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## ENHANCING THE CONVERGENCE OF INSOLVENCY LAWS

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#### Introduction

Discrepancies in national substantive insolvency laws of the Member States create barriers to the free movement of capital in the internal market. Such discrepancies, in particular, make it more difficult to anticipate the outcome for value recovery in cases of insolvency. In 2015, the Commission concluded already in its original Action Plan for a Capital Market Union that "convergence of insolvency and restructuring proceedings would facilitate greater legal certainty for cross-border investors and encourage the timely restructuring of viable companies in financial distress".

In 2019, the Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency (Directive (EU) 2019/1023) established minimum standards both for preventive restructuring procedures available for debtors in financial difficulty, when there is a likelihood of insolvency, and for procedures leading to a discharge of debts incurred by overindebted entrepreneurs and allowing them to take up a new activity. This directive admittedly did not harmonise core aspects of insolvency law, or that of the formal insolvency proceedings, such as a common definition of insolvency, the conditions for opening insolvency proceedings, the ranking of claims, avoidance actions, the identification and tracing of assets belonging to the insolvency estate, etc. Vast differences in insolvency frameworks of EU Member States, where no two systems are alike, thus continue to exist.

The current initiative is complementary to the Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency, and – consequently – focuses on aspects of insolvency laws that were not addressed there. The issue at hand is corporate insolvency (i.e. non-bank insolvency), including companies, partnerships and entrepreneurs. More efficient and predictable insolvency frameworks and enhanced confidence in cross-border financing would help strengthen capital markets in the Union.

This public consultation will contribute to this process by gathering the perception and views of Europeans on a range of issues including: the liability and duties of directors of companies in the vicinity of insolvency; the status and duties of insolvency practitioners; the ranking of claims; avoidance actions; identification and preservation of assets belonging to the insolvency estate; core procedural notions.

### About you

- \*Language of my contribution
  - Bulgarian

0	Croatian
0	Czech
0	Danish
0	Dutch
•	English
0	Estonian
0	Finnish
0	French
0	German
0	Greek
0	Hungarian
0	Irish
0	Italian
0	Latvian
	Lithuanian
	Maltese
	Polish
	Portuguese
0	Romanian
0	Slovak
0	Slovenian
0	Spanish
0	Swedish
*I am	giving my contribution as
0	Academic/research institution
0	Business association
0	Company/business organisation
0	Consumer organisation
0	EU citizen
0	Environmental organisation
0	Non-EU citizen
0	Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
•	Public authority

Trade union

Other
* First name
*Surname
*Email (this won't be published)
*Scope
International
Local
National
Regional
*Level of governance
Parliament
• Authority
Agency
*Organisation name
255 character(s) maximum
Ministry of Justice and Security
*Organisation size
Micro (1 to 9 employees)
Small (10 to 49 employees)
Medium (50 to 249 employees)
<ul><li>Large (250 or more)</li></ul>

### Transparency register number

255 character(s) maximum

Check if your organisation is on the <u>transparency register</u>. It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decision-making.

### \*Country of origin

Please add your country of origi	in or that of your organisation	on	
Afghanistan	Djibouti	Libya	Saint Martin
<sup>©</sup> Åland Islands	Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Albania	Dominican Republic	Lithuania	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa
<ul><li>American</li><li>Samoa</li></ul>	Egypt	Macau	San Marino
Andorra	El Salvador	Madagascar	São Tomé and Príncipe
Angola	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Anguilla	Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Antarctica	Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
Antigua and Barbuda	Eswatini	Mali	Seychelles
Argentina	Ethiopia	Malta	Sierra Leone
Armenia	Falkland Islands	<ul><li>Marshall</li><li>Islands</li></ul>	Singapore
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	Fiji	Mauritania	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	<ul><li>Solomon</li><li>Islands</li></ul>
Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French Polynesia	Micronesia	South Africa

4

Bangladesh	<ul><li>French</li><li>Southern and</li><li>Antarctic Lands</li></ul>	Moldova	<ul><li>South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands</li></ul>
Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
Belgium	Germany	Montenegro	Spain
Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar	Svalbard and
		/Burma	Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden
Bonaire Saint	Guadeloupe	Nauru	Switzerland
Eustatius and			
Saba			
Bosnia and	Guam	Nepal	Syria
Herzegovina			
Botswana	Guatemala	Netherlands	Taiwan
Bouvet Island	Guernsey	New Caledonia	Tajikistan
Brazil	Guinea	New Zealand	Tanzania
British Indian	Guinea-Bissau	Nicaragua	Thailand
Ocean Territory			
British Virgin	Guyana	Niger	The Gambia
Islands			
Brunei	Haiti	Nigeria	Timor-Leste
Bulgaria	Heard Island	Niue Niue	Togo
	and McDonald		
Durking Face	Islands	Nlaufall, lalaual	O Takalaw
Burkina Faso	Honduras	Norfolk Island	Tokelau
Burundi	Hong Kong	Northern Mariana Islanda	Tonga
O Combodia	O Hungary	Mariana Islands	Tripidad and
Cambodia	Hungary	North Korea	Trinidad and
			Tobago

Cameroon	Iceland	North Macedonia	Tunisia
Canada	India	Norway	Turkey
Cape Verde	Indonesia	Oman	Turkmenistan
Cayman Islands	Iran	Pakistan	Turks and
			Caicos Islands
<ul><li>Central African</li><li>Republic</li></ul>	Iraq	Palau	Tuvalu
Chad	Ireland	Palestine	Uganda
Chile	Isle of Man	Panama	Ukraine
China	Israel	Papua New	United Arab
		Guinea	Emirates
Christmas	Italy	Paraguay	United
Island			Kingdom
Clipperton	Jamaica	Peru	United States
Cocos (Keeling)	Japan	Philippines	United States
Islands			Minor Outlying
			Islands
Colombia	Jersey	Pitcairn Islands	Uruguay
Comoros	Jordan	Poland	US Virgin
			Islands
Congo	Kazakhstan	Portugal	Uzbekistan
Cook Islands	Kenya	Puerto Rico	Vanuatu
Costa Rica	Kiribati	Qatar	Vatican City
Côte d'Ivoire	Kosovo	Réunion	Venezuela
Croatia	Kuwait	Romania	Vietnam
Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Wallis and
			Futuna
Curação	Laos	Rwanda	Western
			Sahara
Cyprus	Latvia	Saint	Yemen
		Barthélemy	

Czechia	Lebanon	Saint Helena	Zambia
		Ascension and	
		Tristan da	
		Cunha	
Democratic	Lesotho	Saint Kitts and	Zimbabwe
Republic of the		Nevis	
Congo			
Denmark	Liberia	Saint Lucia	

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Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

### Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

- I agree with the <u>personal data protection provisions</u>
- \* More specifically, I am giving my contribution as:
  - stakeholder in the financial sector
  - stakeholder in the business and trade sector

social- or economic interest organization
practitioner, professional with interest in the field of insolvency
public authority
member of the judiciary
research, academia, "think-tank"
other
*Your are:
a bailiff,
a lawyer,
a notary,
an insolvency practitioner,
a judge,
none of these
* Have you had practical experience with insolvency proceedings?
© Yes
No
*Please, indicate your position from the perspective of employment policy:
employer
employee
self-employed
employer representative
employee representative
1. FRAGMENTATION OF INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORKS AS A

# 1. FRAGMENTATION OF INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORKS AS A PROBLEM FOR THE INTERNAL MARKET AND THE NEED FOR GREATER CONVERGENCE

At present, substantive insolvency law is regulated exclusively at the level of EU Member States. Owing to different legal traditions and policy priorities, this leads to considerable discrepancies between the Member States' insolvency laws. This fragmentation may create barriers to the free movement of capital in the internal market in particular in view of diverging time-limits and lengths of procedures as well as diverging overall procedural efficiency which may make it more difficult to anticipate the outcome for value recovery, making it harder to price risks, including for debt instruments. Legal uncertainty and additional costs for

investors, companies and other stakeholders may lead to the abortion of viable investment projects, reducing growth and employment opportunities and may stand in the way of optimal capital allocation thus constituting a hindrance to the development of a true Capital Markets Union.

In this section stakeholders are asked to assess whether and to what extent this situation constitutes an obstacle to a functioning internal market and which particular features of insolvency play the biggest role in that respect. In the following sections, stakeholders are asked to comment on policy options concerning the various areas of insolvency law.

### 1.1. Do differences in corporate (non-bank) insolvency frameworks in EU Member States pose a problem for the functioning of the internal market?

Select an available ranking scale from 0 to 5: where 0 means 'no problem' and 5 means 'extremely significant problem(s)'

C	nly values between 0 and 5 are allowe	d
	2	

### 1.1.1. In particular, do differences in insolvency frameworks in EU Member States deter cross-border investment/lending?

Select an available ranking scale from 0 to 5: where 0 means 'no problem' and 5 means 'extremely significant problem(s)'

C	nly	values	betwee	en 0 a	and 5	are	allowe	<i>a</i>
	3							

### 1.2. Which of the existing differences between the laws of the Member States in the areas mentioned below most affect the functioning of the Internal Market?

Select an available ranking scale from 0 to 5: where 0 means 'no problem' and 5 means 'extremely significant problem(s)'

#### Please select

	0	1	2	3	4	5
a) Differences in the definition of insolvency;	0	0	•	0	0	0
b) Differences in how insolvency proceedings are triggered - obligations of debtors and rights of creditors to file for insolvency;	0	0	•	0	0	©
c) Differences in the duties and liabilities of directors in vicinity of insolvency and in insolvency proceedings;	0	•	0	0	0	©
d) Differences in the duties and liabilities of insolvency practitioners;	0	0	•	0	0	0
e) Differences in the identification and tracing of assets that belong to the insolvency estate;	0	0	•	0	0	0
f) Differences in the ranking of claims;	0	0	•	0	0	0
g) Differences in relation to avoidance action	0	0	•	0	0	0

### h) Other, please explain

More formal aspects of insolvency proceedings (differences in time limits in proceedings, information to creditors, information on filing of claims) could also adversely affect the functioning of the internal market.

### 1.3. In which area do you consider the insolvency framework of the jurisdiction where you operate is to be reformed?

Select an available ranking scale from 0 to 5: where 0 means 'no problem' and 5 means 'extremely significant problem(s)'

#### Please select

	0	1	2	3	4	5
a) Differences in the definition of insolvency;	•	0	0	0	0	0
b) Differences in how insolvency proceedings are triggered - obligations of debtors and rights of creditors to file for insolvency;	•	0	0	0	0	0
c) Differences in the duties and liabilities of directors in vicinity of insolvency and in insolvency proceedings;	•	0	0	0	0	0
d) Differences in the duties and liabilities of insolvency practitioners;	•	0	0	0	0	0
e) Differences in the identification and tracing of assets that belong to the insolvency estate;	•	0	0	0	0	0
f) Differences in the ranking of claims;	0	•	0	0	0	0
g) Differences in relation to avoidance action	•	0	0	0	0	0

### h) Other, please explain

Part of our insolvency program is to determine whether our proceedings could be made more efficient. Following motions carried by our lower house, we also review our current hierarchy of claims. No final decision has been made about changes.

### 1.4. Which measures should be taken at the EU level to bring about greater convergence of insolvency frameworks?

- a) targeted harmonisation through legislation
- b) recommendation
- c) a combination of both
- d) no measures.

### 1.5 Briefly describe the model for corporate insolvency to which Member States should converge

While we acknowledge that certain aspects of our national insolvency law could be improved, we are yet to be convinced of the benefits of harmonising aspects of insolvency law at European level. If harmonization is considered, we would propose a recommendation.

If the European Commission considers a proposal, we would suggest to target formal aspects of insolvency (such as time limits, information to creditors, information on hierarchy of claims) to speed up insolvency proceedings in the member states. See also our addendum.

## 2. DIRECTORS' LIABILITY IN VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS, DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS

In the vicinity of insolvency, directors are in a key position and it may have to be clarified that their fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the company includes taking into account the interest of creditors and all stakeholders. Legal systems have prescribed, in different ways, what directors should do when a company is near to or actually insolvent. The Restructuring Directive 2019/1023 provides a minimum level of harmonisation for directors' duties where there is a likelihood of insolvency (Art. 19), while the Company Law Digitalisation Directive (EU) 2019/1151 provides for the exchange of information on disqualified directors through the system of inter-connection of business registers (BRIS). The question is whether there are additional needs.

2.1. In your opinion, should there be any minimum harmonization at EU leve
on the duties and obligations of directors in the event of vicinity of
insolvency or when the company is insolvent?

Yes

No

2.2. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, in which aspects of the question do you consider the harmonization of national laws at EU level beneficial? (Multiple replies possible.)

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
A duty of the director in the vicinity of insolvency to formulate plans to take
preventative action to avoid insolvency or to identify possible insolvency
problems, if necessary to file for preventative proceedings;
A duty of the director, once the company is insolvent, to file for the
appropriate insolvency proceedings;
A clarification of the focus of duties of the director when a company is near
to insolvency or is actually insolvent to look at the interests of the creditors
(instead of looking at the interest of the shareholders). This includes rules
against 'wrongful trading'.
Minimum standards at ELI level on sanctions for breaches of the duties

above. This might include civil and/or criminal liability of the directors.

Minimum standards at EU level on the conditions and proceedings leading to the establishment of liability of the directors for breaches of the duties above.
2.3 What measures at EU level do you consider favourable for the enhancement of the effective implementation of decisions disqualifying directors as a consequence of breaching their duties in the vicinity of insolvence 2 (Multiple appropriate)
<ul> <li>insolvency? (Multiple answers possible)</li> <li>Harmonizing substantive issues of disqualification law (such as the conditions leading to a disqualification or the disqualification period) in the context of breaching directors' duties in the vicinity of insolvency</li> <li>Increasing the transparency of decisions on disqualifications vis-à-vis infringed duties in the context of insolvency by putting this information in national public registers</li> <li>Increasing the transparency of decisions on disqualifications in the vicinity of</li> </ul>
insolvency by enhancing cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities, possibly in the context of the Business Register Interconnection System (BRIS)  There shall not be any dedicated measure in insolvency law, the question shall be settled as part of the general company law rules  None of the above, there is no need for any legislative intervention at EU level in this context at this point in time.
3. INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS (the term "insolvency practitioners" is used in the meaning of the definition of Article 2(5) of Regulation (EU) 2015 /848)
Insolvency practitioners play a central role in the effective and efficient implementation of an insolvency law, with certain powers over debtors and their assets and a duty to protect those assets and their value, as well as the interests of creditors and employees, and to ensure that the law is applied effectively and impartially. The Restructuring Directive 2019/1023 comprises provisions on the training, appointment, supervision and remuneration of practitioners (Art. 26, 27), the question is whether further measures are appropriate.
<ul> <li>3.1 In your opinion, which questions in the following list would benefit from a harmonization at EU level? (Multiple answers possible.)</li> <li>Licensing and registration</li> <li>Regulation, supervision and discipline</li> <li>Qualification and training of IPs</li> </ul>

	Appointment of the IPs
	Work standards and ethics for IPs
	Legal powers and duties of IPs
	Remuneration of IPs
<b>V</b>	Other, please elaborate:
<b>V</b>	None of the above

### please elaborate:

Having consulted stakeholders, we find as yet no convincing need to establish harmonised rules on this issue. It does not seem to be a major obstacle for the proper functioning of the internal market. Moreover, given the differences between member states on the purpose, task, of insolvency practictioners, it would be very difficult to establish common rules.

3.2 A number of international and European standard setting bodies have worked recently on a set of principles laying down parameters for the qualifications of insolvency practitioners/insolvency office holders to guide their performance of their function[1]. There is a considerable degree of commonality in the nature of these standards and guidelines.[2]. Which of these principles do you agree with?

[1] See details in University of Leeds, "Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency", p. 78. The study was commissioned by the European Commission and is available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3eb2f832-47f3-11e6-9c64-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[2] A concise summary of this common ground is given by the EBRD when they defined the main principles for benchmarking the IP profession. See EBRD, "Assessment of Insolvency Office Holders: Review of the profession in the EBRD region" (2014) available at: http://www.inppi.ro/arhiva/anunturi/download/196\_1f89a9d9c30bb669c1a3020f0960c8da

	l agree	I do not agree
Licensing and registration - IPs should hold some form of official authorisation to act.	0	•
Regulation, supervision and discipline - given the nature of their work and responsibilities, IP should be subject to a regulatory framework with supervisory, monitoring and disciplinary features.	•	0
Qualification and training - IPs candidates should meet relevant qualification and practical training standards. Qualified IPs should keep their professional skills updated with regular continuing training.	•	0

Appointment system - there should be a clear system for the appointment of IPs, which reflects debtor and creditor preferences and encourages the appointment of an appropriate IP candidate.	•	0
Work standards and ethics - the work of IPs should be guided by a set of specific work standards and ethics for the profession.	•	0
Legal powers and duties - IPs should have sufficient legal powers to carry out their duties, including powers aimed at recovery of assets belonging to the debtor's estate.	•	0
IPs should be subject to a duty to keep all stakeholders regularly informed of the progress of the insolvency case.	•	0
Remuneration - a statutory framework for IP remuneration should exist to regulate the payment of IP fees and protect stakeholders. The framework should provide ample incentives for IPs to perform well and protection for IP fees in liquidation	0	•

#### 4. RANKING OF CLAIMS

With respect to ranking of claims, generally secured creditors are strongly protected and can realise their secured property (collateral). However, some legal systems grant other types of creditors priority status. In some Member States, employee claims are treated as priority claims and may get paid first even ahead of secured creditors. In some Member States tax claims have a preferential status in insolvency proceedings. In some legal systems, a certain carve-out of the proceeds of security rights is used to ensure a minimum satisfaction of unsecured creditors. The question is whether common principles should be introduced by EU measures and what those principles should be.

# **4.1. According to your opinion, which aspect of the rules on the ranking of claims would benefit most from a harmonization at EU level?** (Multiple replies are possible.)

$\square$ The relation	ship between the claims of secured and unsecured creditors
The position	n of the claims by unpaid employees of the debtor
The status of	of tax and other public law claims in the event of insolvency
The subordi	ination of shareholder loans and/or other amounts due to
shareholder	s to general creditor claims
The validity	of creditor agreements on ranking in non-bank insolvency
The super-p	priority of "new financing"[1], including the definition of the "new
money" and	I the conditions of such a priority
None of the	above
Other, pleas	se, elaborate:

#### Please elaborate

<sup>[1] &</sup>quot;New finance" means finance that is provided to a person or company in financial distress or even when insolvent.

We would consider harmonising the hierarchy of claims to be very complex, as it is also linked to other areas of law (such as labour law and security rights) and seriously doubt whether this could be achieved without major (negative) consequences to creditors. We would propose to improve information on the hierarchy of claims by requiring member states to provide this information for instance through the e-justice platform.

- 4.2. Should there be harmonized rules on 'carve outs' for the benefit of unsecured creditors? Or in other words: shall a portion of the amounts secured by security rights (rights in rem) be set aside for the satisfaction of general unsecured creditor claims?
  - Yes,
  - Yes, provided that such rules are clearly defined, have a sufficiently narrow scope and are proportionate,
  - No, such carve-out rules, even with the narrowest scope, would have a negative effect to credit availability and to the cost of credit.
- 4.2.1 If your answer to the previous point was in the affirmative, what types of safeguard would you find necessary to ensure the proportionate nature of such rules? [Multiple answers are possible.]
  - Such benefits shall only apply if a vast proportion of the debtor's assets is encumbered (used as security or collateral for secured creditors)
  - Only involuntary creditors to the debtor may be benefited in this way
  - There shall be a ceiling to the amount to be used for the purpose of such benefit
- 4.3 Rules on privileged claims are a reflection of different economic and social systems individual Member States. Thus, for instance in Member States where social protection of workers is generally insufficient, workers' claims would often be privileged and ranked first in order to at least partially protect those vulnerable categories of persons. Recital 22 of the EU Insolvency Regulation[1] states that "at the next review of this Regulation, it will be necessary to identify further measures in order to improve the preferential rights of employees at European level". In your opinion, how should the position of the employees at the event of insolvency be improved at EU level? (Multiple answers are possible.)

<sup>[1]</sup> Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015,

	Unpaid employees shall be given priority status in the ranking of claims in
	insolvency proceedings (e.g. certain employee claims shall rank above
	secured creditors);
	The priority status of unpaid employees shall be subject to monetary and/or
	other limits;
	Certain employees / categories of employees shall not enjoy priority rights;
	The financial position of employees in the context of insolvency proceedings
	might be more appropriately protected by enhancing the protections
	available under employment law directives, in particular, by strengthening
	the safeguards available under national wage guarantee funds[1];
	Insolvency or more general insolvency related protections available to
	employees should be extended to self-employed persons;
1	No harmonisation is needed.

[1] See Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer

## 4.4 Do you agree that the priority status of unpaid taxes and other public contributions in the context of insolvency proceedings shall be abolished at EU level?

- Yes, tax and other public law claims shall be put in the category of general unsecured claims.
- Yes, tax and other public law claims shall be treated as claims by involuntary creditors.
- No, it is important that Member States may maintain the priority status of such claims in insolvency proceedings

# 4.5 Should there be harmonized rules at EU level that subordinate claims arising out of shareholder loans to claims of other creditors (i.e. subordinate shareholder claims to debt claims)?

- Yes, unless creditor claims are met in full (or unless each class of creditors consents), shareholders cannot receive anything for their shares.
- Yes, shareholder loans have to be treated in the same way as other unsecured claims.
- Yes, but difference has to be made between secured or unsecured loans by shareholders.
- No, the current divergence in national solutions is satisfactory in this respect

4.6 should there be rules at EU level protecting "new financing" with a view to promoting corporate restructuring in insolvency in addition to the rules in Directive 2019/1023 for pre-insolvency restructuring[1]?

[1] Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and
discharge of debt, OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 18–55.
Yes
No
4.6.1. If yes: should new finance rank above prior unsecured claims but below secured claims?
© Yes
No
4.7 Should the general priority rules determining the ranking of claims that apply in liquidation proceedings also apply in restructuring proceedings within insolvency?
Yes

### No, there is no need to use the same priority rules for the two regimes.

5. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS

While legal systems in the various jurisdictions of the EU provide for possibilities to set aside suspect transactions, especially due to fraud, allowing additional assets to be distributed to the creditors. There are divergent approaches as to the conditions for a transaction to be set aside and the time-periods determining when a transaction can be challenged.

Yes, but with the following exceptions (please, elaborate)

5.1. Which kinds of transactions should be covered by the harmonised rules at EU level governing avoidance action? (Multiple answers possible.)

•	•	`	•	•	,
a) Preferences	(transactions benefiting	g one (	creditor to	o the detri	ment of the
general body of	creditors);				
b) Transactions	at an undervalue, incl	uding (	gifts to a	creditor or	a third party;
c) Securities cre	eated in the "suspect p	eriod"	in order t	to convert	a debt from
being unsecure	d to being secured (inv	/alidati	on of sec	curities);	
d) Transactions	to defraud creditors[1]	<b> </b> ;			
e) Transactions	entered into after inso	lvency	proceed	lings;	

<b>V</b>	f) Other [please,	indicate!];	
	a) None of them	there shall not be such harmonized rul	es

#### Please indicate:

We do not see a need for substantive harmonisation. We do see room for improvement on information for stakeholders, insolvency practitioners by making more information available on the definition, scope, time limits and conditions for avoidance actions. This could be done through the e-justice platform.

**5.2.** What types of condition would you find necessary to determine at EU level for a transaction to qualify as avoided action? (Multiple answers possible, but note that some conditions exclude the acceptation of others. If you consider a condition relevant only in relation to certain types of transaction, please, indicate them in the pop-up free text box by using the letter codes under point 5.1)

### Objective criteria

- The transaction happened within the "suspect period" (a set time period before the opening of insolvency proceedings);
- The transaction is to the detriment of the general body of creditors;
- The transaction paces the creditor recipient in a better position than he or she would have been in a liquidation;
- The debtor was insolvent at the time of the transaction;
- The debtor became insolvent as a result of entering into the transaction

If you consider a condition relevant only in relation to certain types of transaction, please, indicate them in the free text box at the end of the condition by using the letter codes a) to g) under point 5.1)

The rules should differentiate between cases where the transaction was obligatory (e.g. pursuant to a contract) or voluntarily.

### Subjective criteria

- The debtor knew or should have known that the transaction benefits the particular creditor or third party over the other creditors;
- The beneficiary of the transaction (a creditor or a third party) knew that the debtor is insolvent or that the payment is detrimental to the general body of the creditors:

<sup>[1] &</sup>quot;Transaction defrauding creditors" means any transaction that was entered into by a debtor who subsequently becomes subject to formal insolvency proceedings and there was some intention to put creditors at a detriment as a result of the transaction. This derives from the actio pauliana.

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or

		shall be o				•	on" in the cont d rules?	ext of
wh	ich a tra	-	must ha	ave been	entered	d into fo	insolvency pr or it to be avo	_
	Yes	eriou ) be	Tiaiiiio	inzed at	LO ICVC	1:		
	<ul><li>No</li></ul>							
	1 What wou saction type		oropriate le	ength of har	monized tii	me-perioc	d(s) with regard to t	he various
5.3.	1.1 Preferei	nces:						
Ple	ase indic	ate the le	ngth					
		3 months	6 months	s 1 year	2 years	or more		
	General	0	0	0	(			
Ple	ase indic	ate the le	ngth					
				6 months	1 year	2 year	3 year or more	
	Where cor	nnected party	involved	0	•	0	0	
5.3.1.2 Undervalued transactions/ gifts								
Ple	Please indicate the length							
		6 months	1 year	2 years	3 years or	more		
	General	0	•	0	0			

### Please indicate the length

	1 year	2 year	3 years	5 years or more
Where connected party involved	•	0	0	0

5.3.1.3 Transactions to defraud creditors

### Please indicate the length

	2 years	3 years	5 years	10 years or more
General	0	0	•	0

Please indicate the lengt	Please	indicate	the	lengt
---------------------------	--------	----------	-----	-------

	2 years	3 years	5 years	10 years or more
Where connected party involved	0	0	•	0

5.3.2 What shall be the point in time from which the "suspect period	d" sha	all be
counted from?		

- The opening of insolvency proceedings
- The appointment of the insolvency practitioner
- Other

5.4 In most Member States, the right to file an avoidance action lies with the insolvency administrator, however, in certain Member States, creditors are also empowered to file it under certain conditions. In your view, who should be entitled to take action in the courts in relation to the avoidance of transactions?

<b>V</b>	the IP
	a government official;
	a court supervisor;
	a creditor alone;

a creditor subject to approval of a court or some other independent body

5.5. Should there be a harmonized limitation period as far as the institution of avoidance proceedings?

0	Yes
	163

No

5.5.1 If your answer to the preceding question was in the affirmative, what shall be the time-period within which avoidance proceedings have to be instituted?

6. HARMONISING PROCEDURAL ISSUES RELATING TO FORMAL INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS

This section addresses the definition of insolvency, the obligation (of the debtor) and the possibility (for others) to file for insolvency proceedings and the requirements for filing claims against an insolvent debtor. On all those questions, there are divergent solutions in the Member States' legal systems. Insolvency is defined on the basis of either only a cash flow/illiquidity test (a company cannot pay its debts as they fall due) or, as an alternative, a balance sheet/overindebtedness test (the value of a company's liabilities outweigh the value of its assets). Approaches also differ as to whether directors are required to file for insolvency proceedings and as to the conditions for creditors to request the opening. To ensure that their claims are acknowledged and taken into account in the calculation of creditors' pay-out in liquidation and in the voting for arrangements for restructuring, creditors need to file their claims with the insolvency practitioner but the conditions, especially concerning the time allowed for the filing varies significantly across the EU.

(	<ul> <li>Should there be a harmonised definition of insolvency at EU level?</li> <li>Yes</li> <li>No</li> </ul>
[] []	<ul> <li>.1. Should the definition of insolvency be based on?</li> <li>Liquidity test?</li> <li>Balance sheet test?</li> <li>The possibility to opt for one of both?</li> <li>Other test (for instance, a combination of elements from both tests)?</li> </ul>
Ple	ease explain
	It should be a substantive test, i.e. a debtor is bankrupt on court order when he fails to pay his due and

6.2. In view of procedural economy, would you consider beneficial introducing rebuttable legal presumptions that would facilitate proving that a debtor is insolvent (for instance: if a debtor is unable to meet its financial obligations over a period of time longer than 90 days, it is considered insolvent)?[Select an available appropriate ranking scale from 0 to 5]

C	nly	values	betweer	o and	5 are	allowe	C
	0						

payable debts.

If such presumptions exist in your respective national rule, please provide a short explanation on the type of presumption and on its main elements or provide reference to it in your respective jurisdiction

6.3. Should there be harmonised rules on how insolvency proceedings are
opened?[Select an available appropriate ranking scale from 0 to 5]
Only values between 0 and 5 are allowed
4
Tick the below replies if you think such rules should:
Oblige an insolvent debtor to file for insolvency
Provide creditors with a right to file for insolvency
6.4. One of the most important issues for legal entities, when they learn that insolvency proceedings have been opened against their debtor, is to learn about this fact in a timely manner and to acquire certainty about the time-period for lodging their claims in the respective insolvency proceedings.
As regards the information on the opening of insolvency proceedings, are national insolvency registers and the interconnectivity of national insolvency registers at EU
level functioning properly? [1] bearing in mind that the EU-wide interconnection of insolvency registers (IRI 2.0, see Article
25 of Regulation (EU) 2015/848) will be fully operational in all Member States only as of 30 June 2021
Yes
No
If no, what should be improved?
More information could be added to provide creditors a better view on the status of insolvency proceedings.
Do you see merit in harmonising national rules on the time-limits for creditors as regards the lodging of their claims?   Yes  No
If yes, what would be the most appropriate time-limit?
14 days before the meeting of creditors. This can be adjusted by the supervising judge.

6.5. Given the increasing number of cross-border insolvency cases and the
need for specialised legal knowledge, should the rules on minimum training
requirements/professional qualifications for judges be harmonised at the El
level?

Yes

No

If no, please explain or indicate "no opinion"

At this moment, there are not enough cross-border cases to justify EU rules on training and knowledge of IP's and judges. We of course agree that organising as trainings and such would provide beneficial effects.

- 6.6. In your assessment, would it contribute to the efficiency of insolvency proceedings if Member States designated specialised chambers at the appropriate court instances for the handling of insolvency cases?
  - Yes
  - O No

### 7. ASSET PRESERVATION, ASSET IDENTIFICATION AND TRACING OF ASSETS BELONGING TO THE INSOLVENCY ESTATE

Asset tracing is a process that enables courts, IP, investigators or parties that demonstrated a legitimate interest to determine a debtor's assets, examine the revenue generated by often fraudulent activity, and follow its trail. EU law has established a specific tool for asset tracing in the area of civil judicial cooperation, in order to obtain information on bank accounts in another Member State in the context of the cross-border freezing of accounts in the Regulation on a European Account Preservation Order[1]. However, there is no horizontal instrument to assist cross-border asset tracing and enforcement in insolvency cases.

[1] Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 59.

7.1. Businesses across the Union often stipulate in contracts among themselves specific "acceleration" or "termination" clauses (also known as "ipso facto clauses") for the event if any of them becomes insolvent. Since rules on such clauses in EU Member States diverge or do not exist and since courts and arbitral tribunals issue very diverging decisions when interpreting such contractual clauses, would you estimate that harmonisation of those rules would enhance legal predictability and security for businesses?

Yes

No

7.2. Should there be EU harmonised rules on assistance (including interconnectivity of relevant registers) in the cross-border tracing of assets of the insolvent debtor?
No
7.3. What are the powers and duties that insolvency practitioners should have /observe in order to trace, secure and recover assets:(choose one or more of the following):  the power to compel the production of books and records (including from lawyers, accountants and banks) the power to conduct audits search order freezing order
<ul> <li>examination of corporate officers</li> <li>the duty to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities</li> <li>other</li> <li>7.4. Where appropriate, please provide reference for any freezing order or</li> </ul>
proprietary injunction available in your respective jurisdiction to the insolvency practitioner against the debtor within insolvency proceedings.
7.5. Should insolvency practitioners have full access to property and collateral database? <ul> <li>Yes</li> <li>No</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>7.6. Should the insolvency practitioner (and other interested parties) be allowed to participate at an early stage of criminal investigation, in order to obtain an easier and wider access to evidence?</li> <li>Yes</li> <li>No</li> </ul>

## 7.7. What other powers or investigative tools should be available to insolvency practitioners? Please, elaborate

The insolvency practictioner has under Dutch law a duty to examine and to report irregularities surrounding the bankruptcy. Furthermore, the insolvency practitioner may, in certain cases (e.g. fraud), file for a disqualification order.

#### **Contact**

**Contact Form**