

## ANNEX

### Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

#### 1. Notification submitted by:

*The Netherlands*

#### 2. Date of the notification:

*8 May 2026*

#### 3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

*The Netherlands will prolong internal border controls from 00:00 on 9 June 2026 up to and including 30 September 2026 at the latest. The controls will be discontinued earlier once the renewed national legal framework for police checks (mobile security monitoring checks) in accordance with Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code is in place. This framework is expected to enter into force before autumn 2026, subject to the legal process.*

#### 4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

*The temporary reintroduction of internal border controls is limited to the Netherlands' land borders with Belgium and Germany and to its intra-Schengen air borders. In relation to air borders, controls are restricted to specific flights which, according to risk analysis or intelligence, are associated with a risk of irregular migration or cross-border crime.*

#### 5. Notification for a:

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event):  
Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event):  
Article 25a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

*N/A*

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event):  
Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

*Previous reintroduction of border control at internal borders from 9 December 2024 up to and including 8 June 2026.*

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

N/A

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

N/A

- reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

**NB:**

*A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.*

**6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):**

N/A

**7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:**

- terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

N/A

- large-scale public health emergencies

N/A

- an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

N/A

- Large scale or high-profile international event

N/A

Other

*According to Frontex figures,<sup>1</sup> in 2024 there were a total of more than 239,000 irregular border crossings at the external borders of the EU. In 2025<sup>2</sup> the number of irregular border crossings at*

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/publications/2024-in-brief-PEEHje>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-irregular-border-crossings-down-26-in-2025-europe-must-stay-prepared-lyKpVb>

*the external borders of the EU declined by 26% compared with 2024. However, the absolute number of irregular border crossings in 2025 (178,000) remains significant. The pressure on the EU caused by irregular migration and migrant smuggling remains great and, despite assistance from Frontex, continues to pose major challenges for Member States in terms of border control, reception and the fight against migration-related crime.*

*For years the Netherlands has been confronted with the consequences of a large influx of irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and substantial secondary migration flows, exacerbated by the malfunctioning Dublin system. This has caused high and cumulative pressure on the existing migration system, in particular on reception capacity and the available housing at local level. Institutions dealing with asylum and the reception of migrants have reached their limits in terms of capacity. At the same time, the number of reported crimes suspected to have been committed by persons residing at reception centres remains significant, even though this number decreased by 13% in 2024 compared with 2023. In 2024, a total of 5,875 suspects were registered who were staying at a COA (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) location or municipal reception location at the time of the offence in question. Figures for 2025 are not yet available. The nationalities associated with having relatively high percentages of suspected offenders are mainly nationalities associated with a low chance of being granted asylum. The problem of public policy disruptions and criminal behaviour has a negative impact on public perceptions of those asylum seekers, as well as on the level of public support for asylum seekers in general.*

*The government of the Netherlands continues to take all possible measures to prevent further disruption to the migration system, as that would lead to dire circumstances and pose an increased threat to public policy.*

*There is continued pressure on the national migration system, in particular on reception capacity, caused by the continued pressure on external borders and high levels of secondary migration (for which the Netherlands is still an important destination country). This in turn further increases the pressure on the asylum system, in particular reception capacity. The government of the Netherlands has consequently decided to prolong the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders from 9 June 2026 00:00 up to and including 30 September 2026.*

*At the same time, the Netherlands is taking measures to enhance cooperation with its neighbouring Member States with respect to cross-border police cooperation and the transfer of irregular migrants apprehended at the internal borders. In addition, the Netherlands is working on amending national legislation in order to improve and enhance police checks in accordance with Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code (mobile security monitoring checks, MTV). Once the renewed national legal framework for police checks in accordance with Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code comes into effect, the Netherlands will terminate internal border controls based on Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code. After the renewed legal framework has come into effect, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (RNLM) will carry out only mobile security monitoring checks in the internal border regions. The intention is to have the renewed legal framework for mobile security monitoring checks enter into force before the autumn of 2026.*

### **European migration situation**

*Despite a decline in the number of irregular border crossings at the EU's external borders, and measures taken by Member States and supported by Frontex, the persistent pressure of irregular*

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<sup>2</sup> Report by the Dutch Research and Data Centre (WODC): <https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/74671322-bffb-4208-ac85-09869a333ac2/file>.

migration on the EU's external borders continues to pose challenges to the Netherlands. These challenges have serious consequences throughout Europe for border control agencies, and organisations dealing with migration, asylum and/or reception of irregular migrants. Secondary movements, some of which are facilitated by migrant smugglers, continue to constitute the main source of the large influx of asylum seekers experienced by several Member States, including the Netherlands.

People smuggling continues to be a lucrative business, and migrants are still prepared to pay high fees for the dangerous crossings and other means of travel provided by smugglers, at great risk to their own lives. Instrumentalisation of migration by third countries further contributes to this undesirable situation. In the first 12 months of internal border controls, 39 persons were apprehended on suspicion of people smuggling. One person was apprehended on suspicion of human trafficking. Two hundred and twenty-five persons were apprehended on suspicion of criminal offences other than terrorism, people smuggling or human trafficking.

The overall situation continues to cause serious problems regarding irregular migration, migrant smuggling, asylum and basic services such as reception and housing, and in relation to public safety in this regard.

#### **Pressure on the national migration system**

In the first 15 months of the internal border controls conducted at the Netherlands' borders with Belgium and Germany, the RNLN denied entry to approximately 600 individuals who did not fulfil the entry conditions under the Schengen Borders Code. In the same period, 270 individuals were arrested during internal border controls in connection with migration-related crime, such as document fraud and human trafficking, traffic offences and drugs related crimes.<sup>3</sup>

The influx of asylum seekers into the Netherlands decreased by 25% in 2025 (approximately 24,100 first-time asylum applications) compared with 2024 (approximately 32,200). However, despite the decrease in pressure arising from irregular migration at the external borders and the influx of asylum seekers into the Netherlands, the pressure on reception facilities in the Netherlands remains high. The Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) is unable to keep up with this sustained influx. In addition, the return of migrants who are not permitted to stay in the Netherlands is not proceeding quickly enough, partly because countries of origin are not cooperating sufficiently. The outflow of beneficiaries of international protection from reception centres to regular housing in municipalities remains low. As a result, reception centres are still overcrowded, which at times leads to incidents. The challenges facing the asylum system as whole, and the pressure on that system, therefore remain extremely great. A significant percentage (69%) of migrants who apply for international protection in the Netherlands and are registered in Eurodac, have been registered previously by another Member State. The Pact on Migration and Asylum has not yet been implemented, and the high absolute number of secondary movements, combined with the ongoing impossibility of Dublin transfers to Greece, Hungary and Italy, is contributing to the pressure on the asylum system in the Netherlands.

Because of the abovementioned developments, the migration system in general and the asylum system in the Netherlands in particular, continue to be highly overburdened. The number of regular and irregular migrants arriving in the Netherlands has also driven up demand for facilities such as housing, care, education and integration programmes. More and more municipalities are indicating that they do not have the capacity to accommodate any (or more) asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection.

<sup>3</sup> House of Representatives, 2024-2025 session, 30 821, no. 267.

*Due to the developments described above, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is having to cope with an increasing number of residents (both asylum applicants and beneficiaries of international protection to whom it has not been possible to assign housing). The number of residents at COA reception centres was 13% higher on 1 March 2026 (approximately 81,700) than on 1 March 2025 (approximately 72,400) (source: www.coa.nl). These high occupancy rates, longer stay times and suboptimal conditions at emergency reception centres regularly put the safety and health of both asylum seekers and COA employees at risk. This is especially the case for vulnerable persons. In addition to hosting asylum seekers, municipalities in the Netherlands are providing reception to Ukrainian displaced persons. The current reception of Ukrainian displaced persons requires a significant effort from municipalities. On 27 February 2026, 90,600 people were staying in emergency reception centres for Ukrainian displaced persons. The occupancy rate of these emergency reception centres is 99.8%.*

## **8. Names of authorised border crossing points**

*In order to avoid disruption to cross-border traffic, no specific border crossing points have been designated.*

## **9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)**

*The Federal Government of Germany has prolonged its temporary internal border controls until 15 September 2026.*

## **10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399**

### **10.1. Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat**

*Before the reintroduction of the temporary measure of internal border control, the RNLN performed mobile security monitoring (MTV) checks on the basis of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) and Article 23 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) in the border regions with Belgium and Germany. These MTV checks, performed on a random basis and/or based on information and intelligence, are carried out on roads, on trains, and at airports for certain flights arriving from the Schengen area.*

*At the time of the reintroduction of internal border control by the Netherlands, the RNLN focused on carrying out internal border controls rather than MTV checks. However, at the end of 2025, the RNLN also started to carry out MTV checks in addition to internal border control.*

*The RNLN verifies the residence status and identity of individuals during these checks, which are primarily for the purpose of aliens supervision. However, national legislation imposes restrictions on MTV checks, including in terms of numbers and duration of checks. The temporary reintroduction of internal border control gives the RNLN greater flexibility in the implementation of checks. It provides the possibility to carry out checks for a longer period of time, to conduct more checks at the same spot and makes it possible to swiftly and effectively deny entry to individuals who do not meet the conditions under the Schengen Borders Code.*

*In addition, internal border checks have a broader purpose than MTV, and assist in the detection and prevention of irregular migration and the detection of cross-border crime, including people smuggling, and therefore contribute to the security of the Schengen area and the prevention of irregular migration. Just like during MTV checks, the RNLN makes use of technology, especially automatic number plate recognition cameras. As mentioned above, in the first 15 months of internal border controls, the RNLN denied entry to approximately 600 individuals and arrested 270 individuals. The RNLN also transferred approximately 870 individuals to Belgium and Germany.*

	<p><i>In conducting internal border controls, the RNLM has taken measures to limit any negative impact on border traffic and the border regions. Possibilities for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of internal border controls are continuously being examined.</i></p> <p><i>Furthermore, the Netherlands continues to take measures to minimise the effect on cross-border traffic, for example by refraining as much as possible from measures that could disrupt traffic flows, and by conducting risk-based checks and consulting with local authorities. As a result, the prolongation of internal border controls is considered to be an appropriate measure to address the above-mentioned existing challenges and threats.</i></p>
10.2.	<b>Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:</b>
	<i>Please refer to the answer provided to question 10.1.</i>
10.3.	<b>Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions</b>
	<p><i>As stated above, the RNLM has been instructed to conduct border checks in such a way as to minimise the impact on cross-border traffic, for example by refraining from measures that could disrupt traffic flows. In addition, the Dutch authorities attach great importance to remaining in close contact with the Belgian and German authorities in order to prevent internal border checks from having a significant impact on the movement of persons and goods.</i></p> <p><i>Furthermore, the Netherlands is committed to ensuring that the economic, social and infrastructural impact on border regions and their residents is minimised to the greatest possible extent.</i></p> <p><i>Since the reintroduction of internal border controls, the impact on traffic flows and cross-border regions has been closely monitored, including through continuous contact with local authorities, other ministries and neighbouring Member States. To date, there have been no indications that the Dutch border controls have had any significant negative impact. Monitoring of the effects of internal border controls on the region and on traffic flows will continue.</i></p>
10.4.	<b>If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):</b>
	N/A
10.5.	<b>Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)</b>
	N/A

**11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)**

11.1.	<b>Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399</b>
	<i>Please refer to the answer provided to question 10.1.</i>
11.2.	<b>Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat</b>
	<i>The current threat level is comparable to that at the time of reintroduction of internal border controls by the Netherlands last year. How long the threat will persist is difficult to</i>

*predict, as pressure on external borders and secondary flows are subject to fluctuations. The number of asylum applications in the Netherlands has dropped in 2025, but this has not (yet) led to a significant improvement in the situation regarding the overburdened migration and asylum system. Nonetheless, the Netherlands is monitoring the situation closely, and is committed to limiting the duration of the internal border controls as much as possible. It is therefore also working on amending national legislation with a view to improving and enhancing the effectiveness of MTV checks, including changes to the restrictions on the number (and duration) of police checks.*

**12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).**

<b>12.1.</b>	<b>Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399</b>
	N/A
<b>12.2.</b>	<b>Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)</b>
	N/A
<b>12.3.</b>	<b>Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)</b>
	N/A
<b>12.4.</b>	<b>Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security</b>
	N/A
<b>12.5.</b>	<b>Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective</b>
	N/A
<b>12.6.</b>	<b>Presentation of mitigating measures</b>
	N/A
<b>12.7.</b>	<b>Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders</b>
	N/A

**13. Any further information (optional)**

*The Netherlands and Belgium are in contact with regard to enhancing cooperation on checks at the internal borders, and have agreed a cooperation protocol with regard to improving the transfer process for migrants who are apprehended at internal borders.*

*The Netherlands and Germany are also exploring their options for improving their cross-border cooperation.*

**14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)**

N/A

## 15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

*Please indicate and specify if any of the notified information is to remain confidential.*

N/A

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ELI:

[http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec\\_impl/2025/315/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/315/oj)

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