

Context Analysis URUZGAN Province

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Note on sensitive information

Although this context analysis is unclassified in order to allow for distribution to important stakeholders in the field of defence, diplomacy and development in Uruzgan, it does contain sensitive information, notably regarding the past and present activities of some people in Uruzgan and the assessment of the local context. The authors went to quite some effort to check this information as thoroughly as possible. However, the amount of time spent in the field and the spectrum of people interviewed do not allow for 100% certainty. All information contained in this context analysis is therefore indicative only, and should be amended, completed or corrected as our understanding of the province deepens. The Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kabul and the Netherlands and Australian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence accept no liability for damage of any kind resulting from the risks inherent in the wrong use or distribution of this document and the information contained therein.

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1 PART ONE: Analysis of the Provincial Context

1.1 Socio-economic data (per District), where available age and gender specific

Geographical orientation

Uruzgan covers an area of 28,522 km², excluding the new District of Gizab (app. 70% of the Netherlands). The capital of Uruzgan is Tarin Kowt (Tarin Kot/Tirin Kowt/Trinkot). The province is situated at the southern foothills of the Hindu Kush. The highest summits (up to 2,778 m) are situated in the north. The south is relatively flat. Tarin Kowt is at an altitude of 1200m. The surrounding provinces are Day Kundi (Daikundi) to the north, Zabul to the southeast, Kandahar to the south and Helmand (Hilmand) to the west.

In March 2004 the 'old' Uruzgan-province was divided into two new provinces: Uruzgan and Day Kundi. The exact borders of the districts and the province are not clear. The districts of Nesh (with Kandahar province) and Kajran (with Day Kundi province) are disputed. Gizab District was recently added to the Province, a move probably inspired by the fact that the majority of this District belongs to the same Pashtun ethnic population as the rest of Uruzgan Province and access to this District is easier from the south than coming from the north. However, it does add a complexity to the Province.

This Context Analysis deals with the Province of Uruzgan as conceived by the central administration in Kabul, and includes the District of Gizab (a former district of Daikundi). According to the 2003 Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, the total population of the Province is 312,800 inhabitants. Just over 3.5% of the population lives in the main towns of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab. Outside the cities the population lives in small (family) villages along the rivers. Closer to the cities these villages are bigger and might count up to a few hundred people. The main roads to and in Uruzgan are accessible to motorised traffic, although mostly unpaved. Up to 2500m the roads are accessible all year round. There are some mountain passes between 1460m-2500m. Off-road the terrain is not accessible for motorised traffic. The main road into Uruzgan, which mainly follows the riverbeds, goes from Kandahar-city through Nesh District of Kandahar Province and into Uruzgan to Tarin Kowt.

The vegetation is high steppe, consisting of drought-resistant grasses (needle grass, sheep's fescue, etc.), low shrubs (mainly sagebrush), low (1-3 meters tall) bushes (locoweed, *Calligonum*), and sparse woodland consisting of juniper and wild pistachio trees 4-10 meters high. Plough lands are planted with grain crops (wheat, barley, rice), poppy and industrial crops (including ambary hemp and cotton). Vineyards and orchards occur near towns.

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District	Population (2003)		Total	Household Listing 2005	% Province	Number of villages (approximate)
	Female	Male				
<i>Tarin Kowt</i>	31,000	32,000	63,000	109,538	29.25	26 large and 122 small
<i>Deh Rawood</i>	25,000	27,100	52,100	50,718	13.54	48 large and 57 small
<i>Chora</i>	17,000	18,000	35,000	72,840	19.45	55 large and 45 small
<i>Khas Uruzgan</i>	28,000	29,500	57,500	37,888	10.12	20 large and 67 small
<i>Shahidi Hassas</i>	25,000	26,000	51,000	48,512	12.95	32 large and 47 small
<i>Gizab</i>	26,000	28,200	54,200	55,000	14.69	Not available
Total	152,000	160,800	312,800	374,496	100.00	

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Note 1: the male population is higher than the female population in all districts according to the official census data. This is most likely due to difficulty in counting the number of females in rural households, as access to females is forbidden for male census officials and men often only mention the number of sons they have.

Note 2: small villages are hamlets of up to ten households. The number of villages is based on the Household Listing of 2005, and differs from the AIMS Maps and UNAMA. They are an approximation of the actual number.

The *Helmand* River is marked by a sinuous braided channel, prone to frequent shifting; low alluvial islands that submerge at high water separate the arms and channels. The river's main channel has a prevailing width of 300-400 meters above the Kajaki dam (maximum 500 meters), and 100-200 meters below it (maximum 400 meters), with a depth of 2-2.5 meters (maximum of 6 meters). Flow rate is very high after snow melt and spring rains. Vehicles cannot cross without bridges or fordes. The bottom is primarily gravel and sand. Banks are low and flat, and in places have small cliffs (2-4 meters high, highest 13 meters). The bottomlands are dry and dissected by irrigation canals and ditches. Near *Alaqadari-Kajaki*, there is a hydropower station on the river, consisting of a riprap dam 274 meters long and 97 meters high, the *Zakhirayi-Abi-Band-e Kajaki* Reservoir, with a surface area of 30 km, and a generating station with a capacity of 33 MW serving Helmand province.

The *Tirirud* (Tiri River) has a prevailing width of 40-50 meters (maximum 150 meters) and a depth of up to 2 meters. The highest water levels on the *Helmand* and *Tirirud* Rivers (1-3 meters above low water), which are due to rapid melting of mountain snow, occur from March to June; at this time both rivers turn into churning white water. Low water lasts from July to October. The level of the *Helmand* River below the *Zakhirayi-Abi-Band-e Kajaki* Reservoir depends on releases from the reservoir. The other rivers in the area are intermittent. They have water from November through June, and at this time reach a width of 5-10 meters (some reach widths of 50-100 meters) at a depth of 0.5-1.5 meters.

Climate

General: The climate of the area is subtropical and continental. The actual weather depends on elevations of the mountainous terrain.

Spring

In the valleys (March to April) warm and generally clear.

In the mountains above 2000m (early April to early June) cool, with unstable weather; light frosts are possible until late in the season. Precipitation occurs as heavy brief rains, sometimes with thunderstorms, and in the mountains snow is possible early in the season.

Summer

Below 2000m. (May through September) hot and dry. Normal temperatures are +25° - +35° C (record 42° C) in daytime and +18° - +24° C at night.

In the mountains above 2000m (early June to early September) considerably cooler, with light frosts possible at night. Precipitation occurs mainly in the season as brief downpours.

Fall

In the valleys (October to November) and in the mountains above 2000m (early September to early November) initially warm and dry but later cool and damp. Light frosts begin in late October or early November. Precipitation occurs mainly as rain, but snow is possible in the mountaintops. Wind directions are variable throughout the year.

Winter

In valleys (December to February) rather mild. Normal temperatures are +3° - +6° C in the daytime, 0° - - 4° C at night.

In the mountains, above 2000m winter (early November to early April) considerably colder. Precipitation in the valleys and basins occurs as snow, which melts rapidly, and rain, and in the mountains only as snow. Snow cover persists above 2500m, lasting 2 to 4 months. In winter, strong winds up to 20 m/s in the

mountaintops and passes are accompanied by snowstorms. This area is characterized by mountain-valley winds; they blow up the mountainsides in daytime and back at night.

Characteristics and statistics

Temp (C°)	Jan	Feb.	March	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Extreme Max	18.3	21.7	29.4	35.0	37.8	42.8	42.8	42.8	37.8	33.3	28.3	21.7
Mean day max	8.9	12.8	19.4	25.0	31.7	37.2	39.4	38.3	33.3	27.2	17.2	12.8
Mean	2.2	5.6	11.1	16.7	22.8	27.8	29.4	28.3	22.2	16.1	8.3	5.6
Mean day min	-4.4	-2.2	2.8	8.3	13.3	18.3	19.4	18.3	11.1	4.4	-1.1	-2.2
Extreme min	-20.0	-11.7	-7.8	2.2	6.1	8.9	8.9	13.3	3.3	-3.9	-11.1	-10.6

Precipitation (mm)	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Maximum	8.4	10.9	11.9	3.6	2.5	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	4.6	4.3
Mean	4.3	5.6	4.6	2.0	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.8
Minimum	1.0	0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
Maximum 24hr	2.8	2.3	2.5	1.3	1.5	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	3.3	2.8

Uruzgan Economy

An analysis of the economy in Uruzgan is complicated by the size of the illicit economy, which has considerably overshadowed most other economic activities in the province. Apart from traditional agricultural activities, small enterprises, cottage industry, trade, revenues accruing from poppy, marble and remittances, there are no other economic activities in Uruzgan. This makes the prospect of income derived from participation in the insurgency all the more attractive to the local youth.

Broadly speaking, agriculture and animal husbandry are the key economic activities, with poppy as an increasingly dominant crop. The landholding pattern in Uruzgan shows a marked preponderance of small-scale family holdings, with a number of bigger landowners and commanders owning larger tracts of land (sometimes land illegally seized from the government, see conflict section).

An important factor that negatively affects the livelihoods of the population is the long period of drought and ensuing neglect of agricultural infrastructure that has forced many young men to seek employment outside the province. Agriculture in general has very much suffered from the decrease in the acreage of arable land in the province due to increased water scarcity since the early 1990s. Although the exact percentage of decrease is unknown, a figure of 40 to 50% is generally cited by elders and government officials.¹ According to FAO between 30 and 50% of the population can be categorized as vulnerable and require some form of food assistance every year (the percentage

¹ This estimate is partly confirmed by statistics from UNODC from their surveyed villages in Uruzgan, which report a reduction of 51% in the total acreage of arable land from the early to the late 1990s, as well as by FAO/MRRD/WFP data for 2003 indicating that only 60 % of usually intensely irrigated land and 15% of irregularly irrigated land was cultivated that year.

depending on the harvest), while 23% of the population suffers from food energy insecurity (<2,100 Kcal daily)².

In addition, trade disruption from the insurgency, has resulted in an increase of prices for commodities in some bazaars (the districts suffering from this phenomenon are Khas Uruzgan, Char Cineh and Chora, and also Nilli bazaar of Day Kundi province in the winter). It does not appear that Taliban elements are taxing the trade, but that insurgents sometimes willingly prevent merchandises from reaching bazaars in areas controlled by the government or in areas controlled by tribes seen as favouring the government.

Agriculture including irrigation

Agriculture and animal husbandry are the key economic activities, with poppy as an increasingly dominant crop.

- Subsistence agriculture is the traditional economic activity of the population of Uruzgan. Most of the land has potential for irrigation, largely thanks to the rivers that cross all districts. Traditional irrigation systems (the main and branch canals as well as *karezes*) have fallen into disrepair due to years of conflict and an absent labour force. The USAID Cash-for Work programme has been successful in repairing the karezes and irrigation canals in some areas. Wheat and other agricultural products cultivated (vegetables, other cereals) are for local consumption and little revenue is therefore created for subsistence farmers through their traditional crops.
- Animal husbandry was central to the livelihoods of many communities in Uruzgan, specifically the Kuchi tribes, with families holding up to 100 heads of livestock or more (with the exception of Khas Uruzgan where the number is lower). There appear to be more goats and sheep than cattle. The years of drought have seriously affected this activity, with a high rate of livestock depletion over the years, estimated at more than 50%. The issue of Kuchi access to Hazarajat has also negatively impacted on the livelihoods of Kuchis, while creating an additional burden on those communities in which Kuchis are now summering instead of Hazarajat
- Fruits: Uruzgan was well known for its orchards and for the quality of its fresh and dried fruits. Nowadays, fruits continue to be produced because land allocated to orchards has not been converted to poppy cultivation, as this would imply that the fruit trees would need to be uprooted, but problematic access to markets and the spread of more profitable forms of agriculture (poppy) have undermined the profitability of this economic activity.
- Women perform a number of agricultural tasks, and therefore play limited but important economic roles within the bounds of tradition. Handicraft is also produced by women in some areas, while older women can sometimes be hired as household helpers within their communities (cfr Role of Women in the Local Economy, below).

Agricultural Credit

- Informal non-poppy related credit in Uruzgan is rare. However loans are obtained from shopkeepers and traders (35% of the loans) and from relatives (36% of the loans), either on interest or the return of loan after a mutually agreed time line. 55% of the poppy growing farmers report to have obtained

²

MRRD VAU, analysis of drought impact in Afghanistan, summer 2003 – summary for Cabinet. The figures include data for Dai Kundi as well.

their loans from shopkeepers and traders (who are often involved in the opium business). The next most frequent source are relatives (30%).

- The lack of rural financial institutions in Afghanistan, in combination with the need of farmers to bridge the gap until the next harvest, was one of the key reasons for farmers to engage in opium poppy cultivation. Notably ‘salaam’ arrangements, i.e. advance sale of opium prior to the harvest, which obliges farmers to plant and harvest opium in order to repay their debts, were identified in the past as a major driving force for poppy cultivation (Afghanistan UNODC Opium Survey 2005).

Formal and informal employment, opportunities and obstacles, private sector, market structures

- Remittances: given the overall depressed state of the economy, many Uruzganis have migrated to Kandahar, Kabul and Quetta in Pakistan in search of jobs, with Hazaras usually going to Kabul, Iran or Quetta, the latter because of the large Hazara community already existing there. Although it is difficult to estimate the level remittances transferred by these workers to their families and kin in Uruzgan, the sum is likely to be substantial, and remittances therefore play a key role in the coping mechanisms of many poor families in the province
- Trade: there are small markets in each district centre, and even smaller ones outside of district centres (like Chenortu), but these are insignificant. The main markets for Uruzgan are Tarin Kowt, Kandahar, Ghazni and Sangin (for opium). Access to these markets for legal cash crops (fruits etc.) is complicated by the poor state of the roads, but mostly by the uncertain security situation (Taliban checkpoints, etc.). The routes and markets for opium are given below. The main market for fruits is to the south in Kandahar, using the main roads.
- Stone mining, divided into two activities
 - Marble, a traditional activity in Uruzgan. Marble cut in Nur Dara (valley of light) of Khas Uruzgan district can be found in Kandahar. This marble mining activity is presently organized locally, with limited economic benefits.
 - Some deposits of various semi precious stones in Khas Uruzgan (near Beril village) and Tarin Kowt (near Bakhod village). Exact names and types of these stones are not known, the deposits are exploited irregularly by communities living in their vicinities
- In Shash Burjak (six towers) area of Khas Uruzgan, elders report that there are some unexploited “petroleum” deposits.

Poppy production and influence on security and governance

- Poppy. According to UNODC, Uruzgan is likely to become one of the five highest producing poppy provinces in 2006, indicating a huge increase in the cultivation of poppy since last year. According to locals, a large majority of arable land was under poppy cultivation in 2006, a significant expansion from last year. Not only does the production and trade in opium have a negative impact on the stability of the province, it also leads to indebtedness of the farming population, drug addiction and criminality.
- Drug trading System: As elsewhere in Afghanistan, the poppy and opium trade is controlled by a relatively small number of key traffickers within Afghanistan, mostly concentrated in Kandahar region (about 15 to 20 key traffickers reportedly control 80% of the Afghan market). Six key traffickers (3-5 tons per convoy) are reportedly active in Uruzgan, besides other low level traffickers. These traffickers are able to operate thanks to high level political support in Kabul, that ensures key appointments are made in the best interest of the traffic.

- Trafficking of large amounts of narcotics is generally being facilitated by protection of different layers of governance. This system prevails throughout the country from the district level to the level of the central government. This means that most of the police hierarchy is probably involved in protecting narcotics trafficking in drug trafficking provinces, and that the control over these appointments is therefore extremely sensitive. Those police officers who refuse to comply with this system have no chance of being appointed in any position of significance, or worse will be fired or even physically eliminated.
- In areas where the insurgency has become as strong as or stronger than the government, traffickers must also seek protection from local insurgents groups. Hence, in a province like Uruzgan, each mid level trafficker is likely to be paying both government and insurgents for protection, and both therefore have a vested interest in the present arrangements.
- This conclusion has far reaching consequences for the stabilization strategy: because governor Munib's stabilization plan involves the appointment of more professional district sub governors and police chiefs, it is likely to disturb the existing system of drug trafficking protection, and therefore will need strong political (and military) support from the international community to be successful.
- Drug trafficking routes: the poppy harvested in Uruzgan generally goes to Helmand where it is refined or sent across the border for refinement, using the Tarin Kowt, Char Cineh or Deh Rawod roads. Northern and Western Uruzgan are also located on the key trafficking route for Poppy cultivated in the North of the country to Helmand through the Central Highlands. Most of these "routes" are tertiary roads or contraband tracks, many of which were already in use during the jihad. In Helmand at least, the trafficking routes appear to be similar to the infiltration routes of the Taliban.
- PEP is a governance program and its main function is to support the Governor's efforts to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, focusing specifically on three key areas: Legal Livelihoods and Development Liaison, Public Information through Community Outreach, Monitoring and Verification. The Governor is responsible for eradication.
- In 2005, the previous Governor made an effort to eradicate poppy production in Uruzgan Province. This affected the ethnic groups not affiliated with the Governor and those producing for his competitors. Governor Munib has not undertaken any action since his nomination because of the security situation and his lack of support within the Province that would be further undermined. Final figures for 2006 are not yet available, but initial estimates show that production has gone up from 4.605 hectares (of very high quality because of much snow in the previous winter) in 2005 to around 10.000 hectares in 2006.

Role of women in the local economy

- Women perform their household related chores as well as a number of agricultural tasks, and therefore play limited but important economic roles within the bounds of tradition. Water is collected for domestic use by women, mostly from wells. Water to be collected from a longer distance is a task for men or children and to a lesser extent by women.
- Engagement of Uruzgan women in agricultural activities outside the home is limited. Crop storage and cleaning of harvests is done by women. Women do not work in the field alongside men.

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However, in Hazara communities women tend to play a larger role in agricultural activities outside the home.

- In poppy cultivation women do not play an active role, this is a male dominated activity. However women do play a role once the poppy has been collected and taken home, where she will be involved in processing and storage of the product. Thus women play no role in collection or sale of poppy.
- Livestock at home is taken care of by women, including the processing of dairy products. The grazing of livestock outside home is usually done by children or elderly women in the family.
- Handicrafts are produced at home by women in some areas (mostly making traditional embroidered hats and garments). However, there is no major market for the handicrafts and most are sold in the local markets or bazaars in the district centres. Older women can sometimes be hired as household helpers within their communities. Female headed households are often supported through traditional community based solidarity mechanisms.
- According to available information, only one woman being the head of the MOWA in Tarin Kowt is working for government in Uruzgan. There are no women in the police, or other government bodies. There are however a limited number of women working as medical personnel in the various MCH's, and a few female teachers in Tarin Kowt and the Hazara areas. One educated woman in Tarin Kowt is eager to assist in educating females.
- Women in the Hazara minority enjoy comparatively greater freedom than their Pashtun counterparts, and both education for girls and health services for women are in higher demand in these communities, as exemplified by the fact that more than half of the girl schools of the province (3 out of 5) are located in those areas.

Human development

- According to the Provincial fact sheet prepared for Uruzgan, the province ranks 30th out of 32 provinces compared on the basis of similar data. It ranks as second worst province for overall primary school attendance, and amongst the worst five provinces for girls' primary school attendance. In addition, it ranks amongst the worst fifteen provinces for maternal mortality ratios and is the second worst province for under-5 mortality rates.
- Uruzgan has always been underserved by Central Government in terms of education, health, transport and other basic services, as a result of which its inhabitants have a reputation as particularly conservative and backward.
- Government provides limited services to outlying areas due to the limited administrative control over the province as a result of the security situation and the poor accessibility of many areas. Whereas the educational system was to some extent distributed over the province, many schools have been closed during past years. Healthcare is mainly in hands of NGO's and some private practitioners, among others traditional midwives.

Health

- The population of Uruzgan province faces severe health problems. Due to the marginal location and insecure situation, health infrastructure and service delivery are poorly developed. The population depends on traditional midwives called *dayau* and on traditional healers called *juyani*, present in every village. One Afghan NGO (since 1995) and a number of private practitioners are active in the province. There is one provincial hospital at Tarin Kowt (120 beds), one comprehensive health centre in each district, and there are three basic health centres.
- The number of doctors in the province remained stable at five between 2001 and 2002, the number of nurses decreased from 24 to five in 2002³. This number has gone up slightly according to discussions with a specialised NGO involved in the province, but it is difficult to attract female nurses. The provincial director for health receives salaries for 18 doctors, but the province has only two (the others either have left or are 'ghost workers'). This gives the central government wrong information on the actual needs.
- One of the private doctors who worked in four villages of Char Cineh District (officially known as Shahidi Hassas) for the last three years mentioned pregnancy complications, malnutrition and anaemia, water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea and typhoid, and addiction to drugs as the main prevalent diseases. In particular young women are facing problems, 14-17 year old girls are being married out to old men of over 60 years of age for bride prices of 1 to 2 million Afghanis. 36% of the young girls use drugs, 8% of young children below the age of 5 years die because of accidentally using drugs left behind in the home by their fathers.
- Vaccination coverage is low, with polio vaccination coverage of 10%, DPT coverage of 5% and measles coverage of 50.5%. 2.3% of the children from 1-4 years suffer from at least one form of disability.
- A WB report mentions that: 'the alarming health conditions of Afghan women do not reflect a deliberate gender discrimination in households, but rather the result of poverty and the general lack of health facilities, which together with a number of social factors affect women particularly hard'. (Resource: Afghanistan National Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction - the role of women in Afghanistan's Future, March 2005). However, this statement contradicts itself: it is true that overall poverty and the dearth of health infrastructure have an effect on everyone in rural areas (both men and women). But as the report states, "a number of social factors" (and cultural factors) contribute to further limit women's access to whatever health services would be available. As women are generally precluded from leaving their communities, access to health services is much more difficult than for men, particularly in a province like Uruzgan. Hence, discrimination plays an important role in the status of women's health in the province.

³

1382 (2003) Afghanistan statistical yearbook, Issue No. 24 September 2003

Education

- The number of schools and madrassas went up from 25 in 2001 to a total number of 99 in 2002. WFP school food programme distributed food to 32 schools in Tarin Kowt District, 26 in Khas Uruzgan, 21 in Chora, 33 in Gizab and 20 in Deh Rawod District. Students (2002): 13688 boys and 385 girls attend primary school in Uruzgan province. About 19% of the children between 7-13 years old go to school.
- There is an acute shortage of female teachers in the Province. Out of 397 teachers in the Central Uruzgan Region, 26% is female. Of the 566 teachers in the Southern Uruzgan Region, 100% is male. According to an NGO active in the field of education, it is impossible to undertake education programmes in Uruzgan province, in particular for girls. However, it might be possible to support literacy programmes for women and girls through educated women living in the communities.
- According to the national survey of 2003, the main reasons for not attending school were (in sequence of importance): inadequate facilities (61.3%), education not seen as necessary (17.5%), the teacher's gender (13.6%), the distance (11.5%), no separate school for girls and boys (10.8%) and domestic work (9.3%). At present, the frequent assaults on schools as a result of the deteriorating security situation is the main reason for non-attendance.
- Programmes in the field of education are absent in Uruzgan province, except for some school buildings and classrooms built with support from USAID and in many cases burnt by the Taliban. Education is discouraged by the Taliban and seen as an attempt by the international community to instill western norms and values in Afghan youths. According to the Taliban, building schools is a political statement, and teachers have been targeted by the Taliban.

The judiciary

- The responsibilities of the Justice institutions are to act on the basis of close cooperation with the Attorney General's Office as well as the prosecutors in the provinces. The judiciary organs face serious understaffing, particularly acute in the prosecutor's office. However, the judges are appointed by the Central Government and are distributed over the tribes (Popolzai, Ghilzai, Alikozai and one Baluch).
- Although detailed information about the types and numbers of cases handled by the judiciary was not forthcoming, information gathered with elders and government representatives indicates a level of service delivery which is even lower than the national provincial average. The predicament of the judiciary was not facilitated by the rule of JMK, who was notoriously prone to overlook legal procedures and reportedly kept private jails. Governor Munib has made an effort to start rectifying the most blatant problems in the judiciary by reportedly requesting that people not be detained without a minimum of due process.
- The police reform is closely linked with the reform of the Justice Sector. In the Ministry of Interior a special Department for Criminal Investigation has been set up by the Tashkeel. The same at the regional and provincial level. Also, a separate State Office of Criminal Investigation has been

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established under direct authority of the Ministry, with sub departments for counter terrorism and counter narcotics.

- The roll out of the Provincial Justice Initiative started in eight provinces. In this programme of basic on the spot training on criminal procedures for justice operators, around 50 actors in the justice sector (20 judges, 20 prosecutors, 7-8 judicial policemen, 2-3 defence lawyers) are trained for 1 month and strengthened in material capacity (office furniture, communication devices, laws, transport). The training is conducted by Afghan judges, prosecutors and policemen who underwent two intense training sessions on criminal procedure, juvenile code and penitentiary law in Kabul. The PJI has a core group of 20-25 trainers who move at the same time to 3-4 provinces and conduct effective mock trials for one month time. The Initiative is low budget and the implementing agency ISISC (International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) has a long experience in a similar kind of training programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq and other post or in-conflict scenarios. All (law) courts (provincial and district level) can be reached. In the near future, the trainers will work in Faryab (Norway funding) and in February 2006 the PJI was conducted in Baghlan (Netherlands funding). Uruzgan might be considered as well but the displacement of the task force should be integrated with the civilian component of the PRT to ensure that the trainers do not run any risk.
- Whereas a lot has been achieved on paper under the Justice and Police reforms, in practice local political and ethnic dynamics form an obstacle to their implementation, whereas there is a grey zone of not yet completely identified areas of joint action and synergetic collaboration. By strengthening the functioning of these institutions at provincial level, there is a chance to enhance confidence of the population and of civil society in Afghanistan as a whole.

The security organs in the province

The province's security organs consist of two battalions of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Highway Police (AHP), each of which reveals a very diverse picture regarding their nature and staffing from a half official tribal militia to professional ANA, each with different capacities and loyalties.

Under the previous Governor, the leading security organs were in hands of the Zirak Durrani: the Chief of Police of Uruzgan Province was Barakzai, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the AHP were Popolzai, the District CoP of Khas Uruzgan and Chora were Achakzai. Under Governor Munib, General Qasim (like Munib from Paktia Province) was appointed as the Provincial Chief of Police. He has no known tribal or family links to the province. This also goes for the newly appointed chief of the provincial National Directorate of Security (NDS) named Rauf. He comes from the Laghman province.

DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed groups)

- DIAG is a process intending to eradicate the influence of illegal armed groups in Afghanistan, thus allowing the consolidation of peace, rule of law and prosperity in the country. By voluntarily surrendering their weapons, disbanding or severing link with armed groups, ex-commanders and

government officials linked with groups will demonstrate their support to the Government to build a safe and prosperous Afghanistan. The DIAG process was launched on 11 June 2005.

- DIAG consists of several phases covering the whole country in the end. The pre-phase, which can be seen as a pilot, covering provinces most suitable to start the programme. The main phase, selecting provinces (18 in total) in accordance to the geographical and linguistic balance, covering the north, east, west and south. In the meantime the significant criterion which is set out for selecting a province is the cooperation of people, preparedness of commanders and Governors.
- Under the current situation, any significant progress on DIAG in Uruzgan seems unlikely.

The Transitional Justice Action Plan

In order for the war-affected people of Uruzgan to regain trust in the government and judiciary, both at a local and national level, it is of vital importance that serious efforts are undertaken in the field of transitional justice. In doing so the 5 key actions from the Transitional Action Plan should be taken into account:

- Acknowledgement of the suffering of the Afghan people;
- Ensuring credible and accountable state institutions;
- Truth seeking and documentation;
- Promotion of reconciliation and national unity;
- Establishment of effective and reasonable accountability mechanisms.

Whereas Transitional Justice focuses on making leaders account for their past behaviour, the National Reconciliation Programme is based on repentance over one's past and a promise of appropriate behaviour in future. As a result, there is a lot of criticism of the Transitional Justice Programme on the latter.

1.2 Culture

- Uruzgan Province is situated in the heart of the so-called Pashtun tribal belt, stretching from Herat in the West to Peshawar in the East, and from Kabul in the North to Kandahar in the South. The majority population of Uruzgan province is Pashtun. The Pashtun are the largest tribal society in the world counting roughly 15 to 25 million people living on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pashtun distinguish themselves by their own language, Pashtu, and a tribal community. Their group identity is based on common ancestors. Nearly all Pashtuns are Sunnite Muslims.

The main elements of Pashtun identity are:

- the shared code of honour and customs, also known as *pashtunwali*
- the belief in a common ancestor: Qais Abdur Rashid
- and the religion of Islam.

The main institutions of Pashtunwali are:

- *Badal*, or revenge
- *Melmastia*, or hospitality

Context Analysis / URUZGAN Province

- *Nang (Ghayrat)*, meaning chivalry or honour. Sometimes Pashtunwali (code of the Pashtun) is equated with Nangwali (code of honour). *Nang* is also used to designate mountain Pashtun who have not yet been encapsulated and influenced by a foreign system and whose social organization still approximates the ideal Pashtun type.
- *Jirga*⁴, or assembly of tribal elders who are called to take decisions, which are usually binding on the parties to a conflict.
- In the ideal model of Pashtun social organization, the concept of *tarburwali* (traditional rivalry between cousins) and *tor* (honour, or chastity of women) play central roles, sometimes overriding other norms and obligations (Ahmed, 1980).

Pashtun social organization

- Pashtun tribes do not possess clearly identified chiefs or rulers, in theory all Pashtun men are equal and decisions are taken as part of a collective mechanism. The ideal model of Pashtun social organization approximates a state of complete democracy (between men), close to anarchy even, with all men being equal, and the social organization and tribal code working to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a few. This ideal egalitarian / anarchic system is held together and regulated by the Pashtun code, which provides its normative boundaries and act as a stabiliser of both internal and external relations.

Pashtunwali or shared honour and custom

- Although aspects of the *pashtunwali* change from place to place and tribe to tribe, there is one main underlying notion influencing all interpretations of the *pashtunwali*: that all Pashtuns have an equal status (especially in front of the law) and that no one should possess more rights and power than others. This idea of equality characterizes the design of tribal institutions such as the jirga as well as the socioeconomic distribution of land. Land ownership remains an important characteristic of being a Pashtun today as it expresses the autonomy of the tribesmen⁵.
- Men and women in Pashtun society inhabit separate worlds where they function and contribute to the sustenance of the whole Pashtun group. These worlds are not mutually exclusive since there are areas of overlap, including duties requiring consultation. Furthermore, there is a spectrum of segregation, with the urban and landowning elite being highly segregated and the pastoral and nomadic tribes knowing little segregation. This gender segregation does not reflect distinction in terms of public and private space. However, there is a porous quality to the boundaries of these spaces that enables the young and the elderly to cross them.

⁴ The traditional decision-making body in Pashtun Afghanistan is the jirga. Jirga are temporary bodies that are created for a special task, usually solving disputes between tribes, sub tribes, clans, families or individuals, but also between the government and the tribes. After the jirga reaches a decision it tends to dissolve. It is only revived if the decision is not accepted or if a new conflict or dispute arises. The most influential jirga members are the spin girls and the khans. While the spin girls are the ones who have the traditional knowledge of the Pashtunwali, the khans' importance stems from their power and influence. Traditionally jirgas are all-male events.

⁵ A good illustration of the attachment of Pashtuns to land is reflected in the expression: *zar, zan, zamin* (*gold, women and land*), the three things that Pashtun themselves say that they care most about.

Context Analysis / URUZGAN Province

- Uruzgan ranks among one of the most conservative areas in Afghanistan, distinguishing itself as the only province nationwide where women candidates could not be found to run for the three reserved female Provincial Council (PC) seats in the 2005 elections.
- In general, women are confined to their traditional roles and are deprived of education, health as well as employment opportunities (the latter outside of their homes). Although they do exercise power within the household, they are excluded from the community decision making process and do not participate in shuras or jirgas.

Types of Leadership and Authority

- At the village level, the female village leader, *qaryadar*, witnesses women's ceremonies, mobilizes women to practice religious festivals, prepares the female dead for burial, and performs services for deceased women. She also arranges marriages for her own family and arbitrates conflicts for men and women.
- At the family level, which is one of the extended family, women create social networks of hierarchy with a leader who manages the household resources, delegates work, forms and strengthens social networks, and gains credibility and social mobility through marriage choices. She also resolves conflicts among women within the household. In the case of *nanawati*, the defence of the guest, she is the family representative who asks for the conflict to be resolved. There may be more than one female household leader. If the female leaders work together compatibly, the household will stay unified; otherwise the house must be partitioned.

Authority of women over Resources

- Women of the landowning and sedentary Pashtun tribes have more control over the management of family resources, while women who are in pastoral semi-nomadic tribes have less control. All women have control of their personal clothes and jewellery, the livestock they raise, the dairy products they produce, and the fruits and vegetables they grow. These they can use to barter for goods or services, or they are free to pass them on as inheritance or gifts. Women in sedentary tribes who have control over flour, oil, and rice can form contracts with other women by paying them for their services. Women who are family leaders and who have resources may use them to augment their authority by withholding their goods from those who choose not to obey. Nomadic women are customarily left in full charge of managing all of their family's resources while the men are away herding for several months at a time.

Authority of Women in Mediation and Arbitration

- Women leaders resolve conflicts between women of their household, between different households, between men and women, and even to a certain extent between men, as in the case of *nanawati*. The scope of a matriarch's authority to arbitrate is dependent on how large her social network is and how honourable her reputation. Thus, by expanding her social networks through marriage, she gains more legislative authority. Her honour is based on how well she follows the Pashtunwali code in her decisions of mediation and arbitration as well as in her own life. At the family level she might arbitrate such matters as conflicts in women's labour contracts, domestic disputes between men and women in the family, and the theft of personal belongings, especially jewellery, and she might make pacts between mothers of children who have harmed or injured each other. At the village level she might arbitrate or mediate in conflicts between women and men of different households.
- As elsewhere in conservative areas of Afghanistan, women can be exchanged or given as parts of dispute settlements (as it creates a blood link between the parties, it is deemed a particularly strong and effective guarantee), and are generally not consulted as regards their marriage partners. The practice of marrying young girls at an early age also has an economic explanation, as brides have a high economic value, especially for the poorer families. They are often married to old men who have more resources to pay the dowry. In very extreme cases, girls may be given up to pay debts.

As a rule, the average dowry for a bride stands between AF 250,000 and AF 400,000 in Uruzgan province, which is relatively low by Afghan standards. However, in Char Cineh District and areas with a strong narcotics economy, dowries have increased considerably (up to AF 1 million) making it difficult for parents to raise the required amount and leading to frustration among girls. Families who cannot afford these prices sometimes make special arrangements to exchange their daughters. Frustration among teenage girls has led to high incidence of drugs abuse.

- Although polygamy is occasionally practised, it is not a widespread phenomenon in the province. As elsewhere in the rural Pashtun world, women who lose their husband must remarry within the family, usually the husband's brother, or have to stay widows for the rest of their lives. According to Pashtunwali, women inherit nothing. Pashtunwali does not function as a system of retributive justice (like Sharia, or our Western Models), but as a system to reestablish balance between and within communities. As such, Pashtunwali based decisions usually take the form of bargain involving blood money, or women. They traditionally do not even inherit the half of what their brothers inherit, due to them under Islamic law, because as women leave the family upon marriage, allowing them their share under Islamic law would undermine the integrity of the family's economic assets (for the long list and explanation of the many points of difference between Pashtunwali and Sharia, legal specialists would have to be consulted).

CONCLUSION: a few characteristics of Pashtunwali

- a. First, the Pashtunwali legal code is mainly guided by a set of concepts defining honour that allow for a variety of practice in different Pashtun social and economic environments. Gender boundaries differ, for example, creating divergent kinds of social space and social orders where women have legal authority and control of limited resources. In other words, the segregation of genders does not necessarily result in the total disempowerment of women. In Pashtunwali, women still have influence and access to specific power structures specifically within segregated, homo-socially ordered Pashtun communities.
- b. Second, Pashtuns have difficulty practising Pashtunwali where there is economic disparity and especially where they are unable to act autonomously. Pashtunwali works best in a community of political equals where differences in wealth and power are not too great. It cannot easily survive where power differences are permanent or where an individual has no capacity to demonstrate autonomy.
In other words, Pashtuns either need to change Pashtunwali and the identity connotations that come along with practising it traditionally; or it will not survive when there are many social and economic differences and when autonomy is severely restricted by state and centralized governments.
- c. Finally, because autonomy and equality are key components to the practice of all Pashtunwali concepts, the survival of the "Pashtun way" is at stake when conflicts with other systems pose a threat to these two key requisites. Urbanization, internal displacement, and the refugee setting threaten economic and social equality, and a powerful centralized government threatens the autonomy. The threat to autonomy has often been linked to Afghan governmental policies on women's rights, de-veiling, and compulsory education. Furthermore, male Pashtun autonomy is abusive to women when women are given as compensation in blood feuds, when women are killed in honour killings, when a widow is forced to marry her brother-in-law (especially if she lacks a male heir), and when women are kept from educational and health resources. In the end, for Pashtunwali to survive, it must adapt its concepts and reduce Pashtun autonomy in order to comply more with a state government system, and it must find a means of balancing power, even in socially and economically disparate conditions.

The religion of Islam

- Another defining feature of being Pashtun is religion. Islam is deeply embedded in the identity of rural Pashtun, is accepted without doubt or questions, and plays a central role in the life of most. Throughout history, religion has been used as a powerful tool of political mobilization, especially in times of crisis (during invasions for example, through the call to Jihad). It is interesting to note that the contradictions that exist between Islamic precepts and Pashtunwali (issue of woman inheritance for example) are well understood but do not affect the religious conviction of Pashtuns.

Pashtun of the Mountains and of the Plains

- Scholars divide the Pashtun into two broad groups: the *nang* or mountain Pashtuns and the *Qalang* or plains Pashtun. The former conform most closely to the ideal type of Pashtun social organization. The latter have lived longer under the influence of the state and have adopted a less equal type of social organization. It is in the Qalang Pashtun societies that Khans⁶ have emerged as important social and political figures, symbolizing the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few and the penetration of tribal society by the State.
- Governments in Afghanistan have traditionally sought to co-opt khans as its ally in a given tribal group, as a result of which Khans have acquired additional political power through access to government resources. Historically, the nang pashtun successfully resisted the encroachments attempts of the state on their autonomy until the 1950s, but were themselves gradually encapsulated by the state thereafter.
- Despite differences among groups and increasing deviance from the ideal model, *pashtunwali* more or less still determines the social life of all Pashtun; stipulating day to day behaviour and providing the legal framework for all communal institutions such as the jirga (tribal gathering) and the shura (tribal council).
- The population has learnt to survive the interventions and foreign intrusions of successive governments and occupation forces. This has made them take on a 'wait and see' attitude whenever new strangers arrive and not change their allegiances easily. Understanding of their reservations, and respect for their culture and social cohesion, will facilitate interaction and possibly lead to fruitful cooperation

1.3 Tribal structure (description of ethnic constitution, distribution over the Province, power structure)

- Uruzgan is a conservative tribal society where the tribal system and informal governance structures continue to play an important role in regulating social relations and adjudicating disputes. Despite the fact that Uruzgan society can be described as relatively far removed from the ideal model of Pashtun social organization, tribes remain important recipients of power alongside the government

⁶ The Khan is a figure to be found mostly in Qalang Pashtun societies. Although it is traditionally a hereditary title, people with influence and resources can also earn the title of khan. In the Southwest, khans tend to belong to influential families. Although their power has diminished since the 1978 revolution, they tend to enjoy the respect and trust of their communities, and also play an important role in solving and mediating disputes.

in the province, and tribal affiliations continue to play a central role in shaping loyalties. With the partial exception of the Popolzai (due to their dominant position at the regional level), tribes in Uruzgan do not generally have a sufficient level of internal cohesion to be able to act as coherent political entities, and do not have adequate representation mechanisms to be able to do so. One sign of the loss of integrity of the tribal system is the fact that tribes have forgotten where their flags are and many do not know the genealogical structure of their own clan.

- Although Uruzgan has some problems and dynamics of its own, it is part of the larger Southern region that encompasses Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul and Kandahar, with Kandahar city acting as the political and economic gravitational centre for the whole zone. Uruzgan province cannot be understood properly and its problems cannot be solved durably unless an approach integrating this regional reality is adopted. The tribal, political, economic and other networks which help shape loyalties and the political landscape, including both the insurgency and the narcotics trade, are very much regional in nature.
- This reality of interdependence partly stems from the fact that the administrative borders of these four provinces were at least in part designed by successive Afghan governments during the old regime in an effort to divide important tribal groups into different administrative units, so as to undermine their political power and leverage in province. This is why for example some of the main tribes of the area (the Nurzai, the Hotak / Tokhi and the Alikozai) are divided between Uruzgan, Northern Kandahar and North-eastern Helmand and Northern Zabul.
- This geographical prism is particularly helpful to understand local dynamics and the insurgency, because the Southern region is very much the heartland of the Taliban movement. Tribal, religious and other networks which underpin the insurgency straddle the provincial administrative boundaries.
- In sum, the territory of Pashtun tribes in Uruzgan does not necessarily coincide with political boundaries. The division of geographical space among the tribes is determined on the basis of tribal administrative sections (*wand*⁷) defining the jurisdiction and responsibility of each tribe and *shuras*. The number of *wands* allocated to a tribe gives an idea about its size, share in resources and influence.

⁷ The term *wand* comes from the notion of *Watan* which has an emotional quality that is close to the notion of “home or the place one belongs to” (German = *Heimat*). It describes a small local region where one person knows the others face to face.

Main tribal confederations and tribes in Uruzgan

Pashtuns believe in a genealogical concept of social structure that is segmented by lines of descent from the common ancestor. It is further divided into tribes (qaum⁸), several sub-tribes, clans and extended families.

The **Pashtun** can be divided into two large tribal confederations, the **Durrani** and the **Ghilzai**, that form two-thirds of all Afghan Pashtuns. The Southern and South-Western tribes are known as the Durrani. The Eastern and the South-Eastern tribes of the Pashtun are called the Ghilzai. Each of these two confederations is subdivided into tribes and sub-tribes. The relationship between the Durrani and the Ghilzai is often tense, in part based on the forced deportation of Ghilzai Pashtun from the southern and eastern parts of the country to the northern part of Afghanistan. The deportations occurred during the reign of various Durrani kings in the past centuries. In the last three centuries, the Durrani (Zirak) ruled the country. Two exceptions to this rule were the communist period and the Taliban regime, which leaned heavily on the Ghilzai.

The dominant tribal confederation in Uruzgan is the Durrani, comprising about 70 to 75% of the total population. Important tribes within the **Durrani** confederation are:


- from the **Zirak**-branch (40-45%): the Popolzai, who up to recently occupied the largest part of the administration and security jobs in the province and still to a large extent do (the current president Hamid Karzai is a Popolzai Durrani); the Barakzai with as main sub-tribe the Mohammadzai; the Achakzai (with at least two sub-branches: the Hamidzai and the Ghibzai); and the Alikozai. These tribes are mostly to be found in the centre and east of the province.
- the second branch of the Durrani, the **Panjpao** (30%), is made up of the Nurzai, Khugiani, Alizai, Ishaqzai, and Maku tribes, with the Nurzai as the dominant tribe among them in the province. These tribes are located mostly in the west of the province.

The **Ghilzai** tribal confederation, divided into two big tribes and a number of smaller tribes, comprise about 15 to 20% of the total population of Uruzgan province. Most of the Ghilzai in the province hail from the Western Ghilzai group (Toran). The large tribes are the Hotak and the Tokhi, smaller tribes in Uruzgan are the Niazi, Kakar, Wardak. Taliban leader Mullah Omar is a member of the Hotak trib

⁸

Qaum means the solidarity group that an individual feels he or she belongs to. Within the Pashtun society qaum usually refers to the tribal or subtribal group, and this is why it is often translated as meaning tribe, but it can also refer to other solidarity levels (kawul, extended family, clan, village, subtribe or in some cases professional group).

Simplified tribal tree of Pashtuns



Note: It should be noted that in the division between Ghilzai and Durrani, a choice has been made that cannot be completely motivated. For example, most sources divide the Durrani into two branches: the Zirak and the Panjpao (see Appendix 1). Other sources, however, consider the Panjpao to be a separate branch of the Ghilzai. The exact reasons behind the deviating choice of including the Panjpao in the Ghilzai are unclear but could be related to the historically subordinate position held by the Panjpao within the Durrani, which also primarily holds true for the relationship between the Durrani and the Ghilzai.

The **Hazara** represent a minority of 10% in the province. They live in the Northern parts of the province (Gizab, Char Cineh and Khas Uruzgan). The Helmand River in the district Gizab is basically the demarcation line between Hazara and Pashtun. Their language is Hazaraqi, a Farsi/Dari dialect. The religion of the Hazara is Shi'a Islam. Like the Pashtun, the Hazara have a tribal culture, although it is not nearly as strong as that of the Pashtun. A distinction is made between two groups: the Sad-e Qabar (original tribes) and the Sad-e Sueka (tribes of mixed origins). The most dominant solidarity group can be found at the village level. Present day Uruzgan was entirely Hazara until they were forcibly expelled from the area by Amir Abdurrahman Khan following a failed uprising in the 1880s. To quell this uprising, the Amir enrolled the help of Pashtun tribes and gave them the land of the dispossessed Hazaras as compensation for their support. It is these Pashtun tribes who now live in most of Uruzgan, with only a few remaining areas of Hazara settlements left. Many of the defeated Hazaras immigrated to Quetta, forming the largest Hazara community outside of Afghanistan, numbering about 100,000 people.

Besides the above tribes, nomad people (**Kuchi**) can be encountered in Uruzgan province. According to the 2005 NMSAK survey⁹, there are 37,115 Kuchi in Uruzgan in the winter, of which 26% are of the long range migratory type, and the rest of the short range migratory type. Most of the short range migratory reportedly summer in Chora and Khas Uruzgan districts, while the long range migratory move to Ajiristan and Malistan. The closure of Malistan to Kuchis by the local population has disrupted the migratory patterns of some of these Kuchis, many of whom now summer in Khas Uruzgan instead. An additional 1,400 Kuchi households, who winter in Kandahar, summer in Khas Uruzgan and Tarin Kowt.

Although this does not appear in the NMSAK survey, elders also report that some Taraki, Tokhi, Popolzai, Andar, Kakar and Kharuti groups pass through the province on their way to Maimana and Ghor (but not Hazarajat since its closure). Elders also indicate that some Kuchi groups used to summer in Shahrstan district of Dai Kundi (a place called Dashti Sherno), but that access to that district has been curtailed to them since 2002.

Kuchi in Uruzgan rank among the least educated Kuchi population countrywide, with one of the lowest literacy rates and very poor access to health and education services.

⁹ National Multi Sectoral Assessment of Kuchis in Afghanistan, Frauke de Weijer (Ministry of Tribal Affairs), 2005.

The approximate tribal composition of the Uruzgan Districts is as follows:*Tarin Kowt*

Durrani (55%) of which: Popolzai (30%), Barakzai (15%), Mohammadzai and Alikozai (each 5%); Ghilzai: Hotak and Tokhi (35%); Hazara (3%); Sayyeds, Alizai and others (7%)

The Tarin Kowt district in particular has many mixed villages where various tribes cohabitate. There are also many conflicts between tribes. Due to the many highly mixed villages, it is difficult to accurately estimate the percentages for the tribes among the district's population. The most important tribal leaders in Tarin Kowt are: Jan Mohammad Khan, Popolzai and former governor who still exerts his influence through his cousin, militia leader Matiullah; Haji Kairo Jan, Popolzai and Uruzgan's representative in the Meshrano Jirga (who initially supported the new governor but now disapproves of his performance as governor); Rozi Khan, Barakzai and former provincial police commander. It is unknown as yet whether he will continue to play a role in the province or be offered a new position outside the province; Abdul Khaleq, an Achakzai tribal leader from Chora and Uruzgan's current representative in the Wolesi Jirga. The tribes in the Ghilzai confederation with the largest representation in Uruzgan are the Tokhi and the Hotak. The Ghilzai's most important tribal leaders in Tarin Kowt are therefore from these tribes. Mohammad Nabi Khan is an important Tokhi tribal leader.

Deh Rawod

Nurzai (50%), Babozai (Hotak) (20%), Popolzai (15%), Barakzai (5%), Alizai (5%) and other (5%).

To date, the Popolzai have held the district's administrative power. The only exception is the mayor of the city of Deh Rawod, who is a Nurzai. The Popolzai in Deh Rawod's administration, especially the police commander, have always strongly supported Jan Mohammad. In Deh Rawod, however, unlike in the other districts, a significant part of the Popolzai also supports the Taliban. One indication of the support some of the Popolzai give the Taliban is the fact that the Taliban commander responsible for the region is a Popolzai. Reports indicate that Taliban leader Mullah Berader (Popolzai) originates from this district and has tribal ties with a part of the Popolzai population in the district.

Although the Popolzai have the strongest representation in Deh Rawod's administration, the Nurzai tribe is the largest tribe in the district. Due to the low amount of influence but majority position held by the Nurzai, this tribe has a conflict with the central authority (and thus with the Popolzai tribe that represents that authority). Conflicts also exist between the various Nurzai sub-tribes. However, the conflicts reported in the district usually involve little to indicate that they are tribal. They are much more likely to be labelled as the responsibility of the Taliban.

Char Cineh (Shahidi Hassas)

Nurzai (60%), Achakzai (20%), Alikozai (10%), and Barakzai (10%)

Until recently, Char Cineh (officially named Shahidi Hassas) had been informally divided by Jan Mohammad into the areas Yakhtan and Oshay, each of which was assigned its own administrative structure. However, because virtually all authorities have departed, Char Cineh is reported to be primarily governed by the elders in the district. The strong support of the Taliban in the district and low presence of authorities make it difficult to map. Jan Mohammad also failed to get a good grip on the district and has little influence there.

Tribal tension is said to exist in the district between the Popolzai and the Nurzai, and among the Nurzai (sub-) tribes. In addition to the controversy with the provincial/local administration, the support for the Taliban in these regions also play an important part in this.

Chora

Achakzai (43%), Popolzai (30%), Barakzai (25%), Hazara (2%)

The Chora district is geographically divided into two parts: Chora and Chenartu. Chora is the low northern area where the district capital is located. The leadership there reflects the relative tribal peace that exists as well as Chora's distance from the mountainous area in the south where the Taliban are actively operating. The southern part is less accessible and more problematic. It is named after the village of Chenartu, where the local leadership is based. This sub-division has not been officially recognised by the Ministry of the Interior.

The most important source of conflict in this part of the province is said to be the differences between the district administration supported by the governor and his key political opponent in the province, Abdul Khaleq Khan. Tension exists between the district's Achakzai majority and Popolzai minority. The Popolzai mainly live in the vicinity of Chenartu and Mirabad.

Khas Uruzgan

Achakzai (65%), Hazara (25%), Barakzai (8%), other such as Nurzai, Ghilzai, Sayyeds, Alikozai, etc. (2%).

The northern part of this district has a large Hazara population. However, the majority of the population is Pashtun, among which the Achakzai have the largest representation. The villages in the vicinity of the eastern checkpoint that openly oppose the Afghan government are home to the Matakzai and Achakzai tribes, known for their support of the Taliban and ACM activities.

Gizab

There are no exact percentages known of tribal divisions in Gizab. Therefore the following numbers are estimates. There is uncertainty about the proportion of Achakzai compared to the Hazara population. Possibly the percentage of Achakzai could be overestimated since the representation of Hazara to the north of Uruzgan increases. Achakzai (78%), Hazara (20%), other such as Tokhi, Malakhel (2%).

Gizab is a district that is divided by the Helmand river. Pashtun of the Achakzai tribe primarily live to the south of this river. These Pashtun maintain good relations with the Pashtun tribes in the Tarin Kowt district. Various Achakzai sub-tribes can be identified, the five largest of which are the Mahakzai, the Karimzai, the Naikozai, the Mailaizai and the Jalaizai. Baluch and Kuchi are also seen in Gizab.

Mostly Hazara of the Jamali tribe live north of the river. Five percent of the population south of the river are Hazara (Timuri tribe). They are led by Amannullah Timuri, who is also district governor. Haji Aminullah has authority over the southern part of Helmand river during the day. Mujahid retains influence over the villages north of the river by means of force and tribal ties.

Importance of tribal dynamics

Tribal affiliations have, in varying degrees, come to play a growing role since the Soviet invasion. This was then exacerbated after the Taliban's collapse, as communities revert back to this known coping mechanisms in the absence of any alternative (in the form of an effective judiciary for example), and as government policies in the area have tended to encourage tribalism. An important legacy of the 30 years of war is the political, military and social importance that former jihad commanders have come to occupy in tribal society. The list of important elders of the province is very similar to the list of Uruzgan's key jihad commanders, underlining the fact that the shift of power between traditional elites and military / jihad leaders has gone far and has not been reversed since the Taliban's collapse.

The last years have also seen a relative weakening of the role and authority of elders over the younger generations in general. This growing generation gap and partial breakdown of social and normative bonds can partly be explained by the general weakening of tribal society at the hands of external forces and partly by the socialization of an increasing number of youth inside radical political Islam and outside of the traditional framework.

It is important to make a note about the way Jirgas operate in Uruzgan as regards the relative power of religious figures. Generally speaking in the Pashtun world, mullahs usually do not take part in jirgas as full rights members unless they are also considered important elders (which happens occasionally). Most often, the jirga will consult local religious figures and hear their opinions respectfully, but mullahs as such usually do not influence the deliberations of jirgas beyond providing advice. In fact, the decisions of jirgas will often run counter to the precepts of Sharia,

even after this contradiction has been established by the religious figure consulted. In other words Pashtunwali usually wins over Sharia when it comes to making concrete decisions affecting social or judicial issues. This is also the case in Uruzgan, but it would appear that ulema have comparatively greater influence over jirgas in the province than elsewhere.

1.4 Conflict analysis

1.4.1 Conflicts of ethnic origin

Durrani vs. Ghilzai

Currently, there is a power struggle between the two Pashtun confederations of the Ghilzai and the Zirak branch of the Durrani, an antagonism deeply rooted in the history of the region and goes back to the first half of the 18th Century. Ahmad Shah Durrani (1724-1773) of the Popolzai renamed his own Pashtun confederation into Durrani and confiscated the land property of the Ghilzai and gave it to his own tribesmen. The non-Durrani (especially Ghilzai) tribes, despite being about equal in size to the Durrani, currently feel sidelined and lack access to power and resources. This has created a general feeling of resentment among them. For the past three decades the Ghilzai have had a major share in the private sector (mainly trade).

The Ghilzai came back to power with the communist coup in 1978. The first communist president Noor Mohammad Tarakai (1978-1979) was a Tarakai Ghilzai, while his successor Hafizullah Amin (1979) was a Kharoti Ghilzai. The communist regime put an end to the Durrani dynastic rule and tried to extinguish the larger Durrani royal family. Pakistan, the major backbone of the Islamic resistance, favoured only Ghilzai in the top ranks of the mujahidin parties and neglected all Durrani initiatives.

The Taliban, which emerged in 1994, tried to avoid the tribal split between the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Members of both tribal confederations were found in the top ranks of the Taliban, e.g. Mullah Omar of the Hatak tribe of the Ghilzai confederation, whereas president Hamid Karzai of the Popolzai Durrani was initially among their supporters and requested to serve as their UN ambassador which he refused.

The collapse of the Taliban regime and the creation of the TISA ushered in a new period of Durrani dominance in the South, with the Popolzai tribe (President Karzai's tribe) coming to the fore within the Durrani. This shift in the tribal balance of power resulted in a new Durrani (mostly Popolzai and Barakzai) dominance throughout the South and, as before, a relative exclusion of the Ghilzai from power in many of the mixed south-western provinces. Most problematic is that even the Ghilzai dominance over the private sector was lost to the Durrani tribes of the Barakzai, Popolzai and Alikozai.

Since the Taliban's collapse, two mutually reinforcing processes have been shaping the Durrani Ghilzai conflict throughout the South in general, and in Uruzgan in particular: on the one hand,

Durrani (and particularly Popolzai) dominance has antagonized many Ghilzai leaders, while traditionally strong Ghilzai support for the Taliban has been used as an excuse to exclude, and sometimes abuse them.

This long standing Ghilzai – Durrani conflict has been exacerbated by jihadi commanders on both sides of the tribal divide to reinforce their grasp over their respective constituencies, and now ranks as one of the main cause of violence in the province, providing much of the momentum for the insurgency locally.

Popolzai vs. all other tribes

Although the underlying conflict between Durrani and Ghilzai is common to all the provinces of the South, it has gone a step further in Uruzgan where the Popolzai tribe has largely monopolized power from the Taliban's collapse until March 2006 through the administration of Popolzai former governor and warlord Jan Mohammad Khan, who is widely seen as having used tribal politics to further his own interests.

Although this has been done mostly at the expense of the Ghilzai tribes of the province, Jan Mohammad Khan also managed to antagonize his fellow Durrani tribesmen, as a result of which the Popolzai are now in some degree of conflict with important segments of virtually all of the other tribes of the province (including Barakzai and Achakzai). It is important to stress that those who JMK has antagonized are precisely what can be labelled as the pro-government segments of the Tokhi, Hotak, Nurzai and to a lesser extent Barakzai and Achakzai tribes, often pushing these potential government allies closer to insurgents. His policy has therefore been particularly damaging, and he can probably be credited with much responsibility for the present virulence of the insurgency.

Panjpao vs. Zirak Durrani

Although Panjpao tribes in the Southwest are usually considered as belonging to the Durrani, the Panjpao (especially the Nurzai) in Uruzgan have shared to some extent the same predicament as their Ghilzai cousins. Hence, in terms of the three key determinants which serve as yardsticks to measure a tribe's position in the political landscape (level of participation in the government, level of victimization by the government in terms of military and police operations, and level of support for the Taliban), Panjpao tribes stand in the middle of a spectrum whose opposite ends are occupied by the Ghilzai and Zirak Durrani respectively.

Pashtun vs. Hazara

Relations between Pashtuns and Hazaras have not been violent for a while, but remain characterized by a general sense of distrust and tension. As elsewhere in Afghanistan, the relationship is largely unequal, with Pashtuns having generally the political and economic upper hand over Hazaras, who tend to live in the upper valleys. Socially, this unequal relationship is illustrated by the fact that, although Pashtun men often take Hazara wives, the reverse is practically unheard of. Some recent developments have soured the relations between the Hazara and the Pashtun.

When the former greater Uruzgan province was divided and the new province of Dai Kundi was created, the predominantly Pashtun district of Gizab was attached to the new province in order to increase its size and population to a level that would justify the creation of a new administrative unit. This decision has been contested by the Pashtun majority in Gizab ever since, and disregarded by the provincial administration of Uruzgan, which continued to staff and support the district until the end of JMK's tenure as governor. The alienation of the Pashtun majority of Gizab following the creation of Dai Kundi can partly account for the absence of the government in the district at present.

The deteriorating security situation and the realization by Dai Kundi authorities that they would not be able to provide security to the district translated into a growing consensus on both sides regarding the need to transfer it back to Uruzgan. Gizab district has now been brought under Uruzgan province although administrative procedures have not yet been concluded (Government salaries and support are still channeled through Dai Kundi province).

Dai Kundi used to belong to Uruzgan province, and the only road out of Dai Kundi open throughout the year is South through Uruzgan province. This road is therefore particularly important for commercial reasons, but is also a key link between Hazarajat and the very important émigré Hazara community in Quetta. For the moment, many Hazaras are only using the road rarely because of the security situation, negatively impacting on the livelihoods of the people of Dai Kundi.

Hazara vs. Kuchis

Another contentious issue is that of the Kuchis who used to spend the summer in the Hazarajat (Malistan district of Ghazni or Shahrستان district of Dai Kundi mostly). Because of the shift in the balance of power following the Taleban's collapse, and using the argument of past abuses committed by some Kuchis against Hazaras during the Taleban regime as well as, more generally, the perceived injustices suffered by Hazaras at the hands of the Pashtuns throughout modern Afghan history, Hazaras have prevented Kuchis from entering the Hazarajat since 2002 causing significant hardships to the livelihoods of Kuchis. A high-level commission has been created in Kabul bringing together Kuchi and Hazara representative in an effort to resolve this long standing issue, but limited progress has been achieved to date towards finding a lasting solution to this very contentious problem.

1.4.2 Access to resources: land, water, wealth

In a generally poor society such as Uruzgan Province, the struggle for access to resources can be expected to be fierce, with leaders generally having the upperhand. This is an important reason for potential conflict of interest between (poor) population groups and (rich and powerful) leaders. It also determines the power of these leaders to force the population to produce crops that are of interest to them, such as poppy. It is therefore essential to know what the basis is of the power of the leaders, so as to see where activities would only strengthen the position of the

leaders and increase the dependency of the population.

A general description and analysis of the following, interlinked, issues will need to be further investigated in the near future:

- a. Control over access to resources, especially land and water. Is the Uruzgan tribal society essentially a feudal system, with large landowners/tribal leaders controlling access? If so, agricultural improvements, e.g. in irrigation infrastructure, might well end up increasing the power of the large landowners by enabling them to select who will profit and who will not and by claiming the benefits of the improvements;
- b. Control over the production of poppy. What are the mechanisms to force farmers into growing poppy and who are behind these mechanisms (provision of credit and inputs with ensuing cycles of indebtedness, access to irrigation water on condition of growing poppy, impossibility to raise bride prices for daughters without help of drug barons, etc.)? Knowledge of these mechanisms is essential to break the cycle of poppy dependency;
- c. Warlordism. Where do leaders control population groups by armed force, whether for political, ethnic or criminal reasons?
- d. Control over government resources, e.g. national programmes being rolled out to village level. How to safeguard that these funds will not be used in a corrupt way?

This general description and analysis should be made specific for the selected villages: Who control what resources and how to prevent that activities strengthen the position of spoilers in stead of the villagers?

1.5 Power Structures

1.5.1 Formal (Shura, Provincial Council, Provincial Development Committee, District Committees, Sectoral Departments)

The National Assembly

- Because of the higher number of representatives involved, and because the election process for both Loya Jirgas were, in retrospect, more transparent and less controversial exercises at the local level than the last Parliamentary elections, many of the elected delegates have a good representational value in the province. As Loya Jirga delegates, they also carry a degree of legitimacy that could possibly be harnessed for the purpose of stabilization if needed.

The Provincial Council

- The lack of an effective representation mechanism was not alleviated by the election of the **Provincial Council (PC)**. This because the current PC only consists of representatives of the Zirak Durrani, namely Barakzai, Achakzai and Popolzai, and is therefor widely seen as deeply flawed and unable to become an effective tool of representation for the province:
 1. the election in Uruzgan has been described as dominated by the former governor who manipulated the results, resulting in the election of non representative personalities;
 2. the fact that the absence of female candidates has left 3 PC seats empty which places Uruzgan province in a disadvantage;
 3. the security situation coupled with the very limited powers of Provincial Councils have combined to further limit the effectiveness of the PC. To this lack of legitimacy can be added the limited mandate of the new body, and the deteriorating security environment.
- As a result, the PC has reportedly never formally met, and its members are openly expressing their inability to fulfil their roles as elected representatives in the present security environment. Although a way should be found to fill the 3 empty female seats, it is unlikely that the PC can be energized during its current term so as to manage to play a useful role in stabilizing the province.
- Even according to Afghan standards, Uruzgan is considered a conservative, traditional and backward province. As an example the participation of women in the 2004-elections was very low. Candidacy for the Wolesi Jirga was low and to the provincial council non-existing. Although a way should be found to fill the 3 empty female seats on the PC, it is unlikely that this largely ceremonial body can be energized during its current term so as to manage to play an important role in stabilizing the province.

Traditional representative mechanisms

- Although they do not hold formal power, community shuras or jirgas can also be influential local actors. In Uruzgan this traditional local system of management/authority exists down to the village level. The shura (village council) is comprised of village elders and influential people in the community. They make decisions regarding important issues in villages. Shuras (best translated as local councils) are longstanding features of Afghan political society. They are convened on an ad hoc basis and are rarely permanent bodies with identifiable members. Shuras of ulema (Islamic scholars) and shuras of elders are usually found at the provincial level, though there are often competing local shuras and some commander-run shuras at the district level.
- Although jirgas are actively relied on as informal governance and dispute resolution tools at the local level, district and provincial shuras, which existed until the end of last year, have almost ceased to exist in the province, with only the Deh Rawod and Khas Uruzgan tribal shuras still reportedly in existence (but not necessarily active).¹⁰ Shuras are usually construed as representation mechanisms vis-à-vis the government, and need a permissive security environment as well as sufficient representativeness to be able to be effective.
- The new governor is trying to remedy this at the provincial and district levels, but it is likely to take time before a really representative shura can be set-up anywhere in the province. At present, it can be estimated that no more than 40% of the province's elders would be willing or able to be part of a shura designed to deal with the government.
- In 2005, Qayyum Karzai created a “Shura for Security and Reform” in Uruzgan, composed of 39 tribal elders. This shura is not active anymore, and is generally dismissed by many as a tool to support the president's brother in the province. Nonetheless, 14 of its members are also important community elders, and are included in the list of important elders available for the PRT.

System/structure/personalities

- Afghanistan's public sector consists of the central government, provinces, municipalities (urban sub-units of provinces) and districts (rural sub-units of provinces), as well as state enterprises. State agencies (including central government ministries and institutions) are considered to be primary budgetary units with their own discrete budgets.
- The powers and responsibilities of the provinces and district administrations are determined (and therefore may be withdrawn) by the central government. Though provinces and districts are legally recognised units of sub national administration, they are not intended to be autonomous in their policy decisions – other than retaining some flexibility in implementing

¹⁰ Although shuras existed in every district, many interlocutors from the province state that they were unrepresentative, used as tools to further the interest of JMK and therefore not credible in the eyes of the population.

centrally determined programmes. Despite this, the practical reality is that certain provinces have considerable authority over their own decision-making, given the regional strengths of some commanders who control substantial revenues and military power.

- The province is the basic unit of local administration. It is not a distinct political entity in the legal sense and has a very modest role, formally, in decisions concerning its own structure, recruitment of senior staff, size of establishment and composition of workforce. In effect, each province is a collection of branches of central government ministries. All decisions on provincial staffing are made in Kabul by the parent ministry, in negotiation with the Office of Administrative Affairs and with oversight by the head of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). Every public employee has a grade, and although the governor approves junior staff appointments (grade 6 and below for permanent staff, grade 3 and below for contract staff) and transfers, the relevant minister approves mid-level staff appointments and senior staff are approved by the President.
- The provinces are further divided into districts. Administrative arrangements between each province and its districts are similar to those in the centre-provincial relationship. However, provincial officers have relatively little discretion with regard to districts as the central ministry in Kabul determines district staffing allocations. Local government departments are operational at central level of the districts; outside district centres they do not hold much influence. It's the local shuras which are the active at the village level.
- All revenues collected by provinces and districts are national revenues, and provinces are merely the tax collectors. In reality, as few provinces are remitting all of the revenues owed to the central government, provinces with revenue sources of their own (such as customs) can remain relatively autonomous from the central government authority. However, Uruzgan province does not have access to any independent revenue source in the form of unofficial custom or other taxes.
- While the governor oversees the civil administration and the chief of police, the military units stationed in the provinces are run by the ANA and report via a regional structure to the Ministry of Defence in Kabul.

Provincial and District administration

- Uruzgan is a level 3 province (the lowest level) officially comprising 4 districts (Chora, Khas Uruzgan, Char Cineh and Deh Rawod) and one provincial centre under the direct administration of the provincial government (Tarin Kowt). A sixth administrative unit (Gizab) was recently officially transferred back and will have to be dealt with from Uruzgan. Ajjiristan district of Ghazni used to belong to Uruzgan until the end of the Daoud regime, and Nesh district of Kandahar until 2004.

The districts have the following levels (daraja):¹¹

Level 1: Gizab

Level 2: Chora, Khas Uruzgan, Deh Rawod

Level 3: Char Cineh

The level of the district is important insofar as it determines the authorized staffing level of the police.

Unofficial districts

- There are also two non operational unofficial districts in the province: Yakhdan (almost entirely inhabited by Nurzai, northwestern part of Char Cineh towards Kijran, area of origin of senior Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah) and Chenartu (southern Part of Chora district, on the road to Khas Uruzgan, populated by a majority of Popolzai). Chenartu being largely populated by the Popolzai tribe, it may well be that its proposed creation had much to do JMK's efforts to support his tribe. In the case of Yakhdan, the rationale appears to be geographical, Yakhdan being a separate valley from Wushai and Tagab (the two other parts of the district).

1.5.2 Informal (shura's, ulema's, local power bearers, etc)

Tribal leadership

- The Pashtun tribal system has survived the long years of war, as illustrated by the fact that tribal identity and linkages, while weakened by the conflict and the rise of the new military religious elite associated with it, have generally remained dominant over factional allegiances.
- The gap that currently exists between the government and the tribes combined with weak state control over the periphery has translated into a resurgence of tribal identity since 2002. Nonetheless, although it remains relevant today, the traditional model of tribal leadership has been challenged since 1978 by the rise to prominence of jihadi commanders and religious leaders.
- Traditional tribal leadership in the Pashtun areas is divided among the following positions: *khan*, *malik*, *wakil*, *spin giri* (based on age and respect), and *sayyed* (descendants of the Prophet Mohamed and therefore above the ethnic divisions giving them a special role in solving conflicts); and leadership among tribes is usually inherited within an elite family. Only if male offspring is unavailable or unable to take on the leadership role will a replacement be chosen outside the family.

¹¹ This information will be double checked with the provincial government.

- There is often competition between tribal elders wishing to achieve prominence within their tribe. Even though there usually is a recognized group of elders who are most influential at the tribal or subtribal level, there is a degree of fluidity in leadership composition over time. For example, if an influential tribal leader is associated too closely with a regime that goes out of power, a new tribal elder may replace him as a new regime arises. One elder is usually chosen to speak on behalf of the tribe with rival tribes or outsiders.
- Leadership among tribes is usually inherited within an elite family (thus most the influential titles are inherited). Links to military power, while important during war times, are considered of lesser importance today. Especially links to international military power or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are not favourable for gaining and maintaining power in the provinces of the South, including Uruzgan, even though such links may be used to harass or arrest rivals and can therefore become tools to maintain political dominance locally.

Jirgas

- The traditional decision-making body in Pashtun Afghanistan is the jirga. The jirga is the tribal forum called on an ad hoc basis to make a decision regarding a particular issue or problem. In a jirga different opinions are listened to and discussed until a consensus is reached, often in the form of negotiated compensation.
- During the jihad years when mujahidin commanders were in power across the province, and especially during Taliban times, sharia became an important means of administering justice alongside Pashunwali in many areas of the South. However jirgas survived the war and have gained once again in influence since 2002, being used for solving disputes and problems in the absence of a functioning system of formal justice. The weakness and corruption of the government judicial system ensures that jirgas are currently considered by locals as the most reliable system for solving conflicts and disputes.
- Jirgas today are important parallel institutions to the official governmental judicial system, which in many instances legitimizes their decision or refers cases to them. Even difficult issues such as factional rivalries among armed groups within or outside government can be tackled through jirgas. Jirgas are usually held in private places such as guest houses, gardens or private compounds.
- As a rule Mullahs do not take part in jirgas as full scale members (unless they are also regarded as elders in the community). Rather, the jirga will often seek their expert advice on the matter being discussed. Although this advice is respected, the jirga is not always bound by it, and often takes decisions based on Pashtunwali (*riwoj*) which contradict sharia.

Shuras

- The shura is a rather new format of gathering in the Southern provinces, introduced by the mujahidin as provincial military shuras. Historically, tribes use the jirga as their main governance mechanism making jirga representatives more influential than shura members. It is composed of a body of permanent tribal representatives who meet frequently. Today, all tribes (Pashtun and non-Pashtun) maintain their own shuras. Every tribe tries to solve its problems with its own shura. Outside assistance is only accepted when the tribal shura is unable to solve a dispute.
- Most districts feature more than one shura. Thus, when working in Uruzgan it is important to sort out what shura one is speaking to and best avoid shuras which lack legitimacy with the people (e.g. artificial or one-party dominated). The Embassy has a list of actors that will provide some guidance on who to speak to in order to find out the ‘true’ or most influential shura within each district.

1.5.3 Religious networks

In traditional Pashtun society (the *Nang* model), Mullahs are respected but usually come from a different social group. With the social changes induced by the jihad and Taliban years, this is less the case today in the province, with mullahs and maulavis now coming from mainstream tribal groups as well. Groups like Sayeds or Qureish (who claim direct descent from the prophet) are highly respected in their communities, holding a higher social status, and constituting “religious clans” that provide many of the religious scholars of the province.

In contrast to other Pashtun provinces (Zabul and Ghazni for example) which were known as centers of religious learning and were home to powerful religious networks before the revolution, mullahs were very respected but had limited power in pre-1978 Uruzgan. Sufi pirs on the other hand were influential. There are two types of religious networks in Uruzgan: Sufi and traditionalist deobandi networks.

The Sufi networks

- Sufi networks are organized around the charismatic figure of a holy man and his family (pir, ogho or sayyed). Some of these religious figures appear to be quite influential in the province, counting hundreds of “murids” (students or followers). Although the pir, ogho or sayyed is highly respected throughout his tribal group, only a few individuals have district or provincial level stature (the zone of influence depends on his importance, ranging from a single village to the province).
- The sufi networks most often translated into relatively moderate jihadi networks (often mahaz or Jabha-i-najot, both headed by important sufi families). Sufism can be described as a mystical practice aiming at cultivating a direct relationship between the individual and the spiritual (god), and is at the heart of popular religious beliefs centered on the worship of saints and holy men.

As expressions of popular Islam that contravened their orthodox interpretation of religion, these practices (and Sufism in general) were disliked by the Taliban, together with other popular activities such as the traditional Pashtun dance of Atani milli. This being said, sufis in Afghanistan generally adhere to a very strict and rigorous Islam when it comes to social issues.

- Sufi pirs and sayyeds do not only play a role as spiritual leaders, but because they stand outside of the tribal order, also play an important social role as solvers of problems and mediators of disputes in communities where they are revered, thus providing another mechanism of conflict resolution alongside traditional jirgas.

Traditionalist religious deobandi networks

- Traditionalist religious networks are organized around deobandi ulema and madrassas, themselves linked with similar networks South of the border. These networks now exist in Uruzgan but were not particularly strong traditionally. In fact, although the Taliban made an effort to build madrassas in every district during their time in power, there are no well-known pre-1978 centers of religious learning in the province, and both religious leaders and rank and file Taliban have usually received their religious education outside of the province, mostly in Pakistan during their years as refugees.
- With religious work and figures gaining status during the jihad and the Taliban years, an increasing number of youths chose to become mullahs or maulavis, acquiring their religious credentials in deobandi Pakistani madrassas or in one of the many similar madrassas that already existed or were created by the Taliban in Afghanistan, thus creating or consolidating traditionalist religious networks in many areas. Hence, although they were not originally indigenous to Uruzgan, these deobandi/Taliban networks underpin the insurgency in the province and as such have come to exert considerable influence. In effect, although there are few active large madrassas still active in Uruzgan, religious scholars inculcate their vision of Islam to thousands of “Taliban” throughout the province, usually in small local madrassas that can be found next to many mosques, each teaching up to 10 students.

Predicament of religious leadership

- Today, the ulema finds itself in a particularly delicate situation, as it is the group most vulnerable to Taliban pressure. In effect, the Taliban need to co-opt and control this group, particularly as strong religious support for the Karzai government would undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and sap their entire propaganda edifice. This is why the Taliban started to systematically target important pro government religious figures in the Southwest (and to a lesser extent the Southeast) over the last two years.
- Given the level of Taliban control in Uruzgan at present and the weakness of the government, the ulema or other religious personalities (pirs, sayyeds etc.) of the province cannot be relied

upon to provide overt support to the government in the short-term, particularly as many mullahs are vulnerable due to their lack of armed support network.

1.5.4 Evolution of the balance of power

An analysis of the evolution of the local balance of power since 1978 reveals the broad outline of a contest between three social groups: The traditional tribal elite (khans), jihadi commanders and religious figures.

The traditional tribal elite

- During the old regime, power was primarily vested in the traditional tribal elite, whose families played important roles locally and served as intermediaries between the government and communities, and who were therefore in a position to leverage government patronage and resources to consolidate their leadership locally. In fact, some of these elite families were linked with the royal family.
- With the revolution and the jihad, khans stopped being able to play their part as distributors of government resources to their client groups and, as symbols of the old order, were often physically eliminated by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime, especially in its early years.
- Their relative demise coincided with the rise to power of jihadi commanders and religious networks, both of which acquired legitimacy through the armed struggle against the occupier, notably because of the exclusive reliance on and support for traditionalist or Islamist religious factions as vectors of armed resistance and political legitimacy during the jihad by Pakistan and western powers. Although weakened, the old landed elite managed to preserve some of its political and social clout by joining the ranks of the government or the mujahedin, in the latter's case usually under the banner of the two most moderate Sunni parties (Mahaz-i-milli and Jabha-i-najot).
- With a few exceptions, the pre revolution modernizing elite that emerged as of the 1950s at the national level out of the government education and administrative system, and usually constituted the local social base of both PDPA and HIG networks in the periphery, did not have many representatives in Uruzgan, a fact which accounts for the relative weakness of both in the province (in contrast to some other provinces in the East and Southeast where members of this class sometimes constitute more than 50% of the population, to be found on both sides of the political divide). There were nevertheless a number of PDPA sympathizers who came to hold positions in the government and the military until 1992, and partially lost their prominence with the demise of Najibullah, before being completely ousted from almost all government positions by the Taliban.

The Jihadi Commanders

- During the Rabanni years jihadi commanders achieved near total political and social supremacy in the province before being eclipsed by the Taliban, the coming of whom marked yet another shift in the balance of power in favour of traditionalist religious leaders at the expense of both other groups.
- Since 2002, jihadi commanders (and to a lesser extent members of the traditional elite) have regained the upper hand politically and economically in the province, with many of the actors of the Rabanni years coming back to the fore. Former communists have also benefited from the new regime, with a number of them having rejoined the ranks of the government and police.

The shift in the balance of power away from traditional elders and the religious establishment is illustrated in annex, which summarizes the present power holders in the province and contains a particularly high number of jihadi or former jihadi commanders.

1.6 General development analysis

1.6.1 Overview of implementation and monitoring capacity

Government capacity and performance

- As elsewhere in Afghanistan, government performance and capacity has been hampered by four problems: lack of qualified personnel, lack of physical infrastructure, lack of financial and logistical resources and lack of oversight and control mechanisms over public expenditures and processes, leading to massive corruption, embezzlement of public funds and inefficient resource allocation.
- Uruzgan province is a particularly acute example of low capacity and bad governance over the past four years. Four factors specific to the province have combined to exacerbate this problem.
 1. ***The government is seen by many in the province as not only inefficient and unable to provide basic services to the population, but also as heavily partial and unrepresentative*** resulting in a government and police that have exacerbated tribal tensions and have been run as private fiefdoms, thereby losing the trust of the majority of the population. The monopolization of power in the hands of Jan Mohamed Khan's supporters, his use of government power to marginalize and abuse rivals and opponents (especially Ghilzai tribes accused of being supportive of Taliban) and promote his interests and that of his tribe is almost universally acknowledged.
 2. ***The lack of a large educated class in Uruzgan is a limiting factor.*** The backwardness of the province has limited the qualified human capacity that the government has been able to attract in some better educated part of the country.

3. ***The rise of the insurgency has ensured that ever fewer individuals are willing to openly join the government.*** This further limits the pool of available human resources the government can rely on.
 4. ***Until the appointment of governor Munib, the Central government has not made a concerted effort to send many qualified personnel from outside to palliate the lack of local capacity.***
- An analysis of the staffing of the various departments of the provincial government, as well as of the judiciary reveals both a lack of professionalism and understaffing, as well as a lack of tribal and ethnic balance within the government. For example, only 1 Hazara, 1 Nurzai, and very few Ghilzais hold important government positions at the provincial level, while Popalzais and other Durranis are significantly overrepresented.
 - The situation is even worse at district level where there is very little in the way of an administrative apparatus (20% of key posts filled in the best of case). District subgovernors and police chiefs, with the exception of the Khas Uruzgan sugovernor, have limited education and administrative experience and in many cases have reportedly alienated the local communities during their tenure (some of them may have recently been shifted to new positions, resigned or been laid off).
 - As the following table shows for the five districts (Tarin Kowt is directly administered from the provincial administration, all Ministries are represented at that level and the district is therefore not included), even though the coverage is uneven and hapzahard, a skeleton administration exists at district level that could be completed and energized with more resources.

Government staffing at district levels¹²

Position	Present in which district
Director of health	Deh Rawod, Khas Uruzgan
Director of education	Deh Rawod, Chora, Char Cineh, Khas Uruzgan
Director for statistics / Census	Chora
Director of agriculture	Deh Rawod, Char Cineh, Khas Uruzgan
Finance	All functioning districts (except Gizab)
Director for Religious affairs	Chora
Communication	Chora, Deh Rawod
Electricity and water	Khas Uruzgan

- Above the lack of qualified human resources, the government is also very short of basic infrastructure and logistical means. Some efforts have been made to address the physical infrastructure deficit at the district level with construction of new district HQs in Chora

¹² Given the changing environment in the province, this information could evolve rapidly

(recently burnt down by the Taliban) and Khas Uruzgan (planned), and the (poorly executed) construction of a new police HQ in Tarin Kowt, they fall short of addressing the problem.

- The above factors in combination ensure that at all levels government capacity is particularly low, with government outreach actually shrinking in the province over the last year. With the insurgency on the rise, the problem of government capacity is translating into a problem of government legitimacy, a fact that insurgents have well understood and are actively trying to capitalize on by creating their own parallel administrative structure and trying to provide some basic services in place of the government, most notably by setting up courts in some areas (Gizab and Char Cineh districts are two areas where the existence of Taliban courts has been mentioned).

1.6.2 Overview of activities and results of previous development programmes

- Reconstruction in Uruzgan is hampered by insecurity and lack of implementing capacity. Insecurity makes the implementing of any reconstruction project particularly daunting. During the past two years the operational space of traditional reconstruction actors and of the government has continuously diminished, as a result of which international and credible national NGOs are practically absent from the province.
- There are at least six “real” NGOs working in the province, among which ADA (mostly involved in implementation of NSP) and AHDS (supporting the health system in the province and also involved in some other sectors). These are the organizations that have the longest involvement in the province, as well as the best experience in humanitarian and development work.
- Anyone wanting to invest in the reconstruction of Uruzgan is therefore faced with an acute implementing capacity problem, forced to rely on few NGOs, or a long list of private contractors, many of which have limited capacity and a poor quality record¹³.
- Reconstruction in the province has been particularly affected by the slow pace of implementation, or in some cases the non implementation, of national programs that play an important role in supporting livelihoods and government outreach in other areas of the country.
- Of particular concern is the fact that Uruzgan was the last province to start NSP. The program has barely started in Tarin Kowt and is unlikely to be able to expand to new districts unless a

¹³ The contractors identified are: Wodoni Afghanistan, UCC, ARC, INORU, HCC, ZCC, HELP, NPCC, ANCC, ARPD, New Beginnings NGO, Afghan Maiwand NGO, Now Bahodur Corporation, Rashid Millat Company, Hamayun Azizi company, Mohamed Asif Faisal company, Nurzai brother corporation, Rahim Popal company. Hoji Amanullah (head of PRT supported chamber of commerce) also has a construction company. There is also an international contractor that has been working with USAID in the province for a number of years, notably on the construction of the Kandahar-TK road.

significant change occurs in the overall security situation. According to government sources, the program roll out has been problematic, yielding very limited results to date.

- The WFP has been providing emergency food supplies through schools and a winter food programme. An overview of schools and vulnerable communities was made available to the embassy. This programme was implemented through NGO's and the Ministry of Education of Uruzgan province. Due to poor security conditions, distribution within the province was highly problematic, two lorries with 29 MT of cereals were attacked and burnt and a godown containing 109 MT of cereals was looted and burnt. Monitoring cannot take place, and WFP is requesting the PRT to ensure security for distribution and undertake monitoring. Distribution faces many flaws and food supplies were reportedly stored in warehouses of the Ministry of Education for the past three years.
- The main reconstruction actor in Uruzgan so far has been the US government, which despite insecurity and limited implementing capacity has according to their PRT-representative managed to spend relatively large amounts of money in reconstruction projects over the last three years, using both USAID and CERP funds. Activities were carried out in the fields of infrastructure (roads, classrooms, clinics) and improvement of irrigation structures and anti-erosion measures through a cash for work programme.

2 PART TWO: Conclusions for mode of operation of the PRT

2.1 Priority areas

From the description of the social-economic, security, political, ethnic and cultural context above, a number of priorities are clear. These are ordered following the three "D"- dimensions of the ISAF mandate for the province: defense (security), democracy (governance) and development (reconstruction). These are based on the context analysis above and the Key Recommendations for Immediate Action formulated by the Policy Action Group for the Southern Region of Afghanistan following concerns expressed by President Hamid Karzai on the escalating situation and widening gap between Government and International Community on one hand, and the population of the four provinces on the other.

Defence and promotion of security

1. Develop a joint long-term strategic security plan with ISAF, the ANSF, ANA and Uruzgan Provincial Government to ensure a consistent approach towards security, economic, developmental and social challenges. This requires:
 - Enhanced effort (including by the international community) to accelerate the development, equipping and modernisation of the ANSF;

- An expanded police presence – in the immediate term through force rebalancing and a joint framework for temporary auxiliary police and in the medium term through full implementation of police and justice reform;
 - Acceleration of the construction, equipping and staffing of a joint coordination centre in Tarin Kowt.
2. Implement and monitor police reform by empowering new police chiefs, focussing on police work and deterrence, professionalizing police action through accountability and monitoring performance and implementing probation board.
 3. Construction of detention facilities and agreement on institutional responsibilities for detainees.

Governance / Political engagement

1. Support implementation of reform measures within Uruzgan province by facilitating national programmes to be rolled out in the province, building effective teams and replacing non-performing officials, in particular the civil service reform and the judicial sector reform.
2. Engage politically with alienated districts and groups, delivering concrete solutions, while strengthening and broadening national reconciliation (including PTS).
3. Ensure provincial policy in the fields of security, governance and development is developed, refined and implemented through existing sectoral Ministries and actors in civil society.

Development/economic

1. Identify strategically important geographic zones where improvements in security and governance will create conditions conducive to more effective, noticeable development. Ensure that more funding reaches these priority areas as well as districts where little or no assistance has yet been delivered.
2. Identify and support the development of productive activities and sources of income generation, taking the whole chain of production, manufacturing, transport and marketing into consideration, while creating an enabling environment for private sector development and the associated productive infrastructure.
3. Support initiatives for equitable capacity development at all levels, both formal and informal, taking local culture and values into consideration, to create future prospects for the youths (both male and female) and enhance implementation capacity in the province.
4. Identify key health investments with existing stakeholders in the health sector: extending the basic package of health services which will form the core of service delivery in all primary health care facilities of the districts; extend the essential package of hospital services at Tarin Kowt to improve the quality of care at the secondary and tertiary health care levels.
5. Ensure community ownership of projects through the involvement of local authorities, provincial development councils, community development councils in project selection,

monitoring and support. Consult and listen to priorities; respond to requests, with explanation when negative.

Public communication, cultural and social

1. Invite ministers and senior government officials to regularly visit Uruzgan province, particularly outlying districts and to engage with tribal shuras and religious leaders. Invite the Governor, members of the Provincial Council and the Provincial Development Committee, and Heads of Provincial Ministries to official ceremonies and to visits to districts and villages to enhance exposure of authorities and leaders to the population. Respond and follow up on locally identified needs such as emergency assistance to vulnerable groups, madrasas, etc.
2. Through a strategic communications team highlight positive developments, while recognizing hardship; convey the national vision to insurgency –hit areas and support religious leaders and traditional ways of spreading information.

2.2 National policy context in so far as relevant for the programme in Uruzgan

The Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS)

The I-ANDS proposes a coherent strategy across three interdependent pillars of activity:

1. Security,
2. Governance, rule of law and human rights, and
3. Economic and Social Development, comprised of 6 sectors:
Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Education, Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Social Protection, and Economic Governance & Private Sector Development.

Among five cross cutting themes mentioned in the I-ANDS, in particular two are of importance for the programme in Uruzgan: Gender Equity and Counter Narcotics.

A short summary of objectives that are particularly relevant for the programme in Uruzgan is given below.

Security Sector

1. The Government, with support of ISAF and their respective PRTs, will promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities
2. The Government will establish a nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced ANA by late 2010
3. All illegal armed groups will be disbanded by late 2007 in all provinces
4. By late 2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced ANP with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable

5. By late 2010, the Government will strengthen its law enforcement capacity at both central and provincial levels

Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights

1. By late 2010 the Government machinery will be restructured and rationalised to ensure a fiscally sustainable public administration; civil service functions will be reformed to reflect core functions and responsibilities
2. A clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established within 6 months, applied within 12 months, and fully implemented within 24 months for all senior level appointments as well as for provincial Governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security
3. By late 2006 a review of the number of administrative units and their boundaries will take place
4. By late 2010, in furtherance of the work of the Civil Service Commission, merit-based appointments, vetting procedures and performance-based reviews will be undertaken for civil service positions at all levels including central government, the judiciary and police
5. By late 2010, female participation in all Afghan governance institutions, including elected and appointed bodies and the civil service, will be substantially increased
6. By late 2010, functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational in each province, and the average time to resolve contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible
7. By late 2010, justice infrastructure will be rehabilitated, and prisons will have separate facilities for women and juveniles
8. A process for registration of land in all administrative units and the registration of titles will be started for all major urban areas by end 2006, and all other areas by end 2008. Registration of rural land will be underway by end 2007
9. By late 2010, the government will increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of traffickers and corrupt officials, and will improve its information base concerning those involved in the drugs trade
10. By late 2010 the government security and law enforcement agencies will adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property

Economic and Social Development

1. In accordance with the Afghan vision, the goal of the economic and social development strategy is to reduce poverty through private sector-led equitable economic growth while progressively eliminating the criminal economy
2. The counter-narcotics programme will target traffickers and corrupt officials while helping the poor to produce licit livelihoods for themselves
3. To create an enabling environment for pro-poor licit growth in agriculture, rural development and other areas, the government will enhance the national productivity and the productivity of

- Afghan individuals by prioritising investments in (1) infrastructure, (2) institutional and human capacity building, (3) protecting the rights of the poor, and (4) private sector development
4. Government will achieve the goals of institutional and human development through investment programmes in education and health
 5. Key education programmes: expand access to primary education, increase enrolment and retention rates, and strengthen the curriculum and quality of teachers; develop an effective skills development system that is responsive to labour market needs
 6. Key health investments: extending the basic package of health services which will form the core of service delivery in all primary health care facilities; extend the essential package of hospital services to improve the quality of care at the secondary and tertiary health care levels
 7. Support to the private sector: improve the investment climate; facilitate trade; strengthen financial services and markets.

The Afghanistan Compact

The Afghanistan Compact is an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the International Community, and determines the principles of cooperation and the support to be given. It covers the same three broad areas as in the I-ANDS, and commitment is confirmed to the agreed timelines (given above, most of them late 2010).

Principles of Cooperation

1. Respect the pluralistic culture, values and history of Afghanistan, based on Islam;
2. Work on the basis of partnership between the Afghan Government, with its sovereign responsibilities, and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations;
3. Engage further the deep-seated traditions of participation and aspiration to ownership of the Afghan people;
4. Pursue fiscal, institutional and environmental sustainability;
5. Build lasting Afghan capacity and effective state and civil society institutions, with particular emphasis on building up human capacities of men and women alike;
6. Ensure balanced and fair allocation of domestic and international resources in order to offer all parts of the country tangible prospects of well-being;
7. Recognise in all policies and programmes that men and women have equal rights and responsibilities;
8. Promote regional cooperation; and
9. Combat corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability.

Approach

The above principles are in complete harmony with the Dutch and Australian principles for the mission in Uruzgan under ISAF-3. In addition to the nine Principles of Cooperation, the following characterize the Dutch/Australian approach:

1. A participatory approach with regard to reconstruction and development in order to promote local (Afghan) ownership, empower local communities and enhance the legitimacy of the Central, provincial and district government. It is impossible to create ownership or persuade local institutions to assume ownership; genuine ownership comes from respecting the autonomy and self-reliance of our partners and respecting their needs and decisions taken.
2. Civilian organisations and local people (NGO's, facilitating partners, etc.) often do not want to be associated with the military as they believe that this will detrimentally affect their security.
3. Aid and humanitarian assistance must be delivered on the basis of need (viewed across Uruzgan Province) and with the understanding of tribal dynamics and the likely impact of assisting one group and not the other. Ensure balanced and fair allocation of resources.
4. Uninformed 'visible' infrastructure work in still dangerously insecure areas can simply create more targets for insurgency and further undermine the populations' security.
5. On the basis of needs and windows of opportunities, a package of interventions is formulated in dialogue with different partners and at different levels: security interventions in close collaboration with the Afghan security institutions such as the ANA, the ASP, the ANP and traditional tribal militias; activities to enhance good governance and the legitimacy of the state through the provincial and district administrations and the social services delivered by government; activities in the field of reconstruction and development through existing (government) institutions, village committees and tribal elders, civil society organizations, NGO's and other actors in the Province.
6. The immediate objective of the Dutch/Australian intervention is to build positive relations with the leaders and population at large of Uruzgan province; undertake immediate measures to build a secure and safe environment for the local communities; enlighten the plight of the population by showing visible results in the field of development; support the establishment of a stable and sustainable institutional environment characterised by good and transparent governance and reliable service delivery of good quality, based on a legal and diversified rural economy.

The Ministry for Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD)

The MRRD has two national programmes that are of importance to activities in Uruzgan province: the National Solidarity Plan (NSP) and the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP). Both programmes receive extensive financial support from the international community and technical assistance from UNDP and GTZ. The programmes are being implemented in Uruzgan and will continue during the period of the Dutch/Australian commitment to ISAF-3, possibly being expanded as security improves.

The NABDP is closely linked with I-ANDS and the MRRD strategy with the same timeline. Its overall strategic goal is the sustainable reduction of poverty and improvement of livelihoods in rural Afghanistan, based on:

- Communities empowered to articulate and address their needs and priorities;
- Government able to support community based, comprehensive rural rehabilitation and development in an integrated, people-focused, inclusive and participatory manner.

In June 2006, District Development Assemblies were established in Uruzgan and District Development Plans were formulated. In July, a Provincial Development Plan and a Provincial Investment Plan were formulated. In August, the project selection, survey and design will take place. Copies of the District Development Plans were made available to the PRT and the Dutch Embassy.

The proposals to be discussed in the recently established Policy Action Group (PAG) will to a large extent be based on these plans.

Uruzgan was the last province to start a NSP. The programme has barely started in Tarin Kowt and is unlikely to expand to new districts unless a significant change occurs in the overall security situation. According to government sources, the programme roll out has been problematic, yielding very limited results to date. It is implemented through ADA, one of the organizations that has the longest involvement in the province, as well as the best experience in humanitarian and development work. ADA is also the Implementing Partner for NSP in neighbouring Zabul, and as such has accumulated significant experience implementing this programme in high risk areas. As the security situation improves, NSP activities can be expanded to the other districts.

Education

One of the top priorities of the Ministry of Education is to rebuild and re-establish education throughout the country as a fundamental cornerstone in reshaping the future of the country through peace, national unity, poverty reduction and economic growth. The basic vision is to facilitate holistic and equitable education opportunities based on the principles of Islam, for children and young adults without discrimination, across Afghanistan. Based on these principles, the MoE formulated an Essential Package of Education Infrastructure, that includes both hardware (physical facilities) and software (human resources, teaching and learning materials and mechanisms) essentials to impart quality education.

The MoE is developing a programme to establish Islamic Schools, similar to the maddrasas but with an emphasis on both moderate Islam religious education (maximum of 40% of the curriculum) and modern subjects geared towards a changing society. The schools will follow the national curriculum and be under the inspection of the MoE. In all Islamic countries teachings in these subjects begin at Class 1 and are taught throughout the schooling age. However, in religious schools the studies around these subjects are more detailed (not just rote learning) where students discuss the interpretation of the Koran with respect to these tenets. The main objectives of these schools is to promote and provide access to modern and tolerant Islamic education and to ensure a constant and adequate supply of graduates with a broad educational horizon and ample exposure to authentic and liberal Islamic scholarship. This will avoid parents sending their children to maddrasas in neighbouring countries.

The basic teachings around the five pillars of Islam that all Muslims are supposed to learn are: Tauheet or the belief one God; Namaz or Daily prayers; Zakat or Tithe (Alms to the poor); Roza or Fasting (during Ramadan); Haj or Pilgrimage to Medina and Mecca.

In Afghanistan these basic teachings are part of the national curriculum. But where public schools are inaccessible, parents will send their children to the mosque to learn the basics from the local mullahs, or to Maddrasas (if available), particularly if the parents are poor and not literate themselves. Wealthy parents will actually hire mullahs to tutor their children at home.

Interpretation is perhaps the key here: whether in the national curriculum or as special subjects in religious education, the content of learning and teaching material will have to be developed to ensure that moderate – as opposed to extremist - Islam is promoted. The Ministry of Education is working with Jama'le-Asar and the scholars from this world famous institution to review the curriculum and develop a syllabus that is compatible with the tolerant form of Islam for the detailed teaching at maddrasas. Teaching and training materials for teacher education in the subject are also being simultaneously developed. UNESCO is supporting this endeavour of the MoE. The MoE has agreed to visit Uruzgan to discuss possibilities to support education in the province, and if feasible, establish a model school in the provincial capital.

Afghan Stabilisation Programme

The Afghan Stabilisation Programme (ASP) was launched in 2004 with the objective to strengthen governance at the sub national level, by rebuilding the essential infrastructure for local governance (police, court, administration and other services) and developing the capacity of local civil administration. It has four pillars: training, administrative reform, a provincial stabilisation fund and district infrastructure. Since the establishment of the programme the concentration has been more on district infrastructure and less attention was paid to local governance and capacity building. The ASP is supported by the Netherlands, and the ASP recently proposed to assist in building up local governance in the three Dutch focal provinces including Uruzgan.

The ASP has the following four objectives for Uruzgan:

1. To address the issues of local governance and basic security;
2. Support the PRR process;
3. Address critical issues related to development and reconstruction; and
4. Support the democratization process.

The following activities will take place in Uruzgan:

1. Experienced and well-qualified provincial advisors will be introduced to work as a right hand of the Governor;
2. The PPR process will be supported in collaboration with IARCSC and MoI;
3. Process modules have been developed to assist the provincial Governor.

2.3 National detention policy

An Afghan solution is being formulated for the present detention policy based on international law and the Sharia. Existing limitations are taken into consideration. The Government of Afghanistan has been working on the new policy framework on detention from December 2005 and it is expected to be finalized and approved by President Karzai in the Summer of 2006. In this process a task group consisting of the Ministers and Directors of the MoJ, MoI, MoD, NSC, NDS, Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office will review and contribute towards the final version. The design for the detention policy was ready by the end of June.

Under the new regime, prisoners will be labelled Armed Opposition Group Personnel (AOGP). This is a complex name to indicate that the security related problems are considered to be of an internal conflict nature.

An ISAF-detainee is to be handed over to the Afghan authorities within 96 hours, and will administratively fall under the MoD. There are three modes of detention: 1) a separate/isolated part of an existing MoJ facility, 2) a facility within an ANA compound, or 3) a new facility. Facilities that meet international standards have been created for the interim period.

An inter-ministerial board will determine whether the detainee resorts under the AOGP. The board has 14 days for screening. Through a thorough screening procedure the decision is taken whether the case falls under AOGP regulations or under criminal law, or neither. In the latter case, the detainee will be released, and in the second category the normal MoI procedures will be followed.

If the AOGP regulations apply, a thorough investigation will follow within 90 days, carried out under the aegis of the board. The AOGP options are: a reconciliation process (PTS), prosecution, or to remain incarcerated as AOGP. The board will review the latter group once every six months.