



# Afghanistan

**MASP 2011 - 2014**

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**Netherlands Embassy Kabul**

The Multi-Annual Strategic Plan sets out the involvement of the Netherlands in Afghanistan for the period 2011-2014 and is a rolling document.

The plan was elaborated late 2010 and approved in 2011. During the appraisal process, the focus of the strategy was enhanced and additional clarifications were received from the Embassy. These were incorporated in the final version. In dialogue with relevant stakeholders such as the government, civil society, development partners and private sector, detailed plans will be elaborated for certain areas before activities can be implemented as part of this Strategic Plan.

In 2012, this document will be updated and revised in response to the changes and developments that have taken place since late 2010.

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**List of Abbreviations**

AIHRC	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ALP	Afghan Local Policy
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APRP	Afghan Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration Program
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASGP	Afghan Subnational Governance Program
CPJP	City Police and Justice Project
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HPC	High Peace Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IC	International Community
IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Government
IEC	Independent Election Commission
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MASP	Multi-Annual Strategic Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoEC	Ministry of Economy
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCH	Nederlands Centrum voor Handelsbevordering
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NJP	National Justice Program
NJSS	National Justice Sector Strategy
NL	Netherlands
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OMF	Opposing Military Forces
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USFOR-A	United States Forces in Afghanistan
WB	World Bank
WBDBR	World Bank Doing Business Ranking

## **1. Introduction and Summary**

### **1.1 Introduction and retrospective**

Afghanistan has been at the heart of the foreign policy of the Netherlands since 2002. The military and civilian mission in Uruzgan contributed to positive change in Uruzgan by adopting the integrated 3D-approach of development, diplomacy, and defence. The operating principle of this approach was development where possible and forceful interventions when necessary.

As a result, life in Uruzgan today is markedly different from four years ago. Security around the three major towns has improved. Over one million trees have been planted, micro-dams and water wells were constructed. Bazaars have increased in number and are increasingly offering locally grown fruits and vegetables. Employment has gone up. Access to health care and education has tremendously improved. Cell phone coverage has been established.

The military withdrawal from Uruzgan in August 2010 and the decision to send an integrated police training mission to Kunduz in January 2011 mark a new phase in the involvement of the Netherlands in Afghanistan. The primary objective remains unchanged: to contribute to reconstruction and stability. The Netherlands will continue to work towards a more secure, developed and a more democratically and better governed Afghanistan.

The challenges in a fragile state like Afghanistan are wide ranging: from insurgency to illiteracy, from its mountainous terrain to its interfering neighbours and from trade in illegal drugs to the proliferation of Islamic radicalism. A long-term perspective and engagement is called for combined with a transition process to reinforce Afghan sovereignty. Therefore, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kabul developed a Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) to implement the Netherlands' involvement in Afghanistan for 2011-2014, taking explicitly into account the local context, complexity and dynamics of the country.

A MASP for a fragile state like Afghanistan cannot be set in stone. The Netherlands' policy needs to be responsive to a rapidly evolving political and security environment in Afghanistan as well as to changing demands in the political domain in the Netherlands.

The plan reflects the policy directives as set out by the Dutch government (as stipulated in the 'Memorie van Toelichting' and the 'Basisbrief Ontwikkelingssamenwerking') and should be read against the general background of Dutch interests in Afghanistan:

- the alleviation of poverty in Afghanistan, in line with the Afghan National Development Strategy;
- the promotion of human rights in general and of the position of women in particular;
- the need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming once more a terrorist safe haven;
- the need to remain a valuable partner contributing to international solidarity through NATO and EU efforts in Afghanistan;
- possible future economic opportunities for the private sector in the Netherlands.

## 1.2 Summary

The Netherlands is committed to international security, the promotion of governance and human rights, and the alleviation of poverty. As a result thereof, the Netherlands has been and will remain substantially involved in Afghanistan.

This MASP for Afghanistan is on the one hand based on the policy directives as set out by the Netherlands government and the policy articles and operational objectives of the ministry of Foreign Affairs (as stipulated in the ‘Memorie van Toelichting’ and the ‘Basisbrief Ontwikkelingssamenwerking’). On the other hand, it finds its basis in the Afghan National Development Strategy.

In order to maximise impact and reduce administrative overhead, the Netherlands has chosen to rationalise its development portfolio in Afghanistan and reduce its involvement from nine to three sectors. During the period 2011-2014, the Netherlands’ bilateral development effort in Afghanistan will be focused on agriculture, rule of law, and governance. This strong focus will allow the Netherlands to capitalise on its added value and to promote its strategic interests. Across these sectors, the Netherlands has three main objectives:

1. to increase the living standard, reduce the poverty and improve the self-sufficiency of Afghan farmers;
2. to strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan by enhancing the access to and delivery of justice;
3. to enhance the legitimacy, the responsiveness, and the accountability of national and sub-national governance.

In all three sectors, a two-tiered approach is envisaged to maximise the impact of the Netherlands’ interventions. Apart from support to the government, much importance is attached to assisting the emergence of a strong and vibrant civil society that demands transparency and accountability from government.

The Netherlands will maintain its significant development presence in Uruzgan for some time to come. At the same time, an integrated police training mission and rule of law programme will be rolled out in Kunduz. Through its strong presence in both provinces, the Netherlands is well-placed to infuse knowledge of the district-level reality into national discussions.

By supporting the government at the national level through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) trust fund, Netherlands’ contributions to development and security will be brought on-budget. This enables the Netherlands to take part in the periodic, macro-level policy dialogue with the government and exert influence with regard to targets for public administration reforms and poverty reduction. Thus, the Netherlands will actively contribute to the harmonisation and alignment goals as set out during the last Kabul Conference and to implementing the Paris declaration.

This way the Netherlands will contribute to a secure, developed and a better governed Afghanistan.

## **2. Country analysis**

After the fall of the Taleban in 2001, Afghanistan was completely destroyed by decades of war and conflict. It was one of the poorest and most destructed countries in the world, with an extremely high mother and child mortality rate, very limited access to education and basic health services and without any credible central authority or governance capacity. Women and girls were completely marginalised and there were millions of Afghan refugees.

Since then, a lot of progress has been achieved. The standard of living in Afghanistan, particularly in the urban areas, has improved significantly. Most noticeable are the education and healthcare indicators, which show an upward trend. The improved access to education – also for girls – has enabled almost six million children to enjoy education, as opposed to the one million children attending school in 2001. Child mortality before the age of five decreased by 36% compared to 2001.

Economic growth has been strong, averaging at 11%. There has been growth in employment and economic activity, especially in the telecom-, construction- and agricultural sectors. There have also been noticeable improvements in infrastructure, housing and communication facilities, especially in urban areas. Cities like Kabul have been significantly transformed. Business activities have increased, enhancing urbanisation and employment.

Since early 2004, Afghanistan has a constitution, which includes the separation of powers, democracy and respect for universal human rights. Afghanistan has made significant progress in human rights since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Economic, education and employment opportunities for women have improved, as has their political participation. Afghanistan is a signatory to the most important international human rights conventions. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has established itself as a trustworthy and internationally respected institution that takes its role seriously. The number of active civil society organisations and private media is growing.

The grouping of ministries in ‘clusters’ and the elaboration of national priority programmes for each cluster have improved the functioning and effectiveness of the central government. Service delivery is slowly improving. Certain ministries in the social sector have contributed significantly in improving access to basic education and public health services and in stimulating community dialogue and rural reconstruction by providing development funding to local communities.

The build-up of the national security forces has been an impressive achievement. Developing these security institutions is at the core of the strategy of the international community, which is to transfer responsibility for security to the Afghans till 2014. The purpose of this transition process is to reinforce Afghan sovereignty while retaining the long-term commitment of ISAF and the international community.

Despite these significant achievements, the stability of Afghanistan is not yet irreversible and a lot of progress still has to be made.

### **2.1 Socioeconomic development**

Afghanistan is still far from reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). A third of the Afghans live below the poverty line. Illiteracy is still widespread and chronic malnutrition persists. Agriculture continues to be the most important productive sector, as it forms about 50% of the legitimate economy. While food production is theoretically sufficient to cover the needs of the entire country, natural disasters and a lack of coherent government policy occasionally cause food insecurity. The total export value of opiates constituted an estimated 30% of real GDP in 2008.

Afghanistan is currently [2010] placed 167<sup>th</sup> on the World Bank Doing Business Ranking (WBDBR), and continues to rank lowest in the South Asia region. Foreign direct investment dropped to 1.4% in 2009-2010. Business development is still mired by bureaucracy, lack of policy predictability and corruption plaguing the regulatory environment. A weak legal and regulatory environment continues to impede major progress from taking place as regards private sector development. In addition, security, and access to land, power, finance and a skilled labour force remain inadequate and are impeding the ability of companies to grow. It is therefore remarkable that, despite the slow pace of reforms, private sector growth is taking place.

Many international development partners are engaged in Afghanistan. Although most donors endorse the Paris and Accra declarations, their respective development cooperation agendas in Afghanistan are much influenced by domestic politics. This results in a need to show quick results. This contrasts starkly with Afghanistan's absorption capacity, which has proven to be limited. Effective and efficient use of funds is further hampered by inadequate donor coordination, the militarisation of aid and the misappropriation of funds through multi-layer contracting. Fortunately, there are signs that donor partners share these concerns and are willing to act accordingly. This notwithstanding, further aid alignment will probably depend on government measures to tackle corruption and improve public finance management.

## **2.2 Security and stability**

Between 2006 and 2010, the security situation throughout Afghanistan has been of great concern. The insurgency remained present in the south and the east and has expanded to the north and many parts of the west. Security incidents were frequent and widespread – often targeting coalition forces but also aimed and Afghan government officials and the civilian population. The increase in security incidents can partly be attributed to increased international troop levels and a corresponding increase in security operations by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) which increased activities of anti-governmental elements. Criminal organisations also support insurgent activities in order to secure their interests in the narcotics business.

The main challenge in transition is to design a framework that is conditions-based, irreversible and not politically biased (towards certain provinces, regions or tribes). It further needs to balance efforts between the three 'lines of operations': governance, development and security. The ANSF are growing substantially and also the quality of especially the Afghan National Army (ANA) has improved substantially. In comparison, the Afghan National Police is still weaker. In order to improve the quality of police and army and to guarantee the agreed growth numbers, there is an urgent need for additional trainers. NATO is strengthening efforts to step up training capacity. The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) plays an important role in improving the quality and build-up of a comprehensive police force.

## **2.3 Governance**

Although service delivery is improving at the central level, at the sub-national level it is in general still lagging behind. Provincial governors are presidential appointees, often without the necessary credentials and a popular mandate. Furthermore, they are frequently given far-reaching powers but lack funding. Governance at the local level is still seriously hampered by capacity problems. The government and the international community have so far not succeeded to provide sufficient incentives for civil servants to work in remote areas. Local and international NGOs try to fill part of the service delivery gaps. The effectiveness of governance is further negatively affected by the disruptive influence and presence of anti-government forces, powerbrokers and warlords. Equally, power politics, cost effectiveness and efficiency are negatively affecting the governance situation.

Public confidence in the Afghan government is low. The organisation of the elections by the Independent Election Commission has improved. Nevertheless, widespread fraud in the last presidential and parliamentary elections has eroded the legitimacy of the government and confidence in the electoral



process. At the Kabul Conference, the Afghan government pledged to initiate a strategy for long-term electoral reform. Afghan ownership of the reform agenda is essential and reform needs to be inclusive and outcome-oriented.

Another major cause of the lack of public confidence in the Afghan government is the widespread corruption. The fight against corruption has been earmarked by the international community as a high priority in order to both improve governance and rebuild trust in the government. The government has announced anti-corruption measures, but these have yet to produce results.

Other factors negatively impacting on government legitimacy include the background of many government officials. In addition, parts of the population do not consider themselves sufficiently represented in both the executive and the legislative. Patterns of patronage and loyalty to warlords and tribes and the prevailing lack of security are also inhibiting factors.

Attempts from the Afghan government to negotiate a political solution with anti-government elements are likely to intensify. As a result of the Consultative Peace Jirga June 2010, the High Peace Council (HPC) was established in September 2010. Also, president Karzai issued a presidential decree formally launching the Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration Program (APRP) in June 2010.

## **2.4 Justice and Human rights**

Judicial reforms in Afghanistan are hampered by a sluggish, corrupt and over-centralised legal system, a serious lack of financial resources and a lack of trained staff. Traditional and religious justice remains strong, although its quality and fairness varies. Access to justice is impeded by limited public awareness of legal rights, the inaccessibility of legal information and the costs associated with bringing cases before the courts.

One of the particular challenges in the Afghan legal system is the need to reconcile and connect formal law and informal, customary law. Attempts to achieve this have yielded little progress. Implementation of the National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS) and the underlying National Justice Programme (NJP) continues to face difficulties and delays because of structural weaknesses in justice institutions and the lack of donor coordination.

The insecurity and the weak capacity of the government have had a negative impact on the human rights situation. A growing perception that tough measures are needed to tackle crime and corruption, the continued marginalisation of moderate voices and a declining confidence in the Western intervention make that traditional views are gaining ground in Afghanistan. Insecurity and electoral fraud have undermined political rights such as the freedom of association, the freedom of movement and the freedom of assembly. Disenfranchisement of voters, in particular women, is widespread. Freedom of religion does not really exist in Afghanistan. This has obvious negative consequences for freedom of speech and association.

Despite the advances in their position, women continue to suffer from discrimination and abuse while participation in public life remains very restricted. Although the government has developed laws in the field of women's rights, violators often go unpunished. Public knowledge of women's rights is limited at best. Afghan women's rights activists fear that growing conservatism in Afghan society, coupled with the trend towards reconciliation with the Taliban and other conservative opposition groups, will result in women's rights being sacrificed to achieve peace.

The role of civil society as a countervailing power is limited, but expanding. It plays an important but insufficiently forceful role. Research organisations have increased their public presence, but do not yet have a tangible impact on government policies. The media has strengthened its capacity, but could play a

more prominent role in promoting debate and civic education. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are upheld in the constitution. Since the fall of the Taliban, the media have grown exponentially from an almost non-existent base. The freedom of expression is nevertheless under constant pressure. The government has closed down media outlets and enacted internet-censorship. The new media law leaves room for interpretation and hence violations and abuse.

The action plan for transitional justice, adopted in 2005, has hardly been implemented. This is partly due to a lack of political will within the current government and the division within the international community on how to proceed. Members of government and international actors acknowledge that transitional justice is of great importance, but argue that such a process could have a negative impact on the country's stability. Therefore, an argument is made for postponement of transitional justice until the insurgency is defeated, a durable peace has been reached and justice institutions have been strengthened. Others, including the Netherlands, put forward that without a transitional justice process and an end to impunity, the conflict will not stop. The dilemma of 'peace versus justice' is therefore expected to play an important role in the near future.

### 3. Strategic choices and objectives

#### 3.1 Introduction

The Netherlands has made a conscious decision to focus its involvement in Afghanistan on three sectors: agriculture, rule of law and governance. This will allow the Netherlands to capitalise on its strengths and to concentrate on those areas in which it has an added value and strategic interest. In addition, the Netherlands will in this way contribute to the harmonisation and alignment goals as set out by the Kabul Conference.

In all three sectors, the approach aims to strengthen both the government (top-down) and civil society (bottom-up). This two-tiered approach will maximise the results of the Netherlands' interventions. Through its continued involvement in Uruzgan and Kunduz, the Netherlands is well-placed to infuse knowledge of the district-level reality into national discussions.

#### 3.2 Modality mix and alignment

The current level of aid fragmentation and off-budget financing neither achieves a robust and coherent policy dialogue between donors and government, nor provides strong enough incentives to the government for significantly improved performance including Public Finance Management. By supporting the government through the ARTF, ANA and LOTFA trust funds, which are closely supervised by the World Bank and UNDP, the Netherlands' funds will be on-budget with effective oversight. Through these funds, direct support is given to development and security.

Furthermore, this funding modality will make it possible for the Netherlands to take part in the periodic, macro-level policy dialogue with government and thus exert influence with regard to targets for public administration reforms and poverty reduction. Other donors such as the United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union follow a similar approach. Next to supporting the government, much importance is attached to assisting the emergence of a strong and vibrant civil society that demands transparency and accountability from government.

The Netherlands' development programme in Afghanistan for the period 2011-2014 (including delegated and non-delegated funds) will be more than 80 % aligned with the policies and priorities of the government as reflected in the ANDS and National Priority Programs and over 50% will be on-budget, in line with the Kabul Conference commitment. The embassy envisages an enhanced coordination and collaboration with other major donors, preferably through pooled funding arrangements.

In order to maximise impact and minimise administrative burdens, the Netherlands has chosen to rationalise its development portfolio. The number of sectors the Netherlands will be involved in has been reduced to three. Consequently, the Netherlands will gradually end its active participation in a total of six sectors in which it feels its added value is limited compared to other donors (health, education, rural development, water, infrastructure and energy). Existing commitments in these sectors will be honoured. Emphasis will be given to embed project and programs institutionally and ensure sustainability of results.

#### 3.3 Focus sector I: Agriculture

Agriculture continues to be the most important productive sector, as it forms about 50% of the legitimate economy and over 85% of the Afghans derive their income from it. Nonetheless, a third of the population is permanently dependent on food support. This is because productivity of the average farmer remains limited and current government policy lacks coherence, effectiveness, and impact.

The Netherlands' strategic goal for the agriculture sector is to **increase living standards, reduce poverty, and improve self-sufficiency of Afghan farmers through a focus on improving skills and knowledge, and increasing agricultural production.** The added value of the Netherlands lies in its ability to link the

local and national realities in policy discussions and its internationally renowned expertise within the field of agriculture at large. The Netherlands is a trusted and valued partner of the Afghan government and currently lead donor in the field of agricultural education.

A two-fold approach is envisaged, working both top-down and bottom-up. The Netherlands intends to increase the governmental capacity to deliver services to farmers. The Netherlands will assist the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) in becoming a well-functioning ministry that formulates policies with the interests of farmers in mind, to support the respective district offices of MAIL in delivering services. This will be done by actively promoting allocation of personnel and resources to these district offices. The Netherlands will work with MAIL leadership to support the formulation and implementation of Change Management II.

Besides that, the Netherlands strives to strengthen the farmers' capacity to produce through increased access to and improved quality of agricultural education by utilising its strong position as lead donor. To this end, the Netherlands promotes nationally coherent and consistent donor support for the development and implementation of a national agricultural education program, strengthen the capacity inside the Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET) department for agricultural education, and fund among others the construction of the National Agricultural Education Centre, comprised of a Teacher Training and Curriculum Development Unit.

In addition, the Netherlands will explore and act upon possibilities to improve the marketability of farmer's products (e.g. certification), thereby giving explicit attention to the possible involvement of the Netherlands' private sector. The recently established pilot Private Sector Development office in Kabul will undertake supporting activities in this respect.

### **3.4 Focus sector II: Rule of Law**

Judicial reforms in Afghanistan have barely taken root. Civil policing and its relationship with the criminal justice system is weak. Access to justice is limited and properly functioning defence counsels are rare. Women continue to suffer from discrimination and abuse and their participation in public life remains very restricted. Although the government has developed laws in the field of women's rights, violators are generally not punished. Enhancing the quality and capacity of the rule of law chain will strengthen the belief of the population in the formal justice system, will decrease the perception of impunity and will provide a credible manner to settle conflicts through the formal and informal justice system.

The key objective of the Netherlands' efforts in this sector is to **strengthen the rule of law**. The Netherlands will **contribute to enhancing the access to and delivery of justice for men and women**. The support to the rule of law sector will be twofold, by providing support at the national level and at the provincial level in Kunduz.

The Netherlands aims to strengthen the relationship between state and non-state actors in order to provide effective oversight over the informal justice system, with sufficient attention to the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups. The Netherlands will focus on training judges, prosecutors and other actors in the judicial sector as well as on strengthening the capacity and quality of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Ensuring a better understanding by members of the Afghan Uniformed Police and prosecutors of their respective roles and increasing their willingness to cooperate is of great importance.

The capacity of the MoJ's 'Taqnin Department' to develop legislation will be strengthened and technical assistance of the Netherlands' international legal institutes will be provided in close cooperation with the EU. The status and needs of the formal and informal justice system will be assessed in order to define the relationship between formal and traditional mechanisms of justice and make these more coherent and complementary.

The Netherlands will increase its support to the EU Police Mission (EUPOL), including the development of civil policing and police leadership capabilities through contributions of specialised staff. Continued support will also be provided to the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA) for police salary payments through UNDP. Emphasis will be put on strengthening UNDP's efforts under LOTFA with regard to capacity building in the context of the Ministry of Interior reform and democratic/community policing.

Civil policing skills, with a focus on leadership, crime investigation, and police cooperation with justice institutions, will be developed. The protection of human rights and particularly women's access to justice, as well as the position of women in the police will be promoted. The Netherlands will also support the regional training centre in Bamyan Province with specific emphasis on female police officer training. At the provincial level in Kunduz, the emphasis will be on strengthening the cooperation between the various justice institutions and law enforcement agencies at the provincial and district level, enhancing their capacities, and where necessary improving the infrastructure.

The integrated police training mission will contribute to establishing oversight and control by the formal justice sector over the informal and traditional justice providers in Kunduz by establishing rule of law coordination meetings. In this context, priority will be given to criminal cases, with a specific attention to human rights, gender equality, and fair trial. Local access to justice will be enhanced and a better functioning defence counsel established. The Netherlands will support the establishment of local grievance resolution mechanisms, including the identification of mediators for local conflicts.

### 3.5 Focus sector III: Governance

Government accountability and legitimacy are low in Afghanistan. Concentration of power in the executive, limited capacity and influence of civil society, low public confidence in the government, and widespread corruption and nepotism are among the determining factors. More effective decentralisation, improved public finance management, electoral reform, and a vibrant civil society will contribute to good governance.

The Netherlands intends to provide tailored support to the enabling factors for 'good governance'. Key objective of the Netherlands' involvement in this sector is to **enhance the legitimacy, the responsiveness, and the accountability of national and sub-national governance**. The added value of the Netherlands lies in its ability to link the local and national realities in policy discussions, its perceived neutrality, and its reputation in the field of human rights.

A two-fold approach is envisaged with attention to both the duty bearers and rights holders, thereby working both top-down and bottom-up to improve legitimacy, responsiveness, and accountability. The Netherlands intends on the one hand to influence government policy development and implementation with regard to national and sub-national governance and administration, including the budget process and public finance management.

On the other hand, the Netherlands will work to strengthen civil society at large, starting at grassroots, and aiming at long-term capacity building of people and organisations. To this end, the Netherlands will engage a dialogue with a broad group of Afghan 'opinion makers', media organisations and journalists on governance and human rights issues. It will organise and facilitate meetings with relevant Afghan stakeholders. This 'embassy-platform' will contribute to strengthening the countervailing power of civil society. The Netherlands will also provide financial support to (media) organisations active in the field of civic education and to research organisations, in order to increase the availability of policy relevant information that feeds into Afghan-led debates about policy issues.

In addition, financial and political support will be provided to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) for the implementation of its strategic plan 2010-2013.

With regard to sub-national governance, the Netherlands will continue to support the roll out of the government's sub-national planning and finance policy and the corresponding implementation framework. The Netherlands will participate in national level policy dialogues to ensure a coherent implementation of the national policy and ensure that local accountability is recognised as an indispensable element of effective sub-national governance. In this context, and subject to a mid-term programme review, it is foreseen to continue supporting the Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP). ASGP will institutionalise sub-national governance, develop provincial and district planning and budgeting capacity, and strengthen the oversight role of provincial councils.

To strengthen the national budget process and public finance management, the Netherlands will play an active role in the macro-level policy dialogue between donors and government through its participation in the Incentive Programme and Strategy Working Groups of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The Netherlands' focus will be on sub-national governance 'systems building', with specific attention to budget allocations to sub-national level and improved local service delivery, accountability and poverty reduction. The Netherlands' involvement in the definition and monitoring of a Performance Assessment Matrix is a key activity in this context. Moreover, the Netherlands aims to provide at least 50% of its financial support on-budget (mostly through ARTF and LOTFA) and at least 80% aligned with national priorities. With this, the Netherlands will actively contribute to the harmonisation and alignment goals as set out during the last Kabul Conference and to implementing the Paris Declaration.

#### 4. Financial implications

Budget of the Netherlands Embassy in Kabul per sector, per year, in million EUR:

<b>Sector</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Agriculture incl. infrastructure in Uruzgan	20.8	15.5	18.0	20.0
Other activities in Uruzgan	6.6	5.7	2.0	0.0
Rule of law	0.3	6.0	8.0	8.0
Governance	4.8	9.0	9.0	9.0
<b>Total budget</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>