

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the regulatory body of the Netherlands (ANVS) and with the agreement of the Operating Company of NRG (Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group) a Follow-up Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA) mission was conducted by the IAEA at Petten in April 2019. An ISCA was conducted in June 2017 and the operating organization NRG agreed that the scope would include the Research Reactor (HFR), the isotope production facility (HCL) and the waste treatment and handling facility (DWT). These three facilities are, together with NRG, hereafter referred to as ‘the organization’. This report presents the follow-up findings.

The overall goal of the ISCA was to support the organization to create a common image of the organization’s safety culture and identify strengths and potential areas needing attention. The main objective with the follow-up ISCA was to review the implementation of the recommendations and suggestions provided by the ISCA mission.

The follow-up ISCA mission was conducted by an IAEA Team Leader and an external consultant from Belgium. A follow-up Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) mission was conducted at the same time as the ISCA follow-up and the teams cooperated during the follow-ups. The mission purpose was to follow-up on how the organization had dealt with the original findings and assess the progress.

Eight areas in need of attention were identified during the 2017 ISCA. The areas were: Leadership, Management System, Nuclear Safety and Safety Culture Attention, Training and Competence, Communication, Interactions, Workload and Resources and Committee roles, independent review and quality assurance.

The ISCA follow-up team noted the good level of implementation of the recommendations and suggestions and acknowledge that the organizations also had taken actions on the encouragements received during the 2017 ISCA.

The ISCA follow-up team assessed that all the ISCA recommendations and suggestions had been addressed and actions taken. Three recommendations were considered having ‘satisfactory progress to date’, one recommendation was considered having ‘insufficient progress to date’ and one recommendation was divided in two parts and given two different grades. Three suggestions were considered being ‘resolved’, two suggestions were considered as having made ‘satisfactory to date’ and one was considered as having ‘insufficient progress to date’.

The recommendations and suggestions that were considered having satisfactory progress to date were mainly related to:

- The development of expectations and practices on leadership for safety for senior leaders
- The development of a leadership profile and leadership development programme
- The establishment of safety culture assessment procedures and plans
- Several different communication efforts

Some of the ISCA recommendations and suggestions were considered having ‘insufficient progress to date’ although some actions have been taken in this regard. These recommendations and suggestions, which are important to the development of a strong safety culture remain valid and actions need to be taken by the organization. These recommendations and suggestions are related to:

- The arrangements to keep the management system up to date within the organization
- The understanding of roles and responsibilities of the reactor safety committee
- The organizations assessment and management of the perceived workload