiliated with Office 39.
 - b) *AKA*: Korea Foreign Insurance Company
 - c) *Location*: Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
3. KORYO CREDIT DEVELOPMENT BANK
 - a) *Description*: Koryo Credit Development Bank operates in the financial services industry in the DPRK's economy.
 - b) *AKA*: Daesong Credit Development Bank; Koryo Global Credit Bank; Koryo Global Trust Bank
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK
4. MANSUDAE OVERSEAS PROJECT GROUP OF COMPANIES
 - a) *Description*: Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies engaged in, facilitated, or was responsible for the exportation of workers from the DPRK to other nations for construction-related activities including for statues and monuments to generate revenue for the Government of the DPRK or the Workers' Party of Korea. The Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies has been reported to conduct business in countries in Africa and Southeast Asia including Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, Mozambique, Madagascar, Namibia, Syria, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
 - b) *AKA*: Mansudae Art Studio
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

Op 5 september 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8040e zitting Resolutie 2374 (2017) inzake Mali aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2374 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8040th meeting, on 5 September 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2364 (2017) and 2359 (2017), concerning the situation in Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and *underscoring* the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives,

Recognizing the legitimate aspiration of all Malian citizens to enjoy lasting peace and development,

Recognizing that the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement") signed in 2015 by the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* coalition of armed groups, and the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* coalition of armed groups, and its continued implementation, represents a historic opportunity to achieve lasting peace in Mali,

Condemning the repeated violations of the ceasefire arrangements by the *Plateforme* and *Coordination* armed groups in the Kidal and Menaka regions, *urging* them to cease hostilities, to strictly adhere to the ceasefire arrangements and to resume a constructive dialogue without delay for the full implementation of the Agreement, and *welcoming* to this extent the recent signing of a truce agreement on 23 August 2017 in Bamako,

Recognizing the recent progress achieved for the implementation of the Agreement, including the establishment of all interim administrations in the North, *while expressing* its deep concern over the persistent delays for its full implementation two years after it was concluded, and *highlighting* the pressing need to deliver tangible and visible peace dividends to the population in the North and other parts of Mali in order to keep the momentum of the Agreement,

Affirming its intention to facilitate, support and follow closely the implementation of the Agreement, *commending* the role played by Algeria and other members of the international mediation team to assist the Malian parties to implement the Agreement, *emphasizing* the need for increased engagement by the members of the international mediation team, and *further emphasizing* the central role the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali should continue to play to support and oversee the implementation of the Agreement,

Deploring that the slow progress in the implementation of the Agreement, particularly its defence and security provisions, as well as the delayed restructuring of the security sector, have hampered efforts to restore security and the authority of the Malian State and the delivery of basic social services in the North of Mali, and *stressing* the primary responsibility of the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* and *Coordination* armed groups to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement in order to improve the security situation across Mali and to forestall attempts by terrorist groups to derail the implementation of the Agreement,

Expressing its serious concern about the volatile security situation, especially the expansion of terrorist and other criminal activities into Central and Southern Mali as well as the intensification of criminal activities such as drug trafficking and trafficking in persons in Mali,

Emphasizing that security and stability in Mali are inextricably linked to that of the Sahel and West Africa regions, as well as the situation in Libya and in the North Africa region,

Acknowledging the impact of the situation in Mali on peace and security in the Sahel, as well as on the wider West Africa and North African region,

Expressing its continued concern over the transnational dimension of the terrorist threat in the Sahel region, as well as the serious challenges posed by transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, including arms, drug and cultural property trafficking, the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism, and *underscoring* the responsibility of the countries in the region in addressing these threats and challenges,

Noting that impunity can encourage a culture of corruption in which trafficking and other criminal interests can thrive, further encouraging instability and insecurity, and *calling for* the Malian government to devote appropriate law enforcement resources in this regard and *encouraging* international, regional and sub-regional cooperation and support to the Malian Government in this endeavor,

Strongly condemning the activities in Mali and in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including the *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO), Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine, and associated individuals and groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), Islamic State in Greater Sahara and Ansaroul Islam, which continue to operate in Mali and constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, as well as human rights abuses and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in Mali and in the region by terrorist groups,

Recalling the listing of MUJAO, the Organisation of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali, and Al-Mourabitoun on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), and *reiterating its readiness*, under the above-mentioned regime, to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who are associated with ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and other listed entities or individuals, including AQIM, Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Strongly condemning the continuing attacks, including terrorist attacks against civilians, the Malian defense and security forces, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French forces, *underlining* the need to bring perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of these reprehensible acts of terrorism to justice, and *urging* the Government of Mali to take measures to ensure that those responsible for these attacks are held accountable,

Strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *reiterating* its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Sahel region and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, *recalling* its resolutions 2133 (2014), 2253 (2015) and 2368 (2017) and including its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from the payment of ransoms or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages and, in this regard, *noting* the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) "Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists",

Strongly condemning all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Mali, including those involving extrajudicial and summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions and ill-treatment of persons whose liberty has been restricted, sexual and gender-based violence, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, *calling on* all parties to respect the civilian character of schools as such in accordance with international humanitarian law and to cease unlawful and arbitrary detention of all children, and *calling upon* all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety and protection of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali, *stressing* the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need, *reiterating* that all parties must allow and facilitate full, safe, and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to all persons in need across Mali,

Noting with grave concern the involvement of non-state actors, notably terrorist groups, in the destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking in cultural property and related offences and *further taking note* of the fact that on 27 September 2016 the ICC found Mr Al Mahdi guilty of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historical monuments in Timbuktu,

Welcoming the continued action by the French forces, at the request and in support of the Malian authorities, to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali,

Welcoming the deployment of the Force Conjointe des Etats du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), *underlining* that the FC-G5S efforts to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups will contribute to create a more secure environment in the Sahel region, with a view to supporting MINUSMA fulfil its mandate to stabilize Mali,

Commending the role of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in Mali in providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and Security Forces, including contributing to the strengthening of civilian authority and respect for human rights, and of the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in providing strategic advice and training for the Police, Gendarmerie and Garde nationale in Mali,

Recalling the mandate of MINUSMA as outlined in resolution 2364 (2017), *reiterating* its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, and for MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities and the Malian people in their efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to their country, bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities to protect the population, and *welcoming* the stabilizing effect of the international presence in Mali, including MINUSMA,

Recalling the provisions of the Agreement calling upon the Security Council to give its full support to the Agreement, to closely monitor its implementation and, if necessary, to take measures against anyone hindering the implementation of the commitments contained therein or the realization of its objectives,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 2364 (2017) expressing the readiness of the Security Council to consider targeted sanctions against those who take actions to obstruct or threaten the implementation of the Agreement, those who resume hostilities and violate the ceasefire, those who attack and take actions to threaten MINUSMA and other international presences, as well as those who provide support to such attacks and actions,

Taking note of the letter of the Government of Mali to the President of the Security Council of 9 August 2017 underlining that the repeated violations of the ceasefire since the beginning of June 2017, particularly in the Kidal region, pose serious threats to the fragile gains made in implementing the Agreement, and thus requesting the Security Council, in order to address the many obstacles to the implementation of the Agreement, to immediately establish a regime of targeted sanctions against those responsible for obstructing the implementation of the Agreement,

Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Travel ban

1. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 9 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
2. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above shall not apply:
 - a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

- c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region;
- 3. *Emphasizes* that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of Mali, observes that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution and calls upon all parties and all Member States to cooperate with the Committee as well as the Panel of experts established pursuant to paragraph 11 below on the implementation of the travel ban;

Asset freeze

- 4. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides* further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;
- 5. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
 - a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
 - b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
 - c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into effect prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;
 - d) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region;
- 6. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
- 7. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 4 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 4 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

- 8. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraph 1 shall apply to individuals, and that the measures contained in paragraph 4 shall apply to individuals and entities, as designated for such measures by the Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:
 - a) Engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement;
 - b) Actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;
 - c) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, including through the proceeds from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;
 - d) Involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against: (i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defense forces; (ii) MINUSMA peacekeepers and other UN and associated per-

- sonnel, including members of the Panel of experts; (iii) international security presences, including the FC-G5S, European Union Missions and French forces;
- e) Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
 - f) Planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
 - g) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;

New Sanctions Committee

9. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein "the Committee"), to undertake to following tasks:
 - a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 1 and 4 above;
 - b) To designate those individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 4, to review information regarding those individuals, and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 5 above;
 - c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 1, to review information regarding those individuals, and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 2 above;
 - d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;
 - e) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States or organizations to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;
 - f) To seek from all States and international, regional and sub-regional organizations whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;
 - g) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to enable the Committee to undertake the tasks mentioned in paragraph 9 above;

Panel of experts

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of thirteen months from the adoption of this resolution, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to five experts ("Panel of experts"), under the direction of the Committee, and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel, *expresses* its intent to consider the renewal of this mandate no later than 12 months after the adoption of this resolution, and *decides* that the Panel shall carry out the following tasks:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 above;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;
 - c) Provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim update by March, 1, 2018, and a final report by September, 1, 2018, and periodic updates in between;
 - d) To assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals subject to measures imposed by paragraphs 1 and 4 above, including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
 - e) To cooperate closely with INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as appropriate;
12. *Requests* that the Panel of experts has the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015);
13. *Notes* that the selection process of the experts composing the Panel should prioritize appointing individuals with the strongest qualifications to fulfil the duties described above while paying due regard to the importance of regional and gender representation in the recruitment process;
14. *Directs* the Panel of experts to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, including the Panel of experts established by

resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities;

15. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of experts and further urges all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of experts to execute its mandate;

Role of MINUSMA

16. *Encourages* timely information exchange between MINUSMA and the Panel of experts, and *requests* MINUSMA to assist the Committee and the Panel of experts, within its mandate and capabilities;

Reporting and review

17. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region, to actively implement the measures contained in this resolution and to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 1 and 4 above;
18. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, including alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali on the situation in Mali as appropriate, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;
19. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);
20. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in Mali under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening through additional measures, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of the country and compliance with this resolution;
21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 11 september 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8042e zitting Resolutie 2375 (2017) inzake Noord-Korea aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2375 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8042nd meeting, on 11 September 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2087 (2013), resolution 2094 (2013), resolution 2270 (2016), resolution 2321 (2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371 (2017) as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on September 2, 2017 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), and 2371 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community and *expressing* great concern that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK who have great unmet needs,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Underscoring its concern that developments on the Korean Peninsula could have dangerous, large-scale regional security implications,

Underscoring its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, and *recalling* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing also its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation, and *reiterating* its welcoming of efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue,

Underlining the need to ensure international peace and security, and ensure lasting stability in north-east Asia at large and to resolve the situation through peaceful, diplomatic and political means,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on September 2 of 2017 in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;
2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

Designations

3. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individual and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individual listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;
4. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of additional WMD-related dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;
5. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology, *directs* the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list every twelve months;
6. *Decides* to apply the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2016) on vessels transporting prohibited items from the DPRK, *directs* the Committee to designate these vessels and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, *further decides* that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report, and *directs* the Committee to regularly update this list when it is informed of additional violations;

Maritime Interdiction of Cargo Vessels

7. *Calls upon* all Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
8. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraph 7 above, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, *decides* that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and *decides further* that, if a flag State neither consents to inspection on the high seas nor directs the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection, or if the vessel refuses to comply with flag State direction to permit inspection on the high seas or to proceed to such a port, then the Committee shall consider designating the vessel

for the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and the flag State shall immediately deregister that vessel provided that such designation has been made by the Committee;

9. *Requires* any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State of a vessel pursuant to paragraph 8 above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details regarding the incident, the vessel and the flag State, and *requests* the Committee to release on a regular basis information regarding these vessels and flag States involved;
10. *Affirms* that paragraph 7 contemplates only inspections carried out by warships and other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, and *underscores* that it does not apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law;
11. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK;
12. *Affirms* that paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 apply only with respect to the situation in the DPRK and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with respect to any other situation and *underscores* in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law;

Sectoral

13. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all condensates and natural gas liquids, and *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such materials;
14. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined petroleum products, *decides* that the DPRK shall not procure such products, *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to procurement by the DPRK or the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 500,000 barrels during an initial period of three months beginning on 1 October 2017 and ending on 31 December 2017, and refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 2,000,000 barrels per year during a period of twelve months beginning on 1 January 2018 and annually thereafter, provided that (a) the Member State notifies the Committee every thirty days of the amount of such supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all the parties to the transaction, (b) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions, and (c) the supply, sale, or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution, *directs* the Committee Secretary to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate amount for the period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017 has been reached, and again notify all Member States when 90 percent and 95 percent of such aggregate amount has been reached, *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, also *directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 90 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached, and *further directs* the Committee Secretary beginning on 1 January 2018 to notify all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts have been reached and to inform them that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year, *directs* the Committee to make publicly available on its website the total amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK by month and by source country, *directs* the Committee to update this information on a real-time basis as it receives notifications from Member States, *calls upon* all Member States to regularly review this website to comply with the annual limits for refined petroleum products established by this provision, *directs* the Panel of Experts to closely monitor the implementation efforts

of all Member States to provide assistance and ensure full and global compliance, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect and provide additional resources in this regard;

15. *Decides* that all Member States shall not supply, sell, or transfer to the DPRK in any period of twelve months after the date of adoption of this resolution an amount of crude oil that is in excess of the amount that the Member State supplied, sold or transferred in the period of twelve months prior to adoption of this resolution, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis a shipment of crude oil is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) or this resolution;
16. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products), and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance, and further *decides* that for such sales, supplies, and transfers of textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products) for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 135 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;
17. *Decides* that all Member States shall not provide work authorizations for DPRK nationals in their jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis in advance that employment of DPRK nationals in a member state's jurisdiction is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to work authorizations for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution;

Joint Ventures

18. *Decides* that States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing, with DPRK entities or individuals, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities, in particular those that are non-commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating profit, have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis, *further decides* that States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution if such joint venture or cooperative entity has not been approved by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, and States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days after the Committee has denied a request for approval, and *decides* that this provision shall not apply with respect to existing China-DPRK hydroelectric power infrastructure projects and the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project solely to export Russia-origin coal as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017);

Sanctions Implementation

19. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;
20. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;
21. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;
22. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April

1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

23. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

Political

24. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK;
25. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities in food and medical care, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected;
26. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017) and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;
27. *Emphasizes* that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
28. *Reaffirms* its support for the Six Party Talks, *calls* for their resumption, and *reiterates* its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
29. *Reiterates* the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, *expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation, and *welcomes* efforts by the Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond;
30. *Urges* further work to reduce tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement;
31. *Underscores* the imperative of achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner;
32. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance, and, in this regard, *expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;
33. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

1. PAK YONG SIK
 - a) *Description*: Pak Yong Sik is a member of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission, which is responsible for the development and implementation of the Workers' Party of Korea military policies, commands and controls the DPRK's military, and helps direct the country's military defense industries.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a

c) *Identifiers*: YOB: 1950; Nationality: DPRK

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA (CMC)
 - a) *Description*: The Central Military Commission is responsible for the development and implementation of the Workers' Party of Korea's military policies, commands and controls the DPRK's military, and directs the country's military defense industries in coordination with the State Affairs Commission.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK
2. ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT (OGD)
 - a) *Description*: The Organization and Guidance Department is a very powerful body of the Worker's Party of Korea. It directs key personnel appointments for the Workers' Party of Korea, the DPRK's military, and the DPRK's government administration. It also purports to control the political affairs of all of the DPRK and is instrumental in implementing the DPRK's censorship policies.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Location*: DPRK
3. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION DEPARTMENT (PAD)
 - a) *Description*: The Propaganda and Agitation Department has full control over the media, which it uses as a tool to control the public on behalf of the DPRK leadership. The Propaganda and Agitation Department also engages in or is responsible for censorship by the Government of the DPRK, including newspaper and broadcast censorship.
 - b) *AKA*: n/a
 - c) *Location*: Pyongyang, DPRK

Op 5 oktober 2017 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 8061e zitting Resolutie 2380 (2017) inzake Libië. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2380 (2017)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8061st meeting, on 5 October 2017

The Security Council,

Recalling resolution 2240 (2015), resolution 2312 (2016) and Presidential Statement 2015/25,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report S/2017/761,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Reaffirming also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC Convention) and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, as the primary international legal instruments to combat the smuggling of migrants and related conduct, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC Convention, as the primary international legal instruments to combat trafficking in persons,

Underlining that, although the crime of smuggling of migrants may share, in some cases, some common features with the crime of trafficking in persons, Member States need to recognize that they are distinct crimes, as defined by the UNTOC Convention and its Protocols, requiring differing legal, operational, and policy responses,

Deploring the continuing maritime tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea that have resulted in thousands of casualties, and noting with concern that such casualties were, in some cases, the result of exploitation and misinformation by transnational criminal organizations which facilitated the illegal smuggling of migrants via dangerous methods for personal gain and with callous disregard for human life,

Expressing grave concern at the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular off the coast of Libya and reiterating that among these migrants may be persons who meet the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

Emphasizing in this respect that migrants, including asylum seekers and regardless of their migration status, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urging all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable, stressing also the obligation of States, where applicable, to protect the human rights of migrants regardless of their migration status, including when implementing their specific migration and border security policies,

Reaffirming in this respect the need to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, especially those of women and children, and to address international migration through international, regional or bilateral cooperation and dialogue and through a comprehensive and balanced approach, recognizing the roles and responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination in promoting and protecting the human rights of all migrants, and avoiding approaches that might aggravate their vulnerability,

Further recalling the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,

Expressing further concern that the situation in Libya is exacerbated by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory, which could provide support to other organized crime and terrorist networks in Libya,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Government of National Accord to take appropriate action to prevent the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through the territory of Libya and its territorial sea,

Mindful of the need to support further efforts to strengthen Libyan border management, considering the difficulties of the Government of National Accord to manage effectively the migratory flows in transit through Libyan territory, and noting its concern for the repercussions of this phenomenon on the stability of Libya and of the Mediterranean region,

Welcoming ongoing support by the most concerned Member States, including Member States of the European Union (EU), taking into account inter alia the role of FRONTEX and the specific mandate of EUBAM Libya in support of the Government of National Accord, and by neighbouring States,

Acknowledging the European Council Conclusions of 23 June 2017 and the press statement of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 16 February 2016 which underlined the need for effective international action to address both the immediate and long-term aspects of illegal migration and human trafficking towards Europe,

Taking note of the Decision of the Council of the European Union of 25 July 2017 to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia until 31 December 2018,

Taking further note of the ongoing discussions between the EU and the Government of National Accord on migration-related issues,

Expressing also strong support to the States in the region affected by the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking and emphasizing the need to step up coordination of efforts in order to strengthen an effective multidimensional response to these common challenges in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to tackle their root causes and to prevent people from being exploited by migrant smugglers and human traffickers,

Acknowledging the need to assist States in the region, upon request, in the development of comprehensive and integrated regional and national strategies, legal frameworks, and institutions to counter terrorism, transnational organized crime, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking, including mechanisms to implement them within the framework of States' obligations under applicable international law,

Stressing that addressing both migrant smuggling and human trafficking, including dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks in the region and prosecuting migrant smugglers, and human traffickers requires a coordinated, multidimensional approach with States of origin, of transit, and of destination, and further acknowledging the need to develop effective strategies to deter migrant smuggling and human trafficking in States of origin and transit,

Emphasizing that migrants should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urging all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable,

Bearing in mind the obligations of States under applicable international law to exercise due diligence to prevent and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to investigate and punish perpetrators, to identify and provide effective assistance to victims of trafficking and migrants and to cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress migrant smuggling and human trafficking,

Reaffirming the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya, and, for these specific purposes, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of stabilization of Libya and endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people;
2. *Reiterates* its calls on Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the EU, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord and with each other, including by sharing information to assist Libya, upon request, in building needed capacity including to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in its territorial sea; in order to prevent the further proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking into, through and from the territory of Libya and off its coast;
3. *Urges* Member States and regional organizations, in the spirit of international solidarity and shared responsibility, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord, and with each other, including by sharing information about acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya's territorial sea and on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and rendering assistance to migrants and victims of human trafficking recovered at sea, in accordance with international law;
4. *Urges* States and regional organizations whose naval vessels and aircraft operate on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Libya, to be vigilant for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and in this context, encourages States and regional organizations to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, in cooperation with Libya;
5. *Calls upon* Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations that are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking to inspect, as permitted under international law, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, any unflagged vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organized criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, including inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies;
6. *Further calls upon* such Member States to inspect, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have been, are being, or imminently will be used by organized criminal enterprises for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya;
7. *Decides* that, for a further period of twelve months from the date of adoption of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015) and otherwise reiterates the content of those paragraphs;
8. *Reaffirms* that the authorizations provided in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 2240 (2015) apply only with respect to the situation of migrant smuggling and human trafficking on the high seas off the coast of Libya and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a flag State over its vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation, and that the authorization provided in paragraph 10 in resolution 2240 (2015) applies only in confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the high seas off the coast of Libya;
9. *Underscores* that this resolution is intended to disrupt the organized criminal enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human trafficking and prevent loss of life and is not intended to undermine the human rights of individuals or prevent them from seeking protection under international human rights law and international refugee law;
10. *Emphasizes* that all migrants, including asylum seekers, should be treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully respected, and urges all States in this regard to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
11. *Urges* Member States and regional organizations acting under the authorizations referred to in paragraph 7 of this resolution to have due regard for the livelihoods of those engaged in fishing or other legitimate activities;
12. *Calls upon* all States, with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking at sea, consistent with States' obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable;
13. *Calls* for Member States to consider ratifying or acceding to, and for States Parties to effectively implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
14. *Requests* States utilizing the authority of this resolution to inform the Security Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every three months thereafter on the progress of actions undertaken in exercise of the authority provided in paragraph 7 above;
15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council eleven months after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation, in particular with regards to the implementation of paragraph 7 above;

16. *Expresses* its intention to continue to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authority provided in this resolution for additional periods;
 17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.
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In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de *vierde* december 2017.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,

H. ZIJLSTRA