

TRACTATENBLAD

VAN HET

KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

JAARGANG 2015 Nr. 143

A. TITEL

*Handvest van de Verenigde Naties;
San Francisco, 26 juni 1945*

B. TEKST

De Engelse tekst van het Handvest is bij Koninklijk Besluit van 21 december 1945 bekendgemaakt in *Stb.* F 321.

De Engelse en de Franse tekst, zoals gewijzigd, zijn geplaatst in *Trb.* 1979, 37.

Op 29 april 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7163^e zitting Resolutie 2153 (2014) inzake Ivoorkust aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2153 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7163rd meeting, on 29 April 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular resolutions 1880 (2009), 1893 (2009), 1911 (2010), 1933 (2010), 1946 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1975 (2011), 1980 (2011), 2000 (2011), 2045 (2012), 2062 (2012), 2101 (2013), and 2112 (2013),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Welcoming the special report of the Secretary-General dated 24 December 2013 (S/2013/761), and *noting* the 2013 midterm report (S/2013/605), and the 2014 Final report (S/2014/266), of the United Nations Group of Experts,

Welcoming the overall progress towards restoring security, peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, commending the President and Government of Côte d'Ivoire's continued efforts to stabilize the security situation and accelerate economic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire and strengthen international and regional cooperation, and notably enhanced cooperation with the governments of Ghana and Liberia, and *calling upon* all national stakeholders to work together to consolidate the progress made so far and to address the underlying causes of tension and conflict,

Recognizing the continued contribution the measures imposed by resolutions 1572 (2004), 1643 (2005), 1975 (2011) and 1980 (2011), as modified by later resolutions, make to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire, including by countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), and *stressing* that these measures aim at supporting the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to possibly further modifying or lifting all or part of the remaining measures, in accordance with progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity,

Welcoming the completion of the electoral cycle that originated in the Ouagadougou Accords, and the announcement of the presidential election in October 2015 and *encouraging* the government and the opposition to move positively and collaboratively towards political reconciliation and electoral reform to ensure that the political space remains open and transparent,

Welcoming the efforts made toward the security reform agenda and especially the increasing cooperation between the National Security Council and the local authorities while expressing concern about the delays in the implementation of the national strategy for security sector reform, in particular beyond Abidjan and *urging* an acceleration of efforts to reform the security sector, including by putting in place an effective chain of command, a system of military justice and appropriate budgetary allocations,

Welcoming the progress made in the overall security situation and efforts to address security challenges *while expressing concern* at delays in implementation of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, *welcoming* efforts towards better monitoring and management of weapons through the National Commission to Fight Against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, with the support of UNOCI, and *emphasizing* the importance of continued efforts in this area, *re-emphasizing* the necessity of the Ivorian Government to provide sufficient financial resources and to develop viable reintegration opportunities for former combatants in order to ensure the achievement of the DDR process by June 2015 at the latest,

Reiterating the urgent need for the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to train and equip its security forces, especially the police and gendarmerie with standard policing weapons and ammunition,

Re-emphasizing the importance of the Ivorian Government to be able to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens in Côte d'Ivoire and *calling on* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure that its security forces remain committed to upholding human rights and applicable international law,

Encouraging closer cooperation between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Group of Experts, originally established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1584 (2005),

Welcoming the ongoing efforts made by the Secretariat to expand and improve the roster of experts for the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Note of the President S/2006/997,

Welcoming the progress made by the Ivorian authorities in combating illegal taxation systems and acknowledging the decrease in the number of illegal checkpoints and incidents of racketeering but noting the insufficient capacity and resources in order to control borders, in particular in the western part of the country,

Noting that the Kimberley Process (KP) recognized that Côte d'Ivoire fulfilled KP Certification Scheme minimum requirements in its Final Communiqué of 22 November 2013, *encouraging* Côte d'Ivoire's full implementation of its Action Plan to develop its diamond sector in line with KP standards, including participation in the KP's Mano River basin initiative, and *welcoming* Côte d'Ivoire's invitation to host a KP review visit six months after legal exports of rough diamonds have resumed,

Recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) on women, peace and security, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on children and armed conflict and its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

Reiterating its firm condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, *condemning* all violence committed against civilians, including women, children, internally displaced persons and foreign nationals, and other violations and abuses of human rights, and *stressing* that the perpetrators on all sides must be brought to justice, whether in domestic or international courts, and *encouraging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to further continue its close cooperation with the International Criminal Court,

Welcoming in this regard the transfer of Charles Blé Goudé, former leader of the Young Patriots, to the International Criminal Court, and further welcoming national and international efforts to bring to justice alleged perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and of violations of international humanitarian law,

Stressing the importance for the Group of Experts to be provided with the sufficient resources for the implementation of its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides*, for a period ending on 30 April 2015, that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d'Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related lethal material, whether or not originating in their territories;
2. *Decides* that supplies of non-lethal equipment, and the provision of any technical assistance, training or financial assistance, intended to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public order, shall no longer require notification to the Committee;
3. *Notes that* the measures on arms and related lethal material in paragraph 1 do not apply to the provision of training, advice, technical or financial assistance, and expertise related to security and military activities, or to non-lethal material, including the supplies of civilian vehicles to the Ivorian security forces;

4. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above shall not apply to:
 - a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French forces who support them, and supplies transiting through Côte d'Ivoire intended for the support of or to be used by United Nations Peacekeeping operations;
 - b) supplies temporarily exported to Côte d'Ivoire to the forces of a State which is taking action, in accordance with international law, solely and directly to facilitate the evacuation of its nationals and those for whom it has consular responsibility in Côte d'Ivoire, as notified in advance to the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004);
 - c) supplies of arms and related lethal materiel to the Ivorian security forces, intended solely for the support of or use in the Ivorian process of SSR, as notified in advance to the Committee established by paragraph 14 of the resolution 1572 (2004), except for those arms and related lethal materiel which are set out in the Annex of this resolution, which require the advance approval of the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004);
5. *Decides* that the Committee shall add, remove or clarify items on the list of arms and related lethal materiel specified in the Annex of this resolution, as appropriate;
6. *Decides*, for the period referred to in paragraph 1 above, that the Ivorian authorities shall notify or request approval in advance, as appropriate, from the Committee for any shipments of items referred to in paragraph 3(c) above, *further decides* that the Member State delivering assistance may, in the alternative, make this notification or approval request pursuant to paragraph 3(c) after informing the Government of Côte d'Ivoire that it intends to do so;
7. *Requests* the Ivorian Government ensure that notifications and approval requests sent to the Sanctions Committee contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use and end user, including the intended destination unit in the Ivorian Security Forces or the intended place of storage, the technical specifications, quantity of the equipment to be shipped, details of the manufacturer and supplier of the equipment, the proposed date of delivery, mode of transportation and itinerary of shipments; *further stresses* the importance of a specific focus on detailed explanations for how the requested equipment will support security sector reform; and *emphasizes* that such notifications and approval requests include information about any intended modification of non-lethal equipment into lethal equipment;
8. *Decides* that the Ivorian authorities shall submit biannual reports to the Committee by 30 September 2015 and by 30 March 2015 on progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR;
9. *Encourages* Ivorian authorities to consult with UNOCI, within its existing mandate and resources, to ensure notifications and authorisation requests contain the required information;
10. *Urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to allow the Group of Experts and UNOCI access to the exempted arms and lethal materiel at the time of import and before the transfer to the end user takes place, *stresses* that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire shall mark the arms and related lethal materiel when received in the territory of Côte d'Ivoire, *urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to maintain a registry of all arms and materials owned by national security forces, with a specific attention to small arms and light weapons, with a view of improving tracking and monitoring of their circulation;
11. *Decides* to review the measures decided in paragraphs above in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization throughout the country, by the end of the period mentioned in paragraph 1, in accordance with progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity;
12. *Decides* to renew until 30 April 2015 the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 9 to 12 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) and stresses its intention to review the continued listing of individuals subject to such measures provided they engage in actions that further the objective of national reconciliation;
13. *Decides* to terminate as of the date of adoption of this resolution the measures preventing the importation by any State of all rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005), in light of progress made towards Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) implementation and better governance of the sector;
14. *Requests* Côte d'Ivoire to update the Security Council, through the Committee, on its progress in implementing its Action Plan for diamonds, including on any enforcement activities involving illegal smuggling, development of its customs regime, and reporting of financial flows from diamonds; *encourages* Côte d'Ivoire to host a KP review visit within nine months following the date of adoption of this resolution to include a representative from the Group of Experts; and further *encourages* Côte d'Ivoire's continued participation in the regional cooperation and law enforcement activities, such as the KP's Mano River Basin initiative;
15. *Invites* the KPCS, in particular, its Working Groups on Monitoring and Statistics, to communicate information, as appropriate, regarding Côte d'Ivoire's compliance with the KPCS to the Security Council, through the Committee, and when possible, for review by the Group of Experts; encourages donors to support Côte d'Ivoire's efforts by sharing related information and providing technical assistance;
16. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to take the necessary steps to enforce the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, including by incorporating relevant provisions in its national legal framework;
17. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular those in the subregion, to fully implement the measures mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 6 above;
18. *Expresses* its continued concern about the instability in western Côte d'Ivoire, *welcomes* and *further encourages* the coordinated action by authorities from neighbouring countries to address this issue, particularly with respect to the border area, including through continuing monitoring, information sharing

and conducting coordinated actions, and in developing and implementing a shared border strategy to inter alia support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides of the border;

19. *Encourages* UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), within their respective mandates, capabilities and areas of deployment, to continue to coordinate closely in assisting respectively the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in monitoring their border, and *welcomes* continued cooperation between the Group of Experts and the Panel of Experts on Liberia appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1854 (2008);
20. *Urges* all illegal Ivorian armed combatants, including in neighbouring countries, to lay down their arms immediately, *encourages* UNOCI, within its mandate and limits of capabilities and areas of deployment, to continue to assist the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in collecting and storing the arms and registering all relevant information related to those arms and further *calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, including the National Commission to Fight Against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, to ensure that those arms are neutralized or not illegally disseminated, in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Associated Materials;
21. *Recalls* that UNOCI, within the monitoring of the arms embargo, is mandated to collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of this resolution, and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;
22. *Reiterates* the necessity for the Ivorian authorities to provide unhindered access to the Group of Experts, as well as UNOCI and the French forces which support it, to equipment, sites and installations referred to in paragraph 2(a) of resolution 1584 (2005), and to all weapons, ammunition and related materiel of all armed security forces, regardless of location, including the arms issued from the collection referred to in paragraph 10 or 11 above, when appropriate and without notice, as set out in its resolutions 1739 (2007), 1880 (2009), 1933 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1980 (2011), 2062 (2012), and 2112 (2013);
23. *Requests* all States concerned, in particular those in the subregion, to cooperate fully with the Committee, and *authorizes* the Committee to request whatever further information it may consider necessary;
24. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts as set out in paragraph 7 of resolution 1727 (2006) for a period of 13 months until 30 May 2015 and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to support its action;
25. *Reiterates* that paragraph 7(b) of resolution 1727 (2006) includes a mandate for the Group of Experts to gather and analyse all relevant information on sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire, for the purchase of arms and related materiel and activities and notes that pursuant to paragraph 12(a) of resolution 1727 (2006) those who are determined to be a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire through the illicit trafficking of natural resources, including diamonds and gold, may be designated by the Committee;
26. *Decides* that the Group of Experts will also report on the activities of and any continued threat to peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire posed by sanctioned individuals and additionally *requests* the Group of Experts to assess and report on the effects of the modifications decided in this resolution;
27. *Requests* the Group of Experts to submit a midterm report to the Committee by 15 October 2014 and to submit a final report by 15 April 2015, after discussion with the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1 above, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1980 (2011);
28. *Decides* that the report of the Group of Experts, as referred to in paragraph 7(e) of resolution 1727 (2006) may include, as appropriate, any information and recommendations relevant to the Committee's possible additional designation of the individuals and entities described in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1980 (2011) and further *recalls* the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;
29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate as appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by UNOCI and, where possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, concerning the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;
30. *Requests* also the French Government to communicate as appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by the French forces and, where possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, concerning the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;
31. *Encourages* the Ivorian authorities to participate in the OECD-hosted implementation program with regard to the due diligence guidelines for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, with a special attention to gold, and to reach out to international organizations with a view to taking advantage of lessons learned from other initiatives and countries that have and are confronting similar issues on artisanal mining;
32. *Calls upon* the Ivorian authorities to continue to take the necessary measures to dismantle the illegal taxation networks, including by undertaking relevant and thorough investigations, reduce the number of checkpoints and prevent incidents of racketeering throughout the country and *further calls upon* the authorities to continue to take the necessary steps to continue to re-establish and reinforce relevant institutions and to accelerate the deployment of customs and border control officials in the North, West and East of the country;

33. *Asks* the Group of Experts to assess the effectiveness of these border measures and control in the region, *encourages* all neighbouring States to be aware of Ivorian efforts in that regard and *encourages* UNOCI, within its mandate, to continue its assistance to Ivorian authorities in the re-establishment of normal customs and border control operation;
34. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other organizations and interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee, the Group of Experts, UNOCI and the French forces, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011), and further *requests* the Group of Experts to coordinate its activities as appropriate with all political actors and to implement their mandate in accordance with the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997);
35. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);
36. *Urges* further in this context that all Ivorian parties and all States, particularly those in the region, ensure:
 - the safety of the members of the Group of Experts;
 - unhindered access by the Group of Experts, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Group of Experts to execute its mandate;
37. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

1. Weapons, direct and indirect fire artillery, and guns with a calibre bigger than 12.7 mm, their ammunition and components.
2. Rocket propelled grenades, rockets, light anti-tank weapons, rifle grenades and grenade-launchers.
3. Surface-to-air Missiles, including man portable air defence systems (Manpads); surface-to-surface missiles; and air-to-surface missiles.
4. Mortars with a calibre bigger than 82 mm.
5. Guided anti-tank weapons, especially guided anti-tank missiles, their ammunition and components.
6. Armed aircraft, including rotary wing or fixed wing.
7. Military armed vehicles or Military vehicles equipped with weapon mounts.
8. Explosive charges and devices containing explosive materials, designed for military purpose, mines and related material.
9. Night observation and night shooting devices.

Op 17 juni 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7198^e zitting Resolutie 2160 (2014) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2160 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7198th meeting, on 17 June 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on international terrorism and the threat it poses to Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), and the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling its previous resolutions extending through 17 March 2015 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as defined in resolution 2145 (2014),

Recalling its resolutions on the recruitment and use of children and armed conflict, *expressing* its strong concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the ongoing violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and other violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the strong links between terrorism and insurgency activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel,

Welcoming the process by which Afghanistan and its regional and international partners are entering into long-term strategic partnership and other agreements aimed at achieving a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive political process in Afghanistan to support reconciliation among all Afghans,

Recognizing that the security situation in Afghanistan has evolved and that some members of the Taliban have reconciled with the Government of Afghanistan, have rejected the terrorist ideology of Al-Qaida and its followers, and support a peaceful resolution to the continuing conflict in Afghanistan,

Recognizing that, notwithstanding the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan and progress in reconciliation, the situation in Afghanistan remains a threat to international peace and security, and *reaffirming* the need to combat this threat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in this effort,

Reiterating its firm commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to advance the peace and reconciliation process, including by the High Peace Council and the implementation of the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme, in line with the Kabul Communiqué and the Bonn Conference Conclusions, and within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and application of the procedures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1988 (2011) and 2082 (2012) as well as other relevant resolutions of the Council,

Welcoming the decision taken by some members of the Taliban to reconcile with the Government of Afghanistan, to have no links to international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida, to respect the constitution, including its human rights provisions, notably the rights of women, and to support a peaceful resolution to the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, and *urging* all those individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, to accept the Government of Afghanistan's offer of reconciliation,

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the ongoing violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in terrorism and the illicit brokering in arms and related material and arms trafficking in the production, trafficking or trade of illicit drugs, and the strong links between terrorism and insurgency activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including women, children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, including humanitarian and development workers,

Underscoring the importance of humanitarian aid operations and *condemning* all acts or threats of violence against United Nations staff and humanitarian actors and any politicization of humanitarian assistance by the Taliban and associated groups or individuals,

Reiterating the need to ensure that the present sanctions regime contributes effectively to ongoing efforts to combat the insurgency and support the Government of Afghanistan's work to advance reconciliation in order to bring about peace, stability, and security in Afghanistan,

Taking note of the Government of Afghanistan's request that the Security Council support reconciliation, including by removing names from the United Nations sanctions lists for those who reconcile and have ceased to engage in or support activities that threaten the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan,

Expressing its intention to give due regard to lifting sanctions on those who reconcile,

Welcoming the briefings by the Chairman of the High Peace Council to the Committee in December 2012 and 2013 as a sign of close, ongoing cooperation between the Security Council and those Afghans working for peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan,

Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, and *expressing* its appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Afghanistan to assist the High Peace Council's peace and reconciliation efforts,

Reiterating its support for the fight against illicit production and trafficking of drugs from, and chemical precursors to, Afghanistan, in neighbouring countries, countries on trafficking routes, drug destination countries and precursors producing countries,

Recalling its resolution 2133 (2014) and the publication by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) of the "Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists", *strongly condemning* incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *expressing its determination* to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable

international law, *calling upon* all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and *reaffirming* the need for all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups,

Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, as well as their use to incite, recruit, fund, or plan terrorist acts,

Recognizing the importance of making the Afghanistan/Taliban sanctions list available in Dari and Pashtu,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the following measures with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution 1988 (2011) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established in paragraph 35 of resolution 1988 ("the Committee") (hereafter known as "the List"):
 - a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons' benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;
 - b) Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified, including where this directly relates to supporting efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to promote reconciliation;
 - c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities;
2. *Decides* that the acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is eligible for listing under paragraph 1 include:
 - a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;
 - b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;
 - c) Recruiting for; or
 - d) Otherwise supporting acts or activities of those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan;
3. *Confirms* that any individual or any group, undertaking or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly by, or otherwise supporting, such an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the List, shall be eligible for listing;
4. *Notes* that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from crimes, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs originating in and transiting through Afghanistan, and trafficking of precursors into Afghanistan, and *underscores* the need to prevent those associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan from benefiting, directly or indirectly, from entities engaging in activities prohibited by this resolution, as well as the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Afghanistan;
5. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to all proposed uses of funds or other financial assets or economic resources in connection with the travel of a listed individual, including costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging, and that such travel-related funds or other financial assets or economic resources may only be provided in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and in paragraph 12 below;
6. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting or related services, used for the support of those on this List, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan;
7. *Confirms* further that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above shall also apply to the direct or indirect payment of ransoms to or for the benefit of individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;

8. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 1 above and are frozen;
9. *Decides* that States, in order to prevent those associated with the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonating cord, or poisons, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices, and *further encourages* Member States to share information, establish partnerships, and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices;
10. *Encourages* Member States to consult the List when considering travel visa applications;
11. *Encourages* Member States to exchange information expeditiously with other Member States, in particular the Government of Afghanistan, when they detect the travel of individuals on the List;

Exemptions

12. *Recalls* its decision that all Member States may make use of the provisions set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), regarding available exemptions with regard to the measures in paragraph 1 (a), and *encourages* their use by Member States;
13. *Underlines* the importance of a comprehensive political process in Afghanistan to support peace and reconciliation among all Afghans, *invites* the Government of Afghanistan, in close coordination with the High Peace Council, to submit for the Committee's consideration the names of listed individuals for whom it confirms travel to such specified location or locations is necessary to participate in meetings in support of peace and reconciliation, and *requires* such submissions to include, to the extent possible, the following information:
 - a) The passport number or travel document number of the listed individual;
 - b) The specific location or locations to which each listed individual is expected to travel and their anticipated transit points, if any;
 - c) The period of time, not to exceed nine months, during which listed individuals are expected to travel;
14. *Decides* that the travel ban imposed by paragraph 1 (b) shall not apply to individuals identified pursuant to paragraph 13 above, where the Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis only, that such entry or transit is justified, further *decides* that any such exemption approved by the Committee shall only be granted for the requested period for any travel to the specified location or locations, *directs* the Committee to decide on all such exemption requests, as well as on requests to amend or renew previously granted exemptions, or on a request by any Member State to revoke previously granted exemptions, within ten days of receiving them, and *affirms* that, notwithstanding any exemption from the travel ban, listed individuals remain subject to the other measures outlined in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
15. *Requests* the Government of Afghanistan, through the Monitoring Team, to provide to the Committee, for its consideration and review, a report on each individual's travel under a granted exemption, promptly upon the exemption's expiration, and *encourages* relevant Member States to provide information to the Committee, as appropriate, on any instances of non-compliance;

Listing

16. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular the Government of Afghanistan, to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities described in paragraph 2 above;
17. *Reaffirms* that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the List, Member States shall use the standard form for listing and provide a statement of case, which should include detailed reasons on the proposed basis for the listing, and as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to the extent possible, the information required by INTERPOL to issue a INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notice, and *decides further* that the statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to the Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 20 below;
18. *Encourages* Member States, in accordance with their national legislation, to submit to INTERPOL, where available, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for the inclusion in the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, and *directs* the Monitoring Team to report to the Committee on further steps that could be taken to improve the quality of the 1988 Sanctions List, including by improving identifying information, as well as steps to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;

19. *Directs* the Committee to update, as necessary, the standard form for listing in accordance with the provisions of this resolution;
20. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee's website, at the same time a name is added to the List, a narrative summary of reasons for listing for the corresponding entry;
21. *Calls upon* all members of the Committee and the Monitoring Team to share with the Committee any appropriate information they may have available regarding a listing request from a Member State so that this information may help inform the Committee's decision on listing and provide additional material for the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 20;
22. *Requests* the Secretariat to publish on the Committee's website all relevant publicly releasable information, including the narrative summary of reasons for listing, immediately after a name is added to the List, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make all list entries and narrative summaries of reasons for listing available in all official languages of the United Nations in a timely and accurate manner, and *notes* the unique circumstances of this request, which is for the purpose of harmonizing this Committee's translation procedures of issuing lists and narrative summaries with those of other United Nations Security Council sanctions committees;
23. *Strongly urges* Member States, when considering the proposal of a new listing, to consult with the Government of Afghanistan on the listing prior to submission to the Committee to ensure coordination with the Government of Afghanistan's peace and reconciliation efforts, and *encourages* all Member States considering the proposal of a new listing to seek advice from UNAMA, where appropriate;
24. *Decides* that the Committee shall, after publication but within three working days after a name is added to the List, notify the Government of Afghanistan, the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan, and the Permanent Mission of the State(s) where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of non-Afghan individuals or entities, the State(s) of which the person is believed to be a national; and further *decides* that the relevant Member State(s) shall take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the listing and to include with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects of listing, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee's procedures for considering delisting requests, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), regarding available exemptions;

Delisting

25. *Directs* the Committee to remove expeditiously individuals and entities on a case-by-case basis that no longer meet the listing criteria outlined in paragraph 2 above, and *requests* that the Committee give due regard to requests for removal of individuals who have reconciled, in accordance with the 20 July 2010 Kabul Conference Communiqué on dialogue for all those who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaida, respect the constitution, including its human rights provisions, notably the rights of women, and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan, and as further elaborated in the principles and outcomes of the 5 December 2011 Bonn Conference Conclusions supported by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community;
26. *Strongly urges* Member States to consult with the Government of Afghanistan on their delisting requests prior to submission to the Committee, to ensure coordination with the Government of Afghanistan's peace and reconciliation efforts;
27. *Recalls* its decision that individuals and entities seeking removal from the List without the sponsorship of a Member State are eligible to submit such requests to the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006);
28. *Encourages* UNAMA to support and facilitate cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the Committee to ensure that the Committee has sufficient information to consider delisting requests, and *directs* the Committee to consider delisting requests in accordance with the following principles, where relevant:
 - a) Delisting requests concerning reconciled individuals should, if possible, include a communication from the High Peace Council through the Government of Afghanistan confirming the reconciled status of the individual according to the reconciliation guidelines, or, in the case of individuals reconciled under the Strengthening Peace Programme, documentation attesting to their reconciliation under the previous programme, as well as current address and contact information;
 - b) Delisting requests concerning individuals who formerly held positions in the Taliban regime prior to 2002 who no longer meet the listing criteria outlined in paragraph 2 of this resolution should, if possible, include a communication from the Government of Afghanistan confirming that the individual is not an active supporter of, or participant in, acts that threaten the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, as well as current address and contact information;
 - c) Delisting requests for reportedly deceased individuals should include an official statement of death from the State of nationality, residence, or other relevant State;
29. *Urges* the Committee, where appropriate, to invite a representative of the Government of Afghanistan to appear before the Committee to discuss the merits of listing or delisting certain individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including when a request by the Government of Afghanistan has been put on hold or rejected by the Committee;

30. *Requests* all Member States, but particularly the Government of Afghanistan, to inform the Committee if they become aware of any information indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity that has been delisted should be considered for listing under paragraph 1 of this resolution, and *further requests* that the Government of Afghanistan provide to the Committee an annual report on the status of reportedly reconciled individuals who have been delisted by the Committee in the previous year;
31. *Directs* the Committee to consider expeditiously any information indicating that a delisted individual has returned to activities set forth in paragraph 2, including by engaging in acts inconsistent with paragraph 25 of this resolution, and *requests* the Government of Afghanistan or other Member States, where appropriate, to submit a request to add that individual's name back on the list;
32. *Confirms* that the Secretariat shall, as soon as possible after the Committee has made a decision to remove a name from the List, transmit the decision to the Government of Afghanistan and the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan for notification, and the Secretariat should also, as soon as possible, notify the Permanent Mission of the State(s) in which the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of non-Afghan individuals or entities, the State(s) of nationality, and *recalls* its decision that States receiving such notification take measures, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual or entity of the delisting in a timely manner;

Review and maintenance of the List

33. *Recognizes* that the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and the urgency that the Government of Afghanistan and the international community attach to a peaceful political solution to the conflict, requires timely and expeditious modifications to the List, including the addition and removal of individuals and entities, *urges* the Committee to decide on listing and delisting requests in a timely manner, *requests* the Committee to review each entry on the list on a regular basis, including, as appropriate, by means of reviews of individuals considered to be reconciled, individuals whose entries lack identifiers, individuals reportedly deceased, and entities reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, *directs* the Committee to review and amend its guidelines for such reviews, as appropriate, and *requests* the Monitoring Team to circulate to the Committee every twelve months a list compiled in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence, in particular the Government of Afghanistan, as well as States of nationality, location or incorporation, where known, of:
 - a) Individuals on the List whom the Afghan Government considers to be reconciled along with relevant documentation as outlined in paragraph 28 (a);
 - b) Individuals and entities on the List whose entries lack identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them;
 - c) Individuals on the List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information outlined in paragraph 28 (c) and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any individuals or entities who would be in a position to receive any unfrozen assets;
34. *Directs* the Committee to review whether these listings remain appropriate, and *further directs* the Committee to remove listings if it decides they are no longer appropriate;
35. *Requests* the Monitoring Team to provide an overview of the current status of the information included in the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices on a periodic basis, as appropriate;
36. *Decides* that, with the exception of decisions made pursuant to paragraph 14 of this resolution, no matter shall be left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, *urges* Committee members to respond within three months, and *directs* the Committee to update its guidelines as appropriate;
37. *Urges* the Committee to ensure that there are fair and clear procedures for the conduct of its work, and *directs* the Committee to review its guidelines as soon as possible, in particular with respect to paragraphs 18, 22, 33, 34, 35 and 36;
38. *Encourages* Member States and relevant international organizations to send representatives to meet with the Committee to share information and discuss any relevant issues;
39. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, including where available, and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;

Cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan

40. *Welcomes* periodic briefings from the Government of Afghanistan on the content of the list, as well as on the impact of targeted sanctions on deterring threats to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, and supporting Afghan-led reconciliation;
41. *Encourages* continued cooperation among the Committee, the Government of Afghanistan, and UNAMA, including by identifying and providing detailed information regarding individuals and entities participat-

ing in the financing or support of acts or activities set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and by inviting UNAMA representatives to address the Committee;

42. *Welcomes* the Government of Afghanistan's desire to assist the Committee in the coordination of listing and delisting requests and in the submission of all relevant information to the Committee;

Monitoring Team

43. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, that the 1267/1989 Monitoring Team, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), shall also support the Committee for a period of thirty months from the date of expiration of the current mandate in June 2015, with the mandate set forth in the annex to this resolution, and further *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure that the Monitoring Team receives the necessary administrative and substantive support to effectively, safely and in a timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council;
44. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to gather information on instances of non-compliance with the measures imposed in this resolution and to keep the Committee informed of such instances, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, *encourages* Committee members to address issues of non-compliance and bring them to the attention of the Monitoring Team or the Committee, and *further directs* the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;

Coordination and Outreach

45. *Recognizes* the need to maintain contact with relevant United Nations Security Council Committees, international organizations and expert groups, including the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), particularly given the continuing presence and negative influence on the Afghan conflict by Al-Qaida, and any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;
46. *Encourages* UNAMA to provide assistance to the High Peace Council, at its request, to encourage listed individuals to reconcile;

Reviews

47. *Decides* to review the implementation of the measures outlined in this resolution in eighteen months and make adjustments, as necessary, to support peace and stability in Afghanistan;
48. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

In accordance with paragraph 43 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following responsibilities:

- a) To submit, in writing, two comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, one by 1 November 2014, and the second by 1 June 2015, on implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures;
- b) To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee's record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;
- c) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
- d) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel on behalf of the Committee;
- e) To gather information on behalf of the Committee on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including by, but not limited to, collating information from Member States and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee's request, and to provide recommendations to the Committee on such cases of non-compliance for its review;
- f) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the List;
- g) To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 20 of this resolution;

- h) To bring to the Committee's attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;
- i) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;
- j) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the List, as instructed by the Committee;
- k) To consult with the Committee, the Government of Afghanistan, or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying individuals or entities that could be added to, or removed from, the List;
- l) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the List as updated and accurate as possible;
- m) To collate, assess, monitor and report on and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;
- n) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations and bodies, including UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, and engage in regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex;
- o) To cooperate closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and engage in a regular dialogue with Member States on the nexus between narcotics trafficking and those individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of this resolution, and report as requested by the Committee;
- p) To submit to the Committee on 1 December 2014 a special written report, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, UNODC and the United Nations sanctions expert panels, as appropriate, on specific cases of cooperation between organized crime syndicates, notably groups undertaking hostage-taking for ransom, narcotics producers and traders, as well as those illegally exploiting natural resources in Afghanistan, including precious and semi-precious stones, and those individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of this resolution;
- q) To consult with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen enforcement of the measures;
- r) To consult with relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions, to learn about the practical implementation of the assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of that measure;
- s) To cooperate closely with the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and other relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom and on relevant trends and developments in this area;
- t) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, and with relevant international organizations, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies to raise awareness of and learn about the practical implementation of the assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure in accordance with FATF Recommendation 6 on asset freezing and its related guidance;
- u) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector and other international organizations, including International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to raise awareness of and learn about the practical implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of these measures;
- v) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, international and regional organizations and relevant representatives of the private sector on the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to peace, security and stability in Afghanistan, to raise awareness of the threat and to develop recommendations for appropriate measures to counter this threat;
- w) To work with relevant international and regional organizations in order to promote awareness of, and compliance with, the measures;
- x) To cooperate with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs, physical descriptions and, in accordance with their national legislation, other biometric and biographic data of listed individuals when available for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices and to exchange information on emerging threats;
- y) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006);
- z) To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance in capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;
- aa) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;
- bb) To study and report to the Committee on the current nature of the threat of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and secur-

- ity of Afghanistan and the best measures to confront it, including by developing a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts according to the priorities identified by the Committee;
- cc) To gather information, including from the Government of Afghanistan and relevant Member States, on travel that takes place under a granted exemption, pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 14, and to report to the Committee, as appropriate; and
- dd) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Op 17 juni 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7198^e zitting Resolutie 2161 (2014) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2161 (2014)¹⁾

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7198th meeting, on 17 June 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2133 (2014) and the relevant statements of its President,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and *reiterating* its unequivocal condemnation of Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it, for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property and greatly undermining stability,

Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Recalling the Presidential Statements of the Security Council (S/PRST/2013/1) of 15 January 2013 on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts and (S/PRST/2013/5) on peace and security in Africa,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, *stressing* in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Recalling its resolution 2133 (2014) and the publication by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) of the "Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists", *strongly condemning* incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *expressing its determination* to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, *calling upon* all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and *reaffirming* the need for all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, and *stressing* in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity,

Reminding all States that they have an obligation to take the measures described in paragraph 1 with respect to all individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of the nationality or residence of such individuals, groups, undertakings or entities,

¹⁾ Reissued for technical reasons on 31 July 2014.

Urging all Member States to participate actively in maintaining and updating the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1989 (2011) (“the Al-Qaida Sanctions List”) by contributing additional information pertinent to current listings, submitting delisting requests when appropriate, and by identifying and nominating for listing additional individuals, groups, undertakings and entities which should be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

Reminding the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) (“the Committee”) to remove expeditiously and on a case-by-case basis individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing outlined in this resolution,

Recognizing the challenges, both legal and otherwise, to the measures implemented by Member States under paragraph 1 of this resolution, *welcoming* improvements to the Committee’s procedures and the quality of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, and *expressing* its intent to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair and clear,

Welcoming the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) and the enhancement of the Ombudsperson’s mandate in resolutions 1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012), *noting* the Office of the Ombudsperson’s significant contribution in providing additional fairness and transparency, and *recalling* the Security Council’s firm commitment to ensuring that the Office of the Ombudsperson is able to continue to carry out its role effectively, in accordance with its mandate,

Welcoming the Ombudsperson’s biannual reports to the Security Council, including the reports submitted on 21 January 2011, 22 July 2011, 20 January 2012, 30 July 2012, 31 January 2013, 31 July 2013, and 31 January 2014,

Welcoming the fourth review in June 2014 by the General Assembly of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) of 8 September 2006 and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system and the Report of the Secretary-General of 14 April 2014 on activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy (A/68/841),

Welcoming the continuing cooperation between the Committee and INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, and all other United Nations bodies, and *encouraging* further engagement with the CTITF to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system,

Recognizing the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist organizations, including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors, and the importance of continued international cooperation to that aim,

Recognizing the need for Member States to prevent the abuse of non-governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and *calling upon* non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, attempts by terrorists to abuse their status, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or belief, and *noting* the relevant recommendation and guidance documents of the Financial Action Task Force,

Recalling its decision that States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls for States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels,

Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, as well as their use to incite, recruit, fund or plan terrorist acts,

Expressing concern at the flow of international recruits to Al-Qaida and those groups associated with it, and the scale of this phenomenon, and *reiterating* further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists and financing that would support terrorists,

Noting with concern the continued threat posed to international peace and security by Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it, and *reaffirming* its resolve to address all aspects of that threat,

Noting that, in some instances, certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that meet the criteria for listing set forth in paragraph 2 of resolution 2082 (2012) or other relevant sanctions resolutions may also meet the criteria for listing set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution,

Noting the efforts of the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists to facilitate implementation by national authorities, and *encouraging* the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, to continue its work to implement the data model approved by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the measures as previously imposed by paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), and paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 1989 (2011), with respect to Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them:

Asset Freeze

- a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons' benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;

Travel Ban

- b) Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

Arms Embargo

- c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities;

Listing Criteria

2. *Reaffirms* that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with Al-Qaida and eligible for inclusion in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List include:
 - a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;
 - b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;
 - c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;
3. *Notes* that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from crime, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors;
4. *Confirms* that any individual, group, undertaking or entity either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, any individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida, including on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, shall be eligible for listing;
5. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting or related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
6. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above apply to funds, financial assets or economic resources that may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of listed individuals in connection with their travel, including costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging, and that such travel-related funds, other financial assets or economic resources may only be provided in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and in paragraphs 9 and 61 below;
7. *Confirms further* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) above shall also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;

8. *Reaffirms* that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 1 above and are frozen;
9. *Encourages* Member States to make use of the provisions regarding available exemptions to the measures in paragraph 1 (a) above, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), *confirms* that exemptions to the travel ban must be submitted by Member States, individuals or the Ombudsperson, as appropriate, including when listed individuals travel for the purpose of fulfilling religious obligations, and *notes* that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may receive exemption requests submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity, for Committee consideration, as described in paragraph 62 below;

Measures implementation

10. *Reiterates* the importance of all States identifying, and if necessary introducing, adequate procedures to implement fully all aspects of the measures described in paragraph 1 above, strongly *urges* all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) revised Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, particularly Recommendation 6 on targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing;
11. *Strongly urges* Member States to apply the elements in FATF's Interpretive Note to Recommendation 6, and to take note of, inter alia, related best practices for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing, and takes note of the need to have appropriate legal authorities and procedures to apply and enforce targeted financial sanctions that are not conditional upon the existence of criminal proceedings, and to apply an evidentiary standard of proof of "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable basis", as well as the ability to collect or solicit as much information as possible from all relevant sources;
12. *Calls upon* Member States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals and entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as required by paragraph 1 (a), and *taking into account* relevant FATF Recommendations and international standards designed to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations, informal/alternative remittance systems and the physical trans-border movement of currency, while working to mitigate the impact on legitimate activities through these mediums;
13. *Urges* Member States to promote awareness of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List as widely as possible, including to relevant domestic agencies, the private sector and the general public to ensure effective implementation of the measures in paragraph 1; and *encourages* Member States to urge that their respective company, property and other relevant public and private registries regularly screen their available databases, including but not limited to those with legal and/or beneficial ownership information, against the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
14. *Decides* that Member States, in order to prevent Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonating cord, or poisons, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices, and *further encourages* Member States to share information, establish partnerships, and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices;
15. *Encourages* Member States, including through their permanent missions, and relevant international organizations to meet the Committee for in-depth discussion on any relevant issues;
16. *Urges* all Member States, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated and removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;
17. *Encourages* Member States to share, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, with the private sector information in their national databases related to fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost identity or travel documents pertaining to their own jurisdictions, and, if a listed party is found to be using a false identity including to secure credit or fraudulent travel documents, to provide the Committee with information in this regard;
18. *Encourages* Member States that issue travel documents to listed individuals to note, as appropriate, that the bearer is subject to the travel ban and corresponding exemption procedures;
19. *Encourages* Member States to consult the Al-Qaida Sanctions List when considering whether to grant travel visa applications, for the purpose of effectively implementing the travel ban;

20. *Encourages* Member States to exchange information expeditiously with other Member States, in particular states of origin, destination and transit, when they detect the travel of individuals on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
21. *Encourages* designating States to inform the Monitoring Team whether a national court or other legal authority has reviewed a listed party's case and whether any judicial proceedings have begun, and to include any other relevant information when it submits its standard form for listing;
22. *Encourages* all Member States to designate national focal points in charge of liaising with the Committee and the Monitoring Team on issues related to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 1 above and the assessment of the threat from Al-Qaida and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it;
23. *Encourages* all Member States to report to the Committee on obstacles to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 1 above, with a view to facilitating technical assistance;

The Committee

24. *Directs* the Committee to continue to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List and for removing them as well as for granting exemptions per resolution 1452 (2002), and *directs* the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in support of these objectives;
25. *Directs* the Committee, as a matter of priority, to review its guidelines with respect to the provisions of this resolution, in particular paragraphs 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 34, 39, 44, 46, 51, 63, 64, 66 and 67;
26. *Requests* the Committee to report to the Council on its findings regarding Member States' implementation efforts, and identify and recommend steps necessary to improve implementation;
27. *Directs* the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 1 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and requests the Chair, in periodic reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 72 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on this issue;
28. *Confirms* that no matter should be left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that extraordinary circumstances require additional time for consideration, in accordance with the Committee's guidelines;
29. *Requests* the Committee to facilitate, through the Monitoring Team or specialized United Nations agencies, assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

Listing

30. *Encourages* all Member States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it;
31. *Reiterates* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;
32. *Reaffirms* that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Member States shall use the standard form for listing provide a statement of case, which should include detailed reasons on the proposed basis for the listing, and as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to the extent possible, the information required by INTERPOL to issue a Special Notice, and *decides* further that the statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to the Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 36 below;
33. *Reaffirms* that Member States proposing a new listing, as well as Member States that have proposed names for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List before the adoption of this resolution, shall specify if the Committee or the Ombudsperson may not make known the Member State's status as a designating State;
34. *Encourages* Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;
35. *Directs* the Committee to update, as necessary, the standard form for listing in accordance with the provisions of this resolution; and further *directs* the Monitoring Team to report to the Committee on further steps that could be taken to improve the quality of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including by improving identifying information, as well as steps to ensure that INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;
36. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee's website, at the same time a name is added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, a narrative summary of reasons for listing the corresponding entry;

37. *Encourages* Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to inform the Committee of any relevant court decisions and proceedings so that the Committee can consider them when it reviews a corresponding listing or updates a narrative summary of reasons for listing;
38. *Calls upon* all members of the Committee and the Monitoring Team to share with the Committee any information they may have available regarding a listing request from a Member State so that this information may help inform the Committee's decision on listing and provide additional material for the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 36;
39. *Reaffirms* that the Secretariat shall, after publication but within three working days after a name is added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the state or states where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the state of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known), *requests* the Secretariat to publish on the Committee's website all relevant publicly releasable information, including the narrative summary of reasons for listing, immediately after a name is added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, and *requests* the Secretary-General to make all list entries and narrative summaries of reasons for listing available in all official languages of the United Nations in a timely and accurate manner, and notes the unique circumstances of this request, which is for the purpose of harmonizing this Committee's translation procedures of issuing lists and narrative summaries with those of other United Nations Security Council sanctions committees;
40. *Reaffirms* the requirement that Member States take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the listing and to include with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects of listing, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee's procedures for considering delisting requests, including the possibility of submitting such a request to the Ombudsperson in accordance with paragraph 43 of resolution 2083 (2012) and annex II of this resolution, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002) regarding available exemptions, including the possibility of submitting such requests through the Focal Point mechanism in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 62 of this resolution;

Review of Delisting Requests – Ombudsperson/Member States

41. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson, established by resolution 1904 (2009), as reflected in the procedures outlined in annex II of this resolution, for a period of thirty months from the date of expiration of the Office of the Ombudsperson's current mandate in June 2015, *affirms* that the Ombudsperson shall continue to receive requests from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government, and affirms that the Ombudsperson shall continue to present to the Committee observations and a recommendation on the delisting of those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities that have requested removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List through the Office of the Ombudsperson, either a recommendation to retain the listing or a recommendation that the Committee consider delisting;
42. *Recalls* its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing in the Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson on a delisting request pursuant to annex II;
43. *Recalls* its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with annex II of this resolution, including paragraph 7 (h) thereof, where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;
44. *Decides* that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 43 on a case-by-case basis;
45. *Reiterates* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;
46. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the Ombudsperson by providing necessary resources, including for translation services, as appropriate, to ensure its continued ability to carry out its mandate in an independent, effective and timely manner;
47. *Strongly urges* Member States to provide all relevant information to the Ombudsperson, including any relevant confidential information, where appropriate, *encourages* Member States to provide relevant information in a timely manner, *welcomes* those national arrangements entered into by Member States with the Office of the Ombudsperson to facilitate the sharing of confidential information, *encourages* Member States' further cooperation in this regard, including by concluding arrangements with the Office

of the Ombudsperson for the sharing of such information, and *confirms* that the Ombudsperson must comply with any confidentiality restrictions that are placed on such information by Member States providing it;

48. *Requests* that Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are already in the process of challenging their listing through national and regional courts to seek removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson;
49. *Notes* the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards and, inter alia, best practices relating to targeted financial sanctions, as referenced in paragraph 12 of this resolution;
50. *Recalls* its decision that when the designating State submits a delisting request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity after 60 days unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the measures shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;
51. *Decides* that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 50 on a case-by-case basis;
52. *Recalls* its decision that, for purposes of submitting a delisting request in paragraph 50, consensus must exist between or among all designating States in cases where there are multiple designating States; and further *recalls* its decision that co-sponsors of listing requests shall not be considered designating States for purposes of paragraph 50;
53. *Strongly urges* designating States to allow the Ombudsperson to reveal their identities as designating States to those listed individuals and entities that have submitted delisting petitions to the Ombudsperson;
54. *Directs* the Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider delisting requests of Member States for the removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that are alleged to no longer meet the criteria established in the relevant resolutions, and set out in paragraph 2 of the present resolution, and *strongly urges* Member States to provide reasons for submitting their delisting requests;
55. *Encourages* States to submit delisting requests for individuals that are officially confirmed to be dead, particularly where no assets are identified, and for entities reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, while at the same time taking all reasonable measures to ensure that the assets that had belonged to these individuals or entities have not been or will not be transferred or distributed to other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List or any other Security Council sanctions list;
56. *Encourages* Member States, when unfreezing the assets of a deceased individual or an entity that is reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist as a result of a delisting, to recall the obligations set forth in resolution 1373 (2001) and, particularly, to prevent unfrozen assets from being used for terrorist purposes;
57. *Reaffirms* that, prior to the unfreezing of any assets that have been frozen as a result of the listing of Usama bin Laden, Member States shall submit to the Committee a request to unfreeze such assets and shall provide assurances to the Committee that the assets will not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to a listed individual, group, undertaking or entity, or otherwise used for terrorist purposes in line with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), and decides further that such assets may only be unfrozen in the absence of an objection by a Committee member within thirty days of receiving the request, and stresses the exceptional nature of this provision, which shall not be considered as establishing a precedent;
58. *Calls upon* the Committee when considering delisting requests to give due consideration to the opinions of designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, and other relevant States as determined by the Committee, *directs* Committee members to provide their reasons for objecting to delisting requests at the time the request is objected to, and *calls upon* the Committee to provide reasons to relevant Member States and national and regional courts and bodies, upon request and where appropriate;
59. *Encourages* all Member States, including designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation to provide all information to the Committee relevant to the Committee's review of delisting petitions, and to meet with the Committee, if requested, to convey their views on delisting requests, and further *encourages* the Committee, where appropriate, to meet with representatives of national or regional organizations and bodies that have relevant information on delisting petitions;
60. *Confirms* that the Secretariat shall, within three days after a name is removed from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation (to the extent this information is known), and *decides* that States receiving such notification shall take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual, group, undertaking or entity of the delisting in a timely manner;

61. *Reaffirms* that, in cases in which the Ombudsperson is unable to interview a petitioner in his or her state of residence, the Ombudsperson may request, with the agreement of the petitioner, that the Committee consider granting exemptions to the restrictions on assets and travel in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this resolution for the sole purpose of allowing the petitioner to meet travel expenses and travel to another State to be interviewed by the Ombudsperson for a period no longer than necessary to participate in this interview, provided that all States of transit and destination do not object to such travel, and further directs the Committee to notify the Ombudsperson of the Committee's decision;

Exemptions/Focal Point

62. *Decides* that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may:
- a) Receive requests from listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 (a) of this resolution, as defined in resolution 1452 (2002) provided that the request has first been submitted for the consideration of the State of residence, and decides further that the Focal Point shall transmit such requests to the Committee for a decision, directs the Committee to consider such requests, including in consultation with the State of residence and any other relevant States, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals, groups, undertaking or entities of the Committee's decision;
 - b) Receive requests from listed individuals for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 (b) of this resolution and transmit these to the Committee to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether entry or transit is justified, directs the Committee to consider such requests in consultation with States of transit and destination and any other relevant States, and decides further that the Committee shall only agree to exemptions to the measures in paragraph 1 (b) of this resolution with the agreement of the States of transit and destination, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals of the Committee's decision;
63. *Decides* that the Focal Point may receive, and transmit to the Committee for its consideration, communications from:
- a) individuals who have been removed from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
 - b) individuals claiming to have been subjected to the measures outlined in paragraph 1 above as a result of false or mistaken identification or confusion with individuals included on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
64. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in consultation with relevant States, to respond, through the Focal Point, to communications referred to in paragraph 63 (b), as may be appropriate, within 60 days;

Review and maintenance of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List

65. *Encourages* all Member States, in particular designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, including where possible and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;
66. *Requests* the Monitoring Team to circulate to the Committee every twelve months a list compiled in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, where known, of:
- a) individuals and entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List whose entries lack identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them;
 - b) individuals on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information such as the certification of death, and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any individuals or entities who would be in a position to receive any unfrozen assets;
 - c) entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List that are reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, along with an assessment of any relevant information;
 - d) any other names on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List that have not been reviewed in three or more years ("the triennial review");
67. *Directs* the Committee to review whether these listings remain appropriate, and *further directs* the Committee to remove listings if it decides they are no longer appropriate;

Coordination and outreach

68. *Directs* the Committee to continue to cooperate with other relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees, in particular that established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011);
69. *Reiterates* the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordi-

nation on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to all three committees, expresses its intention to provide guidance to the committees on areas of common interest in order better to coordinate their efforts and facilitate such cooperation, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the groups to be co-located as soon as possible;

70. *Encourages* the Monitoring Team and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to continue their joint activities, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and 1540 Committee experts to assist Member States in their efforts to comply with their obligations under the relevant resolutions, including through organizing regional and subregional workshops;
71. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), and 2133 (2014);
72. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year, to the Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairs of CTC and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), expresses its intention to hold informal consultations at least once per year on the work of the Committee, on the basis of reports from the Chair to the Council, and further requests the Chair to hold periodic briefings for all interested Member States;

Monitoring Team

73. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, as well as to support the Ombudsperson, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team and its members, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a further period of thirty months from the date of expiration of its current mandate in June 2015, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in annex I, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect, and *highlights the importance* of ensuring that the Monitoring Team receives the necessary administrative support to effectively, safely and in a timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high-risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council;
74. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to identify, gather information on, and keep the Committee informed of instances and common patterns of non-compliance with the measures imposed in this resolution, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, requests the Monitoring Team to work closely with State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, designating States, other relevant States, and relevant United Nations Missions, and further directs the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;
75. *Directs* the Committee, with the assistance of its Monitoring Team, to hold special meetings on important thematic or regional topics and Member States' capacity challenges, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Counter Terrorism Committee and CTED, CTITF, and with the Financial Action Task Force to identify and prioritize areas for the provision of technical assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

Reviews

76. *Decides* to review the measures described in paragraph 1 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in eighteen months or sooner if necessary;
77. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

In accordance with paragraph 73 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following mandates and responsibilities:

- a) To submit, in writing, two comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, one by 30 September 2014, and the second by 31 March 2015, on implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures;
- b) To assist the Ombudsperson in carrying out his or her mandate as specified in annex II of this resolution, including by providing updated information on those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking their removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- c) To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee's record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;

- d) To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;
- e) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with CTED and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;
- f) To work closely and share information with CTED and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to identify areas of convergence and overlap and to help facilitate concrete coordination, including in the area of reporting, among the three Committees;
- g) To participate actively in and support all relevant activities under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy including within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, established to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, in particular through its relevant working groups;
- h) To gather information, on behalf of the Committee, on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including by collating information from all relevant sources, including Member States, and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee's request, and to provide cases of non-compliance and recommendations to the Committee on actions to respond to such cases of non-compliance for its review;
- i) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- j) To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 36 of this resolution;
- k) To consult with the Committee or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying that certain individuals or entities should be added to, or removed from, the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
- l) To bring to the Committee's attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;
- m) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;
- n) To coordinate and cooperate with the national counter-terrorism focal point or similar coordinating body in the state of visit where appropriate;
- o) To cooperate closely with relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom by Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it, and on relevant trends and developments in this area;
- p) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as instructed by the Committee;
- q) To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the Al-Qaida Sanctions List as updated and accurate as possible;
- r) To encourage Member States to provide information to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the fulfilment of its mandate, as appropriate;
- s) To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and the best measures to confront it, including by developing, within existing resources, a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts through an annual workshop and/or other appropriate means, in consultation with the Committee;
- t) To collate, assess, monitor and report on and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including implementation of the measure in paragraph 1 (a) of this resolution as it pertains to preventing the criminal misuse of the Internet by Al-Qaida, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;
- u) To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations, including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex, such as gaps and challenges in States' implementation of the measures in this resolution;
- v) To consult, in confidence, with Member States' intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen implementation of the measures;
- w) To consult with relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, to learn about the practical implementation of the assets freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;
- x) To consult with the relevant representatives of the private sector, in coordination with national authorities, as appropriate, to promote awareness of, and enhance compliance with, the travel ban and the arms embargo;

- y) To consult with relevant representatives of international organizations, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO), to promote awareness of, and enhance compliance with, the travel ban and the arms embargo;
- z) To work with relevant international and regional organizations in order to promote awareness of, and compliance with, the measures;
- aa) To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;
- bb) To work with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs and, in accordance with their national legislation, biometric information of listed individuals for possible inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, and to work with INTERPOL to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;
- cc) To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006), and to work with the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists so as to facilitate implementation by national authorities;
- dd) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;
- ee) To report periodically, as appropriate, to the Committee on linkages between Al-Qaida and those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities eligible for listing under paragraph 1 of resolution 2082 (2012) or any other relevant sanctions resolutions; and
- ff) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Annex II

In accordance with paragraph 41 of this resolution, the Office of the Ombudsperson shall be authorized to carry out the following tasks upon receipt of a delisting request submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity (“the petitioner”).

The Council recalls that Member States are not permitted to submit delisting petitions on behalf of an individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Information gathering (four months)

1. Upon receipt of a delisting request, the Ombudsperson shall:
 - a) Acknowledge to the petitioner the receipt of the delisting request;
 - b) Inform the petitioner of the general procedure for processing delisting requests;
 - c) Answer specific questions from the petitioner about Committee procedures;
 - d) Inform the petitioner in case the petition fails to properly address the original listing criteria, as set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and return it to the petitioner for his or her consideration; and
 - e) Verify if the request is a new request or a repeated request and, if it is a repeated request to the Ombudsperson and it does not contain relevant additional information, return it to the petitioner, with an appropriate explanation, for his or her consideration.
2. For delisting petitions not returned to the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall immediately forward the delisting request to the members of the Committee, designating State(s), State(s) of residence and nationality or incorporation, relevant United Nations bodies, and any other States deemed relevant by the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson shall ask these States or relevant United Nations bodies to provide, within four months, any appropriate additional information relevant to the delisting request. The Ombudsperson may engage in dialogue with these States to determine:
 - a) These States’ opinions on whether the delisting request should be granted; and
 - b) Information, questions or requests for clarifications that these States would like to be communicated to the petitioner regarding the delisting request, including any information or steps that might be taken by a petitioner to clarify the delisting request.
3. Where all designating States consulted by the Ombudsperson do not object to the petitioner’s delisting, the Ombudsperson may shorten the information gathering period, as appropriate.
4. The Ombudsperson shall also immediately forward the delisting request to the Monitoring Team, which shall provide to the Ombudsperson, within four months:
 - a) All information available to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the delisting request, including court decisions and proceedings, news reports, and information that States or relevant international organizations have previously shared with the Committee or the Monitoring Team;
 - b) Fact-based assessments of the information provided by the petitioner that is relevant to the delisting request; and
 - c) Questions or requests for clarifications that the Monitoring Team would like asked of the petitioner regarding the delisting request.

5. At the end of this four-month period of information gathering, the Ombudsperson shall present a written update to the Committee on progress to date, including details regarding which States have supplied information, and any significant challenges encountered therein. The Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for information gathering, giving due consideration to requests by Member States for additional time to provide information.

Dialogue (two months)

6. Upon completion of the information gathering period, the Ombudsperson shall facilitate a two-month period of engagement, which may include dialogue with the petitioner. Giving due consideration to requests for additional time, the Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for engagement and the drafting of the Comprehensive Report described in paragraph 8 below. The Ombudsperson may shorten this time period if he or she assesses less time is required.
7. During this period of engagement, the Ombudsperson:
 - a) May submit questions, either orally or in writing, to the petitioner, or request additional information or clarifications that may help the Committee's consideration of the request, including any questions or information requests received from relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team;
 - b) Should request from the petitioner a signed statement in which the petitioner declares that they have no ongoing association with Al-Qaida, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative thereof, and undertakes not to associate with Al-Qaida in the future;
 - c) Should meet with the petitioner, to the extent possible;
 - d) Shall forward replies from the petitioner back to relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team and follow up with the petitioner in connection with incomplete responses by the petitioner;
 - e) Shall coordinate with States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team regarding any further inquiries of, or response to, the petitioner;
 - f) During the information gathering or dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson may share with relevant States information provided by a State, including that State's position on the delisting request, if the State which provided the information consents;
 - g) In the course of the information gathering and dialogue phases and in the preparation of the report, the Ombudsperson shall not disclose any information shared by a state on a confidential basis, without the express written consent of that state; and
 - h) During the dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson shall give serious consideration to the opinions of designating States, as well as other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States most affected by acts or associations that led to the original listing.
8. Upon completion of the period of engagement described above, the Ombudsperson, with the help of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, shall draft and circulate to the Committee a Comprehensive Report that will exclusively:
 - a) Summarize and, as appropriate, specify the sources of, all information available to the Ombudsperson that is relevant to the delisting request. The report shall respect confidential elements of Member States' communications with the Ombudsperson;
 - b) Describe the Ombudsperson's activities with respect to this delisting request, including dialogue with the petitioner; and
 - c) Based on an analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson's recommendation, lay out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the delisting request. The recommendation should state the Ombudsperson's views with respect to the listing as of the time of the examination of the delisting request.

Committee discussion

9. After the Committee has had fifteen days to review the Comprehensive Report in all official languages of the United Nations, the Chair of the Committee shall place the delisting request on the Committee's agenda for consideration.
10. When the Committee considers the delisting request, the Ombudsperson, shall present the Comprehensive Report in person and answer Committee members' questions regarding the request.
11. Committee consideration of the Comprehensive Report shall be completed no later than thirty days from the date the Comprehensive Report is submitted to the Committee for its review.
12. After the Committee has completed its consideration of the Comprehensive Report, the Ombudsperson may notify all relevant States of the recommendation.
13. Upon the request of a designating State, State of nationality, residence, or incorporation, and with the approval of the Committee, the Ombudsperson may provide a copy of the Comprehensive Report, with any redactions deemed necessary by the Committee, to such States, along with a notification to such States confirming that:
 - a) All decisions to release information from the Ombudsperson's Comprehensive Reports, including the scope of information, are made by the Committee at its discretion and on a case-by-case basis;
 - b) The Comprehensive Report reflects the basis for the Ombudsperson's recommendation and is not attributable to any individual Committee member; and

- c) The Comprehensive Report, and any information contained therein, should be treated as strictly confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member State without the approval of the Committee.
14. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing, the requirement for States to take the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, unless a Committee member submits a delisting request, which the Committee shall consider under its normal consensus procedures.
 15. In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with this annex II, including paragraph 7 (h), unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 1 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council.
 16. Following the conclusion of the process described in paragraphs 42 and 43 of this resolution, the Committee shall convey to the Ombudsperson, within 60 days, whether the measures described in paragraph 1 are to be retained or terminated, setting out reasons and including any further relevant information, and an updated narrative summary of reasons for listing, where appropriate, for the Ombudsperson to transmit to the petitioner. The 60-day deadline applies to outstanding matters before the Ombudsperson or the Committee and will take effect from the adoption of this resolution.
 17. After the Ombudsperson receives the communication from the committee under paragraph 16, if the measures in paragraph 1 are to be retained, the Ombudsperson shall send to the petitioner, with an advance copy sent to the Committee, a letter that:
 - a) Communicates the outcome of the petition;
 - b) Describes, to the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson's Comprehensive Report, the process and publicly releasable factual information gathered by the Ombudsperson; and
 - c) Forwards from the Committee all information about the decision provided to the Ombudsperson pursuant to paragraph 16 above.
 18. In all communications with the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations and confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member States.
 19. The Ombudsperson may notify the petitioner, as well as those States relevant to a case but which are not members of the Committee, of the stage at which the process has reached.

Other Office of the Ombudsperson Tasks

20. In addition to the tasks specified above, the Ombudsperson shall:
 - a) Distribute publicly releasable information about Committee procedures, including Committee Guidelines, fact sheets and other Committee-prepared documents;
 - b) Where address is known, notify individuals or entities about the status of their listing, after the Secretariat has officially notified the Permanent Mission of the State or States, pursuant to paragraph 39 of this resolution; and
 - c) Submit biannual reports summarizing the activities of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council.

Op 15 augustus 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7242^e zitting Resolutie 2170 (2014) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2170 (2014)¹⁾

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7242nd meeting, on 15 August 2014

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1618 (2005), 1624 (2005), 2083 (2012) 2129 (2013), 2133 (2014), 2161 (2014), and its relevant Presidential Statements,

¹⁾ Reissued for technical reasons on 21 August 2014.

Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and Syrian Arab Republic, and *reaffirming further* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Expressing its gravest concern that territory in parts of Iraq and Syria is under the control of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al Nusrah Front (ANF) and about the negative impact of their presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Iraq, Syria and the region, including the devastating humanitarian impact on the civilian populations which has led to the displacement of millions of people, and about their acts of violence that foment sectarian tensions,

Reiterating its condemnation of ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of civilians and other victims, destruction of property and of cultural and religious sites, and greatly undermining stability, and *recalling* that the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo requirements in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014) apply to ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida,

Reaffirming that terrorism, including the actions of ISIL, cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Reaffirming that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism, including while implementing this resolution, comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law, and underscoring that effective counter-terrorism measures and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort, and notes the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism,

Reaffirming that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights in Iraq and Syria, including persecution of individuals on the basis of their religion or belief, or on political grounds, must be held accountable,

Gravely concerned by the financing of, and financial and other resources obtained by, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and underscoring that these resources will support their future terrorist activities,

Strongly condemning incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *expressing its determination* to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, *calling upon* all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and *reaffirming* the need for all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups,

Expressing concern at the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and the scale of this phenomenon,

Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters of new information and communication technologies, in particular the Internet, for the purposes of recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts, as well as for the financing, planning and preparation of their activities, and underlining the need for Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources to incite support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with other obligations under international law,

Condemning in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts and *repudiating* attempts at the justification or glorification (*apologie*) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts,

Underlining the primary responsibility of Member States to protect civilian population on their territories, in accordance with their obligations under international law,

Urging all parties to protect the civilian population, in particular women and children, affected by the violent activities of ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, especially against any form of sexual violence,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, *stressing* in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Noting with concern the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and *reaffirming* its resolve to address all aspects of that threat,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Deplores and condemns* in the strongest terms the terrorist acts of ISIL and its violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law;
2. *Strongly condemns* the indiscriminate killing and deliberate targeting of civilians, numerous atrocities, mass executions and extrajudicial killings, including of soldiers, persecution of individuals and entire communities on the basis of their religion or belief, kidnapping of civilians, forced displacement of members of minority groups, killing and maiming of children, recruitment and use of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence, arbitrary detention, attacks on schools and hospitals, destruction of cultural and religious sites and obstructing the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to education, especially in the Syrian governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo and Idlib, in northern Iraq, especially in Tamim, Salaheddine and Niniveh provinces;
3. *Recalls* that widespread or systematic attacks directed against any civilian populations because of their ethnic or political background, religion or belief may constitute a crime against humanity, *emphasizes* the need to ensure that ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida are held accountable for abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, *urges* all parties to prevent such violations and abuses;
4. *Demands* that ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida cease all violence and terrorist acts, and disarm and disband with immediate effect;
5. *Urges* all States, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001), to cooperate in efforts to find and bring to justice individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida including ISIL and ANF who perpetrate, organize and sponsor terrorist acts and in this regard *underlines* the importance of regional cooperation;
6. *Reiterates its call* upon all States to take all measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance perpetrated by individuals or entities associated with ISIL, ANF and Al-Qaida and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters;

Foreign Terrorist Fighters

7. *Condemns* the recruitment by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida of foreign terrorist fighters, whose presence is exacerbating conflict and contributing to violent radicalisation, *demands* that all foreign terrorist fighters associated with ISIL and other terrorist groups withdraw immediately, and *expresses its readiness* to consider listing those recruiting for or participating in the activities of ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida under the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, including through financing or facilitating, for ISIL or ANF, of travel of foreign terrorist fighters;
8. *Calls upon* all Member States to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, reiterates further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists and financing that would support terrorists;
9. *Encourages* all Member States to engage with those within their territories at risk of recruitment and violent radicalisation to discourage travel to Syria and Iraq for the purposes of supporting or fighting for ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;
10. *Reaffirms* its decision that States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities, as well as its calls for States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels;

Terrorist Financing

11. *Reaffirms* its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
12. *Recalls* its decision in resolution 2161 (2014) that all States shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for the benefit of ISIL, ANF, or any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, by their nationals or by persons within their territory, and *reaffirms* its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all States shall prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, or for the benefit of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
13. *Notes with concern* that oilfields and related infrastructure controlled by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, are generating income which support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organise and carry out terrorist attacks;
14. *Condemns* any engagement in direct or indirect trade involving ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and *reiterates* that such engagement could constitute financial support for entities designated by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) ("the Committee") and may lead to further listings by the Committee;
15. *Emphasizes the importance* of all Member States complying with their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make donations to individuals and entities designated by the Committee or those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated entities;
16. *Expresses its concern* that aircraft or other transport departing from territory controlled by ISIL could be used to transfer gold or other valuable items and economic resources for sale on international markets, or to make other arrangements that could result in violations of the asset freeze;
17. *Confirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 2161 (2014) shall also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;

Sanctions

18. *Observes* that ISIL is a splinter group of Al-Qaida, *recalls* that ISIL and ANF are included on the Al-Qaida sanctions list and in this regard, *expresses its readiness* to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities providing support to ISIL or to ANF, including those who are financing, arming, planning or recruiting for ISIL or ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida through information and communications technologies including the internet and social media or through any other means;
19. *Decides* that the individuals specified in the annex to this resolution shall be subject to the measures imposed in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014) and added to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
20. *Directs* the Committee to make accessible on the Committee's website the narrative summaries of reasons for listing the individuals specified in the annex to this resolution as agreed by the Council and *confirms* that the provisions of resolution 2161 (2014) and subsequent relevant resolutions shall apply to the names specified in the annex for so long as they remain on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;
21. *Encourages* the submission of listing requests to the Committee by Member States of individuals and entities supporting ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida and *further encourages* the Committee to urgently consider additional designations of individuals and entities supporting ISIL and ANF;

Reporting

22. *Directs* the Monitoring Team to submit a report to the Committee within 90 days on the threat, including to the region, posed by ISIL and ANF, their sources of arms, funding, recruitment and demographics, and recommendations for additional action to address the threat and *requests* that, after a Committee discussion of this report, the chair of the Committee to brief the Security Council on its principal findings;
23. *Requests* UNAMI, within its mandate, capabilities, and its areas of operation, to assist the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014);
24. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

Annex

1. **Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabidi al Jahani**

Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabidi al Jahani is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” and “recruiting for” Jabhet al-Nusra, an a.k.a. of Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14).

2. **Hajjaj Bin Fahd Al Ajmi**

Hajjaj bin Fahd al Ajmi is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14).

3. **Abou Mohamed al Adnani**

Abou Mohamed al Adnani is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an a.k.a of Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04).

4. **Said Arif**

Said Arif is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” and “recruiting for” Jabhet al-Nusra, an a.k.a. of Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14).

5. **Abdul Mohsen Abdallah Ibrahim al Charekh**

Abdul Mohsen Abdallah Ibrahim al Charekh is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Jabhet al-Nusra, listed as an a.k.a. of Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14).

6. **Hamid Hamad Hamid al-Ali**

Hamid Hamad Hamid al-Ali is associated with Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an a.k.a. of Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04) and Jabhet al-Nusra, an a.k.a. of Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QE.A.137.14).

Op 27 augustus 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7251^e zitting Resolutie 2174 (2014) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2174 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7251st meeting, on 27 August 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling all its resolutions on Libya since resolution 1970 (2011), as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2013/21) of 16 December 2013,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Deploring the increasing violence in Libya, in particular around Tripoli and Benghazi, *condemning* ongoing fighting by armed groups and incitement to violence, and *expressing* its deep concern at its impact on Libya’s civilian population and institutions, as well as the threat it poses to Libya’s stability and democratic transition,

Welcoming the calls of the Government of Libya and House of Representatives for an immediate ceasefire, *underlining* the need for all parties to engage in peaceful and inclusive political dialogue and to respect the democratic process, and *encouraging* the Arab League, the African Union and all those with influence on the parties, in particular neighbouring and regional countries, to support an immediate cessation of hostilities and constructive engagement with such a dialogue,

Recalling its decision in resolution 1970 (2011) to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and *reaffirming* the importance of the Government of Libya’s cooperation with the International Criminal Court and the Prosecutor,

Reaffirming the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians,

Expressing deep concern at the threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunition in Libya and their proliferation, which poses a risk to stability in Libya and the region, including through transfer to terrorist and violent extremist groups and *underlining* the importance of coordinated international support to Libya and the region to address these issues,

Concerned at the growing presence of Al-Qaida linked terrorists groups and individuals operating in Libya, *reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, and recalling, in this regard, the obligations under resolution 2161 (2014),

Expressing its determination to use targeted sanctions in pursuit of stability in Libya, and against those individuals and entities who threaten its stability and obstruct or undermine its successful completion of the political transition,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls* on all parties to agree to an immediate ceasefire and an end to fighting, and expresses its strong support for the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in this regard;
2. *Condemns* the use of violence against civilians and civilian institutions and *calls for* those responsible to be held accountable;
3. *Calls on* the House of Representatives and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly to carry out their tasks in a spirit of inclusiveness, and calls on all parties to engage in an inclusive Libyan-led political dialogue in order to help restore stability, and to forge consensus around the next steps in Libya's transition;
4. *Reaffirms* that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011), apply to individuals and entities designated under that resolution and under resolution 1973 (2011) and by Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011), *decides* that they shall also apply to individuals and entities determined by the Committee to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition, and *decides* that such acts may include but are not limited to:
 - a) planning, directing, or committing, acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Libya;
 - b) attacks against any air, land, or sea port in Libya, or against a Libyan State institution or installation, or against any foreign mission in Libya;
 - c) providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya;
 - d) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of a listed individual or entity;
5. *Reiterates* that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation, and *notes* that this includes those who assist in the violation of the assets freeze and travel ban in resolution 1970 (2011);
6. *Requests* the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011), in addition to its current mandate, to provide information on individuals and entities who meet the designation criteria specified in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this resolution;
7. *Requests that* the Committee give due regard to requests for delisting of individuals and entities who no longer meet the designation criteria;
8. *Decides* that the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, to Libya in accordance with paragraph 13 (a) of resolution 2009 (2011) as modified by paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013) must be approved in advance by the Committee;
9. *Calls upon* all States, in particular States neighbouring Libya, to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Libya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095 (2013), for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
10. *Reaffirms its decision* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of resolution 1970, as modified by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011) and paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095 (2013), seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and *further reaffirms* its decision that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

11. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 9 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;
12. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 21 oktober 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7280^e zitting Resolutie 2181 (2014) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2181 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7280th meeting, on 21 October 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the Central African Republic, in particular resolutions 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014),

Taking note of the letter dated 3 October 2014 from Catherine Samba-Panza, Central African Republic President of the Transition, to the President of the Security Council,

Also taking note of the letter dated 7 October 2014 from Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union, to the President of the Security Council,

Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorization of the European Union operation contained in paragraph 44 of resolution 2134 (2014) until 15 March 2015;
2. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 24 oktober 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7286^e zitting Resolutie 2182 (2014) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2182 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7286th meeting, on 24 October 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, in particular resolutions 733 (1992), 1844 (2008), 1907 (2009), 2036 (2012), 2023 (2011), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2124 (2013), 2125 (2013), and 2142 (2014),

Taking note of the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (the SEMG) and their conclusions on the situations in both Somalia and Eritrea,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea respectively,

Condemning flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia and to Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region,

Somalia

Welcoming the recent high-level event on Somalia, chaired by the Secretary-General, and *looking forward* to all participants following up on their commitments,

Highlighting in particular the FGS's commitment to establish interim regional administrations by the end of 2014 which is an essential step under the "Vision 2016" programme, and *emphasizing* the importance of this being an inclusive and consultative process,

Underlining the importance of full and effective participation in the peace and reconciliation process across Somali society, including women, youth and minority groups,

Welcoming the establishment of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, and *emphasizing* the importance of establishing the Boundaries and Federation Commission within the upcoming parliamentary session,

Welcoming the FGS' commitment to a credible electoral process in 2016, *emphasizing* the need for legislation to establish the National Independent Electoral Commission as soon as possible, *underlining* the importance of all partners supporting a Somali-led process, and *looking forward* in particular to the upcoming United Nations electoral assessment mission,

Underlining the importance of capacity-building of the Somali Security Forces, and in this regard *reaffirming* the importance of re-establishing training, equipping and retention in the Security Forces of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which is vital for the long-term stability and security of Somalia, *expressing* its support for the ongoing European Union Training Mission and other capacity-building programmes, and *emphasizing* the importance of increased coordinated, timely and sustained support from the international community,

Underlining the need for greater effort in improving the institutional transparency and accountability of public financial management in Somalia, *welcoming* the establishment of a Financial Governance Committee, *encouraging* the FGS to use the Financial Governance Committee effectively, and *underlining* the need for increased mutual transparency and accountability between the FGS and the donor community,

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General and World Bank to develop an initiative aimed at promoting economic development in the Horn of Africa, and *looking forward* to the results of the initiative,

Recalling the total ban on the export and import of charcoal from Somalia, irrespective of whether such charcoal originated in Somalia, as set out in resolution 2036 (2012),

Expressing concern at the continuing violations and abuses of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence in Somalia, including in camps for internally displaced persons, *underscoring* the need to end impunity, promote and protect human rights, hold accountable those who commit such crimes, *welcoming* the efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to address violations and abuses of human rights including by implementing the two action plans signed on children and armed conflict and by developing a National Action Plan to combat sexual violence and *encouraging* the FGS to establish its National Human Rights Commission and to take concrete measures to implement fully the post transition human rights road map of August 2013,

Recalling the arms embargo on Somalia, and in particular the need for all supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia to be notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) ("the Committee"), and *further recalling* that improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region,

Stressing that any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia will be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the Federal Government of Somalia's implementation of its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions,

Stressing the need for all Member States to respect and implement, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, their obligations with respect to preventing unauthorized deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia and to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions,

Recalling that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean,

Taking note of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group's continued assessment that the illegal charcoal trade continues to generate significant funding for Al-Shabaab, *reiterating* that charcoal exports from Somalia are a significant revenue source for Al-Shabaab and also exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, and *deploring* the continued violation of the ban,

Expressing concern that destination countries for Somali charcoal have not yet taken sufficient steps to prevent the importation of charcoal from Somalia,

Taking note of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia's 8 October letter to the Security Council requesting Member States to provide military assistance to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia and to prevent the import of weapons into Somalia in violation of the arms embargo,

Encouraging the FGS, in consultation with all levels of Government in Somalia, to mitigate properly against the petroleum sector in Somalia becoming a source of increased tension in Somalia, including through respecting the provisions of the constitution, and *stressing* the need to resolve issues of resource management and ownership as part of ongoing discussions around federalism,

Eritrea

Welcoming the meetings between representatives of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG in Paris and Cairo and by telephone conference from New York, *encouraging* further cooperation, and *underlining* its expectation that this cooperation will deepen during the SEMG's mandate, including through regular visits to Eritrea by the SEMG,

Stressing its demand that Eritrea make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of June 2008 so that those concerned may ascertain the presence and conditions of the Djiboutian prisoners of war,

Underlining the importance of full cooperation between the SEMG and the Government of Eritrea,

AMISOM

Expressing its gratitude to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for its work in bringing greater peace and stability to Somalia,

Welcoming AMISOM's recent joint operations with the Somali National Army (SNA), and *paying tribute* to the extraordinary bravery and sacrifices made by both AMISOM and SNA personnel in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

Recognizing the importance of effective coordination among the United Nations Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA), AMISOM, troop-contributing countries, and donors in order for UNSOA to effectively plan, budget, and provide authorized logistics for AMISOM operations, and *underscoring* the necessity of enablers and force multipliers to address key limiting factors to AMISOM operations such as timely maintenance of key equipment, maintenance of logistical supply lines, and availability of water,

Recalling and welcoming AMISOM's efforts to assist in the provision of training to the SNA, and *underlining* the importance of the Federal Government of Somalia taking on increased responsibility and ownership of the security sector, which is an essential part of AMISOM's eventual exit strategy,

Expressing concern at the reports of sexual violence and exploitation allegedly perpetrated by some AMISOM troops, *reminding* AMISOM of the United Nations Human Rights and Due Diligence policy, *underscoring* in this context the importance of the United Nations Zero Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the context of peacekeeping, *welcoming* the African Union's deployment of a team to conduct a full investigation into these allegations, and *underlining* the importance of holding to account those responsible for such abuses,

Welcoming the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, and *emphasizing* the importance of new contributors sharing the financial burden of supporting AMISOM,

Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

Taking note of the letter dated 7 February 2014 from the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group recommending an exemption to the arms embargo to improve reporting on security operations for commercial shipping,

Determining that the situation in Somalia, Eritrea's influence in Somalia, as well as the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms embargo

1. *Reaffirms* the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 14 of resolution 2125 (2013), and paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2013) (hereafter referred to as "the arms embargo on Somalia");
2. *Notes* with concern that some deliveries of weapons and military equipment have not been notified to the Committee in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, *underlines* the fundamental importance of timely and detailed notifications to the Committee as set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 2142, *notes* with concern reports of diversion of arms and ammunition, and *encourages* supplying Member States to assist the FGS in improving its notifications to the Committee;
3. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 30 October 2015, and in that context *reiterates* that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely

for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);

4. *Welcomes* the steps taken by the Federal Government of Somalia to establish effective mechanisms in managing its weapons and military equipment, including the Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee, and *notes* with regret that these structures are not functioning with the required level of efficiency nor at all levels of government;
5. *Expresses* its disappointment that a weapons marking and registration process has not yet commenced, despite the Security Council's appeal in its Presidential Statement of 22 May 2014 and *urges* the FGS to implement this process without further delay;
6. *Requests* the SNA and AMISOM to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the SEMG of all military items before their redistribution or destruction;
7. *Reiterates* its request to the FGS, with the support of international partners to establish a joint verification team which would conduct routine inspections of government security forces' stockpiles, inventory records and the supply chain of weapons, and *requests* that any such group provide its findings to the Committee, for the purposes of mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside of the security services of the FGS;
8. *Reiterates* that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
9. *Urges* the FGS to implement fully all its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions, and *requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council by 30 March 2015, and then by 30 September 2015 on:
 - a) The current structure of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
 - b) The infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;
 - c) The procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and on training needs in this regard;
10. *Takes note* of the SEMG's recommendation that weapons on board vessels engaged in commercial activity in Somali ports are granted an exemption to the arms embargo, *expresses* its willingness to take such a proposal forward, in close consultation with the FGS, and *requests* the FGS and SEMG to work together and formulate a proposal which should be communicated to the Security Council by 27 February 2015;

Maritime interdiction of charcoal and arms

11. *Reaffirms* the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), and *reiterates* that the Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia and *reiterates* its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013), that AMISOM support and assist the Somali authorities in doing so, as part of AMISOM's implementation of its mandate set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093;
12. *Condemns* the ongoing export of charcoal from Somalia, in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia reaffirmed above;
13. *Urges* all Member States, including those contributing AMISOM police and troop contingents, to respect and implement their obligations to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2002), and *affirms* this includes taking the necessary measures to prevent the use of their flag vessels for such importing;
14. *Condemns* the flow of weapons and military equipment to Al-Shabaab and other armed groups which are not part of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and *expresses* serious concern at the destabilizing impact of such weapons;
15. *Authorizes* for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution Member States, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, such as "Combined Maritime Forces", in cooperation with the FGS and which the FGS has notified to the Secretary-General and which the Secretary-General has subsequently notified to all Member States, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo on Somalia and the charcoal ban, to inspect, without undue delay, in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia extending to and including the Arabian sea and Persian Gulf, vessels bound to or from Somalia which they have reasonable grounds to believe are:
 - (i) Carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the charcoal ban;
 - (ii) carrying weapons or military equipment to Somalia, directly or indirectly, in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia;
 - (iii) carrying weapons or military equipment to individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009);

16. *Calls upon* all Flag States of such vessels to cooperate with such inspections, *requests* Member States to make good-faith efforts to first seek the consent of the vessel's Flag State prior to any inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, *authorizes* Member States conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 to use all necessary measures commensurate with the circumstances to carry out such inspections and in full compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as may be applicable, and *urges* Member States conducting such inspections to do so without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of the right of innocent passage or freedom of navigation;
17. *Authorizes* Member States to seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) any items identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, the delivery, import or export of which is prohibited by the arms embargo on Somalia or the charcoal ban, *authorizes* Member States to collect evidence directly related to the carriage of such items in the course of such inspections, and *decides* that charcoal seized in accordance with this paragraph may be disposed of through resale which shall be monitored by the SEMG;
18. *Emphasizes* the importance of all Member States, including Somalia, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of Somalia, or of any person or entity in Somalia, or of persons or entities designated for measures set out in resolutions 1844 (2008), 2002 (2011), or 2093 (2013), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
19. *Requests* Member States to dispose of any charcoal, weapons or military equipment seized pursuant to paragraph 17, in an environmentally responsible manner, taking into account the United Nations Environment Programme's 4 September 2013 letter to the Chair of the Committee, and the Committee's 7 May 2014 "Implementation Assistance Notice", *calls upon* all Member States in the region to cooperate in the disposal of such charcoal, weapons or military equipment, *affirms* that the authorization provided for in paragraph 15 includes the authority to divert vessels and their crews, to a suitable port to facilitate such disposal, with the consent of the port State, *affirms* that the authorization in paragraph 15 includes the authority to use all necessary measures to seize items pursuant to paragraph 17 in the course of inspections and *decides* that any Member State cooperating in the disposal of items identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, the delivery, import or export of which is prohibited by the arms embargo on Somalia or the charcoal ban, shall provide a written report to the Committee no later than 30 days after such items enter its territory on the steps taken to dispose or destroy them;
20. *Decides* that any Member State that undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 15, shall promptly notify the Committee and submit a report on the inspection containing all relevant details, including an explanation of the grounds for and the results of the inspection and where possible including the flag of the vessel, the name of the vessel, the name and identifying information of the master of the vessel, the owner of the vessel, and the original seller of the cargo, and efforts made to seek the consent of the vessel's Flag State, *requests* the Committee to notify the Flag State of the inspected vessel that an inspection has been undertaken, *notes* the prerogative of any Member State to write to the Committee concerning the implementation of any aspect of this resolution, and *further encourages* the SEMG to share relevant information with Member States operating under the authorization set out in this resolution;
21. *Affirms* that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a Flag State over its vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation, *underscores* in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law, and *notes* further that such authorizations have been provided only following the receipt of the 8 October 2014 letter conveying the request of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia;
22. *Decides* to review after six months from the date of this resolution, the provisions set out in paragraphs 11 to 21 above;

AMISOM

23. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013) until 30 November 2015, in line with the Security Council's request to the African Union for a maximum level of 22,126 troops, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its Member States' obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;
24. *Recalls* the benchmarks for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation as set out in both the African Union Commission Chairperson's 11 October 2013 letter and the Secretary-General's subsequent 14 October 2013 letter to the President of the Security Council, *requests* that the Secretary-General keep these benchmarks under continuous review in close consultation with the AU, and *further requests* the Secretary-General and African Union to review jointly the impact of the temporary surge authorized in resolution 2124 (2013) and to set out recommendations on next steps in the military campaign by 30 May 2015, taking into due consideration the political situation in Somalia;

25. *Recalls* that, in line with the Joint United Nations-African Union Review of AMISOM, the increases in the force strength decided in resolution 2124 (2013) are to provide a short-term enhancement of AMISOM's military capacity, for a period of 18 to 24 months and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM's force strength will be considered;
26. *Reiterates* paragraphs 4 and 14 of resolution 2124 (2013) and paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2093 (2013) with regard to the logistical support package for AMISOM;
27. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to work closely with and provide technical expertise and to the African Union as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 2124 (2013) in particular by improving the efficiency in planning and strategic management of AMISOM, including strengthening command and control structures and improving the coordination between troop contingents, sectors and joint operations with the SNA;
28. *Welcomes* the recent joint AMISOM and SNA offensive operations, which have had a significant impact in reducing territory held by Al-Shabaab, *underlines* the importance of such operations continuing, *further underlines* that it is essential that military operations are followed immediately by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security, and in that regard *encourages* the timely delivery of Quick Impact Projects in support of FGS stabilization efforts;
29. *Underlines* the imperative of securing key supply routes to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab in view of the deteriorating humanitarian situation Somalia, *requests* AMISOM and the Somali National Army to ensure they give the utmost priority to securing key supply routes essential to improve the humanitarian situation in the most affected areas, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report, in consultation with the FGS and AMISOM, on progress in this regard in his written reports to the Security Council as set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2158 (2014);
30. *Strongly urges* Member States to provide helicopters to AMISOM for the authorized aviation component of up to 12 military helicopters, provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) as well as providing the enablers and force multipliers which were identified as necessary in the 2013 joint United Nations-African Union benchmarking assessment;
31. *Reiterates* its request and that of the African Union Peace and Security Council for AMISOM to develop further an effective approach to the protection of civilians, *notes* with concern that AMISOM has not yet established a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response cell (CCTARC), as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013), and *requests* the African Union to conclude the deployment of this cell without any further delay;
32. *Looks forward* to the results of both the African Union's investigation and investigations by troop-contributing countries concerning acts of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by some AMISOM soldiers, *underlines* the importance of accountability and transparency in this regard, *requests* the African Union to review and endorse the draft African Union policy on prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse, and *requests* the African Union and the Secretary-General to make public the outcomes of these investigations;
33. *Underlines* the need for AMISOM troops to continue to receive appropriate information and predeployment training in relation to human rights principles, including gender equality and sexual violence, and for AMISOM personnel to be properly informed of the accountability mechanisms in place should any abuse be committed;
34. *Encourages* AMISOM to strengthen the mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse, such as introducing a centralized database for the efficient and independent receipt, preliminary assessment and tracking of investigations into allegations of sexual and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse, including through the institution of protective measure for complainants in order to prevent the redeployment of any individual who has been involved in serious violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law, including those related to sexual violence;
35. *Condemns* all violations and abuses committed against children by all parties in Somalia, *calls for* the immediate cessation of such violations and abuses and for those responsible to be held to account, and *requests* the FGS and AMISOM to protect and treat as victims those children who have been released or otherwise separated from armed forces and armed groups, including through the full implementation of standard operating procedures for the protection and handover of these children;
36. *Reiterates* the need for AMISOM to ensure that any detainees in their custody, including disengaged combatants, are treated in strict compliance with applicable obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, including ensuring their humane treatment, and *further reiterates* its request for AMISOM to allow appropriate access to detainees by a neutral body;
37. *Reiterates* its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncaveated funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, *calls upon* the African Union to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM, such as through its own assessed costs as it did for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, and *underlines* the African Union's call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

Public financial management in Somalia

38. *Expresses* its concern that corruption continues to undermine both security in the country and the FGS' efforts to rebuild Somalia's institutions, and *urges* the FGS to fight corruption and tighten financial governance procedures in order to improve transparency and accountability of public financial management, and *urges* the FGS to ensure that assets recovered from overseas and revenue raised including through the ports are documented transparently and channelled through the national budget;
39. *Underlines* the importance of ensuring that international aid is also delivered in a transparent manner and *encourages* all Member States to use the structures being currently being established between the FGS and donors, particularly on recurrent financing;

Humanitarian situation in Somalia

40. *Expresses* serious concern at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *condemns* in the strongest terms increased attacks against humanitarian actors and any misuse of donor assistance and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and *reiterates* paragraph 10 of resolution 2158 (2014) in this regard;
41. *Decides* that until 30 October 2015 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded NGOs participating in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Somalia;
42. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 1 October 2015 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and *requests* relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and their implementing partners that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia to increase their cooperation and willingness to share information with the United Nations Humanitarian Aid Coordinator for Somalia in the preparation of such reports and in the interests of increasing transparency and accountability;

The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group

43. *Recalls* resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and *notes* one of the listing criteria under resolution 1844 (2008) is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia;
44. *Reiterates* its willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals and entities on the basis of the above mentioned criteria;
45. *Requests* Member States to assist the Monitoring Group in their investigations, and *reiterates* that obstructing the investigations or work of the Monitoring Group is a criterion for listing under paragraph 15 (e) of resolution 1907 (2009);
46. *Decides* to extend until 30 November 2015 the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 30 October 2015, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Monitoring Group, in consultation with the Committee, for a period of 13 months from the date of this resolution, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to previous resolutions;
47. *Requests* the Monitoring Group to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, two final reports; one focusing on Somalia, the other on Eritrea, covering all the tasks set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), not later than 30 September 2015;
48. *Requests* the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the Monitoring Group and other relevant United Nations entities to consider the recommendations in the reports of the Monitoring Group and recommend to the Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the Somalia and Eritrea arms embargoes, the measures regarding the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as well as implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolutions 1844 (2008) and paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of resolution 1907 (2009) taking into account paragraph 15 above, in response to continuing violations;
49. *Requests* the Monitoring Group to report on the implementation of the authorization set out in paragraph 15, as part of its regular reporting to the Committee;
50. *Encourages* Member States from East Africa to appoint focal points for the purpose of coordinating and exchanging information with the Monitoring Group on regional investigations into Al-Shabaab;
51. *Underlines* the importance of a constructive relationship between the SEMG and the FGS, *welcomes* efforts made by both so far, and *emphasizes* the need for this to continue and deepen during the course of this mandate;

52. *Welcomes* the SEMG's ongoing and significant efforts to engage with the Government of Eritrea and the Government of Eritrea's cooperation with the SEMG, *emphasizes* that this must continue and strengthen, and *reiterates* its expectation that the Government of Eritrea will facilitate the entry of the SEMG to Eritrea, as requested in paragraph 31 of resolution 2111 (2013);
53. *Urges* Eritrea to make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008;
54. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 12 november 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7309^e zitting Resolutie 2184 (2014) inzake Somalië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2184 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7309th meeting, on 12 November 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, especially resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1844 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012) and 2125 (2013), as well as the Statement of its President (S/PRST/2010/16) of 25 August 2010 and (S/PRST/2012/24) of 19 November 2012,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General (S/2014/740), as requested by resolution 2125 (2013), on the implementation of that resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia, including Somalia's sovereign rights in accordance with international law, with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries,

While noting that the joint counter-piracy efforts of States, regions, organizations, the maritime industry, the private sector, think tanks, and civil society have resulted in a sharp decline in pirate attacks as well as hijackings since 2011, *continuing* to be gravely concerned by the on-going threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea pose to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and the region, to the safety of seafarers and other persons, to international navigation and the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to other ships, including fishing activities in conformity with international law, and also gravely concerned by the extended range of the piracy threat into the western Indian Ocean and adjacent sea areas and increased pirate capacities,

Expressing concern about the reported involvement of children in piracy off the coast of Somalia, reported sexual exploitation of women and girls in areas controlled by pirates, as well as their reported coercion to participate in activities that support piracy,

Recognizing the need to investigate and prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *reiterating its concern* over persons suspected of piracy having been released without facing justice, *reaffirming* that the failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts,

Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 ("The Convention"), sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the ocean, including countering piracy and armed robbery at sea,

Underlining the primary responsibility of the Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *noting* the several requests from Somali authorities for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 4 November 2014, from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2125 (2013) be renewed for an additional twelve months,

Welcoming the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and regional partners in the 17th plenary session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), hosted by the United Arab Emirates in October 2014,

Recognizing the work of the CGPCS to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates and, to promote the establishment of the Law Enforcement Task Force, an on-going network and mechanism for sharing information and evidence between investigators and prosecutors, in accordance with international law, *welcoming*

the work by the Working Group on Capacity Building of the CGPCS to coordinate judicial, penal, and maritime capacity-building efforts to enable regional states to better tackle piracy, and *welcoming* the work by the Working Group on Disrupting Pirate Networks Ashore of the CGPCS to disrupt illicit financial flows linked to piracy,

Welcoming the financing provided by the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Combating Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the Trust Fund) to strengthen regional ability to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted in accordance with applicable international human rights law, *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme, and *being determined* to continue efforts to ensure that pirates are held accountable,

Commending the efforts of the European Union operation ATALANTA, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Ocean Shield, Combined Maritime Forces' Combined Task Force 151 commanded by the Republic of Korea followed by New Zealand, as well as United States ships assigned to Combined Task Force 151 and NATO Task Force 508, the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia and the naval activities of the Southern Africa Development Community, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with Somali authorities and each other to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Initiative (SHADE) and the efforts of individual countries, including China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation, which have deployed naval counter-piracy missions in the region, as stated in the Secretary-General's report (S/2014/740),

Noting the efforts of flag States for taking measures to permit vessels sailing under their flag transiting the High Risk Area (HRA) to embark vessel protection detachments and privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), and *encouraging* States to regulate such activities in accordance with applicable international law and permit charters to favour arrangements that make use of such measures,

Noting the request of some Member States on the need to review the boundaries of the HRA on an objective and transparent basis, taking into account actual incidents of piracy, and *noting* that the HRA is set and defined by the insurance and maritime industry,

Welcoming the capacity-building efforts in the region made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Trust Fund and the European Union's activities under EUCAP Nestor, which is working with the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its criminal justice system, and *recognizing* the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to coordinate and cooperate fully,

Supporting the development of a coastal police force, *noting with appreciation* the efforts made by the IMO and the shipping industry to develop and update guidance, best management practices, and recommendations to assist ships to prevent and suppress piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including in the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean area, and *recognizing* the work of the IMO and the CGPCS in this regard, *noting* the efforts of the International Organization for Standardization, which has developed industry standards of training and certification for Private Maritime Security Companies when providing PCASP on board ships in high-risk areas, and *further welcoming* the European Union's EUCAP Nestor, which is working to develop the sea-going maritime security capacities of Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Tanzania,

Noting with concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia, too often has led to pirates being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to support prosecution, and *reiterating* that, consistent with the provisions of The Convention concerning the repression of piracy, the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention") provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation,

Underlining the importance of continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission to competent authorities of evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *welcoming* the on-going work of the IMO, INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the importance of enabling seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings to prosecute acts of piracy,

Further recognizing that pirate networks continue to rely on kidnapping and hostage-taking to help generate funding to purchase weapons, gain recruits, and continue their operational activities, thereby jeopardizing the safety and security of civilians and restricting the flow of commerce, and *welcoming* international efforts to coordinate the work of investigators and prosecutors, inter alia, through the Law Enforcement Task Force and collect and share information to disrupt the pirate enterprise, as exemplified by INTERPOL's Global Database on Maritime Piracy, and *taking note* of the on-going efforts of the Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at Sea, hosted by Seychelles to combat piracy and transnational organized crime,

Reaffirming international condemnation of acts of kidnapping and hostage-taking, including offences contained within the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, *strongly condemning* the continuing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia, *expressing serious concern* at the inhumane conditions hostages face in captivity, *recognizing* the adverse impact on their families, *calling for* the immediate release of all hostages, and *noting* the importance of cooperation between Member States on the issue of hostage-taking and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages,

Commending Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania for their efforts to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts, and *noting* with appreciation the assistance provided by the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the Trust Fund, and other international organizations and donors, in coordination with the CGPCS, to support Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Somalia, and other States in the region with their efforts to prosecute, or incarcerate in a third State after prosecution elsewhere, pirates, including facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international human rights law, and emphasizing the need for States and international organizations to further enhance international efforts in this regard,

Welcoming the readiness of the national and regional administrations of Somalia to cooperate with each other and with States who have prosecuted suspected pirates with a view to enabling convicted pirates to be repatriated back to Somalia under suitable prisoner transfer arrangements, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *acknowledging* the return from Seychelles to Somalia of convicted prisoners willing and eligible to serve their sentences in Somalia,

Recalling the reports of the Secretary General (S/2011/360 and S/2012/50) which illustrate the seriousness of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and provide useful guidance for the investigation and prosecution of pirates, including on specialized anti-piracy courts,

Stressing the need for States to consider possible methods to assist the seafarers who are victims of pirates, and *welcoming* in this regard the efforts of the "Hostage Support Programme" and the new Piracy Survivor Family Fund launched at the recent CGPCS to provide support to hostages during their release and return home, as well as to their families throughout the hostage situation,

Recognizing the progress made by the CGPCS and UNODC in the use of public information tools to raise awareness of the dangers of piracy and highlight the best practices to eradicate this criminal phenomenon,

Further noting with appreciation the on-going efforts by UNODC to support efforts to enhance Somalia's maritime security and law enforcement capacities, also noting efforts by UNODC and UNDP and the funding provided by the Trust Fund, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other donors to develop regional judicial and law enforcement capacity to investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected pirates and to incarcerate convicted pirates consistent with applicable international human rights law,

Bearing in mind the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, *noting* the operations of information-sharing centres in Yemen, Kenya, and Tanzania and the regional maritime training centre in Djibouti, and *recognizing* the efforts of signatory States to develop the appropriate regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat piracy, enhance their capacity to patrol the waters of the region, interdict suspect vessels, and prosecute suspected pirates,

Emphasizing that peace and stability within Somalia, the strengthening of State institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *further emphasizing* that Somalia's long-term security rests with the effective development by Somali authorities of the Somali National Security Forces,

Taking note with appreciation the work of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at the fourteenth meeting of its Council of Ministers to bolster maritime security and safety, including through the announcement of the second Indian Ocean Dialogue, which will continue to explore options to enhance counter-piracy cooperation, including through improved maritime information-sharing arrangements and stronger national legal capacity and laws, *encouraging* IORA to pursue efforts that are complementary to and coordinated with the ongoing work of the CGPCS, and *welcoming* Somalia's application of membership for IORA as an important step towards building closer regional cooperation on maritime security and other issues,

Recognizing that the ongoing instability in Somalia and the acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast are inextricably linked, and stressing the need to continue the comprehensive response by the international community to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea and tackle its underlying causes, *recognizing* the need to undertake long-term and sustainable efforts to repress piracy and the need to create adequate economic opportunities for the citizens of Somalia,

Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that it condemns and deplors all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
2. *Recognizes* that the on-going instability in Somalia is one of the underlying causes of the problem of piracy and contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, while piracy, in turn, exacerbates instability by introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime and corruption in Somalia;
3. *Stresses* the need for a comprehensive response to repress piracy and tackle its underlying causes by the international community;
4. *Underlines* the primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and urgently requests the Somali authorities, with assistance from the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations entities, to pass a comprehensive set of anti-piracy and maritime laws without further delay and establish security forces with clear roles and jurisdictions to enforce these laws and to continue to develop, with international support as appropriate, the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attacks, and *notes* the Proclamation by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia on 30 June 2014 of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Federal Republic of Somalia;
5. *Recognizes* the need to continue investigating and prosecuting those who plan, organize, or illicitly finance or profit from pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy, *urges* States, working in conjunction with relevant international organizations, to adopt legislation to facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia;
6. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to interdict, and upon interdiction to have mechanisms in place to safely return effects seized by pirates, investigate and prosecute pirates and to patrol the territorial waters off the coast of Somalia to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
7. *Calls upon* the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and *calls upon* Member States to assist Somalia, at the request of Somali authorities and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities and, *stresses* that any measures undertaken pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with applicable international law, in particular international human rights law;
8. *Calls upon* States to cooperate also, as appropriate, on the issue of hostage taking, and the prosecution of suspected pirates for taking hostages;
9. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of all seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates, and further calls upon the Somali authorities and all relevant stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their safe and immediate release;
10. *Recognizes* the need for States, international and regional organizations, and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates and with a view to the arrest and prosecution of key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance and profit from piracy operations, and keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from piracy operations if they meet the listing criteria set out in paragraph 8, resolution 1844 (2008); and *calls upon* all States to cooperate fully with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban;
11. *Renews* its call upon States and regional organizations that are able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms, and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms, and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;
12. *Highlights* the importance of coordination among States and international organizations in order to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, *commends the work* of the CGPCS to facilitate such coordination in cooperation with the IMO, flag States, and Somali authorities, and *urges* continued support of these efforts;
13. *Encourages* Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and *decides* that, for a further period of twelve months from the date of this resolution to renew the authorizations as set out in paragraph 10 of resolution 1846 (2008) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1851 (2008), as renewed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1897 (2009), paragraph 7 of resolution 1950 (2010), paragraph 9 of resolution 2020 (2011), paragraph 12 of resolution 2077 (2012), and paragraph 12 of resolution 2125 (2013) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General;
14. *Affirms* that the authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under The Convention with respect to any other situation,

- and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and *affirms further* that such authorizations have been renewed only following the receipt of the 4 November 2014 letter conveying the consent of Somali authorities;
15. *Decides* that the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 does not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States, international, regional, and subregional organizations undertaking measures in accordance with paragraph 13 above;
 16. *Requests* that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the activities they undertake pursuant to the authorizations in paragraph 13 do not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State;
 17. *Calls upon* all States, and in particular flag, port, and coastal States, States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery, and other States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legislation, to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy who plan, organize, facilitate, or illicitly finance or profit from such attack, consistent with applicable international law including international human rights law, to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial authorities are subject to a judicial process, and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such as victims, witnesses, and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution;
 18. *Calls upon* all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of those convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, and their facilitators and financiers ashore, consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights law, and *decides* to keep these matters under review, including, as appropriate, the establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia with substantial international participation and/or support as set forth in resolution 2015 (2011), and encourages the CGPCS to continue its discussions in this regard;
 19. *Welcomes*, in this context, the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme's continued work with authorities in Somalia and in neighbouring States to ensure that individuals suspected of piracy are prosecuted and those convicted are imprisoned in a manner consistent with international law, including international human rights law;
 20. *Urges* all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds;
 21. *Urges* States, in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation;
 22. *Urges* all States to ensure that counter-piracy activities, particularly land-based activities, take into consideration the need to protect women and girls from exploitation, including sexual exploitation;
 23. *Commends* INTERPOL for operationalizing a global piracy database that consolidates information about piracy off the coast of Somalia and facilitates the development of actionable analysis for law enforcement, and *urges* all States to share such information with INTERPOL for use in the database, through appropriate channels;
 24. *Commends* the contributions of the Trust Fund and the IMO-funded Djibouti Code of Conduct and *urges* both state and non-State actors affected by piracy, most notably the international shipping community, to contribute to them;
 25. *Urges* States parties to The Convention and the SUA Convention to implement fully their relevant obligations under these conventions and customary international law and to cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and other States and international organizations to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
 26. *Acknowledges* the recommendations and guidance provided by the IMO on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea; and *urges* States, in collaboration with the shipping and insurance industries and the IMO, to continue to develop and implement avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia, and further *urges* States to make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from captivity;
 27. *Encourages* flag States and port States to further consider the development of safety and security measures on board vessels, including, where applicable, developing regulations for the use of PCASP on board ships, aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy off the coast of Somalia, through a consultative process, including through the IMO and ISO;
 28. *Invites* the IMO to continue its contributions to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, in coordination, in particular, with the UNODC, the World Food Program (WFP), the shipping industry, and all other parties concerned, and *recognizes* the IMO's role concerning privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in high-risk areas;

29. *Notes* the importance of securing the safe delivery of WFP assistance by sea, and *welcomes* the on-going work by the WFP, EU operation ATALANTA, and flag States with regard to Vessel Protection Detachments on WFP vessels;
30. *Requests* States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Security Council and the Secretary-General in nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in paragraph 13 above and further requests all States contributing through the CGPCS to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, including Somalia and other States in the region, to report by the same deadline on their efforts to establish jurisdiction and cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of piracy;
31. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;
32. *Expresses its intention* to review the situation and consider, as appropriate, renewing the authorizations provided in paragraph 13 above for additional periods upon the request of Somali authority;
33. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 9 december 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7328^e zitting Resolutie 2188 (2014) inzake Liberia aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2188 (2014)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7328th meeting, on 9 December 2014

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements by its President on the situation in Liberia,

Welcoming the sustained progress made by the Government of Liberia, in rebuilding Liberia for the benefit of all Liberians, with the support of the international community,

Taking note of the report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2014/831),

Further noting the Secretary-General's letter and welcoming the recommendations to the Council regarding the Assessment mission concerning the Liberia sanctions regime dated 29 September 2014 (S/2014/707),

Expressing grave concern about the outbreak of the Ebola virus in, and its impact on, West Africa, including Liberia,

Recognizing that the peacebuilding and development gains in Liberia could be reversed in light of the Ebola outbreak, and in light of these factors, *expressing* its intent to scale back and terminate the remaining sanctions in a prudent manner,

Affirming that the Government of Liberia bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace, stability and the protection of the civilian population in Liberia and *stressing* that lasting stability in Liberia will require the Government of Liberia to sustain well-functioning and accountable government institutions, particularly of the rule of law and security sectors,

Stressing the need for continued progress on security sector reform in Liberia to ensure that Liberia's military, police, and border security forces are self-sufficient, capable, and adequately prepared to protect the Liberian people,

Underlining that the transparent and effective management of natural resources is critical for Liberia's sustainable peace and security,

Underlining its determination to support the Government of Liberia in its efforts to meet the conditions of resolution 1521 (2003), welcoming the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission, and encouraging all stakeholders, including donors, to support the Government of Liberia in its efforts,

Determining that the situation in Liberia remains fragile and constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004) remain in force;
2. *Decides* for a period of nine months from the date of adoption of this resolution:
 - a) To renew the measures on travel imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1521 (2003);

- b) To renew the measures on arms, previously imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1521 (2003) and modified by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1683 (2006), by paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 1731 (2006), by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of resolution 1903 (2009), by paragraph 3 of resolution 1961 (2010), and by paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 2128 (2013);
3. *Decides further* to maintain all of the above measures under continuous review with a view to modifying or lifting all or part of the measures of the sanctions regime dependent upon Liberia's progress towards meeting the conditions set out in resolution 1521 (2003) for terminating those measures and in light of the threat to peace and security in Liberia posed by the Ebola virus;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update to the Security Council by August 1, 2015 on progress made by the Government of Liberia to implement the recommendations on the proper management of arms and ammunition, including enacting the necessary legislative frameworks, and on facilitating the effective monitoring and management of the border regions between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire;
5. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1903 (2009) for a period of 10 months from the date of adoption of this resolution to undertake the following tasks in close collaboration with the Government of Liberia and the Côte d'Ivoire Group of Experts:
 - a) To conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States, as feasible given conditions on the ground, to investigate and compile a final report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures on arms as amended by resolutions 1903 (2009), 1961 (2010) and 2128 (2013), and including the various sources of financing for the illicit trade of arms, on progress in the security and legal sectors with respect to the Government of Liberia's ability to effectively monitor and control arms and border issues, and on the Government of Liberia's progress on meeting notification requirements;
 - b) To provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a final report no later than August 1, 2015 on all the issues listed in this paragraph, and to provide an update to the Committee no later than April 23, 2015 on the status of legislation in Liberia related to the Government of Liberia's ability to effectively monitor and control arms and border issues; and any other informal updates to the Committee as appropriate;
 - c) To cooperate actively with other relevant panels of experts, in particular that on Côte d'Ivoire re-established by paragraph 24 of resolution 2153 (2014);
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, for a period of 10 months from the date of this resolution, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to previous resolutions;
7. *Calls upon* all States and the Government of Liberia to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts in all aspects of its mandate;
8. *Recalls* that responsibility for controlling the circulation of small arms within the territory of Liberia and between Liberia and neighbouring States rests with the relevant governmental authorities in accordance with the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006;
9. *Urges* the Government of Liberia to expedite the adoption and implementation of appropriate legislation and take other necessary and appropriate steps to establish the necessary legal framework to combat the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition;
10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 22 januari 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7366^e zitting Resolutie 2196 (2015) inzake de Centraal-Afrikaanse Republiek aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2196 (2015)¹⁾

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7366th meeting, on 22 January 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on the Central African Republic (CAR), in particular resolutions 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) 2149 (2014) and 2181 (2014), as well as the Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/28 of 18 December 2014,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the CAR, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

¹⁾ Reissued for technical reasons on 22 January 2015.

Recalling that the Central African Republic bears the primary responsibility to protect all populations within its territory from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,

Emphasizing that any sustainable solution to the crisis in the CAR should be CAR-owned, including the political process, and should include the restructuring of the Central African Republic security forces,

Reiterating its call upon the Transitional Authorities to accelerate the transition process, including its action towards an inclusive and comprehensive political dialogue and reconciliation process and towards the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections no later than August 2015, with the full, effective and equal participation of women,

Commending the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), Sangaris and EUFOR RCA for the work done in laying the foundation for increased security ahead of and in support of the United Nations Integrated Multi-dimensional Mission to the CAR (MINUSCA)'s deployment, *noting also with concern*, however, that while improving, security in the CAR remains fragile,

Welcoming the decision of the European Union to establish a one-year military advice mission based in Bangui (EUMAM-RCA), as requested by the CAR transitional authorities, in order to contribute to providing them with expert advice on reforming the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) into a multi-ethnic, professional, and republican armed forces, and *underlines* the importance of a clear distribution of tasks and close coordination between the international forces or missions in the CAR and the lead role of MINUSCA in this regard, and *further requests* that this information is included in the regular reporting of the Secretary-General on MINUSCA,

Welcoming the United Nations Secretary-General Report of 1 December 2014 (S/2014/857) submitted pursuant to resolution 2149 (2014),

Welcoming also the interim and final reports (S/2014/452 and S/2014/762) of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and expanded and extended pursuant to resolution 2134 (2014),

Taking note of the final report of the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry (S/2014/928) of 22 December 2014,

Strongly condemning the resurgence of violence, which was politically or criminally motivated, that occurred in October 2014 in Bangui; the continuous cycle of provocations and reprisals by armed groups, both inside and outside of Bangui; the threats of violence, human rights violations and abuses and international humanitarian law violations, including those involving extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence against women and children, rape, recruitment and use of children and attacks against civilians, attacks against places of worship, and denial of humanitarian access, committed by armed elements, which continue to adversely affect the dire humanitarian situation faced by the civilian population and to impede humanitarian access to vulnerable populations,

Equally condemning the targeted attacks against the Transitional Authorities as well as those against MINUSCA, Sangaris and EUFOR RCA troops during the October events in Bangui, *underlining* that attacks targeting peacekeepers are among the designation criteria in paragraph 10 of this resolution and may constitute a war crime and *reminding* all parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law,

Reiterating that all perpetrators of such acts must be held accountable and that some of those acts may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to which the CAR is a State party, *noting* in this regard the opening by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on 24 September 2014 of an investigation following the request of the national authorities on alleged crimes committed since 2012 and *welcoming* the ongoing cooperation by the CAR Transitional Authorities in this regard,

Expressing grave concern at the findings of the Panel of Experts' final report of 29 October 2014 (S/2014/762) that, armed groups continue to destabilize the CAR and to pose a permanent threat to the peace, security and stability of the country, and *further expressing concern* that illicit trade, exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife poaching and trafficking continues to threaten the peace and stability of CAR,

Noting with concern the findings of the Panel of Experts' final report that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remains active in the CAR and that it has established links to other armed groups,

Stressing the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in the CAR and to bring to justice perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and of abuses or violations of human rights, *underlining* in this regard the need to bolster national accountability mechanisms and to implement without delay the 7 August 2014 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Urgent Temporary Measures, which describes, in particular, the establishment of a national Special Criminal Court in charge of investigating and prosecuting the serious crimes committed in the CAR, including through the adoption of the necessary legislation by the Transitional Authorities,

Emphasizing the risk of the situation in the CAR providing a conducive environment for transnational criminal activity, such as that involving arms trafficking and the use of mercenaries as well as a potential breeding ground for radical networks,

Acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo can make to countering the illicit transfer of arms and related materiel in the CAR and its region, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, *recalling* its resolutions 2117 (2013) and 2127 (2013) and expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in the CAR arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and the use of such weapons against civilians affected by armed conflict,

Recalling the need for an inclusive and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) as well as repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) in the case of foreign fighters, including children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, while respecting the need to fight impunity,

Recalling its decision to establish a sanctions regime pursuant to resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) and *emphasizing* that the targeted sanctions aim at, inter alia, individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and expanded pursuant to resolution 2134 (2014) as engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, that impede the political transition process or that fuel violence and at individuals and entities designated by the Committee as involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law or that constitute human rights abuses or violations,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including the key role that neighbouring States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, can play in this regard and *encouraging* efforts to further enhance cooperation,

Determining that the situation in the CAR continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms embargo

1. *Decides* that, through 29 January 2016, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:
 - a) Supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MINUSCA, the African Union-Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), and the European Union Missions and French Forces deployed in the CAR;
 - b) MINUSCA, the AU-RTF, the European Union Missions and French Forces operating in the CAR to provide organizational advice or non-operational training to the CAR government forces and as relevant to the implementation of their mandates, and *requests* these forces to report on measures taken in this regard as part of their regular reports to the Council;
 - c) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee;
 - d) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only;
 - e) Supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of the CAR or the CAR's international legal obligations;
 - f) Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee; or
 - g) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;
2. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution, seize, register and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution and *decides* further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;
3. *Reiterates its call* upon the transitional authorities, with the assistance of MINUSCA and international partners, to address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the CAR, and to ensure the safe and effective management, storage, and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition and further stresses the importance of incorporating such elements into SSR and DDRRR programmes;

Travel ban

4. *Decides* that, through 29 January 2016, all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
5. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above shall not apply:
 - a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;
 - c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the CAR and stability in the region;
6. *Emphasizes* that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR and *observes* that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution;

Asset freeze

7. *Decides* that all Member States shall, through 29 January 2016, continue to freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides further* that all Member States shall continue to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;
8. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 7 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
 - a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
 - b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or
 - c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;
9. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 7 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
10. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 7 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 7 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

11. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraphs 4 and 7 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or violate transitional agreements, or that threaten or impede the political transition process, including a transition toward free and fair democratic elections, or that fuel violence;
12. *Further decides* in this regard that the measures contained in paragraphs 4 and 7 shall also apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as:

- a) acting in violation of the arms embargo established in paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) and extended by paragraph 1 of this resolution, or as having directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred to armed groups or criminal networks in CAR, or as having been the recipient of arms or any related materiel, or any technical advice, training, or assistance, including financing and financial assistance, related to violent activities of armed groups or criminal networks in CAR;
- b) involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, in the CAR, including acts involving sexual violence, targeting of civilians, ethnic- or religious-based attacks, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abduction and forced displacement;
- c) recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the CAR, in violation of applicable international law;
- d) providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, wildlife as well as wildlife products in or from the CAR;
- e) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to CAR, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in CAR;
- f) involved in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against UN missions or international security presences, including MINUSCA, the European Union Missions and French operations which support them;
- g) being leaders of an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014) or this resolution, or having provided support to, or acted for or on behalf of, or at the direction of, an individual or an entity that the Committee has designated pursuant to paragraphs 36 or 37 of resolution 2134 (2014) or this resolution, or an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity;

Sanctions Committee

13. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of resolution 2127 (2013) shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) extended by this resolution;
14. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;

Panel of Experts

15. *Expresses* its full support for the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to paragraph 59 of resolution 2127 (2013);
16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 29 February 2016 and, *expresses its intent* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 29 January 2016 and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to support its action;
17. *Decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts shall include the following tasks, to:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals or entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 11 and 12 above;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;
 - c) Provide to the Committee a midterm update no later than 30 July 2015 and a final report to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee, by 31 December 2015 on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 7 of this resolution;
 - d) Submit progress updates to the Committee, especially in situations of urgency, or as the Panel deems necessary;
 - e) To assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities designated by the Committee pursuant to the criteria renewed by paragraphs 11 and 12 above including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
 - f) To assist the Committee by providing information regarding individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 11 and 12 above, including by reporting such information to the Committee, as it becomes available, and to include in its formal written reports, the names of potential designees, appropriate identifying information, and relevant information regarding why the individual or entity may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 11 and 12 above;
18. *Calls upon* the Panel of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of their mandate;
19. *Expresses* particular concern about reports of illicit trafficking networks which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR, and *encourages* the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks;

20. *Urges* the CAR, its neighbouring States and other member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat regional criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources including gold, diamonds and wildlife poaching and trafficking;
21. *Urges* all parties, and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members;
22. *Further urges* all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
23. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

Reporting and review

24. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region and those in which designated individuals and entities designated are based, to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs of the measures imposed by paragraphs 54 and 55 of resolution 2127 (2013) and paragraphs 30 and 32 of resolution 2134 (2014) renewed by paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 7 of this resolution;
25. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in the CAR under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening through additional measures, in particular the freezing of assets, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of the country and compliance with this resolution;
26. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 29 januari 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7371^e zitting Resolutie 2198 (2015) inzake de Democratische Republiek Congo aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2198 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7371st meeting, on 29 January 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of the DRC for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its populations with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law,

Taking note of the interim report (S/2014/428) and the final report (S/2015/19) of the Group of Experts on the DRC ("the Group of Experts") established pursuant to resolution 1771 (2007) and extended pursuant to resolutions 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012) and 2136 (2014) and of their recommendations,

Recalling the strategic importance of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the region, and *reiterating* its call to all signatories to fulfil promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under this agreement in order to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence,

Reiterating its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC due to ongoing military activities of foreign and domestic armed groups and the smuggling of Congolese natural resources, *stressing* the importance of neutralizing all armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the National Liberation Forces (FNL), and all other armed groups in the DRC, in line with resolution 2147 (2014),

Recalling its Presidential statement of 8 January 2015 (S/PRST/2015/1) and *reiterating* that the swift neutralization of the FDLR is a top priority in bringing stability to and protecting civilians of the DRC and the Great Lakes region, *noting with deep concern* repeated reports of collaboration between elements of the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and the FDLR at a local level, *recalling* that the FDLR is a group under UN sanc-

tions whose leaders and members include perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed, and have continued to promote and commit ethnically based and other killings in Rwanda and in the DRC,

Noting with great concern that the 2 January 2015 deadline set by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has passed, and that the FDLR has not only failed to unconditionally and fully surrender and demobilize, but has also continued to recruit new fighters in their ranks,

Condemning the brutal killings of hundreds of civilians in the Beni area in recent months, *expressing deep concern* regarding the persistence of violence in this region, and *stressing the need* for a thorough and prompt investigation into these attacks in order to ensure that those responsible are held to account, as well as *calling* the DRC for further military action, in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and with the support of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), in accordance with its mandate under resolution 2147 (2014), to end the threat posed by the ADF and all other armed groups operating in the region,

Reaffirming the importance of completing the permanent demobilization of the former 23 March Movement (M23) combatants, *stressing* the importance of ensuring that its ex-combatants do not regroup or join other armed groups, and *calling for* the acceleration of implementation of the Nairobi Declarations and of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) of M23 ex-combatants, including overcoming obstacles to repatriation, in coordination with the regional States concerned,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of any and all internal or external support to armed groups active in the region, including through financial, logistical and military support,

Condemning the illicit flow of weapons within and into the DRC, including their recirculation to and between armed groups, in violation of resolutions 1533 (2004), 1807 (2008), 1857 (2008), 1896 (2009), 1952 (2010), 2021 (2011), 2078 (2012) and 2136 (2014), and *declaring* its determination to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures set out by its resolutions concerning the DRC,

Acknowledging in this respect the important contribution the Council-mandated arms embargo makes to countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons in the DRC, and in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform,

Underlining that the transparent and effective management of its natural resources is critical for the DRC's sustainable peace and security, *stressing* its full respect for the sovereignty of the Government of the DRC over its natural resources and its responsibility to effectively manage these resources in this regard,

Recalling the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including poaching and illegal trafficking of wildlife, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and encouraging the continuation of the regional efforts of the ICGLR and the governments involved against the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *stressing*, in this regard, the importance of regional cooperation and deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources,

Noting with concern reports indicating the involvement of elements of the FARDC, as well as armed groups, in the illegal minerals trade, the illegal production and trade of charcoal and wood, and wildlife poaching and trafficking,

Noting with great concern the persistence of serious human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations against civilians in the eastern part of the DRC, including summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children committed by armed groups,

Noting with deep concern reports and allegations indicating the persistence of serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed by some members of the FARDC and Congolese National Police (PNC), and *recalling* the importance of fighting against impunity within all ranks of the FARDC and PNC, *commending* the DRC authorities for recent prosecutions and condemnations of two high-ranking FARDC officers for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and *stressing the need* for the Government of the DRC to continue to ensure the professionalism of its security forces,

Calling for all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights including those involving violence or abuses against children and acts of sexual and gender-based violence, to be swiftly apprehended, brought to justice and held accountable,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions on women and peace and security, on children and armed conflict, and on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, also *recalling* the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to the parties in armed conflict of the DRC (S/AC.51/2014/3) adopted on 18 September 2014,

Calling on all parties to cooperate fully with MONUSCO and to remain committed to the full and objective implementation of the Mission's mandate, *reiterating* its condemnation of any attacks against peacekeepers, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for such attacks must be brought to justice,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including the key role that neighbouring States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, can play in this regard and *encouraging* efforts to further enhance cooperation,

Underlining the fundamental importance of timely and detailed notifications to the Committee concerning arms, ammunition and training as set out in section 11 of the Guidelines of the Committee,

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Sanctions regime

1. *Decides* to renew until 1 July 2016 the measures on arms imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008) and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of that resolution and further *decides* that the measures on arms imposed by paragraph 1 and 5 of resolution 1807 (2008) shall not apply to the supply of arms and related materiel, as well as assistance, advice or training, intended solely for the support of or use by MONUSCO or the African Union-Regional Task Force;
2. *Decides* to renew, for the period specified in paragraph 1 above, the measures on transport imposed by paragraphs 6 and 8 of resolution 1807 (2008) and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraph 7 of that resolution;
3. *Decides* to renew, for the period specified in paragraph 1 above, the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1807 (2008) and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 12 of resolution 1807 (2008) in relation to those measures;
4. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 9 of resolution 1807 (2008) shall not apply as per the criteria set out in paragraph 10 of resolution 2078;
5. *Decides* that the measures referred to in paragraph 3 above shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee for engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the DRC, and *decides* that such acts include:
 - a) acting in violation of the measures taken by Member States in accordance with paragraph 1 above;
 - b) being political and military leaders of foreign armed groups operating in the DRC who impede the disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants belonging to those groups;
 - c) being political and military leaders of Congolese militias, including those receiving support from outside the DRC, who impede the participation of their combatants in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes;
 - d) recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the DRC in violation of applicable international law;
 - e) being involved in planning, directing, or participating in the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, rape and other sexual violence, abduction, forced displacement, and attacks on schools and hospitals;
 - f) obstructing the access to or the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the DRC;
 - g) supporting individuals or entities, including armed groups, involved in destabilizing activities in the DRC through illicit trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife as well as wildlife products;
 - h) acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of an entity owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity;
 - i) planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers or UN personnel;
 - j) providing financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, a designated individual or entity;

Group of Experts

6. *Decides* to extend until 1 August 2016 the mandate of the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and renewed by subsequent resolutions, expresses its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 1 July 2016, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Group of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, for a period of 18 months from the date of this resolution, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group established pursuant to previous resolutions;
7. *Requests* the Group of Experts to fulfil its mandate as consolidated below, with a focus on areas affected by the presence of illegal armed groups, and to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a mid-term report no later than 30 October 2015, and a final report no later than 15 June 2016, as well as submit progress updates to the Committee, especially in situations of urgency, or as the Group deems necessary:
 - a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 4 above;

- b) gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation, with a focus on incidents of non-compliance, of the measures decided in this resolution;
 - c) consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of Member States, in particular those in the region, to ensure the measures imposed by this resolution are effectively implemented;
 - d) gather, examine and analyze information regarding the regional and international support networks to armed groups and criminal networks in the DRC;
 - e) gather, examine and analyze information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms, related materiel and related military assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks and the transfer of arms and related materiel to armed groups from the DRC security forces;
 - f) gather, examine and analyze information regarding perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses, including those within the security forces, in the DRC;
 - g) evaluate the impact of minerals traceability referred to in paragraph 22 below and continue collaboration with other forums;
 - h) assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by this resolution, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
8. *Expresses* its full support to the UN Group of Experts of the 1533 Committee and calls for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, MONUSCO, relevant UN bodies and the Group of Experts, *encourages* further that all parties and all States ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control and *reiterates* its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members and its support staff, and that all parties and all States, including the DRC and countries of the region, provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
9. *Calls upon* the Group of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;

Armed groups

10. *Strongly condemns* all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international humanitarian law as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights including attacks on the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children, and *reiterates* that those responsible will be held accountable;
11. *Demands* that the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA and all other armed groups operating in the DRC cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities, including the exploitation of natural resources, and that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms, and liberate and demobilize all children from their ranks;
12. *Calls upon* all States, especially those in the region, to take effective steps to ensure that there is no support, in and from their territories, for armed groups in the DRC, stressing the need to address the networks of support, financing and recruitment of armed groups active in the DRC, as well as the need to address the ongoing collaboration between FARDC elements and armed groups at a local level, and *calls upon* all States to take steps to hold accountable, where appropriate, leaders and members of the FDLR and other armed groups residing in their countries;
13. *Demands* that the Government of the DRC, per its commitments in the Nairobi Declarations of 12 December 2013, accelerate the implementation of its Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme, in coordination with neighbouring countries where former M23 combatants have found refuge and the United Nations and international organizations, *and stresses* the importance of overcoming obstacles to the repatriation of these ex-combatants, ensuring that the DDRRR programme is fully funded and implemented, particularly those programmes necessary to support the successful demobilisation and reintegration of former M23 combatants, that the M23 does not regroup and resume military activities, and that its members do not join or support other armed groups, in line with the Nairobi declarations and relevant UN Security Council resolutions;

Commitments of the Government of the DRC

14. *Welcomes* the progress made to date by the Government of the DRC on ending the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, *urges* the Government of the DRC to continue the full implementation and dissemination throughout the military chain of command, including in remote areas, of its commitments made in the action plan signed with the United Nations detailing concrete, time-bound measures to release and reintegrate children associated with the Congolese armed forces and to prevent further recruitment, and for the protection of girls and boys from sexual violence, and further *calls upon* the Government of the DRC to ensure that children are not detained on charges related to association with armed groups;

15. Also *calls on* the Government of DRC to pursue its action plan commitments to end sexual violence and violations committed by its armed forces and undertake further efforts in that regard, noting that failure to do so may result in the FARDC being named in the Secretary-General's report on sexual violence;
16. *Stresses* the importance of the Government of the DRC actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country and of regional cooperation to this end, including through its ongoing cooperation with the International Criminal Court, *encourages* MONUSCO to use its existing authority to assist the government of the DRC in this regard, and *calls on* all signatories of the PSC Framework Agreement to continue to implement their commitments and cooperate fully with one another and the Government of the DRC, as well as MONUSCO to this end;
17. *Recalls* that there should be no impunity for any of those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the DRC and the region, and, in this regard, *urges* the DRC, all countries in the region and other concerned UN Member States to bring perpetrators to justice and hold them accountable;
18. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC to enhance stockpile security, accountability and management of arms and ammunition, with the assistance of international partners, to address urgently reports of diversion to armed groups, as necessary and requested, and to urgently implement a national weapons marking program, in particular for state-owned firearms, in line with the standards established by the Nairobi Protocol and the Regional Centre on Small Arms;
19. *Emphasizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of the DRC to reinforce State authority and governance in eastern DRC, including through effective security sector reform to allow army, police and justice sector reform, and to end impunity for violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, *urges* the Government of the DRC to increase efforts in this regard, in accordance with its national commitments under the PSC Framework;

Natural resources

20. *Further encourages* the continuation of efforts by the Government of the DRC to address issues of illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources, including holding accountable those members of the FARDC who participate in the illicit trade of natural resources, particularly gold and wildlife products;
21. *Stresses* the need to undertake further efforts to cut off financing for armed groups involved in destabilizing activities through the illicit trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife products;
22. *Welcomes* in this regard the measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement the due diligence guidelines on the supply chain of minerals, as defined by the Group of Experts and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *recognizes* the Congolese Government's efforts to implement minerals traceability schemes, and *calls on* all States to assist the DRC, the ICGLR and the countries in the Great Lakes region to develop a responsible minerals trade;
23. *Welcomes* measures taken by the Governments in the region to implement the Group of Experts due diligence guidelines, including adopting the Regional Certification Mechanism of the ICGLR into their national legislation, in accordance with OECD Guidance and international practice, and *requests* the extension of the certification process to other Member States in the region, and *encourages* all States, particularly those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the due diligence guidelines;
24. *Encourages* a swift response by the ICGLR to put in place the necessary technical capacity required to support Member States in their fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and *further encourages* the ICGLR to take immediate actions to fully implement the mineral certification process;
25. *Encourages* all States to continue efforts to end the illicit trade in natural resources, in particular in the gold sector, and to hold those complicit in the illicit trade accountable, as part of broader efforts to cut off financing for armed groups and criminal networks, including those with members in the FARDC;
26. *Reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 7 to 9 of resolution 2021 (2011) and *calls upon* the DRC and States in the Great Lakes region to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat regional criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including wildlife poaching and trafficking, and require their customs authorities to strengthen their control on exports and imports of minerals from the DRC;

Role of MONUSCO

27. *Recalls* the mandate of MONUSCO to support the Congolese authorities in the implementation of their national commitments under the PSC Framework agreement, in line with resolution 2147 (2014);
28. *Recalls* the mandate of MONUSCO to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, in cooperation with the Group of Experts, and in particular to observe and report on flows of military personnel, arms or related materiel across the eastern border of the DRC, including by using surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems, seize, collect and dispose of arms or related materials brought into the DRC in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1, in accordance with paragraph 4 c) of paragraph 2147 (2014);
29. *Notes* that MONUSCO has a role to play in encouraging the consolidation of an effective national civilian structure that controls key mining activities and manages in an equitable manner the extraction and trade of natural resources in eastern DRC, in line with resolution 2147 (2014);

30. *Requests* MONUSCO to assist the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1533 (2004) and the Group of Experts established by the same resolution, within its capabilities, including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the sanctions measures;

Reporting and review

31. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region and those in which individuals and entities designated pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution are based, to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and recommended in paragraph 8 of resolution 1952 (2010);
32. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
33. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);
34. *Decides* that, when appropriate and no later than 1 July 2016, it shall review the measures set forth in this resolution, with a view to adjusting them, as appropriate, in light of the security situation in the DRC, in particular progress in security sector reform including the integration of the armed forces and the reform of the national police, and in disarming, demobilizing, repatriating, resettling and reintegrating, as appropriate, Congolese and foreign armed groups, with a particular focus on children among them;
35. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 12 februari 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7379^e zitting Resolutie 2199 (2015) inzake bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid veroorzaakt door terroristische handelingen aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2199 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7379th meeting, on 12 February 2015

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security including countering terrorism, and *underlining* the importance of prompt and effective implementation of relevant resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) as key instruments in the fight against terrorism,

Recalling its Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2161 (2014), 2170 (2014), and 2178 (2014) and its Presidential Statements of 28 July 2014 and 19 November 2014, including its stated intention to consider additional measures to disrupt oil trade by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Daesh), Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, as a source of terrorism financing,

Recognizing the importance of the role that financial sanctions play in disrupting ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and emphasizing also the need for a comprehensive approach to fully disrupt ISIL and ANF that integrates multilateral strategies with national action by Member States,

Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, and reaffirming further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization,

Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

Expressing, in this regard, its deep appreciation for Arab League Resolution 7804 (7 September 2014), the Paris Statement (15 September 2014), the FATF statement on countering the financing of ISIL (24 October 2014) and the Manama declaration on countering terrorist finance (9 November 2014),

Reaffirming its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists,

Recognizing the significant need to build capacities of Member States to counter terrorism and terrorist finance,

Reiterating its deep concern that oilfields and their related infrastructure, as well as other infrastructure such as dams and power plants, controlled by ISIL, ANF and potentially other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, are generating a significant portion of the groups' income, alongside extortion, private foreign donations, kidnap ransoms and stolen money from the territory they control, which support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks,

Condemning in the strongest terms abductions of women and children, *expressing outrage* at their exploitation and abuse, including rape, sexual abuse, forced marriage, committed by ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and encouraging all state and non-state actors with evidence to bring it to the attention of the Council, along with any information that human trafficking may support the perpetrators financially,

Reaffirming the obligation of Member States to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities,

Expressing its concern that economic resources such as oil, oil products, modular refineries and related material, other natural resources including precious metals such as gold, silver, and copper, diamonds, and any other assets are made available to ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and noting that direct or indirect trade with ISIL and ANF in such materials could constitute a violation of the obligations imposed by resolution 2161 (2014),

Reminding all States of their obligation to ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice,

Reaffirming its decision 2133 (2014) and *noting again* that ransom payments to terrorist groups are one of the sources of income which supports their recruitment efforts, strengthens their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks, and incentivizes future incidents of kidnapping for ransom,

Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, as well as their use to incite, recruit, fund or plan terrorist acts,

Expressing grave concern at the increased incidents of kidnapping and hostage-murdering committed by ISIL, and condemning those heinous and cowardly murders which demonstrate that terrorism is a scourge impacting all of humanity and people from all regions and religions or belief,

Welcoming the report on ANF and ISIL from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, published on 14 November 2014, and *taking note* of its recommendations,

Noting with concern the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and reaffirming its resolve to address all aspects of that threat,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Oil Trade

1. *Condemns* any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular of oil and oil products, and modular refineries and related material, with ISIL, ANF and any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated as associated with Al-Qaida by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and *reiterates* that such engagement would constitute support for such individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and may lead to further listings by the Committee;

2. *Reaffirms* that States are required by resolution 2161 (2014) to ensure that their nationals and those in their territory not make assets or economic resources, directly or indirectly, available to ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and *notes* that this obligation applies to the direct and indirect trade in oil and refined oil products, modular refineries and related material;
3. *Reaffirms* that States are required by resolution 2161 (2014) to freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction;
4. *Reaffirms* that States are required by resolution 2161 (2014) to ensure that no funds, other financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, by their nationals or by persons within their territory for the benefit of ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;
5. *Recalls* that funds and other financial assets or economic resources made available to or for the benefit of listed individuals or entities are not always held directly by them, and *recalls* in addition that in identifying such funds and benefits, States should be alert to the possibility that property owned or controlled indirectly by the listed party may not be immediately visible;
6. *Confirms* that economic resources include oil, oil products, modular refineries and related material, other natural resources, and any other assets which are not funds but which potentially may be used to obtain funds, goods or services;
7. *Emphasizes* therefore that States are required by UN Security Council resolution 2161 (2014) to freeze without delay funds, other financial assets and economic resources of ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, including oil, oil products, modular refineries and related material and other natural resources owned or controlled by them, or persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, as well as any funds or negotiable benefit arising from such economic resources;
8. *Recognizes* the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, individual terrorists, and terrorist organizations, including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors, and the importance of continued international cooperation to that aim;
9. *Emphasizes* that States are required to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available, directly or indirectly, any funds, other financial assets or economic resources, including oil, oil products, modular refineries and related material and other natural resources that are identified as directed to, collected for, or otherwise for the benefit of ISIL, ANF, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, as well as any funds or negotiable benefit arising from such economic resources;
10. *Expresses concern* that vehicles, including aircraft, cars and trucks and oil tankers, departing from or going to areas of Syria and Iraq where ISIL, ANF or any other groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida operate, could be used to transfer oil and oil products, modular refineries and related material, cash, and other valuable items including natural resources such as precious metals and minerals like gold, silver, copper and diamonds, as well as grain, livestock, machinery, electronics, and cigarettes by or on behalf of such entities for sale on international markets, for barter for arms, or for use in other ways that would result in violations of the asset freeze or arms embargo in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014) and *encourages* Member States to take appropriate steps in accordance with international law to prevent and disrupt activity that would result in violations of the asset freeze or targeted arms embargo in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014);
11. *Reaffirms* that all States shall ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts, and *emphasizes* that such support may be provided through trade in oil and refined oil products, modular refineries and related material with ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;
12. *Decides* that Member States shall inform the 1267/1989 Committee within 30 days of the interdiction in their territory of any oil, oil products, modular refineries, and related material being transferred to or from ISIL or ANF, and *calls upon* Member States to report to the Committee the outcome of proceedings brought against individuals and entities as a result of such activity;
13. *Encourages* the submission of listing requests to the Committee by Member States of individuals and entities engaged in oil trade-related activities with ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida and directs the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to immediately consider designations of individuals and entities engaged in oil trade-related activities with ISIL, the ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;
14. *Calls upon* Member States to improve international, regional, and subregional cooperation, including through increased sharing of information for the purpose of identifying smuggling routes used by ISIL and ANF, and for Member States to consider provision of technical assistance and capacity building to assist other Member States to counter smuggling of oil and oil products, and modular refineries and related material, by ISIL, ANF and any other individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida;

Cultural Heritage

15. *Condemns* the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria particularly by ISIL and ANF, whether such destruction is incidental or deliberate, including targeted destruction of religious sites and objects;
16. *Notes with concern* that ISIL, ANF and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, are generating income from engaging directly or indirectly in the looting and smuggling of cultural heritage items from archaeological sites, museums, libraries, archives, and other sites in Iraq and Syria, which is being used to support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks;
17. *Reaffirms* its decision in paragraph 7 of resolution 1483 (2003) and *decides* that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in such items, thereby allowing for their eventual safe return to the Iraqi and Syrian people and *calls upon* the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the implementation of this paragraph;

Kidnapping for Ransom and External Donations

18. *Reaffirms its condemnation of* incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions and *expresses its determination* to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law;
19. *Reaffirms* that the requirements of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 2161 (2014) apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid, *emphasizes* that this obligation applies to ISIL and ANF, and *calls upon* all Member States to encourage private sector partners to adopt or to follow relevant guidelines and good practices for preventing and responding to terrorist kidnappings without paying ransom;
20. *Reiterates its call upon* all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and *reaffirms* the need for all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups;
21. *Expresses its grave concern* of reports that external donations continue to make their way to ISIL, ANF and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and *recalls the importance* of all Member States complying with their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make donations to individuals and entities designated by the Committee or those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated entities;
22. *Stresses* that donations from individuals and entities have played a role in developing and sustaining ISIL and ANF, and that Member States have an obligation to ensure that such support is not made available to those terrorist groups and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida by their nationals and persons within their territory, and urges Member States to address this directly through enhanced vigilance of the international financial system and by working with their non-profit and charitable organizations to ensure financial flows through charitable giving are not diverted to ISIL, ANF or any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;

Banking

23. *Urges* Member States to take steps to ensure that financial institutions within their territory prevent ISIL, ANF or other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with Al-Qaida from accessing the international financial system;

Arms and related materiel

24. *Reaffirms* its decision that States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities, as well as its calls for States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels;
25. *Expresses concern* at the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, to ISIL, ANF and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and its potential impact on regional and international peace and security and impeding efforts to combat terrorism in some cases;

26. *Reminds* Member States of their obligation pursuant to paragraph 1 (c) of resolution 2161 (2014), to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types to listed individuals and entities, including ISIL and ANF;
27. *Calls upon* all States to consider appropriate measures to prevent the transfer of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, if there is a reasonable suspicion that such arms and related materiel would be obtained by ISIL, the ANF or other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida;

Asset Freeze

28. *Reaffirms* that the requirements in paragraph 1 (a) of Security Council resolution 2161 apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting or related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

Reporting

29. *Calls upon* Member States to report to the Committee within 120 days on the measures they have taken to comply with the measures imposed in this resolution;
30. *Requests* the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies to conduct an assessment of the impact of these new measures and to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) within 150 days, and thereafter to incorporate reporting on the impact of these new measures into their reports to the Committee in order to track progress on implementation, identify unintended consequences and unexpected challenges, and to help facilitate further adjustments as required, and further requests the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) to update the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution as part of its regular oral reports to the Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team;
31. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 24 februari 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7390^e zitting Resolutie 2204 (2015) inzake het Midden-Oosten aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2204 (2015)¹⁾

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7390th meeting, on 24 February 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015) and the statements of its President dated 15 February 2013 (S/PRST/2013/3) and 29 August 2014 (S/PRST/2014/18) concerning Yemen,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen,

Expressing concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of weapons,

Reiterating its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

Expressing its support for and commitment to the work of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, in support of the Yemeni transition process,

Recalling the listing of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and associated individuals on the Al-Qaida sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and *stressing* in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2161 (2014) as a significant tool in combating terrorist activity in Yemen,

Noting the critical importance of effective implementation of the sanctions regime imposed pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), including the key role that Member States from the region can play in this regard and encouraging efforts to further enhance cooperation,

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

¹⁾ Reissued for technical reasons on 3 March 2015.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition following the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, in line with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and in accordance with resolution 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), and 2140 (2014) and with regard to the expectations of the Yemeni people;
2. *Decides* to renew until 26 February 2016 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), and *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2014);

Designation Criteria

3. *Reaffirms* that the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) ("the Committee") as engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen;

Reporting

4. *Decides* to extend until 25 March 2016 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 25 February 2016, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee, for a period of 13 months from the date of this resolution, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);
5. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 24 September 2015, and a final report no later than 24 January 2016 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;
6. *Directs* the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2161 (2014);
7. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and further urges all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
8. *Emphasizes* the importance of holding consultations with concerned Member States, as may be necessary, in order to ensure full implementation of the measures set forth in this resolution;
9. *Calls* upon all Member States to report to the Committee within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014);
10. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of developments;

United Nations involvement

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices role, *notes* with appreciation the work of his Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar, and *stresses* the importance of the United Nations' close coordination with international partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council, Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a, and other actors, in order to contribute to the successful transition;
12. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate assistance from the international community in support of the transition, and to propose options for strengthening the office of the Special Adviser to enable him to fulfil his mandate, including on United Nations assistance for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform, holding general elections, and creating mechanisms for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as well as security sector reform;
13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 3 maart 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7396^e zitting Resolutie 2206 (2015) inzake Zuid-Sudan aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2206 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7396th meeting, on 3 March 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements on South Sudan, in particular resolutions 2057 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2132 (2013), 2155 (2014) and 2187 (2014),

Expressing grave alarm and concern regarding the conflict between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and opposition forces since December 2013 which emanated from internal political disputes among the country's political and military leaders,

Deeply concerned that the conflict has resulted in great human suffering, including significant loss of life, displacement of two million people, and the loss of property, further impoverishing and disadvantaging the people of South Sudan,

Strongly condemning past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving targeted killings of civilians, ethnically-targeted violence, extra-judicial killings, rape, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, and attacks on schools, places of worship and hospitals, as well as United Nations and associated peacekeeping personnel and objects, by all parties, including armed groups and national security forces, as well as the incitement to commit such abuses and violations, *further condemning* harassment and targeting of civil society, humanitarian personnel and journalists, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights must be held accountable, and that the Government of South Sudan bears the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,

Expressing deep concern over the large-scale displacement of persons and deepening humanitarian crisis, *stressing* the responsibility borne by all parties to the conflict for the suffering of the people of South Sudan, and the necessity of ensuring that the basic needs of the population are met, *commending* United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners for their efforts to provide urgent and coordinated support to the population, *calling upon* all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, the full, safe, and unhindered access of relief personnel, equipment and supplies to all those in need and the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees, *condemning* all attacks against humanitarian personnel and facilities and *recalling* that attacks against humanitarian personnel and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival may amount to violations of international humanitarian law,

Commending the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Ministerial Group's initiative, as supported by the United Nations and African Union, in establishing a forum for political and security dialogue, and *expecting* all parties to participate in this process and respect the decisions reached by IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 13 March 2014,

Welcoming the IGAD-mediated commitments made to resolve the crisis in South Sudan, namely the 23 January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; 9 May 2014 Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan; and the 1 February 2015 Areas of Agreement of the Establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in the Republic of South Sudan,

Welcoming the resolve indicated in the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government Communiqué of 10 June 2014 and 25 August 2014 that IGAD Member States will take further collective action, including through the imposition of punitive measures, to pressure any party that fails to honour its commitments to date or acts contrary to the Communiqué of that Assembly,

Welcoming the Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) of 12 June 2014, which, inter alia, reiterated the readiness of that Council, upon recommendation by IGAD, to immediately pursue targeted sanctions and other measures against any party that continues to undermine the search for a solution to the conflict and fails to honour its commitments,

Welcoming further the Communiqué of the AU PSC of 17 September 2014 which, inter alia, reiterated its determination, in coordination with IGAD, to take the necessary measures against any party that fails to honour its commitments and continues to undermine the search for a negotiated solution to the current crisis,

Strongly condemning the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) – in Opposition for failing to reach agreement to form a transitional government within the 60-day period outlined in the 26th Communiqué of 10 June 2014,

Taking note of the Communiqué of the 27th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 25 August 2014, which inter alia: deplored the numerous violations of the agreements signed by the Parties to date, reiterated the need for an inclusive and broad-based approach to negotiations; expressed serious concerns over the worsening humanitarian situation in South Sudan; and called upon the stakeholders to negotiate and complete the agreement on a Transitional Government of National Unity within 45 days,

Taking note of the Communiqué of the 28th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 7 November 2014, which inter alia: resolved that the Government of South Sudan and opposition forces commit to an unconditional, complete and immediate end to all hostilities; invited collective action by the States of the IGAD region to enact asset freezes and travel bans within the region, and denied the supply of arms and ammunition and any other materiel that could be used in war if the Government of South Sudan and opposition forces commit any violation of the cessation of hostilities; and called on the AU PSC, the United Nations Security Council, and the international community to render all possible assistance in the implementation of these measures, should it be necessary to implement these measures,

Taking note of the 21 January 2015 Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM, agreed under the aegis of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, and 16 February 2015 Communiqué of the Meeting of the SPLM Tripartite Committee on the Implementation of Phase I of the Arusha SPLM Reunification Agreement,

Taking note of the AU PSC Communiqués dated 5 December 2014 and 29 January 2015 which, inter alia, stressed that sanctions will be imposed against all parties that continue to obstruct the political process and undermine the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 23 January 2014,

Welcoming the China-mediated “Five-Point Plan” agreed upon by the representatives of the GRSS and the SPLM/A- in Opposition during the Special Consultation in Support of IGAD-led South Sudan Peace Process convened on 12 January in Khartoum, namely: (i) earnestly commit to the full implementation of all signed agreements; (ii) speed up the pace of negotiations towards the formation of a transitional government at an early date; (iii) take concrete steps to relieve the humanitarian situation in conflict-affected areas, and facilitate access of international humanitarian assistance; (iv) ensure the safety of all personnel and assets of all countries and international entities operating in South Sudan; and (v) provide strong support for and take active part in the IGAD-led mediation efforts, and, in this regard, *strongly urging* both parties to immediately implement the Five-Point Plan,

Expressing its deep appreciation for the actions taken by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeepers and troop- and police-contributing countries to protect civilians, including foreign nationals, under threat of physical violence and to stabilize the security situation,

Recognizing the importance of independent and public human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting for its useful role in laying the groundwork for justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities,

Taking note with interest of the 21 February 2014 UNMISS Interim Human Rights report, and 8 May 2014 UNMISS “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” and the 19 December 2014 UNMISS “Special Report: Attack on Bentiu, Unity State, 29 October 2014,” 29 October 2014 UNMISS “Special Report: Attack on Bentiu, Unity State” and the 9 January 2015 UNMISS Report on “Attacks on Civilians in Bentiu & Bor”,

Expressing grave concern that, according to the UNMISS 8 May 2014 “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report” there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, including extrajudicial killings, rape and other acts of sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detention have been committed by both government and opposition forces, and that war crimes have been committed, and, stressing the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in South Sudan and to bring to justice perpetrators of such crimes,

Stressing the importance of accountability, reconciliation, and healing as prominent elements of a transitional agenda while taking note of the important role international investigations, and where appropriate, prosecutions can play with respect to holding those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity,

Recognizing the work of the African Union Commission of Inquiry (AU COI) in investigating and documenting violations as well as abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in South Sudan, *anticipating with interest* its findings and recommendations, *encouraging* the public release of its final report as soon as possible, and *welcoming* the further engagement of the African Union to ensure justice and accountability, as well as healing and reconciliation for South Sudan,

Strongly condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating sexual violence against a particular ethnic group, which has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and *calling on* the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to take appropriate measures to address such activity, and further *urging* all parties to desist from these actions and instead contribute to promoting peace and reconciliation among the communities,

Recognizing the important role played by civil society organizations, faith leaders, women, and youth in South Sudan, *underscoring* the importance of their participation – along with the former SPLM detainees and other political parties – to finding a sustainable solution to the crisis in the country, and *concerned* by efforts by the government to limit such participation including by preventing individuals from travelling to join the talks and by increased restrictions of freedom of expression,

Reaffirming all its relevant resolutions on women, peace, and security, on children and armed conflict, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as resolutions 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, resolution 2150 (2014) on the Prevention and Fight against Genocide, and resolution 2151 (2014) on security sector reform,

Recalling resolutions 1209 (1998) and 2117 (2013) and *expressing grave concern* at the threat to peace and security in South Sudan arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and *emphasizing* the importance of strengthening efforts to combat the illicit circulation of such weapons,

Expressing deep concern at persistent restrictions placed upon the movement and operations of UNMISS, *strongly condemning* the attacks by government and opposition forces and other groups on United Nations and IGAD personnel and facilities, the detentions and kidnappings of United Nations and associated personnel and *calling upon* the Government of South Sudan to complete its investigations of these attacks in a swift and thorough manner and to hold those responsible to account,

Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Endorses* the Cessation of Hostilities Agreements (“CoH Agreements”) accepted and signed by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and SPLM – in Opposition on 23 January 2014, 6 May 2014 and 9 May 2014;
2. *Expresses deep concern* at the failures of both parties to honour their commitments to date, to engage the peace process meaningfully toward political resolution of the crisis and to bring an end to the violence and, in particular, *condemns* the continued and flagrant violations of the CoH Agreements as documented by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism;
3. *Demands* that the parties respect all aspects of the CoH Agreements and immediately implement the necessary modalities in accordance with the 9 May 2014 Agreement and other relevant Agreements, including the progressive withdrawal of foreign forces deployed in South Sudan since 15 December 2013, *calls upon* all parties to armed conflict in South Sudan to issue clear orders prohibiting all violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses, and *underscores* the necessity for all parties to ensure immediate access to humanitarian agencies and further *demands* that the parties commit to finding a comprehensive agreement without further delay;
4. *Reiterates* that there is no military solution to the conflict;

Sanctions Designation Criteria

5. *Underscores* its willingness to impose targeted sanctions in order to support the search for an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan;
6. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraph 9 shall apply to individuals, and that the provisions of paragraph 12 shall apply to individuals and entities, as designated for such measures by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 16 of this resolution (“the Committee”) pursuant to paragraphs 16 (c) and 16 (d), respectively, as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan;
7. *Underscores* that such actions or policies as described in paragraph 6 above may include, but are not limited to:
 - a) Actions or policies that have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement;
 - b) Actions or policies that threaten transitional agreements or undermine the political process in South Sudan;
 - c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in South Sudan;
 - d) The targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law;
 - e) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the armed conflict in South Sudan;

- f) The obstruction of the activities of international peacekeeping, diplomatic, or humanitarian missions in South Sudan, including IGAD's Monitoring and Verification Mechanism or of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance;
 - g) Attacks against United Nations missions, international security presences, or other peacekeeping operations, or humanitarian personnel; or
 - h) Acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an individual or entity designated by the Committee;
8. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 12 shall apply to individuals, as designated for such measures by the Committee who are leaders of any entity, including any South Sudanese government, opposition, militia, or other group, that has, or whose members have, engaged in any of the activities described in paragraphs 6 and 7 above;

Travel Ban

9. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individuals who may be designated by the Committee, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
10. *Notes* that designated individuals may have multiple nationalities or passports, *expresses* its concern that travel between the two States of which a designated individual has nationality or a passport may undermine the objectives of the travel ban imposed in paragraph 9, and *requests* that the Panel of Experts established in paragraph 18 of this resolution (the "Panel of Experts") report to the Committee information about such travel;
11. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 9 above shall not apply:
- a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
 - b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;
 - c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in South Sudan and stability in the region;

Asset Freeze

12. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any individuals or entities that may be designated by the Committee, or by any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides* further that all Member States shall for this initial period ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons' benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;
13. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
- a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
 - b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
 - c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;
14. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the

intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;

Sanctions Committee/Panel of Experts

16. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake the following tasks:
 - a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 9 and 12 of this resolution with a view to strengthening, facilitating and improving implementation of these measures by Member States;
 - b) To seek and review information regarding those individuals and entities who may be engaging in the acts described in paragraph 6 and 7 above;
 - c) To designate individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 9 above and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 11 above;
 - d) To designate individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above, and to consider requests for exemptions in paragraph 13 above;
 - e) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;
 - f) To report within 60 days to the Security Council on its work and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;
 - g) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;
 - h) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed; and,
 - i) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;
17. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Committee ninety days from the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to implement effectively paragraphs 9 and 12 of this resolution;
18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period, thirteen months from the adoption of this resolution, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to five experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel, *expresses* its intent to consider the renewal of this mandate no later than March 2, 2016, and *decides* that the Panel shall carry out the following tasks:
 - a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 6 and 7 above;
 - b) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, with particular focus on the benchmarks outlined in paragraphs 21 and 22 below;
 - c) Gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to individuals and entities undermining political processes to reach a final peace agreement or participating in acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable;
 - d) Provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim report by September 1, 2015, a final report by February 1, 2016, and except in the months when these reports are due, updates each month; and,
 - e) Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by this resolution, including through the provision of identifying information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;
19. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts and *further urges* all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;
20. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

Review

21. *Expresses* its intent to review the situation after the IGAD-agreed deadline of March 5, 2015, and again after the envisioned start of the Pre-Transition Period on April 1, 2015, and at 60-day intervals thereafter or more frequently, as needed, and also expresses its intent to impose any sanctions that may then be appropriate to respond to the situation, which may include an arms embargo and the designation of sen-

ior individuals responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan, so as to encourage the Government of South Sudan and opposition forces to form a transitional government of national unity, take effective and comprehensive steps to cause forces under direct or indirect control to cease military operations, acts of violence, as well as violations of human rights, and enable full access for humanitarian assistance;

22. *Affirms* also that it shall be prepared to adjust the measures contained in this resolution, including by strengthening through additional measures, as well as modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the peace, accountability, and reconciliation process, and in light of the implementation of the parties' commitments, including the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and other commitments specified in the preamble of this resolution, and compliance with this resolution;
23. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 5 maart 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7399^e zitting Resolutie 2208 (2015) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2208 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7399th meeting, on 5 March 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) and all its subsequent resolutions on Libya,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (S/2015/144),

Taking note also of the special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the UN presence in Libya (S/2015/113) including the recommendations on the configuration of the UN presence made therein,

Supporting the ongoing efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate a political solution to the increasing challenges facing the country,

Recognizing, in the current circumstances, the need for a short extension of the mandate of UNSMIL,

Recognizing also the need for a short extension of the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014),

Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend until 31 March 2015 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014);
2. *Decides* to extend until 31 March 2015 the mandate of UNSMIL, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2144 (2014), under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership;
3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Op 27 maart 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7420^e zitting Resolutie 2213 (2015) inzake Libië aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2213 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7420th meeting, on 27 March 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) and all its subsequent resolutions on Libya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate a Libyan-led political solution to the increasing challenges facing the country and *underlining* the importance of agreement, in accordance with the principles of national ownership, on immediate next steps towards completing Libya's political transition, including the formation of a national unity government,

Welcoming the ongoing UN-facilitated political dialogue, *recognising* the contribution of Member States to host and support meetings of that dialogue, and *emphasizing* the necessity for the constructive participation of the elected House of Representatives and other Libyan parties to take forward the democratic transition, build state institutions and start the reconstruction of Libya,

Gravely concerned at the growing trend of terrorist groups in Libya to proclaim allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (also known as Da'esh) and the continued presence of other Al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups and individuals operating there, *reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, and *recalling*, in this regard, the obligations under resolution 2161 (2014),

Expressing deep concern at the threat posed by unsecured arms and ammunition in Libya and their proliferation, which undermines stability in Libya and the region, including through transfer to terrorist and violent extremist groups, and *underlining* the importance of coordinated international support to Libya and the region to address these issues,

Reaffirming the importance of holding accountable those responsible for violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including those involved in attacks targeting civilians,

Recalling its decision in resolution 1970 (2011) to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), *noting* the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber dated 10 December 2014, and *emphasizing strongly* the importance of the Libyan government's full cooperation with the ICC and the Prosecutor,

Recalling the need for all parties to respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (S/2015/144),

Taking note also of the special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the UN presence in Libya (S/2015/113) including the recommendations on the configuration of the UN presence made therein,

Taking note of the final report of the Panel of Experts (S/2015/128) submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 (d) of resolution 2144 (2014) and the findings and recommendations contained therein,

Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls for* an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, *underscores* that there can be no military solution to the ongoing political crisis, and *urges* all parties in Libya to engage constructively with the efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate, in accordance with the principles of national ownership, the formation of a national unity government and agreement on interim security arrangements necessary for stabilising Libya;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States to fully support the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
3. *Encourages* Member States, particularly in the region, to urge all parties in Libya to engage constructively in the UN-facilitated dialogue and work quickly towards a successful outcome;
4. *Condemns* the use of violence against civilians and civilian institutions and continuing escalation of conflict, including attacks on airports, State institutions, and other vital national infrastructure and natural assets, and *calls for* those responsible to be held accountable;
5. *Calls upon* the Libyan government to promote and protect human rights, including those of women, children and people belonging to vulnerable groups, and to comply with its obligations under international law, and *calls for* those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights to be held accountable;
6. *Condemns* cases of torture and mistreatment, and deaths by torture, in detention centres in Libya, *calls upon* the Libyan government to take all steps necessary to accelerate the judicial process, transfer detainees to State authority and prevent and investigate violations and abuses of human rights, *calls for* all Libyan parties to cooperate with Libyan government efforts in this regard, *calls for* the immediate release of all individuals arbitrarily arrested or detained in Libya, including foreign nationals, and *underscores* the Libyan government's primary responsibility for promoting and protecting the human rights of all persons in Libya, particularly those of African migrants and other foreign nationals;

7. *Calls upon* the Libyan government to cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the International Criminal Court and the Prosecutor as required by resolution 1970 (2011);
8. *Encourages* Libya and regional States to promote regional cooperation aimed at stabilization of the situation in Libya, to prevent former Libyan regime elements and violent extremist groups or terrorists from using the territory of Libya or such States to plan, fund or carry out violent or other illicit or terrorist acts to destabilize Libya or States in the region, and *notes* that such cooperation would benefit regional stability;

United Nations mandate

9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 September 2015 under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and *decides further* that the mandate of UNSMIL as an integrated special political mission, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, shall focus, as an immediate priority, on support to the Libyan political process and security arrangements, through mediation and good offices, and further, within operational and security constraints, shall undertake:
 - a) human rights monitoring and reporting;
 - b) support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering its proliferation;
 - c) support to key Libyan institutions;
 - d) support, on request, for the provision of essential services, and delivery of humanitarian assistance and in accordance with humanitarian principles;
 - e) support for the coordination of international assistance;
10. *Recognises* that the current security situation in Libya requires a reduction in the Mission's size, but *requests* the Secretary-General to maintain the necessary flexibility and mobility to adjust UNSMIL staffing and operations at short notice in order to support, as appropriate and in accordance with its mandate, implementation by the Libyans of agreements and confidence-building measures or in response to their expressed needs, and further *requests* the Secretary-General keep the Security Council informed prior to such changes to UNSMIL in his reports pursuant to paragraph 27 of this resolution;

Sanctions measures

11. *Reaffirms* that the travel ban and asset freeze measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011), apply to individuals and entities designated under that resolution and under resolution 1973 (2011) and by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011), and *reaffirms* that these measures also apply to individuals and entities determined by the Committee to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition, and *decides* that such acts may include but are not limited to:
 - a) planning, directing, or committing, acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Libya;
 - b) attacks against any air, land, or sea port in Libya, or against a Libyan State institution or installation, including oil facilities, or against any foreign mission in Libya;
 - c) providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya;
 - d) threatening or coercing Libyan State financial institutions and the Libyan National Oil Company, or engaging in any action that may lead to or result in the misappropriation of Libyan state funds;
 - e) violating, or assisting in the evasion of, the provisions of the arms embargo in Libya established in resolution 1970 (2011);
 - f) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of a listed individual or entity;
12. *Reiterates* that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation, and notes that this includes those who assist in the violation of the assets freeze and travel ban in resolution 1970 (2011);
13. *Condemns* the continued violations of the measures contained in resolution 1970 (2011) and directs the Committee, in line with its mandate and guidelines, to consult as soon as possible with any Member State about which the Committee deems there is credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the State is facilitating such violations or any other acts of non-compliance with these measures;

Prevention of illicit oil exports

14. *Decides* to extend until 31 March 2016 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014);
15. *Urges* the Libyan government to provide regular updates to the Committee on ports, oil fields, and installations that are under its control, and to inform the Committee about the mechanism used to certify legal exports of crude oil;

Arms embargo

16. *Stresses* that arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, that are supplied, sold or transferred as security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan government in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), should not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by parties other than the designated end user;
17. *Urges* the Libyan government to improve further the monitoring and control of arms or related materiel that are supplied, sold or transferred to Libya in accordance with paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014), including through the use of end user certificates, and *urges* Member States and regional organizations to provide assistance to the Libyan government to strengthen the infrastructure and mechanisms currently in place to do so;
18. *Reiterates* its call upon Libya, with the assistance of international partners, to address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the country, and to ensure the safe and effective management, storage, and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition;
19. *Calls upon* all Member States, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 and modified by subsequent resolutions, to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, vessels and aircraft bound to or from Libya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011), paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095 (2013) and paragraph 8 of 2174 (2014) for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions, and *calls upon* all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections;
20. *Reaffirms its decision* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of resolution 1970, as modified by paragraph 13 of 2009 (2011), paragraphs 9 and 10 of 2095 (2013), and paragraph 8 of 2174 (2014), seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and *further reaffirms* its decision that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;
21. *Requires* any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 19 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

Assets

22. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Libyan authorities to implement measures to increase transparency of government revenues and expenditures, including salaries, subsidies, and other transfers from the Central Bank of Libya, and *welcomes* the efforts of the Libyan authorities to eliminate the duplication of payments and to guard against the illegal diversion of payments, and *encourages* further steps in this regard that ensure the long-term sustainability of Libya's financial resources;
23. *Supports* the efforts of the Libyan authorities to recover funds misappropriated under the Qadhafi regime and, in this regard, *encourages* the Libyan authorities and Member States that have frozen assets pursuant to resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) as modified by resolution 2009 (2011) to consult with each other regarding claims of misappropriated funds and related issues of ownership;

Panel of Experts

24. *Decides* to extend until 30 April 2016 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, established by paragraph 24 of resolution 1973 (2011) and modified by resolutions 2040 (2012) 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), *expresses its intent* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, and *decides* that the Panel shall carry out the following tasks:
 - a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011), and modified in resolutions 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014) and in this resolution;
 - b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011) 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011) 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

- c) make recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, the Libyan government or other States may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;
 - d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 180 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, no later than 15 March 2016 with its findings and recommendations;
25. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including UNSMIL, and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1970 (2011) 1973 (2011), 2146 (2014) and 2174 (2014), and modified in resolutions 2009 (2011) and 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and *calls on* UNSMIL and the Libyan government to support Panel investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities, as appropriate;
26. *Calls upon* all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members, and that all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the region, provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Panel of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

Reporting and review

27. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution at least every 60 days;
28. *Affirms* its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, and its readiness to review the mandate of UNSMIL, as may be needed at any time in light of developments in Libya, particularly outcomes of the UN-facilitated dialogue;
29. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Op 14 april 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7426^e zitting Resolutie 2216 (2015) inzake het Midden-Oosten aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2216 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7426th meeting, on 14 April 2015

Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), and 2204 (2015) and presidential statements of 15 February 2013, 29 August 2014, and 22 March 2015,

Noting the letter dated 24 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen, to the United Nations, transmitting a letter from the President of Yemen, in which he informed the President of the Security Council that "he has requested from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States to immediately provide support, by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression by the Houthis", and *noting* the letter dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar, S/2015/217, transmitting a letter from the Representatives of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,

Recalling the resolution of Summit XXVI of the League of Arab States on the developments in Yemen, stressing inter alia the necessity to resume Yemen's political transition process with the participation of all Yemeni parties in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and its commitment to stand by the people of Yemen,

Condemning the growing number of and scale of the attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),

Expressing concern at the ability of AQAP to benefit from the deterioration of the political and security situation in Yemen, mindful that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed,

Reiterating its support for the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council in assisting the political transition in Yemen and *commending* its engagement in this regard,

Reaffirming its support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and *reiterating its call* to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and the legitimacy of the President of Yemen,

Expressing grave alarm at the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen, and *emphasizing* that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

Recalling that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and access, may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law,

Emphasizing the need for the return to the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, including drafting a new constitution, electoral reform, the holding of a referendum on the draft constitution and timely general elections, to avoid further deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in Yemen,

Reaffirming its full support for, and commitment to, the efforts of the United Nations and the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Yemen, in particular to the UN-brokered negotiations, and its support for the efforts of the Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a,

Alarmed at the military escalation by the Houthis in many parts of Yemen including in the Governorates of Ta'iz, Marib, AlJauf, Albayda, their advance towards Aden, and their seizure of arms, including missile systems, from Yemen's military and security institutions,

Condemning in the strongest terms the ongoing unilateral actions taken by the Houthis, and their failure to implement the demands in resolution 2201 (2015) to immediately and unconditionally withdraw their forces from government institutions, including in the capital Sana'a, normalize the security situation in the capital and other provinces, relinquish government and security institutions, and safely release all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained, and *reiterating* its call on all non-State actors to withdraw from government institutions across Yemen and to refrain from any attempts to take over such institutions,

Deploing any attempt by the Houthis to take actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen, and *noting* that such actions are unacceptable,

Expressing alarm that such actions taken by the Houthis undermine the political transition process in Yemen, and jeopardize the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen,

Noting with concern the destabilizing actions taken by the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, including supporting the Houthis' actions, which continue to undermine the peace, security and stability of Yemen,

Welcoming the intention of the Gulf Cooperation Council to convene a conference in Riyadh, upon the request of the President of Yemen, with the participation of all Yemeni parties to further support the political transition in Yemen, and to complement and support the UN-brokered negotiations,

Recalling its resolution 2117 (2013) and expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in Yemen arising from the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Recognizing that the continuing deterioration of the security situation and escalation of violence in Yemen poses an increasing and serious threat to neighbouring States and *reaffirming its determination* that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Demands* that all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, fully implement resolution 2201 (2015), *refrain* from further unilateral actions that could undermine the political transition in Yemen, and *further demands* that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally:
 - a) end the use of violence;
 - b) withdraw their forces from all areas they have seized, including the capital Sana'a;
 - c) relinquish all additional arms seized from military and security institutions, including missile systems;
 - d) cease all actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen;
 - e) refrain from any provocation or threats to neighbouring States, including through acquiring surface-surface missiles, and stockpiling weapons in any bordering territory of a neighbouring State;
 - f) safely release Major-General Mahmoud al-Subaihi, the Minister of Defence of Yemen, all political prisoners, and all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained; and
 - g) end the recruitment and use of children and release all children from their ranks;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015), in particular paragraph 1 of this resolution, in 10 days from the adoption of this resolution; and in case of further non-implementation, *expresses* its intent to consider designating additional individuals and entities who are engaged in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, to be subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014);
3. *Decides* that the individuals listed in the annex of this resolution shall be subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014);
4. *Reiterates* the importance of the implementation of all measures imposed by resolution 2140 (2014), as extended in resolution 2204 (2015);

5. *Calls upon* all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, to abide by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the relevant Security Council resolutions and to resume and accelerate inclusive United Nations-brokered negotiations, including on issues relating to governance, to continue the political transition in order to reach a consensus solution and *stresses* the importance of full implementation of agreements reached and commitments made towards that goal and *calls on* the parties, in this regard, to agree on the conditions leading to an expeditious cessation of violence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions, including this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015);
6. *Demands* that all Yemeni parties adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation and all unilateral actions to undermine the political transition and *stresses* that all parties should take concrete steps to agree and implement a consensus-based political solution to Yemen's crisis in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference;
7. *Urges* all Yemeni parties to respond positively to the request of the President of Yemen to attend a conference in Riyadh, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to further support the political transition in Yemen, and to complement and support the UN-brokered negotiations;
8. *Calls on* all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law;
9. *Reaffirms*, consistent with international humanitarian law, the need for all parties to ensure the safety of civilians, including those receiving assistance, as well as the need to ensure the security of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel, and *urges* all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian actors to reach people in need of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance;
10. *Calls on* all parties to facilitate the evacuation by concerned States and international organizations of their civilians and personnel from Yemen and *commends* steps already taken in this regard;
11. *Reaffirms* the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises and the obligations of host Governments, including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of these missions or impairment of their dignity;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and evacuation, including the establishment of humanitarian pauses, as appropriate, in coordination with the Government of Yemen, and *calls on* Yemeni parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need;
13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices role in order to enable a resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and *stresses* the importance of the United Nations' close coordination with international partners, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council, Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a, and other actors, in order to contribute to a successful transition;

Arms embargo

14. *Decides* that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim, Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Huthi, and the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee") pursuant to paragraph 20 (d) of this resolution, the individuals and entities listed in the annex of this resolution, and those acting on their behalf or at their direction in Yemen, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;
15. *Calls upon* Member States, in particular States neighbouring Yemen, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to Yemen, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
16. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such

as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and *decides* further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

17. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 15 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for supply, sale, or transfer are found, further *requires* such Member States to submit to the Committee within 30 days a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

Additional designation criteria

18. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of the same and *stresses* the importance of their full implementation;
19. *Reaffirms* paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014), and *underscores* that acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen may also include the violations of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 14 or obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen;

Mandate of the Sanctions Committee

20. *Decides* that the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) shall also undertake the following tasks:
 - a) monitoring implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 14 of this resolution;
 - b) seeking from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 14 above;
 - c) examining and taking appropriate action on information regarding alleged non-compliance with the measures contained by this resolution;
 - d) designating as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 14 above;

Mandate of the Panel of Experts

21. *Decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014) and renewed by resolution 2204 (2015) shall also include monitoring implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 14;
22. *Requests* the Secretary-General, having due regard for the increased mandate of the Panel of Experts, to increase the Panel to five members, and make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel;
23. *Calls upon* the Panel of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, including the 1267 Monitoring Team, as relevant to the implementation of their mandate;

Commitment to review

24. *Reaffirms* its readiness to take further measures in case of non-implementation by any Yemeni party of this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015);
25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

1. Abdulmalik al-Houthi
Abdul Malik al Houthi is a leader of a group that has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.
In September 2014, Houthi forces captured Sanaa and in January 2015 they attempted to unilaterally replace the legitimate government of Yemen with an illegitimate governing authority that the Houthis dominated. Al-Houthi assumed the leadership of Yemen's Houthi movement in 2004 after the death of his brother, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. As leader of the group, al-Houthi has repeatedly threatened Yemeni authorities with further unrest if they do not respond to his demands and detained President Hadi, Prime Minister, and key cabinet members. Hadi subsequently escaped to Aden. The Houthis then launched another offensive towards Aden assisted by military units loyal to former president Saleh and his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh.
2. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh
Ahmed Ali Saleh has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Yemen.
Ahmed Ali Saleh has been working to undermine President Hadi's authority, thwart Hadi's attempts to reform the military, and hinder Yemen's peaceful transition to democracy. Saleh played a key role in

facilitating the Houthi military expansion. As of mid-February 2013, Ahmed Ali Saleh had issued thousands of new rifles to Republican Guard brigades and unidentified tribal shaykhs. The weapons were originally procured in 2010 and reserved to purchase the loyalties of the recipients for political gain at a later date.

After Saleh's father, former Republic of Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh, stepped down as President of Yemen in 2011, Ahmed Ali Saleh retained his post as commander of Yemen's Republican Guard. A little over a year later, Saleh was dismissed by President Hadi but he retained significant influence within the Yemeni military, even after he was removed from command. Ali Abdullah Saleh was designated by the UN under UNSCR 2140 in November 2014.

Op 28 april 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7436^e zitting Resolutie 2219 (2015) inzake Ivoorkust aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2219 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7436th meeting, on 28 April 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular resolutions 1880 (2009), 1893 (2009), 1911 (2010), 1933 (2010), 1946 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1975 (2011), 1980 (2011), 2000 (2011), 2045 (2012), 2062 (2012), 2101 (2013), 2112 (2013), 2153 (2014), and 2162 (2014),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Welcoming the special report of the Secretary-General dated 12 December 2014 (S/2014/892), and *noting* the 2014 midterm report (S/2014/729), and the 2015 Final report (S/2015/252) of the United Nations Group of Experts,

Welcoming the overall progress towards restoring security, peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, commending the President and Government of Côte d'Ivoire's continued efforts to stabilize the security situation and promote economic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire and strengthen international and regional cooperation, and notably continued cooperation with the governments of Ghana and Liberia, and *calling upon* all national stakeholders to work together to consolidate the significant progress made so far and to address the underlying causes of tension and conflict,

Recognizing the continued contribution the measures imposed by resolutions 1572 (2004), 1643 (2005), 1975 (2011) and 1980 (2011), as modified by later resolutions, including resolution 2153 (2014), make to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire, including by countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), and *stressing* that these measures aim at supporting the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to possibly further modifying or lifting all or part of the remaining measures, in accordance with progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity, and *underlining* the significance of a peaceful, credible and transparent presidential election in this regard and the effective management of arms and related materiel,

Noting the upcoming presidential election in October 2015, *welcoming* in this regard the reforms adopted to prepare for this election, including the amendments to the electoral code, as well as the work undertaken by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), including through the establishment of its local branches, and *encouraging* it to continue to engage all political stakeholders in preparation of this election, *further welcoming* the steps taken by the Government to foster political dialogue and reconciliation, and *encouraging* the Government and the opposition to continue to work positively and collaboratively to ensure that the political space remains open and transparent,

Welcoming the political commitment of the Ivorian authorities to the SSR process and the efforts made towards its implementation, including through the elaboration of the legal framework for SSR defining the national strategy of the SSR as well as the national security strategy, enhanced cooperation between the National Security Council and the line ministries and international community, as well as the efforts towards decentralization of the SSR process, reinforcement of democratic governance of this sector, and efforts towards improving the gender balance within the security forces, while *expressing concern* about the delays in the adoption of certain laws and regulations relevant to SSR and the insufficient cohesion within the army, and *urging* an acceleration of efforts to reform the security sector, including by putting in place an effective chain of command, a system of military justice and appropriate budgetary allocations,

Welcoming the progress made in the overall security situation and efforts to address security challenges as well as the significant achievements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, while *expressing concern* at delays in its implementation, *re-emphasizing* that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire must provide sufficient financial resources and develop viable reintegration opportunities for former combatants in order to complete the DDR process before the presidential election of 2015 in accordance with the objective announced by the President of Côte d'Ivoire, and *stressing* the necessity for continued efforts to target unregistered combatants and to follow up on DDR efforts after June 2015 in order to ensure their sustainability,

Welcoming efforts towards better monitoring and management of weapons through the National Commission to Fight Against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, with the support of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), including through the marking of arms and related lethal materiel and efforts in the rehabilitation and improvement of armouries, and *emphasizing* the importance of continued efforts in this area, *taking note* in this regard the signature and ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by Côte d'Ivoire and *encouraging* States, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations that are in a position to do so to support Côte d'Ivoire to fulfil and implement its relevant obligations,

Reiterating the urgent need for the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue to train and equip its security forces, especially the police and gendarmerie with standard policing weapons and ammunition, and *stressing* the primary role of the police and the gendarmerie in maintaining law and order, including to secure the upcoming electoral process,

Re-emphasizing the importance of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to be able to respond proportionately to threats to the security of all citizens in Côte d'Ivoire and *calling on* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure that its security forces remain committed to upholding human rights and applicable international law,

Recognizing the efforts made by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to notably improve its cooperation with the Group of Experts originally established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1584 (2005), and *encouraging* further close cooperation between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Group of Experts,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts made by the Secretariat to expand and improve the roster of experts for the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, bearing in mind the guidance provided by the Note of the President S/2006/997,

Welcoming the progress made by the Ivorian authorities in combating illegal taxation systems, *acknowledging* the efforts undertaken to reduce the number of illegal checkpoints and incidents of racketeering, *stressing* the need to continue such efforts, including through developing a national border management strategy, *encouraging* implementation of the 2015-2016 action plan on customs administration, while *noting* the need for capacity building and allocation of resources in order to control borders, in particular in the western part of the country,

Recalling its decision to terminate through resolution 2153 the measures preventing the importation by any State of all rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005), in light of progress made towards Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) implementation and better governance of the sector,

Noting that the Kimberley Process (KP) recognized that Côte d'Ivoire fulfilled KP Certification Scheme minimum requirements in its Final Communiqué of 22 November 2013, *encouraging* Côte d'Ivoire's full implementation of its Action Plan to develop its diamond sector in line with KP standards, including participation in the KP's Regional Approach for the Mano River Union countries, *welcoming* the KP review visit that took place in March 2015, and *commending* efforts made by the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development II (PRADD II) project in cooperation with the Friends of Côte d'Ivoire to build alternate livelihoods within mining communities,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions on women, peace and security, on children and armed conflict, and on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

Reiterating its firm condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, *condemning* all violence committed against civilians, including women, children, internally displaced persons and foreign nationals, and other violations and abuses of human rights, and *stressing* that the perpetrators on all sides must be brought to justice, whether in domestic or international courts, and *encouraging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to further continue its close cooperation with the International Criminal Court,

Welcoming in this regard national and international efforts to bring to justice alleged perpetrators from all sides of violations and abuses of human rights and of violations of international humanitarian law,

Stressing the importance for the Group of Experts to be provided with the sufficient resources for the implementation of its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides*, for a period ending on 30 April 2016, that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d'Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related lethal materiel, whether or not originating in their territories;
2. *Decides* that supplies of non-lethal equipment, and the provision of any technical assistance, training or financial assistance, intended to enable the Ivorian security forces to use only appropriate and proportionate force while maintaining public order, shall not require notification to the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004);
3. *Notes that* the measures on arms and related lethal materiel in paragraph 1 do not apply to the provision of training, advice, technical or financial assistance, and expertise related to security and military activities, or to non-lethal materiel, including the supplies of civilian vehicles to the Ivorian security forces;
4. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above shall not apply to:
 - a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French forces who support them, and supplies transiting through Côte d'Ivoire intended for the support of or to be used by United Nations Peacekeeping operations;
 - b) supplies temporarily exported to Côte d'Ivoire to the forces of a State which is taking action, in accordance with international law, solely and directly to facilitate the evacuation of its nationals and those for whom it has consular responsibility in Côte d'Ivoire, as notified in advance to the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004);
 - c) supplies of arms and related lethal materiel to the Ivorian security forces, intended solely for the support of or use in the Ivorian process of SSR, as notified in advance to the Committee established by paragraph 14 of the resolution 1572 (2004), except for those arms and related lethal materiel which are set out in the Annex of this resolution, which require the advance approval of the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004);
5. *Decides* that the Committee shall add, remove or clarify items on the list of arms and related lethal materiel specified in the Annex of this resolution, as appropriate;
6. *Decides*, for the period referred to in paragraph 1 above, that the Ivorian authorities shall notify or request approval in advance, as appropriate, from the Committee for any shipments of items referred to in paragraph 4(c) above, *further decides* that the Member State delivering assistance may, in the alternative, make this notification or approval request pursuant to paragraph 4(c) after informing the Government of Côte d'Ivoire that it intends to do so;
7. *Requests* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure that notifications and approval requests sent to the Committee contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use and end user, including the intended destination unit in the Ivorian security forces or the intended place of storage, the technical specifications, quantity of the equipment to be shipped, details of the manufacturer and supplier of the equipment, the proposed date of delivery, mode of transportation and itinerary of shipments; *further stresses* the importance of a specific focus on detailed explanations for how the requested equipment will support SSR, and emphasizes that such notifications and approval requests include information about any intended modification of non-lethal equipment into lethal equipment;
8. *Decides* that the Ivorian authorities shall submit biannual reports to the Committee by 15 September 2015 and by 30 March 2016 on progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR;
9. *Encourages* Ivorian authorities to consult with UNOCI, within its existing mandate and resources, to ensure notifications and authorisation requests contain the required information;
10. *Urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to allow the Group of Experts and UNOCI access to the exempted arms and lethal materiel at the time of import and before the transfer to the end user takes place, *welcomes* the efforts of the National Commission to Fight Against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons to mark the arms and related lethal materiel when received in the territory of Côte d'Ivoire and *encourages* it to continue such efforts, *urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to maintain a registry of all arms and materiel present in the country, with a specific attention to small arms and light weapons, including any private arms caches, with a clear process delineated for how the Government of Côte d'Ivoire intends to track the movement of weapons;
11. *Decides* to review by the end of the period mentioned in paragraph 1 the measures decided in paragraphs above, with a view to possibly further modifying or lifting all or part of the remaining measures, in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of Côte d'Ivoire, in accordance with progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity, bearing in mind in this regard the significance of peaceful, credible and transparent election process and the effective management of arms and related materiel as described in paragraph 10 above;
12. *Decides* to renew until 30 April 2016 the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 9 to 12 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) and stresses its intention to review the continued listing of individuals subject to such measures provided they engage in actions that further the objective of national reconciliation;
13. *Requests* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue to update the Security Council, through the Committee, on its progress in implementing its Action Plan for diamonds, including on any enforcement

activities involving illegal smuggling, the development of its customs regime, including the creation of a risk profile for customs and law enforcement officials, and the reporting of financial flows from diamonds;

14. *Welcomes* the steps taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to start implementing the recommendations outlined in the report of the Kimberley Process Review Visit of October 2013, *expresses concern* that smuggling of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire continues, and *urges* it to continue its efforts to fully and quickly implement all of these recommendations in order to support the development of a legitimate supply chain for the export of rough diamonds;
15. *Encourages* Côte d'Ivoire and other adjacent countries to continue participation in KP regional cooperation and law enforcement activities, such as the Regional Approach for countries of the Mano River Union.
16. *Invites* the KPCS, in particular, its Working Groups on Monitoring, Statistics, and Diamond Experts, to communicate information, as appropriate, regarding Côte d'Ivoire's compliance with the KPCS to the Security Council, through the Committee, and when possible, for review by the Group of Experts; encourages donors to support Côte d'Ivoire's efforts by sharing related information and providing technical assistance;
17. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to take the necessary steps to enforce the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, including by incorporating relevant provisions in its national legal framework;
18. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular those in the subregion, to fully implement the measures mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 6 above;
19. *Expresses* its continued concern about the instability in western Côte d'Ivoire, *welcomes* and *further encourages* the coordinated action by authorities from neighbouring countries to address this issue, particularly with respect to the border area, including through continuing monitoring, information sharing and conducting coordinated actions, and in developing and implementing a shared border strategy to inter alia support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides of the border;
20. *Encourages* UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), within their respective mandates, capabilities and areas of deployment, to continue to coordinate closely in assisting respectively the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in monitoring their border, and *welcomes* continued cooperation between the Group of Experts and the Panel of Experts on Liberia appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1854 (2008);
21. *Urges* all illegal Ivorian armed combatants, including in neighbouring countries, to lay down their arms immediately, *encourages* UNOCI, within its mandate and limits of capabilities and areas of deployment, to continue to assist the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in collecting and storing the arms and registering all relevant information related to those arms and further *calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, including the National Commission to Fight Against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, to ensure that those arms are neutralized or not illegally disseminated, in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Associated Materials;
22. *Recalls* that UNOCI, within the monitoring of the arms embargo, is mandated to collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of this resolution, and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;
23. *Reiterates* the necessity for the Ivorian authorities to provide unhindered access to the Group of Experts, as well as UNOCI and the French forces which support it, to equipment, sites and installations referred to in paragraph 2(a) of resolution 1584 (2005), and to all weapons, ammunition and related materiel of all armed security forces, regardless of location, including the arms issued from the collection referred to in paragraph 10 or 11 above, when appropriate and without notice, as set out in its resolutions 1739 (2007), 1880 (2009), 1933 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1980 (2011), 2062 (2012), 2112 (2013), and 2153 (2014);
24. *Requests* all States concerned, in particular those in the subregion, to cooperate fully with the Committee, and *authorizes* the Committee to request whatever further information it may consider necessary;
25. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts as set out in paragraph 7 of resolution 1727 (2006) until 30 May 2016, *expresses its intent* to consider the renewal of this mandate no later than 30 April 2016, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to support its action;
26. *Reiterates* that paragraph 7(b) of resolution 1727 (2006) includes a mandate for the Group of Experts to gather and analyse all relevant information on sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire, for the purchase of arms and related materiel and activities and notes that pursuant to paragraph 12(a) of resolution 1727 (2006) those who are determined to be a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire through the illicit trafficking of natural resources, including diamonds and gold, may be designated by the Committee;
27. *Requests* the Group of Experts to submit an interim update on its work to the Committee by 15 September 2015 and to submit a final report to the Security Council by 8 April 2016, after discussion with the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1 above, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1980 (2011), with recommendations in this regard, as well as to submit progress updates to the Committee, especially in situations of urgency, or as the Group deems necessary;
28. *Decides* that the update and the report of the Group of Experts, as referred to in paragraph 27 above, may include, as appropriate, any information and recommendations relevant to the Committee's possible

additional designation of the individuals and entities described in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1980 (2011) and further *recalls* the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms;

29. *Decides* that the Group of Experts will also report on the activities of sanctioned individuals as well as on any continued threat to peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire posed by those individuals or others, consistent with paragraph 28 above;
30. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate as appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by UNOCI and, where possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, concerning the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;
31. *Requests* also the French Government to communicate as appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by the French forces and, where possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, concerning the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;
32. *Welcomes* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire's efforts to participate in the OECD-hosted implementation program with regard to the due diligence guidelines for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, and *urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to reach out to international organizations with a view to taking advantage of lessons learned from other initiatives and countries that have and are confronting similar issues, and *calls upon* all States to take appropriate steps to raise awareness of the guidelines referred to above, and to urge importers, processing industries and consumers of Ivorian mineral products to exercise due diligence by applying the aforementioned guidelines, with a special attention to gold;
33. *Calls upon* the Ivorian authorities to continue to take the necessary measures to dismantle the illegal taxation networks, including by undertaking relevant and thorough investigations, further reduce the number of checkpoints and prevent incidents of racketeering throughout the country, and *increase* control and oversight over the areas where natural resources, and particularly gold, are illegally exploited, and *further calls upon* the authorities to continue to take the necessary steps to continue to re-establish and reinforce relevant institutions and to accelerate the deployment of customs and border control officials in the North, West and East of the country;
34. *Asks* the Group of Experts to assess the effectiveness of these border measures and control in the region, *encourages* all neighbouring States to be aware of Ivorian efforts in that regard and *encourages* UNOCI, within its mandate, to continue its assistance to Ivorian authorities in the re-establishment of normal customs and border control operation;
35. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other organizations and interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee, the Group of Experts, UNOCI and the French forces, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011), and further *requests* the Group of Experts to coordinate its activities as appropriate with all political actors and to implement their mandate in accordance with the Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997);
36. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict to continue sharing relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);
37. *Urges* further in this context that all Ivorian parties and all States, particularly those in the region, ensure:
 - the safety of the members of the Group of Experts;
 - unhindered access by the Group of Experts, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Group of Experts to execute its mandate;
38. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

1. Weapons, direct and indirect fire artillery, and guns with a calibre bigger than 12.7 mm, their ammunition and components.
2. Rocket propelled grenades, rockets, light anti-tank weapons, rifle grenades and grenade-launchers.
3. Surface-to-air Missiles, including man portable air defence systems (Manpads); surface-to-surface missiles; and air-to-surface missiles.
4. Mortars with a calibre bigger than 82 mm.
5. Guided anti-tank weapons, especially guided anti-tank missiles, their ammunition and components.
6. Armed aircraft, including rotary wing or fixed wing.
7. Military armed vehicles or Military vehicles equipped with weapon mounts.
8. Explosive charges and devices containing explosive materials, designed for military purpose, mines and related material.

9. Night observation and night shooting devices.

Op 20 juli 2015 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties tijdens zijn 7488^e zitting Resolutie 2231 (2015) inzake Iran aangenomen. De Engelse tekst van de resolutie luidt:

Resolution 2231 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010),

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation,

Welcoming diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015, (S/2015/544, as attached as Annex A to this resolution) and the establishment of the Joint Commission,

Welcoming Iran's reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,

Noting the statement of 14 July 2015, from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union aimed at promoting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA (S/2015/545, as attached as Annex B to this resolution),

Affirming that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and *expressing* its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter,

Affirming that full implementation of the JCPOA will contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

Strongly supporting the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities, and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "Framework for Cooperation" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", and *recognizing* the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA,

Affirming that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among States, inter alia, by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, contribute to strengthening their collective security and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further *recognizing* that effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort between the IAEA and States, that the IAEA Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in this case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,

Encouraging Member States to cooperate, including through IAEA involvement, with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with Annex III of the JCPOA,

Noting the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other measures foreseen in this resolution, and *inviting* Member States to give due regard to these changes,

Emphasizing that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, and *having* regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

1. *Endorses* the JCPOA, and *urges* its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA;
2. *Calls upon* all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA;
3. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA, and *reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports;
4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments;

Terminations

5. *Requests* that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;
6. *Requests* further that, as soon as the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;
7. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5:
 - a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated;
 - b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;
8. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item "Non-proliferation" will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized;
9. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the terminations described in Annex B and paragraph 8 of this resolution shall not occur if the provisions of previous resolutions have been applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10. *Encourages* China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Iran (the "JCPOA participants") to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and *expresses* its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;
11. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, *decides* further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and *expresses* its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;
12. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a)

shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

13. *Underscores* that, in the event of a notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, Iran and the other JCPOA participants should strive to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, *expresses* its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved, *decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that if the notifying JCPOA participant State informs the Security Council that such an issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above, then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and *notes* Iran's statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA;
14. *Affirms* that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions;
15. *Affirms* that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that, prior to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with Iran or Iranian individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with each other with regard to such harm, and to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities, and *decides* if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and entities for business activities with Iran that were consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions prior to the application of these provisions;

JCPOA Implementation

16. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;
17. *Requests* Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council, *expresses* its intention to share such proposals with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA for its review, *invites* any Member of the Security Council to provide relevant information and opinions about these proposals, *encourages* the Joint Commission to give due consideration to any such information and opinions, and *requests* the Joint Commission to provide its recommendations on these proposals to the Security Council within twenty working days (or, if extended, within thirty working days);
18. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in order to support JCPOA implementation, to take the necessary administrative measures to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint Commission through agreed practical arrangements;
19. *Requests* the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA, and *requests* further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA;
20. *Requests* the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to recommending approval where consistent with this resolution and the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA so as to provide for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for Iran's nuclear activities under the JCPOA, and *encourages* the Joint Commission to establish procedures to ensure detailed and thorough review of all such proposals;

Exemptions

21. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, by JCPOA participant States or Member States acting in coordination with them, that is directly related to: (a) the modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production; (b) the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium; and (c) the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor;
22. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that Member States engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, when constituted, the Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; c) the require-

- ments, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant INFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the INFCIRCs referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers;
23. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), that are:
 - a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA;
 - b) required for preparation for the implementation of the JCPOA; or,
 - c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this resolution;
 24. *Notes* that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Other Matters

25. *Decides* to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks specified in Annex B and the release of guidance;
26. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures in this resolution;
27. *Decides* that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;
28. *Recalls* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and *underscores*, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply;
29. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the application of the provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and this resolution;
30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.

Annex A:

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme,

including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

- (i) The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
- (ii) The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
- (iii) Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
- (iv) Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
- (v) This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.
- (vi) The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
- (vii) The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- (viii) The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.
- (ix) A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
- (x) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.
- (xi) All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices.
- (xii) Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.
- (xiii) The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.
- (xiv) The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.
- (xv) The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
- (xvi) The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.

NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF₆ stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.

B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.

9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

SANCTIONS

18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue – 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.¹⁾
19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:
 - (i) Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
 - (ii) Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
 - (iii) Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
 - (iv) Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
 - (v) Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
 - (vi) Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;
 - (vii) Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;

¹⁾ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

- (viii) Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
 - (ix) Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - (x) Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - (xi) Export of key naval equipment and technology;
 - (xii) Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
 - (xiii) Provision of flagging and classification services;
 - (xiv) Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
 - (xv) Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
 - (xvi) Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
 - (xvii) Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
 - (xviii) Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
 - (xix) Associated services for each of the categories above.
20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:
- (i) Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
 - (ii) Transactions in Iranian Rial;
 - (iii) Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
 - (iv) Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
 - (v) Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
 - (vi) Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 - (vii) Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
 - (viii) Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales;
 - (ix) Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - (x) Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
 - (xi) Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
 - (xii) Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
 - (xiii) Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
 - (xiv) Trade in gold and other precious metals;
 - (xv) Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
 - (xvi) Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector;
 - (xvii) Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
 - (xviii) Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
 - (xix) Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.
23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.
24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA

participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.

25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.
27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.
28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements.²⁾ The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.
29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.
30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.
31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.
32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.
33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran's access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

²⁾ "Government officials" for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:
- (i) Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
 - (ii) Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
 - (iii) Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.
 - (iv) Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
 - (v) UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level – either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.
37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. GENERAL

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

B. ARAK HEAVY WATER RESEARCH REACTOR

2. Iran will modernise the Arak heavy water research reactor to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and industrial purposes. Iran will redesign and rebuild the reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to this Annex) to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, including testing of fuel pins and assembly prototypes and structural materials. The design will be such as to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal operation. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The E3/EU+3 and Iran share the understanding that the parameters in the conceptual design are subject to possible and necessary adjustments in developing the final design while fully preserving the above-mentioned purposes and principles of modernisation.
3. Iran will not pursue construction at the existing unfinished reactor based on its original design and will remove the existing calandria and retain it in Iran. The calandria will be made inoperable by filling any openings in the calandria with concrete such that the IAEA can verify that it will not be usable for a future nuclear application. In redesigning and reconstructing of the modernized Arak heavy water research reactor, Iran will maximise the use of existing infrastructure already installed at the current Arak research reactor.
4. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding the modernisation of the Arak reactor as described in this Annex. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
5. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the final design. If the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within three months, Iran could raise the issue through the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.
6. The IAEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with the approved final design.
7. As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with their national laws, take appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to support co-operation. E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through the mechanism established by this JCPOA, as well as through exploration of relevant funding contributions.
8. E3/EU+3 parties will also support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories, upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate, including but not limited to technical and financial assistance, supply of required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.
9. The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium in the form of UO₂ with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO₂ in a full core load, with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The international partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial fuel core load for the reactor outside Iran. The international partnership will cooperate with Iran, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran for subsequent fuel core reloads for future use with this reactor. Destructive and non-destructive testing of this fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of the participating countries out-

side of Iran and that country will work with Iran to license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned reactor under IAEA monitoring.

10. Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Iran will store under IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernised Arak reactor.
11. All spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, will be shipped out of Iran to a mutually determined location in E3/EU+3 countries or third countries, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded, consistent with national laws, with the recipient party, within one year from the unloading from the reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by the recipient country.
12. Iran will submit the DIQ of the redesigned reactor to the IAEA which will include information on the planned radio-isotope production and reactor operation programme. The reactor will be operated under IAEA monitoring.
13. Iran will operate the Fuel Manufacturing Plant only to produce fuel assemblies for light water reactors and reloads for the modernized Arak reactor.

C. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT

14. All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the modernised Arak research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and production of deuterate solutions and chemical compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. Iran's needs, consistent with the parameters above, are estimated to be 130 metric tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments prior to commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 metric tonnes after the commissioning, including the amount contained in the reactor.
15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.

D. OTHER REACTORS

16. Consistent with its plan, Iran will keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying only on light water for its future nuclear power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation including assurances of supply of necessary fuel.
17. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be concluded consistent with national laws with the recipient party.

E. SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES

18. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or spent fuel reprocessing R&D activities. For the purpose of this annex, spent fuel includes all types of irradiated fuel.
19. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
20. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium from spent fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.
21. For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.
22. The E3/EU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-destructive examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in Iran, using their existing facilities outside Iran. Except for the Arak research reactor complex, Iran

will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing PIE or seek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for 15 years.

23. For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiation examination (PIE) of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural materials. These examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex. However, the E3/EU+3 will make available their facilities to conduct destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.
24. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.
25. Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (defined as 20% or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using neptunium-237) for 15 years.
26. If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.

F. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

27. Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in no more than 30 cascades in their current configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) for 10 years.
28. Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67 percent for 15 years.
29. Iran will remove the following excess centrifuges and infrastructure not associated with 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in FEP, which will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring:
 - 29.1. All excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m centrifuges. Excess IR-1 centrifuges will be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges of the same type on a one-for-one basis.
 - 29.2. UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps.
30. For the purpose of this Annex, the IAEA will confirm through the established practice the failed or damaged status of centrifuge machines before removal.
31. For 15 years, Iran will install gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope enrichment, exclusively at the locations and for the activities specified under this JCPOA.

G. CENTRIFUGES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

32. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. For 10 years and consistent with its enrichment R&D plan, Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. Mechanical testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type will be carried out only on the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7 and IR-8. Iran will build or test, with or without uranium, only those gas centrifuges specified in this JCPOA.
33. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
34. Consistent with its plan, Iran will continue working with the 164-machine IR-4 cascade at PFEP in order to complete the necessary tests until 30 November 2015 or the day of implementation of this JCPOA, whichever comes later, and after that it will take these machines out of the PFEP and store them under IAEA continuous monitoring at Natanz in Hall B of FEP.
35. Iran will continue the testing of a single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 years.
36. Iran will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.
37. Iran will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
38. Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the IR-8 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades and will commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.
39. For 10 years, Iran, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium materials and verified by the IAEA.

40. For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only at the PFEP and the Tehran Research Centre.
41. For the purpose of adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will remove all centrifuges except those needed for testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for the IR-1 cascade (No. 1) as described below. For the full IR-1 cascade (No. 6), Iran will modify associated infrastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters. The IR-1 cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rotors and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum, power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D programme.
42. Consistent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework (including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible with single centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale testing.
43. Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and simulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing within 10 years, a full presentation to, and approval by, the Joint Commission is needed.

H. FORDOW FUEL ENRICHMENT PLANT

44. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow.
45. Iran will not conduct any uranium enrichment or any uranium enrichment related R&D and will have no nuclear material at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) for 15 years.
46. For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines at one wing of the FFEP of which:
 - 46.1. Two cascades that have not experienced UF6 before will be modified for the production of stable isotopes. The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. To prepare these two cascades for installation of a new cascade architecture appropriate for stable isotope production by the joint partnership, Iran will remove the connection to the UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6 pipework (except for the dump line in order to maintain vacuum) to storage in Fordow under IAEA continuous monitoring. The Joint Commission will be informed about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at FFEP.
 - 46.2. For four cascades with all associated infrastructure remaining except for pipework that enables crossover tandem connections, two will be placed in an idle state, not spinning. The other two cascades will continue to spin until the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon completion of the transition to stable isotope production described in the previous subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle state, not spinning.
47. Iran will:
 - 47.1. remove the other 2 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges from this wing, by removing all centrifuges and cascade UF6 pipework, including sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency inverters.
 - 47.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets and vacuum pumps. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
48. Iran will:
 - 48.1. remove all excess centrifuges and uranium enrichment related infrastructure from the other wing of the FFEP. This will include removal of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converters, and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.
 - 48.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All these excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.
49. Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope production at Fordow.
50. Iran will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas centrifuges to the FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in

Iran will occur at the FFEP and at Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities for testing, modification and balancing these IR-1 centrifuges.

51. The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA, access to the FFEP in order to monitor Iran's production of stable isotopes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.

I. OTHER ASPECTS OF ENRICHMENT

52. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol.³⁾ The IAEA will confirm on an annual basis, for the duration of the plan that the nature and scope and scale of Iran's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line with this plan.
53. Iran will start to install necessary infrastructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall B of FEP after year 10.
54. An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, IR-8) and the associated definitions need to be accomplished by implementation day.
55. An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.

J. URANIUM STOCKS AND FUELS

56. Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) for 15 years.
57. All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF₆ (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. Iran will enter into a commercial contract with an entity outside Iran for the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg UF₆ in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, where applicable, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. Iran may choose to seek to sell excess enriched uranium to the IAEA fuel bank in Kazakhstan when the fuel bank becomes operational.
58. All uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. Scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less. In case of future supply of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U₃O₈) for TRR fuel plates fabrication, all scrap oxide and other forms not in plates that cannot be fabricated into TRR fuel plates, containing uranium enriched to between 5% and 20%, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67% or less within 6 months of its production. Scrap plates will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside Iran. The commercial transactions should be structured to return an equivalent amount of natural uranium to Iran. For 15 years, Iran will not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back to UF₆.
59. Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran do not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from other sources outside of Iran for use in Iran's nuclear research and power reactors, including those which will be fabricated outside of Iran for the initial fuel load of the modernised Arak research reactor, which are certified by the fuel supplier and the appropriate Iranian authority to meet international standards, will not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit. The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF₆ or the equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF₆. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF₆ stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF₆. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF₆ would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group. The Joint Commission will

³⁾ Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.

also support assistance to Iran including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran.

60. Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for the purchase of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3 will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract. In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3 will supply a quantity of 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U₃O₈) and deliver to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75% enriched uranium oxide (U₃O₈) will be supplied in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg and each new increment will be provided only when the previous increment of this material has been verified by the IAEA to have been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into enriched uranium targets. Iran will notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.

K. CENTRIFUGE MANUFACTURING

61. Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any other centrifuge components, to meet the enrichment and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.
62. Consistent with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-1 centrifuge machines in storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-1 centrifuges in Natanz and the IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period from the start of the implementation of the JCPOA, the level of stock of IR-1 machines falls to 500 or below, Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-1 machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the stock of 500.
63. Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10, Iran will produce complete centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and enrichment R&D needs. Iran will store them at Natanz in an above ground location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they are needed for final assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

L. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AND MODIFIED CODE 3.1

64. Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament).
65. Iran will notify the IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force.

M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN

66. Iran will complete all activities as set out in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", as verified by the IAEA in its regular updates by the Director General of the IAEA on the implementation of this Roadmap.

N. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG TERM PRESENCE OF IAEA

67. For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for this JCPOA, for 15 years or longer, for the specified verification measures:
 - 67.1. Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working space in individual nuclear sites.
 - 67.2. Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence, including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
 - 67.3. Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150 within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran, consistent with its laws and regulations.

O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)

68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.

P. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO ENRICHMENT

70. For 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in this Annex.
71. Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of the FEP and PFEP, for 15 years.
72. For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.
73. Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. For 15 years, Iran will only engage, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or enrichment related activities, including related research and development activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.

Q. ACCESS

74. Requests for access pursuant to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for the purpose of JCPOA implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and are without prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge.
75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.
76. If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.
77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA's concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.
78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA's original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA's concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY

79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
80. In this context:
 - 80.1. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inven-

tory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.

- 80.2. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.

S. OTHER URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION ACTIVITIES

81. For 10 years, Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production activities will be exclusively based on gaseous centrifuge technology.⁴⁾ Iran will permit IAEA access to verify that uranium isotope separation production and R&D activities are consistent with this Annex.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
- 82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.
- 82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
- 82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
- 82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

Attachment:

Arak conceptual design

Fundamental Principles:

- Maximize use of the current infrastructure of original design of Arak research reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40, according to their respective ratings.
- Modernizing of the original design in order to be a multi-purpose research reactor comprising radioisotope production, structural materials and fuel (pins and assembly prototypes) testing and able to conduct other neutronic experiments which demand high neutron fluxes (more than 10^{14}).
- Using heavy water as coolant, moderator and reflector. Light water would be utilized as an annular ring around the compact new core for safety reasons if necessary.
- Around 78 fuel assemblies in a tight hexagonal grid spacing with the following preliminary characteristics will be loaded.
- Up to 3.67 percent enriched UO_2 , in the improved assembly design, will be used as fuel.
- Power will not exceed to 20 MWth.
- Adding different types of beam tubes to the existing beam tubes which being extended to the edge of the new compact core.
- Having one central channel in the center of the new core with passive cooling system for the purpose of structural materials and fuel pins and assembly prototypes testing with neutron flux beyond $2 \cdot 10^{14}$, twelve in-core irradiation channels (IIC) inside the core and twelve lateral irradiation channels (LIC) just next to the outer ring of fuel assemblies.
- The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed and fixed to meet the best anticipated performances.
- Consistent with relevant section of Annex 1, subsidiary laboratories are part of the modernization project of the Arak Research Reactor. In Addition, Annex III reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratories.
- The highest tolerable pressure for the first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (at the interance of the reactor pit).

⁴⁾ For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.

- The highest possible flow rate for coolant is 610 kg/s at the pressure of 0.33 MPa in the main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same conditions.

Preliminary Characteristics:

Core Parameters	Values
Power (MW)	20
Number of fuel assemblies	~ 78
Active length (cm)	~ 110
Lattice configuration	Hexagonal
Fuel pellets Material	UO ₂
Fuel enrichment level	Up to 3.67 %
Clad material	Zr Alloys
Burnable poison	Yes, if necessary
Lattice pitch (cm)	~ 11
Coolant medium	D ₂ O
Moderator medium	D ₂ O
Reflector medium	D ₂ O
Reflector thickness (cm)	~ 50
Purity of D2O	~ 99.8%
Mass of D2O (mtons)	~ 60-70
Yearly makeup	Yes
K _{eff}	< 1.25
Core Excess reactivity (pcm)	< 20000
Cycle length (days) <small>approximatly</small>	~ 250
²³⁹ Pu at EoC (g)	~ 850
²³⁹ Pu purity at EoC	~ 78%
²³⁵ U consumption	~ 60%
Maximum Thermal Flux, E<0.625ev	~ 3•10 ¹⁴
Maximum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Minimum Thermal Flux, E<0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev	~ 1•10 ¹⁴
Fluid velocity in channels (m/s)	~ 3.8
Channel mass flow rate (kg/s)	~ 2.4
Working pressure (MPa)	0.33
Fluid inlet temperature (°C)	~ 47
Fluid outlet temperature (°C)	~ 78
Core material	Mainly S.S. 304
Core wall Thichness (mm)	~ 30
Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm)	~ 0.65
Inner Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.67
Outer Clad Diameter (cm)	~ 0.8
Number of pins per assembly	12
Mass of UO2 in full core load (Kg)	~ 350
Core diameter (cm)	~ 240

JCPOA Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments

The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V (Implementation Plan) to this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

A. European Union¹⁾

1. The EU and EU Member States commit to terminate all provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (as subsequently amended) implementing all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, to terminate all provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended), as specified in Sections 1.1-1.10 below, and to terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required, in accordance with Annex V:
 - 1.1. **Financial, banking and insurance measures²⁾**
 - 1.1.1. Prohibition and authorisation regimes on financial transfers to and from Iran (Article 10 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 30, 30a, 30b and 31 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.1.2. Sanctions on banking activities (Article 11 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 33 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.1.3. Sanctions on insurance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 35 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.1.4. Sanctions on financial messaging services (Article 20(12) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.1.5. Sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
 - 1.1.6. Sanctions on grants, financial assistance and concessional loans (Article 9 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP);
 - 1.1.7. Sanctions on Government of Iran public-guaranteed bonds (Article 13 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Article 34 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.1.8. Sanctions on associated services³⁾ for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 - 1.2. **Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors**
 - 1.2.1. Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 11, 12 and 14a, and Annexes IV and IVA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.2.2. Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products (Articles 3b and 3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 13 and 14, and Annex V of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.2.3. Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 4, 4a and 4b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 8, 9 and 10, and Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.2.4. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles 6, 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 17(1), 17(2)(b) and (c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(5), 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.2.5. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 - 1.3. **Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors**
 - 1.3.1. Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, 8a, 18a and 18b of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10a, 10b, 10c, 37a, and 37b, and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012);
 - 1.3.2. Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.3.3. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 - 1.4. **Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage**
 - 1.4.1. Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage (Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15 and 16, and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the references above).
 - 1.5. **Nuclear proliferation-related measures**

¹⁾ For the purposes of EU legislation, "Iranian person, entity or body" means:

- (i) the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;
- (ii) any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;
- (iii) any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;
- (iv) any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.

²⁾ The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only.

³⁾ For the purposes of this Annex, the term "associated services" means any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.

- 1.5.1. Sanctions related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities (goods and technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(1) (a), (b), (d), (e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 17(1) and (2)(a), 18, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
- 1.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
- 1.6. **Metals**
 - 1.6.1. Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and 15c, and Annex VIIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
- 1.7. **Software**
 - 1.7.1. Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 10d, 10e and 10f, and Annex VIIA of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
- 1.8. **Arms**
 - 1.8.1. Sanctions on arms (Articles 1(1)(c), (3) and (4), and 3 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), 17(1) and (2)(a), and 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.8.2. Sanctions on associated services for the category above (see the references above).
- 1.9. **Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban)**
 - 1.9.1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:
 - 1.9.1.1. listed Iranian banks and financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran;
 - 1.9.1.2. listed persons, entities and bodies related to the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
 - 1.9.1.3. listed persons, entities and bodies related to shipping, shipbuilding and transport;
 - 1.9.1.4. other listed persons, entities and bodies not related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities;
 - 1.9.1.5. listed persons, entities and bodies related to proliferation-sensitive nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missile-related activities; and
 - 1.9.1.6. entities and individuals listed by the UN Security Council, as set out in Attachment 1, part I to this Annex for categories 1.9.1.1-1.9.1.4, Attachment 2, part I to this Annex for category 1.9.1.5, and Parts II of Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex for category 1.9.1.6 (Articles 19 and 20, and Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29, and Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
- 1.10. **Other provisions**
 - 1.10.1. The commitment in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 not specified above.
 - 1.10.1.1. Definitions (Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012); and
 - 1.10.1.2. General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 26a, 27 and 28 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP; Articles 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 43a, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012).
2. The EU represents that the provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute the full and complete list of all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. These sanctions or restrictive measures will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.
3. **Effects of the lifting of EU economic and financial sanctions**
 - 3.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the following activities, including associated services, will be allowed, beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU Member States' laws and regulations in effect:⁴⁾
 - 3.2. **Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)**
 - 3.2.1. Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU financial and credit institutions, and Iranian persons, entities or bodies, including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the requirement for authorisation or notification;
 - 3.2.2. Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States; and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial and credit institutions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint ventures or bank accounts in Iran;
 - 3.2.3. Provision of insurance or reinsurance to Iran or the Government of Iran, an Iranian legal person, entity or body, or a natural person or a legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;
 - 3.2.4. Supply of specialised financial messaging services to any Iranian natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex;

⁴⁾ Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.

- 3.2.5. Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance; and into commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran; and
- 3.2.6. Sale or purchase of public or public-guaranteed bonds to and from Iran, the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or Iranian banks and financial institutions or persons acting on their behalf.
- 3.3. **Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.5)**
 - 3.3.1. Import, purchase, swap or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products, natural gas or petrochemical products and related financing;
 - 3.3.2. Sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or technology, technical assistance, including training, used in the sectors of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries in Iran covering exploration, production and refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, to any Iranian person, in or outside Iran, or for use in Iran; and
 - 3.3.3. Granting of any financial loan or credit to, the acquisition or extension of a participation in, and the creation of any joint venture with, any Iranian person that is engaged in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors in Iran or outside Iran.
- 3.4. **Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3)**
 - 3.4.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of naval equipment and technology for ship building, maintenance or refit, to Iran or to any Iranian persons engaged in this sector; the design, construction or the participation in the design or construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons; the provision of vessels designed or used for the transport or storage of oil and petrochemical products to Iranian persons, entities or bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including those pertaining to technical specification, registration and identification numbers of any kind, to Iranian oil tankers and cargo vessels;
 - 3.4.2. Access to the airports under the jurisdiction of EU Member States of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran;
 - 3.4.3. Cessation of inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member States of cargoes to and from Iran in their territories with regard to items which are no longer prohibited; and
 - 3.4.4. Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or Iranian-contracted vessels not carrying prohibited items; and the provision of fuel, engineering and maintenance services to Iranian cargo aircraft not carrying prohibited items.
- 3.5. **Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.2)**
 - 3.5.1. Sale, supply, purchase, export, transfer or transport of gold and precious metals as well as diamonds, and provision of related brokering, financing and security services, to, from or for the Government of Iran, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or the Central Bank of Iran; and
 - 3.5.2. Delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and coinage to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.
- 3.6. **Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)**
 - 3.6.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals, such as aluminum and steel to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
- 3.7. **Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)**
 - 3.7.1. Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial processes, including updates, to any Iranian person, entity or body, or for use in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA,
- 3.8. **Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See Section 1.9.1)**
 - 3.8.1. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or economic resources to, the persons, entities and bodies, including Iranian banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex; and
 - 3.8.2. As a result of delisting as specified in this Annex, entry into, or transit through the territories of EU Member States of individuals listed in Attachment 1 to this Annex.

B. United States⁵⁾

4. The United States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related sanctions⁶⁾ as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below, and to terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622 and 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance with Annex V.⁷⁾

4.1. Financial and banking measures

- 4.1.1. Sanctions on transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including: the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and other specified Iranian financial institutions; the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),⁸⁾ Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and other specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and certain designated individuals and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)(I); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.2. Sanctions on the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 1(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.3. Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.4. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including limitations on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.5. Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) Section 213(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.1.6. Sanctions on financial messaging services to the CBI and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 220; IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.1.7. Sanctions on associated services⁹⁾ for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.2. Insurance measures

- 4.2.1. Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex (Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7);

⁵⁾ For the purposes of U.S. legislation, "Iranian person" means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.

⁶⁾ The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term "non-U.S. person" means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person. For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is "owned or controlled" by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

⁷⁾ All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201-207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214-216, 222, 224, 311-312, 402-403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.

⁸⁾ Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.

⁹⁾ See footnote 3 for the meaning of "associated services".

NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).

4.3. Energy and petrochemical sectors

- 4.3.1. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil (ISA Section 5(a)(7); NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.3.2. Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and (4)-(8); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Section 1 of E.O. 13590, Sections 1(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.3.3. Sanctions on the purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran (NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.3.4. Sanctions on the export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran (ISA Section 5(a)(3); NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Section 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of E.O. 13574, Sections 1(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);
- 4.3.5. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's energy sector including with NIOC, NICO and NITC (NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a); TRA Section 212(a); Sections 1(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.3.6. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.4. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors

- 4.4.1. Sanctions on transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators including IRISL, South Shipping Line, and NITC, and the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁰⁾ (TRA Sections 211(a) and 212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d); 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.4.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.5. Gold and other precious metals

- 4.5.1. Sanctions on Iran's trade in gold and other precious metals (NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.5.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.6. Software and metals

- 4.6.1. Sanctions on trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex (NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.6.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.7. Automotive sector

- 4.7.1. Sanctions on the sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAAs Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(II), (a)(1)(C)(ii)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i), 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 13645); and
- 4.7.2. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see individual citation references above).

4.8. Designations and other sanctions listings

- 4.8.1. Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(1) and TRA Section 212; and

¹⁰⁾ This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and E.O. 13645).

4.9. Nuclear proliferation-related measures

- 4.9.1. Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT;
- 4.9.2. Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and
- 4.9.3. Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA Section 501).

5. Other trade measures

5.1. The United States commits to:¹¹⁾

- 5.1.1. Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use, (ii) export, re-export, sale, lease or transfer to Iran of spare parts and components for commercial passenger aircraft, and (iii) provision of associated serviced, including warranty, maintenance, and repair services and safety-related inspections, for all the foregoing, provided that licensed items and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation;¹²⁾
- 5.1.2. License non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person¹³⁾ to engage in activities with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA; and
- 5.1.3. License the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.

6. The United States represents that the provisions listed in Section 4 above constitute the full and complete list of all U.S. nuclear-related sanctions. These sanctions will be lifted in accordance with Annex V.

7. Effects of the lifting of U.S. economic and financial sanctions:

7.1. As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 above, beginning on implementation day such sanctions, including associated services, would not apply to non-U.S. persons who carry out the following or that:¹⁴⁾

7.2. Financial and banking measures¹⁵⁾ (See Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7)

Engage in activities, including financial and banking transactions, with the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, Iranian financial institutions and other Iranian persons specified in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including the provision of loans, transfers, accounts (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions), investments, securities, guarantees, foreign exchange (including Rial related transactions), letters of credit and commodity futures or options, the provision of specialised financial messaging services and facilitation of direct or indirect access thereto, the purchase or acquisition by the Government of Iran of U.S. bank notes, and the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt.¹⁶⁾

7.3. Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1)

Provide underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)

¹¹⁾ To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.

¹²⁾ Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.

¹³⁾ For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.

¹⁴⁾ Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on U.S. sanctions.

¹⁵⁾ For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.

¹⁶⁾ Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.

or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.

7.4. Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)

Are part of the energy sector of Iran; purchase, acquire, sell, transport or market petroleum, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; provide to Iran support, investment (including through joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology that can be used in connection with Iran's energy sector, the development of its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products; or engage in activities with Iran's energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO).

7.5. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2)

Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of Iran; own, operate, control or insure a vessel used to transport crude oil, petroleum products (including refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural gas) to or from Iran; operate a port in Iran, engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran or a port operator in Iran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas¹⁷⁾), including port services, such as bunkering and inspection, classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels to Iran, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), NITC, and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.

7.6. Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2)

Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing including security, insurance and transportation.

7.7. Software and metals (See Sections 4.6.1 to 4.6.2)

Sell, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, to or from Iran in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, and the sale, supply, or transfer of such materials to the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuilding sectors of Iran, and Iranian ports, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or provide services for the foregoing, including insurance and transportation.

7.8. Automotive sector (See Sections 4.7.1 to 4.7.2)

Conduct or facilitate financial or other transactions for the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of goods and services used in connection with the automotive sector of Iran.

7.9. Designations and other sanctions listings (See Section 4.8.1)

The removal of designations and/or sanctions as described in Section 4.8.1, ceasing the application of secondary sanctions for transactions with individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex; and unblocking of property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction for individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex.

ATTACHMENT 1 – PART I

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

ACENA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ADVANCE NOVEL
AGHAJARI OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
AGHAZADEH, Reza
AHMADIAN, Mohammad
AKHAVAN-FARD, Massoud
ALPHA EFFORT LTD
ALPHA KARA NAVIGATION LIMITED
ALPHA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
ARIAN BANK
ARVANDAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
ASHTAD SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
ASPASIS MARINE CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION
ASSA CORPORATION LTD
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
AVRASYA CONTAINER SHIPPING LINES
AZARAB INDUSTRIES
AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY ALIAS AZORES SHIPPING FZE LLC
BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO CA

¹⁷⁾ The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.

BANK KARGOSHAE
BANK MELLAT
BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
BANK MELLI IRAN ZAO
BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY
BANK MELLI,
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE
BANK REFAH KARGARAN
BANK TEJARAT
BATENI, Naser
BEST PRECISE LTD
BETA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
BIS MARITIME LIMITED
BONAB RESEARCH CENTER
BRAIT HOLDING SA
BRIGHT JYOTI SHIPPING
BRIGHT SHIP FZC
BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN
CHAPLET SHIPPING LIMITED
COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
CONCEPT GIANT LTD
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK
CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
DAMALIS MARINE CORPORATION
DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
DARYA DELALAN SEFID KHAZAR SHIPPING COMPANY
DELTA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
DELTA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
DIAMOND SHIPPING SERVICES
DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EAST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
ELBRUS LTD
ELCHO HOLDING LTD
ELEGANT TARGET DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
EMKA COMPANY
EPSILON NARI NAVIGATION LTD
E-SAIL A.K.A.E-SAIL SHIPPING COMPANY
ETA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
ETERNAL EXPERT LTD.
EUROPÄISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK
EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN
FAIRWAY SHIPPING
FAQIHIAN, Dr Hoseyn
FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
FASIRUS MARINE CORPORATION
FATSA
FIFTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK
FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FIRST PERSIAN EQUITY FUND
FOURTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH

FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
FUTURE BANK BSC
GACHSARAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
GALLIOT MARITIME INCORPORATION
GAMMA KARA NAVIGATION LTD
GIANT KING LIMITED
GOLDEN CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLDEN SUMMIT INVESTMENTS LTD.
GOLDEN WAGON DEVELOPMENT LTD.
GOLPARVAR, Gholam Hossein
GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
GOOD LUCK SHIPPING COMPANY LLC
GRAND TRINITY LTD.
GREAT EQUITY INVESTMENTS LTD.
GREAT METHOD LTD
GREAT PROSPECT INTERNATIONAL LTD.
HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES
HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST & SHIPPING GMBH
HARVEST SUPREME LTD.
HARZARU SHIPPING
HELIOTROPE SHIPPING LIMITED
HELIX SHIPPING LIMITED
HK INTERTRADE COMPANY LTD
HONG TU LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED
HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
IFOLD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
INDUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & RENOVATION ORGANIZATION
INSIGHT WORLD LTD
INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
IOTA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
IRAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY
IRAN FUEL CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION
IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY
IRAN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS CO.
IRANIAN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY LIMITED
IRANIAN OIL PIPELINES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (IOPTC)
IRANIAN OIL TERMINALS COMPANY
IRANO MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
IRINVESTSHIP LTD
IRISL (MALTA) LTD
IRISL EUROPE GMBH
IRISL MARINE SERVICES AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
IRISL MARITIME TRAINING INSTITUTE
IRITAL SHIPPING SRL
ISI MARITIME LIMITED
ISIM AMIN LIMITED
ISIM ATR LIMITED
ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
ISIM SAT LIMITED
ISIM SEA CHARIOT LTD
ISIM SEA CRESCENT LTD
ISIM SININ LIMITED
ISIM TAJ MAHAL LTD
ISIM TOUR COMPANY LIMITED
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
JACKMAN SHIPPING COMPANY
KALA NAFT
KALAN KISH SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
KAPPA NARI NAVIGATION LTD
KARA SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH
KAROOON OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
KAVERI MARITIME INCORPORATION
KAVERI SHIPPING LLC

KEY CHARTER DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 KHALILIPOUR, Said Esmail
 KHANCHI, Ali Reza
 KHAZAR EXPL & PROD CO
 KHAZAR SHIPPING LINES
 KHEIBAR COMPANY
 KING PROSPER INVESTMENTS LTD.
 KINGDOM NEW LTD
 KINGSWOOD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 KISH SHIPPING LINE MANNING COMPANY
 LAMBDA NARI NAVIGATION LIMITED
 LANCING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LOGISTIC SMART LTD
 LOWESWATER LTD
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK
 MAGNA CARTA LIMITED
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MAROUN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASJED-SOLEYMAN OIL & GAS COMPANY
 MASTER SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY PJS
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INCORPORATION
 METRO SUPREME INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 MIDHURST SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED (MALTA)
 MILL DENE LTD
 MINISTRY OF ENERGY
 MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
 MODALITY LTD
 MODERN ELEGANT DEVELOPMENT LTD.
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INCORPORATION
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE COMPANY SRL
 NAMJOO, Majid
 NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NARMADA SHIPPING
 NATIONAL IRANIAN DRILLING COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY NEDERLAND (A.K.A.: NIOC NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATION OFFICE)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIMITED
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (NIOEC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTION COMPANY (NIOPDC)
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
 NEUMAN LTD
 NEW DESIRE LTD
 NEW SYNERGY
 NEWHAVEN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NOOR AFZA GOSTAR
 NORTH DRILLING COMPANY
 NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT COMPANY
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OCEAN EXPRESS AGENCIES PRIVATE LIMITED
 ONERBANK ZAO
 OXTED SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 PACIFIC SHIPPING
 PARS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ENERGY ZONE
 PARTNER CENTURY LTD

PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PETRO SUISSE
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD
 PETROLEUM ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE
 PETROPARS IRAN COMPANY
 PETROPARS LTD.
 PETROPARS OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
 PETROPARS OPERATION & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 PETROPARS RESOURCES ENGINEERING LTD
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED
 PETWORTH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 POST BANK OF IRAN
 POWER PLANTS' EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY (SAAKHTE TAJHIZATE NIROOGAHI)
 PROSPER METRO INVESTMENTS LTD.
 RASTKHAH, Engineer Naser
 REIGATE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
 REZVANIANZADEH, Mohammad Reza
 RISHI MARITIME INCORPORATION
 SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LTD
 SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
 SALEHI, Ali Akbar
 SANFORD GROUP
 SANTEXLINES
 SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
 SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SHALLON LTD
 SHEMAL CEMENT COMPANY
 SHINE STAR LIMITED
 SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
 SILVER UNIVERSE INTERNATIONAL LTD.
 SINA BANK
 SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS
 SINOSE MARITIME
 SISCO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 SIXTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SMART DAY HOLDINGS LTD
 SOLTANI, Behzad
 SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT)
 SOROUGH SARAMIN ASATIR
 SOUTH WAY SHIPPING AGENCY CO. LTD
 SOUTH ZAGROS OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 SPARKLE BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
 SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
 STATIRA MARITIME INCORPORATION
 SUREH (NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY)
 SYSTEM WISE LTD
 TAMALARIS CONSOLIDATED LTD
 TENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TEU FEEDER LIMITED
 THETA NARI NAVIGATION
 THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
 TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED

TRADE CAPITAL BANK
TRADE TREASURE
TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LTD
TULIP SHIPPING INC
TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
UNIVERSAL TRANSPORTATION LIMITATION UTL
VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE
WEST OIL & GAS PRODUCTION COMPANY
WESTERN SURGE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
WISE LING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ZANJANI, Babak
ZETA NERI NAVIGATION

ATTACHMENT 1 – PART II

*LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
AND ANNEX VIII TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012*

AGHA-JANI, Dawood
ALAI, Amir Moayyed
ASGARPOUR, Behman
ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
BAKHTIAR, Haleh
BEHZAD, Morteza
ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
IRISL BENELUX NV
JABBER IBN HAYAN
KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
MOHAMMADI, Jafar
MONAJEMI, Ehsan
NOBARI, Houshang
NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
PARS TRASH COMPANY
PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
QANNADI, Mohammad
RAHIMI, Amir
RAHIQI, Javad
RASHIDI, Abbas
SABET, M. Javad Karimi
SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
TAMAS COMPANY

ATTACHMENT 2 – PART I

*LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX II TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
AND ANNEX IX TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012*

AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION, AIO
AL YASIN, Javad
ALUMINAT

ANSAR BANK
ARAN MODERN DEVICES
ARAS FARAYANDE
ARFA PAINT COMPANY
ARFEH COMPANY
ARIA NIKAN,
ARMED FORCES GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION
ASHTIAN TABLO
BABAEI, Davoud
BALS ALMAN
BANK SADERAT IRAN
BANK SADERAT PLC
BARGH AZARAKSH
BEHNAM SAHRIYARI TRADING COMPANY
BONYAD TAAVON SEPAH
BORBORUDI, Sayed Shamsuddin
DANESHJOO, Kamran
DARVISH-VAND, IRGC Brigadier-General Javad
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES
ESNICO (EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)
ETEMAD AMIN INVEST CO MOBIN
EYVAZ TECHNIC
FADAVI, Rear Admiral Ali
FAJR AVIATION COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES
FARAHI, IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi
FARASEPEHR ENGINEERING COMPANY
FATAH, Parviz
GHANI SAZI URANIUM COMPANY
HAERI, Engineer Mojtaba
HIRBOD CO
HOSEYNITASH, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
HOSSEINI NEJAD TRADING CO.
INSTITUTE OF APPLIED PHYSICS
IRAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
IRAN AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY
IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
IRAN COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES
IRAN COMPOSITES INSTITUTE
IRAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
IRAN MARINE INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
IRAN POOYA
IRAN SAFFRON COMPANY OR IRANSAFFRON CO.
IRANIAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION
IRGC AIR FORCE
IRGC QODS FORCE
IRGC-AIR FORCE AL-GHADIR MISSILE COMMAND
ISFAHAN OPTICS
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
JAFARI, Milad
JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
JELVESAZAN COMPANY
KARANIR
KARIMIAN, Ali
KHALA AFARIN PARS
KHANSARI, Majid
MAAA SYNERGY
MACPAR MAKINA SAN VE TIC
MAHMUDZADEH, Ebrahim
MARINE INDUSTRIES
MAROU SANAT
MATSA (MOHANDESI TOSEH SOKHT ATOMI COMPANY)
MECHANIC INDUSTRIES GROUP
MEHR BANK
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
MOBIN SANJESH
MODERN TECHNOLOGIES FZC
MOHAMMADI, Mohammad

MOHAMMADLU, Brigadier-General Beik
 MOVASAGHNIA, Mohammad Reza
 MULTIMAT LC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI
 NACCACHE, Anis
 NADERI, Brigadier-General Mohammad
 NAJJAR, IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad
 NAQDI, BrigGen Mohammad Reza
 NASERI, Mohammad Sadegh
 NASERIN VAHID
 NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 NEKA NOVIN
 NOAVARAN POOYAMOJ
 NOURI, Ali Ashraf
 OIL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND INVESTMENT COMPANY
 ORGANISATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
 PAKPUR, BrigGen Mohammad
 PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
 PARTO SANAT CO
 PASSIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
 PAYA PARTO
 QASEMI, Rostam (a.k.a. Rostam GHASEMI)
 RAAD IRAN
 RAKA
 RESEARCH CENTRE FOR EXPLOSION AND IMPACT
 ROSMACHIN
 SAIDI, Hojatoleslam Ali
 SALAMI, BrigGen Hossein
 SAMAN NASB ZAYENDEH ROOD; SAMAN NASBZAINDE ROOD
 SAMAN TOSE'E ASIA
 SAMEN INDUSTRIES
 SCHILLER NOVIN
 SEPANIR OIL AND GAS ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPANY
 SHAFI'I RUDSARI, Rear Admiral Mohammad
 SHAHID AHMAD KAZEMI INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
 SHAKHESE BEHBUD SANAT
 SHAMS, Abolghassem Mozaffari
 SHAMSHIRI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ali
 SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
 SHETAB G.
 SHETAB GAMAN
 SHETAB TRADING
 SHIRAZ ELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES
 SIMATEC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 SOLAT SANA, Abdollah
 SOLTANI, Hamid
 STATE PURCHASING ORGANISATION
 STEP STANDART TEKNIK PARCA SAN VE TIC A.S.
 SUN MIDDLE EAST FZ COMPANY
 SURENA (A.K.A. SAKHD VA RAH-AN- DA-ZI)
 TABA (IRAN CUTTING TOOLS MANUFACTURING COMPANY – TABA TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN)
 TAGHTIRAN
 TAJHIZ SANAT SHAYAN
 TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION OFFICE OF THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
 TEST TAFSIR
 TIDEWATER
 TOSSE SILOOHA
 TURBINE ENGINEERING MANUFACTURING
 VAHIDI, IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad
 WEST SUN TRADE GMBH
 Y.A.S. CO. LTD
 YARSANAT
 YASA PART
 ZADEH, Amir Ali Haji

ATTACHMENT 2 – PART II

LIST OF PERSONS, ENTITIES AND BODIES SET OUT IN ANNEX I TO COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP AND ANNEXES VIII TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 267/2012

7TH OF TIR.
ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
ABZAR BORESH KAVEH CO.
AGHAJANI, Azim
AHMADIAN, Ali Akbar
AMIN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AMMUNITION AND METALLURGY INDUSTRIES GROUP
ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES GROUP
BAHMANYAR, Bahmanyar Morteza
BANK SEPAH
BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL
BARZAGANI TEJARAT TAVANMAD SACCAL COMPANIES
BEHINEH TRADING CO.
CRUISE MISSILE INDUSTRY GROUP
DASTJERDI, Ahmad Vahid
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION (DIO)
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER
DERAKHSHANDEH, Ahmad
DOOSTAN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
ELECTRO SANAM COMPANY
ESLAMI, Mohammad
ESMAELI, Reza-Gholi
ETTEHAD TECHNICAL GROUP
FAJR INDUSTRIAL GROUP
FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
FARASAKHT INDUSTRIES
FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
FATER (OR FAATER) INSTITUTE
GHARAGAHE SAZANDEGI GHAEM
GHORB KARBALA
GHORB NOOH
HARA COMPANY
HEJAZI, Mohammad
HOJATI, Mohsen
IMENSAZAN CONSULTANT ENGINEERS INSTITUTE
INDUSTRIAL FACTORIES OF PRECISION (IFP) MACHINERY
JOZA INDUSTRIAL CO.
KALA-ELECTRIC
KAVEH CUTTING TOOLS COMPANY
KETABACHI, Mehrdada Akhlaghi
KHATAM AL-ANBIYA CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS
KHORASAN METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
M. BABAIE INDUSTRIES
MAKIN
MALEK ASHTAR UNIVERSITY
MALEKI, Naser
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT
MIZAN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING A.K.A.: 3MG
NAQDI, Mohammad Reza
NEJAD NOURI, Mohammad Mehdi
NIRU BATTERY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
OMRAN SAHEL
ORIENTAL OIL KISH
PARCHIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
PARS AVIATION SERVICES COMPANY
PEJMAN INDUSTRIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
QODS AERONAUTICS INDUSTRIES
RAH SAHEL
RAHAB ENGINEERING INSTITUTE
REZAIE, Morteza
SABALAN COMPANY
SAD IMPORT EXPORT COMPANY

SAFARI, Morteza
SAFAVI, Yahya Rahim
SAFETY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (SEP)
SAHAND ALUMINUM PARTS INDUSTRIAL COMPANY
SAHEL CONSULTANT ENGINEERS
SALIMI, Hosein
SANAM INDUSTRIAL GROUP
SEPANIR
SEPASAD ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHAHID BAGHERI INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SBIG)
SHAHID HEMMAT INDUSTRIAL GROUP (SHIG)
SHAHID KARRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SATARRI INDUSTRIES
SHAHID SAYYADE SHIRAZI INDUSTRIES
SHO'A' AVIATION.
SOLEIMANI, Qasem
SPECIAL INDUSTRIES GROUP
TABATABAEI, Ali Akbar
TIZ PARS
YA MAHDI INDUSTRIES GROUP
YAS AIR
YAZD METALLURGY INDUSTRIES
ZAHEDI, Mohammad Reza
ZOLQADR, General

ATTACHMENT 3

IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL AND ENTITIES IDENTIFIED AS GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (GOI) ON THE SDN LIST; DESIGNATED ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS ON THE SDN LIST AND ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS LISTED ON THE FSE LIST; INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SANCTIONED UNDER ISA; BLOCKED PROPERTY OF THE FOREGOING

AA ENERGY FZCO¹⁾
ABAN AIR
ADVANCE NOVEL LIMITED
AFZALI, Ali
AGHA-JANI, Dawood
AL AQILI GROUP LLC
AL AQILI, Mohamed Saeed
AL FIDA INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING
AL HILAL EXCHANGE
ALPHA EFFORT LIMITED
AMERI, Teymour
AMIN INVESTMENT BANK¹⁾
ANTARES SHIPPING COMPANY NV
ARASH SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED¹⁾
ARIAN BANK
ARTA SHIPPING ENTERPRISES LIMITED¹⁾
ASAN SHIPPING ENTERPRISE LIMITED¹⁾
ASCOTEC HOLDING GMBH¹⁾
ASCOTEC JAPAN K.K.¹⁾
ASCOTEC MINERAL & MACHINERY GMBH¹⁾
ASCOTEC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY GMBH¹⁾
ASCOTEC STEEL TRADING GMBH¹⁾
ASHTAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
ASIA BANK
ASIA ENERGY GENERAL TRADING (LLC)¹⁾
ASIA MARINE NETWORK PTE. LTD.
ASSA CO. LTD.
ASSA CORP.
ATLANTIC INTERMODAL
ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN

¹⁾ Denotes Iranian financial institutions and individuals and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

AZORES SHIPPING COMPANY LL FZE
 BAHADORI, Masoud¹⁾
 BANCO INTERNACIONAL DE DESARROLLO, C.A.
 BANDAR IMAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 BANK KARGOSHAEE
 BANK KESHAVARZI IRAN¹⁾
 BANK MARKAZI JOMHOURI ISLAMI IRAN¹⁾
 BANK MASKAN¹⁾
 BANK MELLAT¹⁾
 BANK MELLI IRAN INVESTMENT COMPANY
 BANK MELLI IRAN¹⁾
 BANK MELLI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO.
 BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE (OF IRAN)¹⁾
 BANK REFAH KARGARAN¹⁾
 BANK SEPAH INTERNATIONAL PLC
 BANK SEPAH¹⁾
 BANK TEJARAT¹⁾
 BANK TORGVOY KAPITAL ZAO¹⁾
 BANK-E SHAHR¹⁾
 BATENI, Naser
 BAZARGAN, Farzad¹⁾
 BEHSAZ KASHANE TEHRAN CONSTRUCTION CO.¹⁾
 BEHZAD, Morteza Ahmadali
 BELFAST GENERAL TRADING LLC
 BEST PRECISE LIMITED
 BIIS MARITIME LIMITED
 BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED¹⁾
 BLUE TANKER SHIPPING SA¹⁾
 BMIIC INTERNATIONAL GENERAL TRADING LTD
 BOU ALI SINA PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 BREYELLER STAHL TECHNOLOGY GMBH & CO. KG¹⁾
 BUSHEHR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 BYFLEET SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 CAMBIS, Dimitris¹⁾
 CASPIAN MARITIME LIMITED¹⁾
 CAUCASUS ENERGY
 CEMENT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
 CENTRAL INSURANCE OF IRAN
 CISCO SHIPPING COMPANY CO. LTD.
 COBHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 COMMERCIAL PARS OIL CO.¹⁾
 CONCEPT GIANT LIMITED
 CREDIT INSTITUTION FOR DEVELOPMENT¹⁾
 CRYSTAL SHIPPING FZE
 CYLINDER SYSTEM L.T.D.¹⁾
 DAJMAR, Mohammad Hossein
 DANESH SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 DARYA CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 DAVAR SHIPPING CO LTD¹⁾
 DENA TANKERS FZE¹⁾
 DERAKHSHANDEH, AHMAD
 DETTIN SPA
 DEY BANK¹⁾
 DFS WORLDWIDE
 DIVANDARI, Ali
 DORKING SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 EDBI EXCHANGE COMPANY
 EDBI STOCK BROKERAGE COMPANY
 EFFINGHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 EGHTEHAD NOVIN BANK¹⁾
 EIGHTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 EIGHTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ELEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 ELEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTER
 ESLAMI, Mansour
 EUROPAISCH-IRANISCHE HANDELSBANK AG¹⁾

EUROPEAN OIL TRADERS
 EVEREX
 EXECUTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ORDER¹⁾
 EXPORT DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN¹⁾
 EZATI, Ali
 FAIRWAY SHIPPING LTD
 FAL OIL COMPANY LIMITED
 FARNHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 FARSOUDEH, Houshang
 FAYLACA PETROLEUM
 FERLAND COMPANY LIMITED
 FIFTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.
 FIRST ISLAMIC INVESTMENT BANK LTD.
 FIRST OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FIRST OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FIRST PERSIA EQUITY FUND
 FOURTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FOURTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 FOURTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 FUTURE BANK B.S.C.¹⁾
 GALLIOT MARITIME INC
 GARBIN NAVIGATION LTD¹⁾
 GEORGIAN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
 GHADIR INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 GHAED BASSIR PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS COMPANY¹⁾
 GHALEBANI, Ahmad¹⁾
 GHARZOLHASANEH RESALAT BANK¹⁾
 GHAVAMIN BANK¹⁾
 GHEZEL AYAGH, Alireza
 GOLDEN RESOURCES TRADING COMPANY L.L.C.¹⁾
 GOLDENTEX FZE
 GOLPARVAR, Gholamhossein
 GOMSHALL SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 GOOD LUCK SHIPPING L.L.C.
 GRACE BAY SHIPPING INC¹⁾
 GREAT BUSINESS DEALS
 GREAT METHOD LIMITED
 HADI SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO
 HARAZ SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HATEF SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HEKMAT IRANIAN BANK¹⁾
 HERCULES INTERNATIONAL SHIP¹⁾
 HERMIS SHIPPING SA¹⁾
 HIRMAND SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HODA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HOMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HONAR SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 HONG KONG INTERTRADE COMPANY¹⁾
 HORMOZ OIL REFINING COMPANY¹⁾
 HORSHAM SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 HOSSEINPOUR, Houshang
 HTTS HANSEATIC TRADE TRUST AND SHIPPING, GMBH
 IDEAL SUCCESS INVESTMENTS LIMITED
 IFIC HOLDING AG¹⁾
 IHAG TRADING GMBH¹⁾
 IMPIRE SHIPPING COMPANY¹⁾
 INDUS MARITIME INC
 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION OF IRAN¹⁾
 INTERNATIONAL SAFE OIL
 INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH¹⁾
 IRAN & SHARGH COMPANY¹⁾
 IRAN & SHARGH LEASING COMPANY¹⁾
 IRAN AIR

IRAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY¹⁾
 IRAN O HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN O MISR SHIPPING COMPANY
 IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY¹⁾
 IRAN ZAMIN BANK¹⁾
 IRANAIR TOURS
 IRANIAN MINES AND MINING INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ORGANIZATION¹⁾
 IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED¹⁾
 IRANIAN-VENEZUELAN BI-NATIONAL BANK / JOINT IRAN-VENEZUELA BANK¹⁾
 IRASCO S.R.L.¹⁾
 IRINVESTSHIP LTD.
 IRISL (MALTA) LIMITED
 IRISL (UK) LTD.
 IRISL CHINA SHIPPING CO., LTD.
 IRISL EUROPE GMBH
 IRISL MARINE SERVICES & ENGINEERING COMPANY
 IRISL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CO.
 IRITAL SHIPPING SRL COMPANY
 ISI MARITIME LIMITED
 ISIM AMIN LIMITED
 ISIM ATR LIMITED
 ISIM OLIVE LIMITED
 ISIM SAT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CHARIOT LIMITED
 ISIM SEA CRESCENT LIMITED
 ISIM SININ LIMITED
 ISIM TAJ MAHAL LIMITED
 ISIM TOUR LIMITED
 ISLAMIC REGIONAL COOPERATION BANK¹⁾
 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
 JABBER IBN HAYAN
 JAM PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY
 JASHNSAZ, Seifollah¹⁾
 JUPITER SEAWAYS SHIPPING¹⁾
 KADDOURI, Abdelhak
 KAFOLATBANK¹⁾
 KALA LIMITED¹⁾
 KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED¹⁾
 KARAFARIN BANK¹⁾
 KASB INTERNATIONAL LLC¹⁾
 KAVERI MARITIME INC
 KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
 KERMAN SHIPPING CO LTD
 KHALILI, Jamshid
 KHAVARMIANEH BANK¹⁾
 KHAZAR SEA SHIPPING LINES
 KISH INTERNATIONAL BANK¹⁾
 KISH PROTECTION & INDEMNITY
 KONING MARINE CORP¹⁾
 KONT INVESTMENT BANK
 KONT KOSMETIK
 KSN FOUNDATION
 KUO OIL PTE. LTD
 LANCELIN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 LEADING MARITIME PTE. LTD.
 LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
 LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC
 LOGISTIC SMART LIMITED
 LOWESWATER LIMITED
 MACHINE SAZI ARAK CO. LTD.¹⁾
 MAHAB GHODSS CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANY¹⁾
 MAHDAVI, Ali
 MALSHIP SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.
 MARANER HOLDINGS LIMITED
 MARBLE SHIPPING LIMITED
 MARJAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾

MAZANDARAN CEMENT COMPANY
 MAZANDARAN TEXTILE COMPANY
 MCS ENGINEERING¹⁾
 MCS INTERNATIONAL GMBH¹⁾
 MEHR CAYMAN LTD.
 MEHR IRAN CREDIT UNION BANK¹⁾
 MEHRAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 MELLAT BANK SB CJSC
 MELLAT INSURANCE COMPANY¹⁾
 MELLI AGROCHEMICAL COMPANY, P.J.S.
 MELLI BANK PLC
 MELLI INVESTMENT HOLDING INTERNATIONAL
 MELODIOUS MARITIME INC
 MERSAD SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
 METAL & MINERAL TRADE S.A.R.L.¹⁾
 MID OIL ASIA PTE LTD
 MILL DENE LIMITED
 MINAB SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 MINES AND METALS ENGINEERING GMBH¹⁾
 MIR BUSINESS BANK ZAO
 MOALLEM INSURANCE COMPANY
 MOBIN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 MODABER¹⁾
 MODALITY LIMITED
 MOGHADDAMI FARD, Mohammad
 MOHADDES, Seyed Mahmoud¹⁾
 MOINIE, Mohammad¹⁾
 MONSOON SHIPPING LTD¹⁾
 MOUNT EVEREST MARITIME INC
 MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN¹⁾
 N.I.T.C. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE¹⁾
 NABIPOUR, Ghasem
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) LIMITED¹⁾
 NAFTIRAN INTERTRADE CO. (NICO) SARL¹⁾
 NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED¹⁾
 NARI SHIPPING AND CHARTERING GMBH & CO. KG
 NASIRBEIK, Anahita
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD¹⁾
 NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY¹⁾
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY LLC¹⁾
 NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY¹⁾
 NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 NAYEBI, Pourya
 NEFERTITI SHIPPING COMPANY
 NEUMAN LIMITED
 NEW DESIRE LIMITED
 NEW YORK GENERAL TRADING
 NEW YORK MONEY EXCHANGE
 NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED¹⁾
 NIKOUSOKHAN, Mahmoud¹⁾
 NIKSIMA FOOD AND BEVERAGE JLT
 NINTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 NINTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED¹⁾
 NIZAMI, Anwar Kamal
 NOOR AFZAR GOSTAR COMPANY
 NOOR ENERGY (MALAYSIA) LTD.¹⁾
 NOURI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
 NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED¹⁾
 NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
 NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
 OCEAN CAPITAL ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 OIL INDUSTRY INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 OMID REY CIVIL & CONSTRUCTION COMPANY¹⁾
 ONE CLASS PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD.¹⁾

ONE VISION INVESTMENTS 5 (PTY) LTD.¹⁾
 ONERBANK ZAO¹⁾
 ORCHIDEA GULF TRADING
 P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED¹⁾
 PACIFIC SHIPPING DMCEST
 PAJAND, Mohammad Hadi
 PARDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 PARS MCS¹⁾
 PARS OIL AND GAS COMPANY¹⁾
 PARS OIL CO.¹⁾
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 PARS PETROCHEMICAL SHIPPING COMPANY¹⁾
 PARS TRASH COMPANY
 PARSAEI, Reza¹⁾
 PARSIAN BANK¹⁾
 PARTNER CENTURY LIMITED
 PARVARESH, Farhad Ali
 PASARGAD BANK¹⁾
 PEARL ENERGY COMPANY LTD.
 PEARL ENERGY SERVICES, SA
 PERSIA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
 PERSIA OIL & GAS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CO.¹⁾
 PETRO ENERGY INTERTRADE COMPANY¹⁾
 PETRO ROYAL FZE¹⁾
 PETRO SUISSE INTERTRADE COMPANY SA¹⁾
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED¹⁾
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE¹⁾
 PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL¹⁾
 PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED¹⁾
 PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA S.A. (PDVSA)
 PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE¹⁾
 PETROPARS LTD.¹⁾
 PETROPARS UK LIMITED¹⁾
 PIONEER ENERGY INDUSTRIES COMPANY
 POLAT, Muzaffer
 POLINEX GENERAL TRADING LLC¹⁾
 POLYNAR COMPANY¹⁾
 POST BANK OF IRAN¹⁾
 POURANSARI, Hashem¹⁾
 PROTON PETROCHEMICALS SHIPPING LIMITED¹⁾
 PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA BUKOVYNA
 QANNADI, Mohammad
 QULANDARY, Azizullah Asadullah
 RAHIQI, Javad
 RASOOL, Seyed Alaeddin Sadat
 REY INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 REY NIRU ENGINEERING COMPANY¹⁾
 REYCO GMBH.¹⁾
 REZVANIYANZADEH, Mohammed Reza
 RISHI MARITIME INC
 RISHMAK PRODUCTIVE & EXPORTS COMPANY¹⁾
 ROYAL ARYA CO.¹⁾
 ROYAL OYSTER GROUP
 ROYAL-MED SHIPPING AGENCY LTD
 SABET, Javad Karimi
 SACKVILLE HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SADAF PETROCHEMICAL ASSALUYEH COMPANY¹⁾
 SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
 SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY
 SAMAN BANK¹⁾
 SAMAN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 SAMBOUK SHIPPING FZC¹⁾
 SANDFORD GROUP LIMITED
 SANTEX LINES LIMITED
 SARKANDI, Ahmad
 SARMAYEH BANK¹⁾
 SARV SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾

SECOND OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SECOND OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEIBOW LIMITED
 SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED
 SEIFI, Asadollah
 SEPID SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 SEVENTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SEVENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SEYYEDI, Seyed Nasser Mohammad¹⁾
 SEYYEDI, Seyedeh Hanieh Seyed Nasser Mohammad
 SHAHID TONGGOOYAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 SHALLON LIMITED
 SHAZAND PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 SHERE SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 SHIPPING COMPUTER SERVICES COMPANY
 SHOMAL CEMENT COMPANY
 SIMA GENERAL TRADING CO FZE¹⁾
 SIMA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 SINA BANK¹⁾
 SINA SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 SINGA TANKERS PTE. LTD.
 SINO ACCESS HOLDINGS LIMITED
 SINOSE MARITIME PTE. LTD.
 SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP.
 SIXTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 SIXTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 SMART DAY HOLDINGS GROUP LIMITED
 SOKOLENKO, Vitaly
 SORINET COMMERCIAL TRUST (SCT) BANKERS
 SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY
 SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN
 SPEEDY SHIP FZC
 SPRINGTHORPE LIMITED
 STARRY SHINE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
 SWISS MANAGEMENT SERVICES SARL¹⁾
 SYNERGY GENERAL TRADING FZE¹⁾
 SYSTEM WISE LIMITED
 TABATABAEI, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Khatibi¹⁾
 TABRIZ PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY¹⁾
 TADBIR BROKERAGE COMPANY¹⁾
 TADBIR CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 TADBIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP¹⁾
 TADBIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GROUP CO.¹⁾
 TADBIR INVESTMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 TAFAZOLI, Ahmad
 TALAI, Mohamad
 TAMAS COMPANY
 TAT BANK¹⁾
 TC SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED¹⁾
 TENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THE EXPLORATION AND NUCLEAR RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION COMPANY
 THE NUCLEAR REACTORS FUEL COMPANY
 THIRD OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 THIRD OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 THIRTEENTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 TONGHAM SHIPPING CO LTD
 TOP GLACIER COMPANY LIMITED
 TOP PRESTIGE TRADING LIMITED
 TOSEE EQTESAD AYANDEHSAZAN COMPANY¹⁾
 TOSEE TAAVON BANK¹⁾
 TOURISM BANK¹⁾
 TRADE TREASURE LIMITED
 TRUE HONOUR HOLDINGS LIMITED
 TWELFTH OCEAN ADMINISTRATION GMBH
 TWELFTH OCEAN GMBH & CO. KG
 UPPERCOURT SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED
 VALFAJR 8TH SHIPPING LINE CO SSK

VOBSTER SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
 WEST SUN TRADE GMBH¹⁾
 WIPPERMANN, Ulrich
 WOKING SHIPPING INVESTMENTS LIMITED
 YASINI, Seyed Kamal
 YAZDI, Bahareh Mirza Hossein
 ZADEH, Hassan Jalil
 ZANJANI, Babak Morteza
 ZARIN RAFSANJAN CEMENT COMPANY¹⁾
 ZEIDI, Hossein
 ZHUHAI ZHENRONG COMPANY
 ZIRACCHIAN ZADEH, Mahmoud¹⁾

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
EP-CFD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFJ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFO	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFP	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-CFR	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IAM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBH	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBJ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBN	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBP	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBV	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IBZ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-ICF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDA	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
EP-IDF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IDG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEB	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEC	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IED	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEF	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IEG	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRK	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRN	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRR	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-IRT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDD	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
EP-MDE	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXI	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXL	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BXM	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGS	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CGT	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHW	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHX	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHY	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CHZ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-CJQ	IRAN AIR	Aircraft	
UR-BHJ	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-BXN	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIX	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CIY	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CJA	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
UR-CJK	PRYVATNE AKTSIONERNE TOVARYSTVO AVIAKOMPANIYA	Aircraft	
RIONA	HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO	Vessel	9349588
MIRZA KOCHEK KHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7027899
ASSA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632814
AMITEES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7632826
HORMUZ 2	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	7904580
PARMIDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8105284
BARSAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8107581
PANTEA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8108559
IRAN AKHAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8113009
SARINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8203608
SABRINA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8215742
ATTRIBUTE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309593
ALIAS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309608
AQUARIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309610
ADVENTIST	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309622
AGEAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309634
ANGEL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309646
AGILE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309658
AJAX	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309672
ACROBAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309684
SHADFAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309696

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
AMPLIFY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8309701
IRAN HORMUZ 21	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314263
IRAN HORMUZ 22	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8314275
IRAN HORMUZ 23	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319782
IRAN SHALAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319940
IRAN YOUSHTAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8319952
AEROLITE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320121
ADRIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320133
NAGHMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320145
RONAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320157
ACCURATE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320169
TABANDEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320171
GULAFSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320183
ALAMEDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8320195
IRAN PARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322064
IRAN CHARAK	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8322076
IRAN HORMUZ 25	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422072
IRAN HORMUZ 26	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8422084
DORITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8605234
IRAN SHALAMCHEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8820925
AAJ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	8984484
IRAN HORMUZ 12	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9005596
IRAN KONG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9007582
VISTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010711
VIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9010723
IRAN HORMUZ 14	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9020778
HAMD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036052
SOBHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9036935
SATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9040479
ABBA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051624
BEHDAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051636
PARSHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051648
VALERIAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9051650
NEGEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9071519
ATTAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9074092
PARIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9076478
TEEN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9101649
GOWHAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9103087
IRAN DALEER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9118551
PATRIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137210
NARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137246
KADOS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9137258
ZOMOROUD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138044
BRELYAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9138056
NILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165786
JOVITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165798
MANOLA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165803
GLADIOLUS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165815
ELYANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165827
NEGAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9165839
SAVIZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167253
GLOXINIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167265
NESHAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167277
BEHSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167289

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
JAIRAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9167291
IRAN SHAHED	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9184691
GOLSAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193185
ZARSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193197
ARVIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193202
ARTAVAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9193214
TERESA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209324
GABRIELA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209336
SARITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209348
SILVER CRAFT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9209350
MAHNAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213387
TERMEH	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9213399
MAHSAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226944
HAMADAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9226956
TARADIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245304
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9245316
ZAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260160
ZIVAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9260172
VALILI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270646
SHAMIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270658
IRAN SHAHR-E-KORD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270684
IRAN KASHAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9270696
SININ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9274941
PARMIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283007
AZARGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283019
SALIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283021
GOLBON	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9283033
PARDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284142
TANDIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9284154
SHERE	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305192
UPPERCOURT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305207
TONGHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305219
VOBSTER	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9305221
GOLAFRUZ	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9323833
ADALIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9328900
SHABGOUN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346524
AGATA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346536
BENITA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9346548
MARISOL	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349576
ORIANA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349590
MERCEDES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349667
RAMONA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9349679
GILDA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367982
SANIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9367994
SARIR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368003
SOMIA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9368015
GLORY	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369710
ARIES	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9369722
ABTIN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9379636
ARSHAM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9386500
PARSHAD	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387786
HAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387798
RAAZI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387803
SAEI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9387815

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
ARTMAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405930
BASKAR	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405942
BAHJAT	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405954
HAAMI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405966
SHAADI	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9405978
SHAYAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420356
TABAN 1	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420368
YARAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9420370
AMIN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9422366
AVANG	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465746
KIAZAND	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465758
BATIS	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465760
WARTA	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465849
SALIM	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465851
ARDAVAN	ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES	Vessel	9465863
NAMI	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8419178
GAS CAMELLIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8803381
TESS	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	8913564
KATERINA 1	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9031959
MARIA	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9110626
SUN OCEAN	LISSOME MARINE SERVICES LLC	Vessel	9408358
YOUNES ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8212465
YOUSEF ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316106
YAGHOUB ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8316168
TOLOU ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8318178
VALFAJR2 ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8400103
BADR ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8407345
BANEH ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8508462
SARDASHT ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517231
MARIVAN ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	8517243
BRIGHT ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9005235
CARIBO ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9011246
AURA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9013749
BICAS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9077850
MAHARLIKA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079066
NAPOLI ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079078
NYOS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079080
NAINITAL ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079092
NATIVE LAND ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9079107
ATLANTIC ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9107655
SPARROW ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171450
SWALLOW ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9171462
SUPERIOR ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172038
SPOTLESS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172040
SABRINA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9172052
DESTINY ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9177155
HUMANITY ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9180281
ORIENTAL ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9183934
SHONA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187629
ABELIA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187631
ALERT ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187643
SUNDIAL ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187655
SILVER CLOUD ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9187667
HUWAYZEH ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212888

BLOCKED PROPERTY	PROPERTY OF	TYPE	IMO NUMBER
HORIZON ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212890
HAPPINESS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212905
MARINA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212917
HALISTIC ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9212929
DELVAR ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218454
DAYLAM ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218466
DAMAVAND ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218478
DENA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218480
DARAB ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9218492
IRAN FAZEL ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283746
FIANGA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9283760
IRAN FAHIM ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286140
IRAN FALAGH ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9286152
DECESIVE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356593
SANCHI ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9356608
MAJESTIC ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357183
SUCCESS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357353
SUNEAST ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357365
SPLENDOUR ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357377
COURAGE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357389
HONESTY ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357391
AMBER ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357406
DAL LAKE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357717
JUSTICE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9357729
HYDRA ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362059
DOVE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362061
ZEUS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9362073
IMICO NEKA 455 ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404546
IMICO NEKA 456 ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404558
IMICO NEKA 457 ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9404560
SUNSHINE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569205
DOJRAN ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569619
ATLANTIS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569621
FORTUN ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569633
SALALEH ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569645
SMOOTH ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569657
SKYLINE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569669
INFINITY ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569671
DEMOS ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9569683
YANGZHOU DAYANG DY905 ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9575424
SUNRISE ¹⁾	NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY	Vessel	9615092
ANTHEM	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8310669
JAFFNA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	8609515
OLYSA	SIQIRIYA MARITIME CORP	Vessel	9001605

¹⁾ Denotes blocked property of individual and entities identified as GOI by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. U.S. persons and foreign entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person will continue to be prohibited from transactions with these individuals and entities, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

ATTACHMENT 4

ABBASI-DAVANI, Fereidoun
 ADVANCE ELECTRICAL AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES SL
 ALUMINAT
 ANDISHEH ZOLAL
 ARIA NIKAN MARINE INDUSTRY

BUJAR, Farhad
 DAYENI, Mahmoud Mohammadi
 EYVAZ TECHNIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY
 FAKHRIZADEH-MAHABADI, Mohsen
 FARATECH
 FARAYAND TECHNIQUE
 FULMEN GROUP
 IMANIRAD, Arman
 IMANIRAD, Mohammad Javad
 IRAN CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY COMPANY
 IRAN POOYA
 JAHAN TECH ROOYAN PARS
 JAVEDAN MEHR TOOS
 KAHVARIN, Iradj Mohammadi
 KALAYE ELECTRIC COMPANY
 KHAKI, Parviz
 MANDEGAR BASPAR KIMIYA COMPANY
 MARO SANAT COMPANY
 MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
 NEDA INDUSTRIAL GROUP
 NEKA NOVIN
 PARTO SANAT CO.
 PAYA PARTOV CO.
 PENTANE CHEMISTRY INDUSTRIES
 PETRO GREEN
 PISHRO SYSTEMS RESEARCH COMPANY
 POUYA CONTROL
 PUNTI, Pere
 RAHIMYAR, Amir Hossein
 SIMATIC DEVELOPMENT CO.
 TAGHTIRAN KASHAN COMPANY
 TANIDEH, Hossein
 TARH O PALAYESH
 THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE INNOVATION AND RESEARCH
 TOWLID ABZAR BORESHI IRAN
 WISSER, Gerhard
 YASA PART
 ZOLAL IRAN COMPANY

JCPOA Annex III – Civil Nuclear Cooperation

A. General

1. Iran and E3/EU+3 decided to co-operate, among others, including through IAEA technical cooperation, where appropriate, and without prejudice to the existing bilateral agreements, in different areas of civil nuclear co-operation to be developed within the framework of this JCPOA, as detailed in this Annex. In this context, the Joint Commission will also support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, as appropriate.
2. All civil nuclear cooperation projects under this JCPOA will be mutually determined by the participating states and will be consistent with the JCPOA and the national laws and regulations of the participating parties.
3. The civil nuclear and scientific cooperation projects envisioned between Iran and the E3/EU+3 as part of this JCPOA may be undertaken in a variety of formats, with a variety of potential participants. A given project undertaken by the E3/EU+3 will not necessarily include participation by all E3/EU+3 parties:
 - 3.1. bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements with Iran. Such arrangements would be mutually determined by the participating states.
 - 3.2. projects under the auspices of the IAEA, either through IAEA technical co-operation projects including through Project and Supply Agreements.
 - 3.3. through International Science and Technology Centres.
 Specifically, E3/EU+3 parties will undertake, to develop nuclear co-operation with Iran, in particular within the following areas:

B. Reactors, Fuels and Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes

4. **Modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, technologies and facilities**
 E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate Iran's acquisition of light-water research and power reactors, for research, development and testing, and for the supply of electricity and desalination, with arran-

gements for the assured supply of nuclear fuel and the removal of spent fuel as provided for in relevant contracts, for each reactor provided. This may include the following areas for co-operation:

- 4.1. Construction as well as effective and safe operation of new light water power reactors and associated equipment, according to Generation III+ requirements, including small and medium sized nuclear reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
 - 4.2. Construction of state of the art light water moderated multipurpose research reactors capable of testing fuel pins, assembly prototypes and structural materials with associated related facilities, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate.
 - 4.3. Supply of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control systems for the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;
 - 4.4. Supply of nuclear simulation and calculation codes and software solutions with regard to the above areas, including joint development, as appropriate;
 - 4.5. Supply of first and second loop main equipment as well as core of the above research and power reactors, including joint design and manufacturing, as appropriate;
 - 4.6. On-the-job training on fuel management scenarios and reshuffling for the above research and power nuclear reactors;
 - 4.7. Joint technical review of Iran's current nuclear reactors, upon the request by Iran, in order to upgrade current equipment and systems, including concerning nuclear safety;
5. **Arak Modernisation Project**
- 5.1. As described in Section B of Annex I, an international partnership composed of E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, which may subsequently be enlarged to include mutually determined third countries will be established, to support and facilitate the redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor at Arak into a modernised, not exceeding 20MWth, heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor, based on the agreed conceptual design (as attached to Annex I).
 - 5.2. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager, and have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernisation project. A Working Group composed of E3/EU+3 participants will be established to support and facilitate the redesigning and rebuilding of the reactor. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group would implement the Arak modernisation project, with E3/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities as described in Annex I. The Working Group could be enlarged to include other countries by consensus of the participants of the Working Group and Iran. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will conclude an official document expressing their strong commitments to the Arak modernisation project in advance of Implementation Day which would provide an assured path forward to modernise the reactor and would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants, especially in the key areas such as redesign, design review and certification, reactor core manufacturing, fuel design, fabrication and supply, safety and security, spent fuel treatment or disposition, as well as concerning the supply of materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems, and subsequently contracts would be concluded. The participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, consistent with their respective national laws, in such a manner as to enable the safe and timely construction and commissioning of the modernised reactor.
 - 5.3. Iran and the Working Group will cooperate to develop the final design of the modernised reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories to be carried out by Iran, and review conformity with international safety standards, such that the reactor can be licensed by the relevant Iranian regulatory authority for commissioning and operation.
 - 5.4. Iran will continue to assume the primary responsibility for financing the modernisation project. Additional funding arrangements for the project, including for IAEA projects supporting the Arak modernisation project, will be determined based on the official document and contracts to be subsequently concluded.
6. **Nuclear Fuel**
- 6.1. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will support assistance to Iran, including through the IAEA, as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel fabricated by Iran.
 - 6.2. E3/EU+3 parties will seek to cooperate regarding the supply of modern fuels, including, as appropriate, joint design and fabrication, the relevant licenses and fabrication technologies and equipment and related infrastructure, for current and future nuclear research and power reactors, including technical assistance on purification processes, forming and metallurgical activities for different types of nuclear fuel clads and cladding for the modernised Arak heavy water research reactor.

C. Research and Development (R&D) Practices

7. To implement other aspects of this JCPOA and in support of a broader opening of scientific engagements between the E3/EU+3 and Iran, the E3/EU+3 and Iran will seek cooperation and scientific exchange in the field of nuclear science and technology:
 - 7.1. Accelerator-based nuclear physics and nuclear astrophysics research, and stable isotope production in international collaboration at the nuclear, physics, and technology centre at the Fordow facility. Iran will request from the E3/EU+3 and other interested parties specific proposals for cooperative international nuclear, physics, and technology projects and will host an international workshop

to review these proposals. The goal is to realise international collaborative projects within a few years. The transitioning to stable isotope production of two cascades will be conducted in a joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.

- 7.2. Plasma physics and nuclear fusion;
- 7.3. Research reactor applications at the TRR, modernized Arak reactor, or at other future research reactors in Iran, such as:
 - 7.3.1. Training
 - 7.3.2. Radio-isotope production and utilization
 - 7.3.3. Nuclear desalination
 - 7.3.4. Neutron transmutation doping
 - 7.3.5. Neutron activation analysis
 - 7.3.6. Neutron capture therapy
 - 7.3.7. Neutron imaging and materials characterization studies using neutron beams
- 7.4. E3/EU+3 parties and Iran could also explore co-operation in the following additional areas:
 - 7.4.1. Design, manufacture and/or assembly of in-core measuring instrumentation and technologies;
 - 7.4.2. Nuclear instrumentation and control, systems and electronics design, manufacture and/or assembly;
 - 7.4.3. Fusion technology and plasma physics and related infrastructure and facilitating contribution of Iran to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project and/or similar projects, including relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 - 7.4.4. Neutrino astronomy;
 - 7.4.5. Design and manufacturing, and supply, of different types of accelerators and supply of related equipment including through relevant IAEA technical cooperation projects;
 - 7.4.6. Data acquisition and processing software and interface equipment;

D. Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security

8. **Nuclear safety**

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, engage in workshops and training events in Iran to support interactions between Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities and those from the E3/EU+3 and elsewhere to, among other things, share lessons learned on establishing and maintaining regulatory independence and effectiveness, and training on implementing nuclear safety culture and best practices; facilitate exchanges and visits to nuclear regulatory authorities and nuclear power plants outside of Iran focusing on best practices for safe operation; and enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability.

Provide support and assistance to enable Iran to join relevant conventions on nuclear safety and security, e.g. through workshops or seminars furthering accession to such commitments. Such workshops or seminars could also take place under the auspices of the IAEA.

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, will co-operate with Iran in the following areas of nuclear safety, as well as in other areas to be mutually agreed:

- 8.1. Conclusion of bilateral/multilateral agreements with related organisations and research centres;
- 8.2. Supply of valid codes, instruments and equipment related to nuclear safety;
- 8.3. Facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear safety;
- 8.4. Enhance and strengthen domestic emergency preparedness and severe accident management capability;
- 8.5. Arrange on-the-job training and apprenticeship courses for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations in the area of nuclear safety inside and outside of Iran;
- 8.6. Establish a Nuclear Safety Centre in Iran, which shall be equipped with necessary tools, techniques and equipment, in order to support and facilitate technical and professional training and exchange of lessons-learned for reactor and facility operators, regulatory authority personnel and related supportive organizations;

9. **Nuclear Safeguards**

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

- 9.1. Cooperation in the form of on-the-job trainings and workshops to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control process, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes;
- 9.2. E3/EU+3 parties, and other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran for the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards and transparency measures in Iran.
- 9.3. This cooperation could take the form of training and workshops to strengthen Iran's safeguards regulatory authority, nuclear material accounting and control processes, human resource development, and quality assurance/quality control processes.

10. **Nuclear Security**

E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices. Co-operation in the following areas can be envisaged:

- 10.1. Co-operation in the form of training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems;
- 10.2. Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran's ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.

E. Nuclear Medicine and Radioisotopes, Associated Technologies, Facilities and Processes

11. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran to improve the utilization of nuclear medicine in Iran in order to enhance Iran's expertise in diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy, increase the availability of medical radioisotopes for diagnosis and treatment of Iranian citizens, and facilitate Iran's participation in the broader international scientific and nuclear medicine community. Such cooperation may include:

- 11.1. Upgrades to the infrastructure associated with existing cyclotron facilities, including for medical radioisotopes production.
- 11.2. Facilitating Iranian acquisition of a new cyclotron, and associated radio-pharmacy equipment, for medical radioisotopes production.
- 11.3. Acquisition of state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and radiotherapy equipment for existing or new nuclear medicine centers, including co-operation between hospitals for the treatment of individual patients.
- 11.4. Cooperation on occupational and patient dosimetry procedures.
- 11.5. Improved target utilization to increase radioisotope production.
- 11.6. Acquisition of radioisotope sources for brachytherapy, and radiotherapy instrument calibration, and other medical and industrial applications.
- 11.7. Supply of state-of-the-art radio-medicine center and necessary laboratories.

F. Waste Management and Facility Decommissioning

12. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in the safe, effective, and efficient management and disposition of nuclear and radiological wastes derived from Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities and nuclear medicine, radioisotope production and/or consumption activities.
13. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran in areas of safe, effective, and environmentally friendly best practices for facility decontamination and decommissioning, including cooperation on long term storage facilities for the repository of low and medium level waste.
14. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, are prepared to facilitate exchanges and visits to relevant sites and locations outside of Iran related to effective waste management and best practices.
15. E3/EU+3 parties, as appropriate, will facilitate the supply of appropriate equipment and systems for waste management and depository facilities in Iran.

G. Other projects

16. Other projects may be implemented between the relevant E3/EU+3 parties and Iran, as mutually determined by the participants in the JCPOA, including in the following areas:
 - 16.1. Construction of nuclear desalination and associated infrastructure in Iran;
 - 16.2. Development of laser technology for medical applications (e.g. for eye surgery);

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

1. **Establishment, Composition, and Coordinator**

- 1.1. The Joint Commission is established to carry out the functions assigned to it in the JCPOA, including its Annexes.
- 1.2. The Joint Commission is comprised of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), together, the JCPOA participants.
- 1.3. The Joint Commission may establish Working Groups in particular areas, as appropriate.
- 1.4. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ("High Representative"), or his/her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission.

2. **Functions**

- 2.1. The Joint Commission will perform the following functions:

- 2.1.1. Review and approve the final design for the modernized heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories prior to the commencement of construction, and review and approve the fuel design for the modernized heavy water research reactor as provided for in Section B of Annex I;
- 2.1.2. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, development, acquisition, construction or operation of hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 21 of Annex I;
- 2.1.3. Review and approve plans submitted by Iran to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel, as provided for in paragraph 26 of Annex I;
- 2.1.4. Review and approve, upon request by Iran, projects on new types of centrifuges to proceed to a prototype stage for mechanical testing, as provided for in paragraph 43 of Annex I;
- 2.1.5. Receive information in advance about the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 44 of Annex I;
- 2.1.6. Receive information about the conceptual framework of stable isotope production at Fordow, as provided for in paragraph 46.1 of Annex I;
- 2.1.7. Assess and then approve, upon request by Iran, that fuel assemblies manufactured in Iran and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF₆, based on the objective technical criteria, with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran, as provided in paragraph 59 of Annex I;
- 2.1.8. Support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced by Iran, as provided for in paragraph 59 of Annex I;
- 2.1.9. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, engagement by Iran, including through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment and enrichment related activities, including related research and development, as provided for in paragraph 73 in Annex I;
- 2.1.10. Provide consultation, and advise on the necessary means in the context of access as specified in paragraph 78 of Annex I;
- 2.1.11. Review and approve in advance, upon request by Iran, the design, development, fabrication, acquisition, or use for non-nuclear purposes of multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device and explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, as provided for in paragraphs 82.2 and 82.3 of Annex I;
- 2.1.12. Review and consult to address issues arising from the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA and its Annex II;
- 2.1.13. Review and decide on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with, Iran, in accordance with Section 6 of this Annex and the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA;
- 2.1.14. Review, with a view to resolving, any issue that a JCPOA participant believes constitutes nonperformance by another JCPOA participant of its commitments under the JCPOA, according to the process outlined in the JCPOA;
- 2.1.15. Adopt or modify, as necessary, procedures to govern its activities;
- 2.1.16. Consult and provide guidance on other implementation matters that may arise under the JCPOA.

3. Procedures

- 3.1. The Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time upon request of a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator. The Coordinator will convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to be held no later than one week following receipt of such a request, except for consultations in accordance with Section Q of Annex I and any other matter that the Coordinator and/or a JCPOA participant deem urgent, in which case the meeting will be convened as soon as possible and not later than three calendar days from receipt of the request.
- 3.2. Meetings of the Joint Commission will be held in New York, Vienna, or Geneva as appropriate. The host country should facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.
- 3.3. The Joint Commission may decide by consensus to invite observers to attend its meetings.
- 3.4. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the UN, the work of the Joint Commission is confidential and may be shared only among JCPOA participants and observers as appropriate, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.

4. Decisions

- 4.1. Except as stated otherwise in this Annex, decisions by the Joint Commission are to be made by consensus.
- 4.2. Each JCPOA participant will have one vote. Decisions of the Joint Commission are to be taken by the Representative or the Deputy Representative or other such alternate as the JCPOA participant may designate.
- 4.3. The vote of each JCPOA participant will be made known to all other JCPOA participants if any JCPOA participant requests a recorded vote.

- 4.4. Matters before the Joint Commission pursuant to Section Q of Annex I are to be decided by consensus or by affirmative vote of five JCPOA participants. There is no quorum requirement.
- 4.5. The Coordinator will not take part in decision-making on nuclear-related transfers and activities as set out in Section 6 of this Annex.
5. **Other**
 - 5.1. Each JCPOA participant will be responsible for its own costs of participating in the Joint Commission, unless the Joint Commission decides otherwise.
 - 5.2. JCPOA participants may request that the Coordinator circulates a notification to the other JCPOA participants at any time. Upon such a request, the Coordinator will circulate such notification without delay to all JCPOA participants.
6. **Procurement Working Group**
 - 6.1. With the purpose of establishing a procurement channel, the Joint Commission will, except as otherwise provided by the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, review and decide on proposals by states seeking to engage in:
 - 6.1.1. the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and, if the end-use will be for Iran's nuclear programme set out in this JCPOA or other non-nuclear civilian end-use, all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the relevant State determines that they could contribute to activities inconsistent with the JCPOA; and,
 - 6.1.2. the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above;
 - 6.1.3. acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technologies as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investments in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.
 - 6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.
 - 6.3. Each E3+3 State and Iran will participate in the Procurement Working Group. The High Representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group.
 - 6.4. Except as otherwise provided by the Joint Commission or the United Nations Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the Procurement Working Group will consider proposals according to the following process:
 - 6.4.1. Upon receipt of a proposal, including all necessary supporting information, by a State seeking to engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1, the Coordinator will forward the proposal, through appropriate means, without delay to the Procurement Working Group and, when the proposal relates to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, to the IAEA. The Procurement Working Group will have up to 30 working days to consider and decide on the proposal.
 - 6.4.2. "Necessary supporting information" for purposes of Section 6.4.1 means: (a) a description of the item; (b) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the exporting entity; (c) the name, address, telephone number, and email address of the importing entity; (d) a statement of the proposed end-use and end use location, along with an end-use certification signed by the AEOL or the appropriate authority of Iran attesting the stated end-use; (e) export license number if available; (f) contract date, if available; and (g) details on transportation, if available; provided that if any of the export license number, contract date, or details on transportation are not available as of the time of submittal of the proposal, such information will be provided as soon as possible and in any event as condition of approval prior to shipment of the item.
 - 6.4.3. Each participant in the Procurement Working Group will have to communicate to the Coordinator, within 20 working days, whether it approves or rejects the proposal. The timeline for consideration may be extended for an additional period of 10 working days at the request of a participant of the Procurement Working Group.
 - 6.4.4. The proposal will be recommended for approval as soon as the Coordinator receives formal approvals from all the Procurement Working Group Participants or if, at the end of the 30 working day period, the Coordinator has received no disapprovals from any of the Procurement Working Group Participants. If at the end of the 30 working day period, the proposal has not been recommended for approval, the proposal may, at the request of at least two Working Group Participants within 5 working days, be referred to the Joint Commission, which would decide on approval of the proposal by consensus within 10 working days. Oth-

erwise the proposal will be recommended for disapproval. The disapproving JCPOA participant(s) should provide relevant information regarding the disapproval to the Joint Commission as appropriate, taking into account the need to protect confidential information.

- 6.4.5. The Coordinator will communicate the recommendation of the Joint Commission to the United Nations Security Council no later than 35 working days, or in case of referral to the Joint Commission no later than 45 working days from the date the Coordinator transmitted the proposal and all necessary supporting information to the Procurement Working Group.
- 6.4.6. Except as decided otherwise by consensus, the Procurement Working Group will meet every three weeks for reviewing the proposals. When some of the proposals to be reviewed relate to items, material, equipment, goods and technology intended to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the JCPOA, the IAEA may be invited to attend the meeting as an observer.
- 6.5. All JCPOA participants will act in accordance with the procurement channel and will only engage in transfers and activities referenced in Section 6.1 following approval by the Joint Commission and the United Nations Security Council. Iran will not use, acquire, or seek to procure the items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology referred to in Section 6.1 of this Annex for nuclear activities which are inconsistent with this JCPOA.
- 6.6. Any JCPOA participant may refer a procurement-related activity to the Joint Commission under the dispute settlement mechanism if it is concerned that such activity is inconsistent with this JCPOA.
- 6.7. Iran will provide to the IAEA access to the locations of intended use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex.
- 6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.
- 6.9. The Procurement Working Group will respond to requests for guidance on procurement activities from third parties, as communicated by the Coordinator. The Procurement Working Group will endeavor to respond to such requests for guidance within 9 working days from the date the Coordinator submits it to the Procurement Working Group.
- 6.10. The Joint Commission will report to the United Nations Security Council at least every 6 months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues.
7. **Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting**
 - 7.1. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibilities for reviewing and consulting on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA assisted by a working group on the implementation of sanctions lifting.
 - 7.2. The Joint Commission participants will participate in this working group. The High Representative will serve as coordinator of this working group.
 - 7.3. If at any time following the implementation day Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure including related designations of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the working group.
 - 7.4. The participants of the working group will review and consult, with a view to resolving the issue within 30 working days.
 - 7.5. If after involvement of the working group, the issue remains unresolved, any participant of the JCPOA may refer it to the Joint Commission.

JCPOA Annex V – Implementation Plan¹⁾

1. This Annex describes the sequence of the actions specified in Annexes I and II to this JCPOA.

A. Finalisation Day

2. Upon conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran will endorse this JCPOA.
3. Promptly after the conclusion of the negotiations of this JCPOA, the proposed UN Security Council resolution referred to in Section 18 of this Annex will be submitted to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
4. The EU will promptly endorse the UN Security Council resolution referred to above through Council Conclusions.

¹⁾ This Annex is only for the purpose of determining the sequence of implementation of the commitments described in this JCPOA and annexes thereto and does not restrict or expand the scope of these commitments.

5. Iran and the IAEA will start developing necessary arrangements to implement all transparency measures provided for in this JCPOA so that such arrangements are completed, in place, and ready for implementation on Implementation Day.

B. Adoption Day

6. Adoption Day will occur 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council through the resolution referred to above, or at an earlier date by mutual consent of all JCPOA participants, at which point this JCPOA comes into effect.
7. Beginning on Adoption Day, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations, including legal and administrative preparations, for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
8. Iran will officially inform the IAEA that, effective on Implementation Day, Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, pending its ratification by the Majlis (Parliament), and will fully implement the modified code 3.1.
9. Iran will implement paragraph 66 from Section M on "Past and Present Issues of Concern" of Annex I.
10. The EU and its Member States will adopt an EU Regulation, taking effect as of Implementation Day, terminating all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions as specified in Section 16.1 of this Annex, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of agreed nuclear-related measures.
11. The United States, acting pursuant to Presidential authorities, will issue waivers, to take effect upon Implementation Day, ceasing the application of the statutory nuclear-related sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.2 of this Annex. The President will also take action to direct that all appropriate additional measures be taken to implement the cessation of application of sanctions as specified in Sections 17.1 to 17.4 of this Annex, including the termination of Executive orders as specified in Section 17.4, and the licensing of activities as specified in Section 17.5.
12. E3/EU+3 participants and Iran will begin discussions on an official document to be concluded in advance of Implementation Day which will express strong commitments of the E3/EU+3 participants to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor modernisation project and define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
13. The EU, its Member States and the United States will begin consultation as appropriate with Iran regarding relevant guidelines and publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures to be lifted under this JCPOA.

C. Implementation Day

14. Implementation Day will occur upon the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in paragraph 15 below, and, simultaneously, the E3/EU+3 taking the actions described in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, and with the actions described in paragraph 18 below taking place at the UN level in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.
15. **Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:**
 - 15.1. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
 - 15.2. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
 - 15.3. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
 - 15.4. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development";
 - 15.5. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant";
 - 15.6. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
 - 15.7. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
 - 15.8. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";
 - 15.9. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
 - 15.10. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on "Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1";
 - 15.11. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on "Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency"; and
 - 15.12. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant".
16. **The European Union will:**
 - 16.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.1-1.1.3; 1.1.5-1.1.8; 1.2.1-1.2.5; 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 16 and 17 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP) and 1.3.3; 1.4.1 and 1.4.2; 1.10.1.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 39, 43, 43a of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) of Annex II. EU Member States will terminate or amend national implementing legislation as required.
 - 16.2. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.6.1-1.7.2 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.

- 16.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II of this JCPOA from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012. Suspend the provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Section 1.9.1 of Annex II in relation to individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II.
- 16.4. Amend the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 of Annex II to implement the relevant provisions of the UN Security Council resolution referred to above.
17. **The United States will:**²⁾
 - 17.1. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5 and 4.7 of Annex II, with the exception of Section 211(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA);
 - 17.2. Cease the application of the sanctions set forth in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
 - 17.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List), and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II;
 - 17.4. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645 and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 as set forth in Section 4 of Annex II; and
 - 17.5. License activities as set forth in Section 5 of Annex II.
18. **UN Security Council**
 - 18.1. In accordance with the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA, the provisions imposed in UN Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) will be terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments, and specific restrictions, including restrictions regarding the transfer of proliferation sensitive goods will apply.³⁾
 - 18.2. The E3/EU+3 will take appropriate measures to implement the new UNSC resolution.

D. Transition Day

19. Transition Day will occur 8 years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
20. **The European Union will:**
 - 20.1. Terminate the provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and suspend the corresponding provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP specified in Sections 1.1.4, 1.3.2 (in so far as it concerns Articles 15 and 18 of Council Decision and Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation); 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 (in so far as it concerns Ballistic Missiles restrictions); 1.6.1-1.9.1 of Annex II.
 - 20.2. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 2 to Annex II from Annexes VIII and IX to Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012.
 - 20.3. Remove individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 1 to Annex II from Annexes I and II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.
 - 20.4. Terminate all provisions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP suspended on Implementation Day.
21. **The United States will:**
 - 21.1. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions set forth in Sections 4.1-4.5, 4.7 and 4.9 of Annex II;
 - 21.2. Seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the statutory sanctions described in Section 4.6 of Annex II, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to Annex II; and
 - 21.3. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 4 to Annex II from the SDN List and/or the FSE List as set forth in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II.
22. **Iran will:**
 - 22.1. Seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.

E. UNSCR Termination Day

23. UNSCR (UN Security Council resolution) Termination Day will occur in accordance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA, which is 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated.

²⁾ The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply are those directed towards non-U.S. persons, as described in Section 4 of Annex II.

³⁾ The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.

24. On UNSCR Termination Day, the provisions and measures imposed in that resolution would terminate and the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.
25. **The European Union will:**
 - 25.1. Terminate all remaining provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 and Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

F. Other

26. The terminations described in this Annex V are without prejudice to other JCPOA commitments that would continue beyond such termination dates.

Annex B:

Statement

Statement

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have concluded with Iran a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. To improve transparency and create an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have set forth below certain provisions. Their participation in the JCPOA is contingent upon the United Nations Security Council adopting a new resolution that would, acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter: terminate resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015); require States to comply with the provisions in this statement for their respective durations; and facilitate, in cooperation with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA, implementation of the JCPOA as provided in paragraphs 2 and 6(a) below.

As provided by a resolution so deciding, the following provisions would apply on the date on which the IAEA Director General submits a report verifying that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA:

1. The term "all States" as used in this document, and as incorporated in the resolution, means "all States without exception."
2. All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:
 - a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;
 - b) the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph (a) above; and
 - c) acquisition by Iran of an interest in a commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them,

except that approval in advance by the Security Council shall not be required for the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when such equipment is for light water reactors, low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors, as well as items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 2 only when for exclusive use in light water reactors. For any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that are approved by the Security Council pursuant to subparagraph (a) above, or are supplied, sold, or transferred subject to the exception stated above, States are to ensure that: (a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; (b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; (c) they notify the Security Council within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and d) in the case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer.

And except also that approval in advance by the Security Council is not required for the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, that is directly related

to the necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium, and the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor, provided that Member States ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Security Council and Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the referenced INFCIRC have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers.

This paragraph shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date, then the requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

3. Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

4. All States may participate in and permit the activities described below *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activity:

- a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546 and of any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and
- b) the provision to Iran of any technology or technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, or Iran's acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in subparagraph a of this paragraph or related to the activities described in paragraph 3.

provided that in the event of an approval by the Security Council: (a) the contract for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and (b) Iran commit not to use such items for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

This paragraph shall apply until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

5. All States may participate in and permit, *provided* that the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to approve: the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from or through their territories, or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, to Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, and the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in this subparagraph.

This paragraph shall apply until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

6. All States are to:
 - a) Take the necessary measures to ensure that any activities described in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 occur on their territories, or involving their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or involving their flag vessels or aircraft, only pursuant to the relevant terms of those paragraphs, and also to prevent and prohibit any activities inconsistent with these provisions, until the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier;
 - b) Take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the UN Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran, until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier;
 - c) For eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, continue to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of the JCPOA, and freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the individuals and entities that were specified on the

list established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) as of the date of adoption of the new resolution, with the exception of those individuals and entities specified in Attachment hereto, or that may be de-listed by the Security Council, and freeze those of additional individuals and entities that may be designated by the Security Council as: having engaged in, directly associated with or provided support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities undertaken contrary to Iran's commitments in the JCPOA or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified in this statement; having assisted designated individuals or entities in evading or acting inconsistently with the JCPOA or the new resolution; having acted on behalf or at the direction of designated individuals or entities; or having been owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, including through illicit means.

d) For eight years from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of designated individuals or entities. These requirements shall not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(i) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Security Council within five working days of such notification;

(ii) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;

(iii) To be necessary for the civil nuclear cooperation projects described in Annex III of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council;

(iv) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), is not for the benefit of a person or entity subject to the measures in this paragraph, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council; or

(v) To be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in paragraph 2, or to any other activity required for the implementation of the JCPOA, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Security Council and has been approved by the Security Council.

In addition, this provision shall not prevent a designated individual or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such individual or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in this statement; the payment is not directly or indirectly received by an individual or entity subject to the measures in this paragraph; and after notification by the relevant States to the Security Council of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization.

In addition, States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to this paragraph of interest or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts were frozen, provided that such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these measures and are frozen;

e) For five years from the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals described in paragraphs 6(c) above, although underlining that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory. The measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Security Council determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Security Council concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the new resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA statute is engaged;

f) Take the required actions, in accordance with the resolution and guidance provided by the Security Council, with respect to items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement, and cooperate in such efforts.

7. All States are called upon to facilitate full implementation of the JCPOA by inspecting, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the

sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement; and are called upon also to cooperate in inspections on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is being undertaken contrary to the provisions contained in the JCPOA or this statement.

China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union note their understanding that, upon adoption of a resolution endorsing the JCPOA, the Security Council would make the practical arrangements to undertake directly the tasks specified in this statement, including to monitor and take action to support the implementation by Member States of these provisions, review proposals described in paragraph 2 of this statement, answer inquiries from Member States, provide guidance, and examine information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution. Furthermore, these states propose that the Security Council ask the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of these provisions every six months.

The duration of the provisions in this statement may be reviewed by the Joint Commission at the request of any participant at its biannual ministerial-level meetings, at which time the Joint Commission could make recommendations by consensus to the Security Council.

ATTACHMENT

1. AGHA-JANI, Dawood
2. ALAI, Amir Moayyed
3. ASGARPOUR, Behman
4. ASHIANI, Mohammad Fedai
5. ASHTIANI, Abbas Rezaee
6. ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANISATION OF IRAN (AEOI)
7. BAKHTIAR, Haleh
8. BEHZAD, Morteza
9. ESFAHAN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CENTRE (NFRPC) AND ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE (ENTC)
10. FIRST EAST EXPORT BANK, P.L.C.:
11. HOSSEINI, Seyyed Hussein
12. IRANO HIND SHIPPING COMPANY
13. IRISL BENELUX NV
14. JABBER IBN HAYAN
15. KARAJ NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE
16. KAVOSHYAR COMPANY
17. LEILABADI, Ali Hajinia
18. MESBAH ENERGY COMPANY
19. MODERN INDUSTRIES TECHNIQUE COMPANY
20. MOHAJERANI, Hamid-Reza
21. MOHAMMADI, Jafar
22. MONAJEMI, Ehsan
23. NOBARI, Houshang
24. NOVIN ENERGY COMPANY
25. NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND MEDICINE
26. PARS TRASH COMPANY
27. PISHGAM (PIONEER) ENERGY INDUSTRIES
28. QANNADI, Mohammad
29. RAHIMI, Amir
30. RAHIQI, Javad
31. RASHIDI, Abbas
32. SABET, M. Javad Karimi
33. SAFDARI, Seyed Jaber
34. SOLEYMANI, Ghasem
35. SOUTH SHIPPING LINE IRAN (SSL)
36. TAMAS COMPANY

C. VERTALING

Voor de vertaling van het Handvest, zoals gewijzigd, zie *Trb.* 1987, 113.

D. PARLEMENT

Zie *Trb.* 1951, 44.

E. PARTIJGEGEVENS

Zie de rubrieken E en F van *Trb.* 1951, 44 en, laatstelijk, *Trb.* 2012, 200.

G. INWERKINGTREDING

Zie *Trb.* 1951, 44 en *Trb.* 2011, 57.

J. VERWIJZINGEN

Zie laatstelijk *Trb.* 2012, 200.

In overeenstemming met artikel 19, tweede lid, van de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen heeft de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bepaald dat de resoluties zullen zijn bekendgemaakt in het gehele Koninkrijk op de dag na de datum van uitgifte van dit Tractatenblad.

Uitgegeven de *derde* september 2015.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken,

A.G. KOENDERS